

THE REIGN OF THE  
EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH

1848-1916

BY  
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## INTRODUCTION

**M**OMENTOUS as has been the transformation of Germany and of Russia as a result of the Great War, it is probably no exaggeration to describe the sudden disappearance of Austria-Hungary from the ranks of the Great Powers, and its partition among seven States, as the biggest purely *political* event in Europe since the fall of the Western Empire fourteen centuries earlier, and also as one of the most important *social* events since the French Revolution. It is impossible to understand the causes of this collapse without knowing something of the reign of Francis Joseph, so vividly depicted in Herr Tschuppik's pages. Long before the war a curious prophecy was quoted by the gossips of Vienna to the effect that Francis Joseph would survive three heirs to his Crown, and die in the middle of a disastrous war: and this was literally fulfilled. But Francis Joseph's reign was not merely unique in its length—eclipsing Queen Victoria's by five years, and even Louis XIV's, if we reckon from his majority—but it began in war and revolution, as it ended in war and the first mutterings of an even greater revolution. Though these two convulsions are separated by more than six decades, there is an intimate causal connection between them, and there are some who argue that the germ of eventual failure lay in the fatal decisions of 1849 and the following years.

It would obviously be unfair to ascribe all the blame for these decisions to a stripling of eighteen, surrounded by such masterful men as Schwarzenberg, Windischgrätz, and Bach. But it is certain that he was pre-eminently true to Hapsburg type, and that his every action followed logically from the educational system devised for his benefit and from the traditions, alike of internal, foreign, and military policy, inherited from his grandfather Francis and from Metternich. It is the purpose of this Introduction to attempt a survey, stripped so far as possible of unnecessary detail, of the main problems confronting the young Emperor on his accession.

The complex organism known since 1867 as 'Austria-Hungary' may be said to have come into being in 1526, when

King Louis of Hungary fell on the fatal field of Mohács and the Turks overran the great Danubian plain. Under the stress of a common danger, Hungary and Bohemia accepted Ferdinand of Hapsburg as their King, and thus united with Austria--the hereditary provinces of the Archducal House.

From the very outset there is a definite dynastic policy, pursued by each successive ruler despite profound differences of character and outlook; and the dominant note in this policy is centralization, in whose service were enlisted the parallel forces of Catholicization and Germanization. The dynasty created a joint army, led, as time went on, by a partly hereditary military caste which never coincided with the territorial aristocracy, and which attracted to its ranks men of adventurous spirit from every country in Europe. It also founded a bureaucracy which owed everything to the throne and which was in the main a-national in feeling, though the time was to come when German and centralist interests became identical. The strength supplied by these two forces was reinforced by the dynasty's alliance with the Church.

But in Hapsburg history, though the advancement of the dynasty is never lost sight of as the supreme aim, there is seldom a clear political issue. The Hapsburg State is always a prey to that peculiar duality which is inherent in its geographical situation, and of which the symbol is the double-headed eagle, facing both ways--westward towards Germany and eastward towards the Balkans. Hence there are constant diversions, which force it to leave one or other of its tasks incomplete. There is simultaneous need for asserting Hapsburg authority in the Empire and for defending Europe against Turkish aggression. Or, again, the desire to rally all Christendom against the Crescent is impeded by the desire to extirpate heresy at home, with the result that Protestants and Turks are driven into alliance. In the seventeenth century the recovery of Hungary is delayed by the religious quarrel and the Thirty Years' War; while in the eighteenth century the conquest of the Balkan Peninsula by the Hapsburgs is checked or frustrated on four successive occasions by complications in the west.

Centralization reaches its first stage in 1620, with the fall of Bohemian independence, which becomes definitive at the

Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The second stage is marked by the recovery of Hungary from the Turks between 1683 and 1718, though Hungary escapes the fate of Bohemia, and, through the Pragmatic Sanction of 1723, asserts its legal position and maintains continuity, in spite of constant violations in practice. The third stage is the enlightened despotism of the eighteenth century, when a reconstructed bureaucracy becomes the backbone of the absolutist and centralist system. After the dangerous experiments of Joseph II, the crisis of the French Revolution drives the dynasty back into extreme reaction, and the State as a whole into a prolonged period of intellectual stagnation: but at the same time it introduces from the west those ideas of nationality and social equality which were to ferment throughout the nineteenth century and completely transform the whole Austrian problem. With the expulsion and decay of Turkey the whole *raison d'être* of Hapsburg unity has disappeared: and, looking back from our point of vantage, we may diagnose the main problem which faced Francis II and his grandson Francis Joseph as that of finding a new *raison d'être* for the Hapsburg State—something that would counteract the corroding forces of nationality, and provide a higher unity for the complex and ill-assorted group of races and provinces under their rule.

Whatever may be said of the paternal rule of the great Empress and her son Joseph, there can be no question that under them the Austrian dominions were the centre of many political, social, and cultural experiments, and were more full of life and progress than any other Continental State. The accession of Francis II in 1792 ushered in a period of stark reaction, which was to endure till 1848, and then, after a brief and stormy interlude, was prolonged for yet another decade. For two whole generations there was both political and intellectual atrophy: and, long before the constitutional era dawned, Austria had lost the spiritual leadership of Germany, and the final issue of her long rivalry with Prussia was only a question of time.

There are few more striking instances in history of the extent to which a single man, of mediocre but stubborn character, can determine and deflect the development of a great State.

Indeed, after himself ruling as an autocrat for forty-three years (1792-1835), the Emperor Francis left behind him an elaborate machine which continued to run almost of itself for another thirteen years, under his weak-minded successor Ferdinand.

Francis was already inelastic and ultra-conservative by nature; and the impressions left upon him in early manhood by the French Revolution, and rendered still more vivid by the fate of his aunt Marie Antoinette, dominated him throughout life and made him irrevocably hostile to reform or innovation of any kind. His favourite maxim of 'Stability' was merely another word for rigidity and stagnation, and to him, as to his brother-autocrat, Nicholas of Russia, there was but little to choose between liberalism and revolution. He was a born pedant, and it is a commonplace of criticism that he would have been an ideal *Hofrat*, or official, in one of his own bureaux. He was tireless and hardworking, but lacked all sense of proportion, and became immersed in red tape and office formalities. At his death there was an accumulation of thousands of documents awaiting his personal decision: he could not bring himself to delegate power, but often enough acted on the principle more crudely expressed by his brother, Archduke Louis, 'Letting it lie is the best way of dealing with it' ('Liegen lassen ist die beste Erledigung.') 'Believe me,' once said Kolowrat—after 1835 the colleague and rival of Metternich—'he who has to serve for any time in the immediate entourage of the Emperor, must become either a philosopher or an intriguer or an ox, in order to endure it.' To which Kübeck, perhaps the ablest and most influential official of the Franciscan era, cynically rejoined: 'Of these three, most people hold to the *juste milieu*, namely, intrigue.'

A few further anecdotes will illustrate the lengths to which Francis carried his hatred of change or ideas, and the atmosphere in which Austria had been immersed for half a century before Francis Joseph's stormy accession. In 1821 he addressed the professors of the *gymnasium* at Laibach in the following terms: 'Hold to the old, for it is good, and our ancestors found it to be good, so why should not we? There are now new ideas going about, which I never can nor will approve.



Avoid these, and keep to what is positive. For I need no savants, but worthy citizens. To form the youth into such citizens is your task. He who serves me must teach what I order. He who cannot do so, or who comes with new ideas, can go, or I shall remove him.' On another occasion he replied thus to an address sent by one of the Hungarian County Assemblies: 'The whole world is going mad and leaving its ancient laws, is seeking for imaginary constitutions. You have a constitution received uninjured from your ancestors. Love it: I too love it, and will preserve and hand it down to our heirs.'

His attitude to literary talent is shown by his frowning inquiry to a poet who had presented him with a collection of patriotic verse, 'Who *ordered* you to write them?' or, again, by the apology which he addressed to a general for confusing him with the author of a treatise on strategy! And thus, though Vienna under Francis could boast some of the greatest names in music, all the giants of German literature from Goethe onwards were taboo there, and Grillparzer, the greatest of Austrian dramatists, and himself an arch-conservative, could place on record that 'in the Austria of those days there was no place for a poet,' and that 'despotism has destroyed my literary life.'

Austria, then, in the first half of the nineteenth century was the Police State *par excellence*, and to the very end never altogether shook off the virus of the old system. Meanwhile, in foreign policy the principle of 'Stability' found its equivalent in the maintenance of the Status Quo, as imposed upon Europe at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and at first upheld by the Holy Alliance, which slowly developed into a working alliance between the three Eastern autocratic Powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. Here again the directing force was Francis, but he would, of course, have been helpless in practice without the supple genius of Metternich. There are few more remarkable political partnerships in history, and few based on so striking a contrast of personality—the obstinate, plodding, suspicious, unintellectual, hidebound, strait-laced master, with simple tastes and accessible to the plain man, and the gay, elegant, and cynical minister, full of charm and dilettante interests, dabbling in many subjects, and always glad to leave drudgery to his subordinates. Perhaps the strongest link between them was the

conviction, almost amounting to an obsession, that the Revolution must be challenged at every point, that no concession was possible, and that, in Metternich's own words, 'if you remove one stone from the arch, the whole thing crashes round it.' 'Heaven,' he said on another occasion, 'has placed me beside a man who is, as it were, made for me. The Emperor Francis wastes no words. Leaving aside secondary considerations, he always goes straight towards his goal. He never throws down the glove, but picks it up if it is thrown to him.' In 1829, Metternich assured one of Tsar Nicholas's generals that it was a complete mistake to assume that he, Metternich, led Francis at his pleasure. 'The Emperor's will is firm, and no one can bring him to do what he does not want. If he heaps favours on me and trusts me, this is because I go the way which he prescribes to me, and, had I the misfortune to stray from it, Prince Metternich would not remain twenty-four hours Foreign Minister.'

The legend of the all-powerful Minister has long since been exploded. Indeed, we now possess overwhelming documentary evidence that, even at the height of his prestige in Europe, Metternich never exercised any noticeable influence upon the internal situation, and that his periodical proposals for a minimum of political and administrative reform were all either disregarded or indefinitely deferred; and he had not the energy or character to threaten resignation. In 1826, Francis, after a dangerous illness, promised that he would at last take up the problem: and Metternich took advantage of this to warn him that 'it is not enough, as affairs stand to-day, for Your Majesty to govern. You must assure to your successor the instruments of government.' But again nothing was done, and, after the second French Revolution of July 1830, Francis hated more than ever the idea of reform.

Meanwhile, Austria, thanks to Metternich, undoubtedly enjoyed an unequalled position in Europe in the years following the Congress of Vienna. What 'Stability' was at home, the principles of the Status Quo and Legitimacy were in foreign policy. The first serious breach in this system was dealt by the Greek Revolution, which slowly drove Russia into conflict with Turkey and alliance with the West. The new diplomacy of Canning—'that baneful meteor,' as Metternich called him—

placed Austria in a position of dangerous isolation, which continued for a time even after the former's death in 1827. On the news of the July Revolution in Paris, Metternich collapsed in his chair, declaring the work of his whole life to be destroyed, and comparing the event to 'the bursting of a dam in Europe.' But he speedily recovered his equanimity, and succeeded in reconstructing the Conservative alliance of the three eastern Powers. 'I have come to place myself under the orders of my chief,' said Tsar Nicholas to Metternich when they met in 1833. Only a few months earlier, Metternich had written, 'The salvation of the world—I repeat it with a feeling of religious conviction—lies solely in the monarchs continuing to remain united'; and, when his master died in 1835, he wrote in similar terms, assuring the Tsar of his permanent devotion to this ideal. This remains the keynote of his whole policy from the death of Francis till the upheaval of 1848, and explains the growing conflict with British policy, as expounded by the aggressive Palmerston and even by the milder Aberdeen, with whom he had once been on terms of personal friendship. The Convention of Münchengrätz (1833)—Metternich's main achievement in the second half of his career—was, in effect, a sort of league of divine right against the subversive Powers of the West. It secretly defined anew the much-debated doctrine of non-intervention, in the sense that any independent sovereign had the right to summon another to his aid, and in that case no third Power had the right to interfere. But this doctrine became a two-edged weapon when applied to Belgium, Switzerland, or Italy; and when at last, in 1846, Metternich stultified his own theories by annexing the little free city of Cracow, Palmerston publicly denounced this as a violation of the Acts of the Congress of Vienna, which was a single whole, and, therefore, 'if not valid on the Vistula, can be declared invalid on the Rhine and the Po.' Metternich had time and again declared that Austria's power stood or fell with the validity of the settlement of 1815; and now, as Prince Albert reminded the King of Prussia, the basis of those treaties on which the European balance had rested for thirty years had been undermined by the very Power from which this might least have been expected.

It must be added that for at least ten years, if not longer,

Metternich himself was fully conscious that he was defending a lost cause and merely postponing the evil day. But what doubled his pessimism was the utter deadlock in the internal situation of Austria since 1835. Francis had left strict injunctions against all political change, but his own disappearance in itself changed everything. As no other than Kubeck recorded in his diary, 'We now have an absolute monarchy without a monarch. The principle of Legitimacy could not have been more terribly attacked than by this foolish adaptation of it.' 'Ferdinand the Good,' as the poor cipher Emperor was christened—'Dottedl Ferdy' ('Nandl der Trottel') was the more drastic nickname given by the Vienna mob—was in the hands of an ill-assorted triumvirate, the Archduke Louis, Count Kolowrat, and Prince Metternich. Francis had deliberately passed over his three really brilliant and enlightened brothers, Charles, John, and Joseph, and selected the one who had the least energy and fewest ideas. In practice, Louis could only maintain himself by playing off Kolowrat and Metternich against each other, and, as neither was strong enough to gain the upper hand, there was a complete deadlock, and all initiative became impossible.

The universal discontent which this paralysis of the State provoked, but which the all-pervading activities of the police, with its twin weapons of censorship and espionage, kept in check, found expression in an anonymous book published in 1842 under the title of *Austria and its Future*. The breakdown of the old system is best shown by the fact that its author, Baron Andrian, was a high official in Vienna, yet contrived to keep his secret till the Revolution, and again that, despite all precautions, it circulated very widely in Austria. It was a grave and detailed indictment of the whole bureaucratic machine, and of centralization as 'the pest of the century,' and culminated in the drastic assertion that 'Austria in relation to Europe is what China is to Asia.'

The final condemnation of the régime lies in what only became known in our own times, namely, that Metternich, Kubeck, and many others at the head of affairs realized whither the current was flowing and yet felt powerless to stem it. In 1843 we find Princess Metternich recording in her diary,

'Clement plays the rôle of Jeremiah and no one listens to him'; and as late as January 1848 he told Count Hartig that the fault lay 'in the failure to govern on the part of those called to govern.' In 1851, after the great upheaval was over, the Archduchess Sophie, in conversation with his wife, openly reproached him for 'willing an impossibility—to conduct the monarchy without an Emperor, and with an idiot (*Trottel*) as representative of the Crown.' The Princess countered with the venomous inquiry, what possible substitute there had been, thereby implying that Sophie's husband, Francis Charles, was little better than his brother Ferdinand. The real charge against Metternich is that he saw pretty clearly the inevitable outcome of such a régime, but for the sake of power and office condoned what he was too indolent to cure.

In the decade preceding the Revolution of 1848 events were greatly complicated by the growth of national feeling throughout the Hapsburg dominions. The Czechs had awakened from an eclipse of two centuries, and a group of able scholars was engaged in reviving the memories of Bohemia's great past, preaching the kinship of all Slavs, and introducing those linguistic and literary reforms which were to be the basis of cultural and political revival in the second half of the century. In Hungary the movement was still stronger, and by no means confined to a literary renaissance. The ancient feudal constitution, though often infringed or suspended by the Hapsburgs—and notably during the entire reign of Joseph II—still survived unaltered from the Middle Ages, and possessed in the local county assemblies an ideal instrument of national resistance. After 1811, Parliament remained closed for thirteen years, but in 1825 even Francis had to consent to its reopening, and from that moment the constitutional movement became year by year more irresistible. In 1830 it received a further impulse from the foundation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, to which Count Stephen Széchenyi—known to his contemporaries as 'the greatest Magyar'—contributed the whole of his princely income for a year. In 1830 also began a series of legislative measures for the substitution of Magyar for Latin, till then the official language of all political intercourse. This culminated in the linguistic laws of 1843-4, by which

Magyar became the exclusive language of Parliament, the Government, and all official business, and it was announced that this principle would also shortly be extended to the entire educational system of the country, and also to the autonomous sister kingdom of Croatia. These changes coincided with, or, rather, resulted from, an outburst of Magyarizing fervour among the ruling class, such as filled tried patriots like Széchenyi with misgivings, and kindled a lively ferment among the non-Magyar nationalities. For the national revival had been no less intense among the Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, and Roumanians, though their geographical and political situation was less favourable.

In the few years which separated the fatal legislation of 1843 from the great European explosion, Louis Kossuth, the Magyar popular tribune, fought vigorously in a double cause: on the one hand, for liberty of the Press, for modern constitutional reform, and for the emancipation of the peasantry—aims which won for him the sympathy of western Europe—and on the other hand for racial monopoly of the harshest and most iniquitous kind, pursued with such intemperance as to rally against him and the Magyars as a whole all the other races of the country.

This, the second main clue to events in 1848, was not always clearly grasped by contemporary observers in the west. For, by an irony of fate, there was not a straight issue: and, while the champions of nationality were driven to support dynastic and military autocracy, the champions of constitutional and representative government stood committed to a policy of forcible assimilation against all their neighbours. The famous laws of 1848, adopted with feverish enthusiasm by the Hungarian Parliament, were compounded of these two contradictory tendencies. In one short month Hungary was transformed, on paper, from a medieval to a modern State: but the framework of this new State was to be narrowly national. The result was a furious racial war, in which the 'unhistoric nations,' as Dr. Renner has aptly called them, fought on the side of the Crown in its most unconstitutional mood. The forces of progress were divided, and the autocracy took a fresh spell of life under men of such consummate ability as Schwarzenberg, Bach, Bruck,

Thun, and others. It was not until the 'sixties that the struggle for constitutional government was resumed: and, after wavering irresolutely between conservative and liberal solutions, between federalism and centralism, the Emperor Francis Joseph in 1867 at last established the Dual system, which stereotyped the Magyar hegemony in Hungary and thereby made it finally impossible to rearrange the Hapsburg dominions on national lines, save by a *coup d'état*. The policy of racial assimilation was resumed with all the old zeal: the problem once more, as in 1848, became entangled with questions of foreign policy, but under less favourable circumstances. As in 1848, all the non-Magyar races united against the ruling race, and the result this time was the partition of Hungary and the downfall of the Hapsburg dynasty.

Despite this tragic conflict of races the Magyars held out till the summer of 1849 against the forces of reaction and were only finally subdued by the help of 180,000 Russian troops, sent by Tsar Nicholas in aid of the young Francis Joseph (in fulfilment of a pledge given to Francis at Münchengrätz in 1833). The difference between the prolonged resistance of the Magyars and the rapid collapse of the Revolution first in Prague (June 15th, 1848), and then in Vienna itself (October 30th), is simply the difference between a country where the constitutional tradition was strong and unbroken and two countries where there was no such tradition, and a consequent dearth of political leadership.

Moreover, while events in Hungary were merely the culmination of a movement which had been swelling for over twenty years, the revolution in Vienna and in Prague was from the first dominated by parallel events in Germany. The representation of Austria at the new Federal Parliament in Frankfort speedily raised in an acute form the whole future of the Hapsburg Monarchy: her delegates found themselves faced by the dilemma of including non-German provinces within the new Germany (which was contrary to §§ 2 and 3 of the draft constitution), or of excluding from it the German provinces of Austria. It was the issue of the 'Little German' and 'Great German' programmes, behind which lurked the rivalry of Austria and Prussia, of

Hapsburg and Hohenzollern, and which was eventually to be solved by 'blood and iron' in the war of 1866. Moreover this issue forced the Czechs to choose between Frankfurt and Vienna, and the famous refusal addressed in their name by Palacky to the German Federal Parliament was in effect an affirmation of Austria as against Germany, which, if the statesmen of Vienna had possessed the foresight and moderation to meet it halfway, might speedily have transformed the Western and Southern Slavs (Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Slovenes, Croats and probably even Serbs) into the firmest bulwarks of a federalised Hapsburg State. How different might then have been the evolution of all these races, is shown by the all too brief interlude of Kremsier, the little Moravian town in which the Austrian Parliament was allowed to sit from the autumn of 1848 till its summary dismissal in March 1849. The draft constitution which it worked out is the living proof that the nations of Austria were in that age already capable of working out their political salvation, and will remain to all time as a charter of democratic government and inter-racial conciliation. Indeed, it is not too much to say that even to-day it has not lost its moral value as an ideal programme for mixed racial states.

There are many other useful historical parallels which might be drawn between the situation at the beginning and at the end of Francis Joseph's reign. The purpose of this Introduction has been to show, however inadequately, that the stage for Francis Joseph, and even for the final drama of 1918, had already been set under Francis and Metternich, and that their purposes and aims provide the real clue to the events of which Herr Tschuppik treats.

R. W. SETON-WATSON

*March 1st, 1930*



## AUTHOR'S PREFACE

**I**T is eleven years since the Empire of the Hapsburgs founded by Rudolph, after surviving for more than six hundred years, vanished from the scene. Raised to the rank of a Great Power through the shrewdness, forcefulness, and ambition of a single family, the Empire withstood all the convulsions of Europe until the catastrophe of 1918. Francis Joseph was the last monarch inspired by the Hapsburg traditions, and he assisted at its re-birth as an Empire of eighteen lands and eleven races out of the ashes of the Revolution and Counter-Revolution. He also dug its grave. At the beginning of his sixty-eight years of rule he attempted to pit Hapsburg dynastic ambition against the Revolution of 1848. Under Francis Joseph, the Counter-Revolution won the day; Cracow and Prague, Milan and Vienna, and finally Hungary, were brought to their knees. The treaties by which the sovereignty of the dynasty over its territories was defined were annulled, and in the glow of victory the sovereign sought to enlarge his powers. He silenced the voice of the Nations when in 1848, for the first time, they tried to replace with a free constitution the rights guaranteed to them by historic treaties. He severed the link between the Nations of Austria and Germany, refusing to let his subjects sit in the Frankfort Parliament of Peoples. He disbanded his own Parliament, and closed the mouths of the Nations. Francis Joseph the Counter-Revolutionary strove to build up Austria anew, without the collaboration of the Peoples. The deep impulse which spurred on the Nations towards free development throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century conflicted with the Hapsburg ambition to play a part in Europe. This ambition was defeated, not by the immediate impact of contrary ideals, but by the power of Napoleon III and by the authority of England, both of which, since the Crimean War, were against Austria and on the side of the ideals. In 1859 the Hapsburgs lost a portion of their Italian domains; in 1866 the remainder of these, as well as their rights in Germany.

This was the decisive moment in Francis Joseph's life. The

defeat on the battlefields made peace with Hungary imperative, and peace with Hungary smoothed the path for constitutional government in Austria. The question now was whether the recreated Empire would be able to reassert its lost control over the European policy of Germany. While the Archduke Albert was prophesying the defeat of Germany in a new Battle of Leipzig, to take place at the beginning of September 1870, the Battle of Sedan brought an end to these schemes. Napoleon III had been Francis Joseph's first adversary ; when he fell, he was his last hope. In 1871, Francis Joseph finally renounced his hopes of revenge. This was the hardest sacrifice, this good-bye to his ambitions in Germany. But now a second and greater opponent, Bismarck, intervened decisively in the fate of the Hapsburgs. Thanks, not to Bismarck's benevolence, but to the power of the new German Empire, Francis Joseph found a way to appease the conscience which reproached him for having lost part of the Empire of his fathers. But with the occupation of Bosnia the Hapsburgs trod on the ground that was to prove fatal to them.

Those pettifogging critics who find the origin of the disaster in the German-Austrian Alliance are altogether mistaken. Alsace-Lorraine, Germany's war booty, remained an impediment to the reconciliation of Germany and France ; but Tsarist Russia, which would have charged a higher price for an alliance than Austria, was at least as doubtful a quantity. The most gifted prophet could hardly have pronounced Austria in 1871 unworthy of partnership in an alliance. She was stronger by that time than in 1859 and 1866 ; she was a powerful and liberally governed Empire, well on the ascendant. The uncertainty surrounding her future was not such as to rouse fears that her downfall might come quite soon. It was not her essential structure, not the number and contrasts of her Peoples, that threatened disaster. Bismarck's words on the subject are worth more than all the interpretations of historians : 'With good government the next war can be avoided ; bad government may lead to a seven years' war.' He did not give voice to the conclusion of his thoughts, but the implication was—a war which would end with the downfall of the Hapsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, and the Romanovs.

Francis Joseph did not recognize the problematical nature of his Empire. In the second half of his reign he saw more clearly what was necessary than did the average German bourgeois or nobleman ; he tried to shake off the fascination of the German Centralist policy ; he favoured and furthered universal suffrage. In his first attempt to stretch out a hand to the Nations he had the German bourgeoisie and the ruling classes of Hungary against him ; in the fight for the vote, Germans and nobles were again his opponents. He had no racial programme ; but which of the old parties among the cultured loyal classes of Austria was superior to him in this respect ? When Austria arose anew, the nationalistic lower middle classes took the place of the cultured classes as political leaders. The racial contrasts were now greater, but not great enough to disrupt the Empire. Nor did danger threaten as yet from the neglected and unsolved problem of the Peoples. Over the Empire, like threatening clouds, floated the old Hapsburg dream of hegemony. It had been dispelled in Italy and Germany ; it rose up again anew in the Balkans. The ruling classes had no eye for historical analogies ; in the Balkan fight for freedom they did not recognize a repetition of the dramas of 1848, 1859, and 1866.

When Francis Joseph, with the spectre of the Great War before his eyes, agreed on July 30th, 1914, to take strategic measures against Serbia, he spoke the following words : 'If the Monarchy must fall, it shall at least fall with dignity.' This was good-bye to Hapsburg ambitions, as well as to the Austrian Empire.

Was the fall inevitable ? In the minds of the greater part of its Peoples, in the mind of Europe, the Austrian Empire served a function as a refuge for the many nations assembled by the Hapsburgs under one common roof—the State. The edifice was never fully completed ; the free union of the Peoples was never achieved. With the extinction of the last unifying force — Francis Joseph — the Peoples decided against the Hapsburgs. They proved Francis Joseph to be right.

The meaning of this momentous chapter of European history, as well as the significance of Francis Joseph's own personality, cannot be discovered by explanations, but only by the presentation of actual facts. The writer of this book belongs to that

type of Austrian who had their real home in the Hapsburg Empire. Six generations of his family served the Empire as soldiers or officials. In direct succession : Franz Tschuppik, under Maria Theresa, was Physician in the Field to the forces of Count of the Empire Ulysses von Browne, dying after the Battle of Prague, 1757 ; Kajetan Tschuppik, 1752-1821, was Engineer Officer in the army of General Baron de Beaulieu, which fought in Italy against the young Bonaparte ; Franz Tschuppik, 1790-1853, Counsellor in the Bohemian Provincial Government ; Friedrich Tschuppik, who died in 1887, was bailiff of the Bohemian properties of Emperor Ferdinand ; Friedrich Tschuppik was engineer of the Austrian North-West Railway Line. The son of this man and author of this book has lived through thirty years of Austrian history as a journalist in Prague and Vienna. The men of his generation differed from their ancestors ; they loved Austria, but, in spite of all traditional loyalties, they were not so uncritical as their fathers. Between them lay 1866, Sedan, the creation of the new German Empire, the awakening of the masses. We loved the old Hapsburg Empire, with its prodigious exuberance of historical traditions and the variety of its popular life ; but at the same time we were disquieted by the facts of the new times, so that our love did not spare us from criticism and opposition. These contrasts of feeling and thought speak in this book. It is written in a spirit of love and criticism.

BERLIN, 1929

KARL TSCHUPPIK

## CHAPTER I

DECEMBER 2nd, 1848

ON the afternoon of December 2nd, 1848, the Viennese stood and gazed at certain small placards posted at the street corners of the inner town. These placards announced that the Imperial and Royal Administration of Lower Austria had extended the state of siege, with all its implications, over the whole province, and that the provincial police force had been placed under the command of the Governor of Vienna, General Baron von Welden. Vienna, accustomed to take in silence whatever was given to her, was familiar with the language of these official notices. Since the Imperial troops had marched in on the evening of October 31st she had been given nothing but military commands. Nevertheless, the new threat of an extension of the state of siege left her wondering. For already, it seemed, the town lay sufficiently defenceless at the feet of the conqueror. All the barracks and many other buildings—Stadtkonvikt, Polytechnikum, Theresianum—all these were occupied by military. The surrounding towns and villages right up to Baden, Wiener-Neustadt, and the left of the Danube as far as the Hungarian frontier, had troops quartered on them; the roads were blocked with artillery and transport. Vienna had been brought to her knees. These further military movements, then, could only foreshadow the return of the Emperor. Schönbrunn Castle, too, was all abustle. For no other purpose could those guns behind the castle railings be trained on the town save to protect the monarch.

In painful apprehension the Viennese read the order of December 2nd. The last act of the Revolution was not yet ended. After so many bombardments, arrests, and courts-martial, there was more still to come. During the Revolution, Vienna had thrilled with some new excitement every day—a parade, a Guards review, a resolution of the Reichstag, a new journal, popular meetings, troopings of the colours, public speeches, demonstrations, shindies; there had always been something up. But that Vienna was now a faded dream.

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Soldiers and police, patrols and informers, now strode through the streets, and sad processions of prisoners too.

Prisons and police stations no longer sufficed to hold the victims of the Revolution ; they overflowed into barracks and monasteries. The cellars of the Corn Market Barracks were filled with prisoners. Anxious friends, in search of the missing, strove with straining eyes to penetrate to the secrets behind the long walls of the gloomy Salzgies police station, with its wooden barred windows. The cowed Viennese brooded with horror over this place, and the jail by the melancholy New Gate, the straggling Salzgies barracks too, with its gloomy elevated arches, and the dungeons of the 'Elendsbastei.' And when, in the evening, another procession of prisoners, flanked by Croats and Grenadiers, disappeared behind these walls, they were followed by the anxious eyes of mothers with children at their side, fathers or friends who hung round this place of horror and in vain stared at the closed windows.

It was in the Stabstockhaus that Robert Blum spent his last hours after being discovered and arrested in the hotel 'Zur Stadt London' at six o'clock in the morning on November 4th. Schuselka, who was in the same hotel, was alarmed by the clatter of the guard, thinking it was for him they had come. Chief Inspector Felsenthal and Captain Count Caboga, with eight armed Grenadiers, inquired for Blum and Fröbel. Blum guessed what was in store for him. 'I believe you will return to Frankfort alone,' he said to Fröbel, showing how little faith he put in the immunity from arrest which was his right as a Deputy in the Frankfort Parliament. On November 9th, four days after his arrest, he met his end, far from the city's observation. At five o'clock in the morning they awoke Blum in his cell and read out his sentence. It was to death by hanging, as provided in the code of Maria Theresa, but, as there was no hangman available, powder and lead were to be the actual instruments of death. Blum was an adherent of the German Catholic Sect, and Father Raimund, of the Scottish Monastery, who was sent to prepare him for his end, had the good taste to leave out the prescribed admonitions, and to confine his ministrations to some words about Socrates. Lieutenant Anton Pokorny, of the Bohemian Rifles, was ordered to carry out the death-sentence. On the way

to the place of execution in Briggittenau, Pokorny managed to show Blum his sympathy. This officer was enabled, by superior intelligence and humanity, unlike the official recorders of Blum's last acts, to appreciate the picturesque quality of his heroic death. In his depiction of the scene he did not fail to record how the arms of his six riflemen trembled before they mastered themselves sufficiently to pierce Blum's heart, lungs, left eye, and brain.

Nor was this all. Fröbel and Messenhauser, it seemed, had also to die. Nothing short of the annihilation of the great figures of the Revolution seemed to satisfy the victorious might of Windischgrätz. First Messenhauser was dismissed, and the next day Anton Brogini, a convivial soul who had got entangled in a quarrel with corporals of the Parma infantry at the inn 'Zum roten Apfel,' met his death in the trenches. The next condemnations were those of Dr. Edward Palluci and the Swiss, Ludwig Brziemski, on November 18th; and on November 20th those of Johann Ritter von Vogtberg, a student; Edward Elgner, an assistant schoolmaster; and Smalhofer, a calico printer; all of whose sentences were, however, commuted to a long period of forced trench labour in light chains. On November 22nd, Julius Becher and Hermann Jellinek, the two most active workers on the *Radikal*, were shot. Jellinek was twenty-five years old, a doctor of philosophy of Leipzig, a friend of Edgar Bauer, a littérateur, and a Hegelian. It was his desire, he had said, not to see Metternich disappear from the scene uncriticized. Before he perished by order of Windischgrätz he had given voice in 1848 to the aspiration of Palacky and the Parliamentarians of Kremsier, officially included in the programme of the Frankfort Left. 'The Peoples of Austria must govern themselves' and be 'free to enter into federal relations with one another,' he declared. (This task of the Hapsburg Empire was to cry out for fulfilment throughout Francis Joseph's long life!) At half-past seven on the morning of November 23rd, according to an eyewitness who passed by the square left of the New Gate after the execution, Bauer's brains lay scattered upon the grass.

On this followed a nine days' pause. A few administrative orders by the Governor, Baron von Welden, in whose eyes Vienna was a nest of bandits, improved the situation for traffic.

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The early closing orders for inns and coffee-houses were maintained, but traffic could now pass freely from the inner city to the suburbs. House-to-house searches and persecutions were less frequent. But this pause did not last long. On December 2nd the Viennese learned that the state of siege had been extended to the whole province. At once the barracks were put in a state of readiness. The guard at the palace of the Imperial War Council was strengthened ; guns were mounted in many parts of the town. Prices on the stock exchange fell by 2 per cent. In an extra edition of the *Lloyd*, printed at midday on December 5th, the editor announced that a full account of the meeting of the Reichstag would be published in the afternoon. Thus it was that Vienna learned the news that the Emperor Ferdinand had abdicated and that his nephew, Francis Joseph, had ascended the throne.

There was a new Emperor ; and the fact had been kept jealously secret not only from the Viennese. On the morning of Saturday, December 2nd, gentlemen and officers in full dress, Court ladies and orderlies, hurried to the episcopal palace in the market-place at Olmütz, knowing only that the members of the Imperial House and Court, Field-Marshal Prince Windischgrätz, General Jellačić, the Ministers, the President of the Provincial Administration Count Lažansky, the Prefect of the District Count Mercandin, together with the highest state officials and officers, were required to assemble in the episcopal palace at eight o'clock. The garrison of Olmütz had, on the previous night, received orders to assemble for a parade at nine o'clock the next morning. Half an hour before eight, the great throne-room of the residency and the adjoining chambers were opened. The assembled company guessed that something out of the ordinary was pending, but could not yet grasp why they had been summoned. Whispers, murmurs, and questions grew so loud that Hübner had to ask for silence.

At eight o'clock the side door leading to the private apartments of the Imperial couple opened. The Emperor Ferdinand and the Empress Maria Anna appeared, conducted by the Military Secretary, Prince Josef Lobkowitz, and followed by the Lord Chamberlain, Friedrich Egon Count zu Fürstenberg, and his lady. There followed at a short distance, the Archduchess



Sophie, the Archduke Francis Charles, and their son, Francis Joseph. The Emperor Ferdinand, dressed, as usual, in a black morning coat, looked irresolute, and had to be led to the place prepared for him. Prince Lobkowitz now handed him a paper, which in a weak voice, and with many pauses, he proceeded to read out. It ran thus : 'Weighty considerations have led Us to the irrevocable decision to renounce the Imperial Crown.' Here he stopped, glanced away from the paper to his audience, and then continued : 'The renunciation is in favour of Our beloved nephew, His Serene Highness Archduke Francis Joseph, Whom we now declare to have attained His majority.' He paused again, then resumed : 'Our beloved brother, His Serene Highness Archduke Francis Charles, His Highness's father, has declared that he irrevocably renounces, in favour of his aforesaid son, the right of succession to the throne which falls to him according to the existing laws of My house and of the State.'

So now the secret was out. The Prime Minister, Prince Schwarzenberg, concluded the formalities, reading out a proclamation of the coming of age of the Archduke Francis Joseph, the renunciation of Francis Charles, and Ferdinand's abdication of 'the Crown of the Austrian Empire and of all the kingdoms united under it, and of all the crown lands ; a Crown hitherto worn by Us in the service of Our beloved Peoples.' Then followed a little family scene, evidently stage-managed by the Archduchess Sophie. The young Emperor stepped up to his uncle and knelt before him. Ferdinand stroked his nephew's hair, raised him, and said, 'Do your duty. What I have done I have done willingly.' Windischgrätz stage-managed the rest: the proclamation of the change of throne, accompanied by trumpet flourishes before the town hall and in the cathedral square, the parade of troops, the homage of the assembled crowds in the streets.

The young Archduke Francis Joseph was now Emperor. Little more was known of him than that his parents were the Archduke Francis Charles, second son of the Emperor Francis, and the Archduchess Sophie, daughter of King Max I of Bavaria. He had come into the world on August 18th, 1830, under the eye of his grandfather, and of the Imperial family, in the prim

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middle-class atmosphere of the Court of that monarch. From the windows of his parental home could be seen the extensive and beautiful castle grounds planned by Maria Theresa. From the drive there was a view of the castle court, with baroque railings and entrance flanked by obelisks, on whose summits Napoleon had perched his bravely soaring eagles. The Emperor Francis hated the eagles of his son-in-law, but he left them on the obelisks, where they are enthroned to this day. Theresa's magnificence was foreign to his being. He revolted against the records of a bolder, more masterful spirit, glorying in the expression of its own vitality. In hatred of this swollen and varied architecture, he had pulled down Theresa's baroque ornamentation and imposed his own taste upon the castle façade, with that severe simplicity of vertical lines which later came to be known as the Franciscan style. One single joyless man suffices to spread gloom and discontent through a whole house. Here the joyless man was lord over all. 'I don't like it,' was the motto of the Court. Everything that limited the absolute power of the sovereign, or seemed to diminish it, was execrated. He was at war with the written word, the Press, public speeches, open courts of justice, and liberty in local administration. He would know nothing of educational progress ; he would hear no criticism of the budget or the administration ; even the privileges of the clergy appeared to him as a limitation of his own rights. He loved the police and their methods. 'No philosophers for me ; the police are enough' ; was one of his frequent sayings. He allowed nobody to influence his methods of government ; he could bear no one who had any outstanding talents. From his birth to his death, the Emperor Francis distrusted every one.

## CHAPTER II

### FRANCIS JOSEPH'S EDUCATION

**F**RANCIS JOSEPH was five years old when the Emperor Francis died. He had seen his grandfather, a haggard old gentleman with small white face and pale eyes. He had noted the bony hand when the Emperor put him through his marching exercises. Scarcely had Francis Joseph left the arms of his nurse than, like every Prince of the Imperial House, he was given his *ajo*. (The word is taken from the Italian and Spanish *ayo*, meaning tutor and preceptor.) After a long family council, Heinrich Count Bombelles was chosen to be Francis Joseph's *ajo*. Bombelles was an aristocrat of an international type peculiar to the Hapsburg Court, a type which rose to power and distinction after the eclipse of the old Protestant nobility. Of Portuguese descent, born a French subject at Versailles in the days of the great Revolution, Count Bombelles entered the Austrian army through the influence of his elder brother, who had served first in Naples and then in the Privy Chancery in Vienna. Having gone through the campaign of 1815, he was made an adjutant by the Archduke Ferdinand, and was later transferred from the cavalry to the Diplomatic Service. In 1836, the sixth year of Francis Joseph's life, he took over the education of the three sons of the Archduke Francis Charles. There has been much discussion about this courtier, whom Helfert describes as a cavalry officer 'of distinguished sentiments, noble physique, many-sided knowledge, ripe insight and experience.' Möring, a captain in the Engineers, one of those secret devotees of letters to be found even then in the Imperial and Royal army, says of Bombelles, in his 'Sibylline books,' that he was 'a lovable cross between a philosopher and a courtier.' The best information comes from his patron, Metternich himself, who, after Bombelles's death in 1850, said in his praise: 'I look upon Count Bombelles as one of those few men who, while following their own innate opinions, thought as I thought, saw as I saw, and wished as I wished.'

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Besides the *ajo*, each Prince had his own special tutor. Francis Joseph's was Johann Baptista, Count Coronini. From this high-born officer, who took in hand his form and demeanour and self-control, Francis Joseph learnt more than from Count Bombelles. Coronini grasped how he could teach the delicate, timid, anxious boy pride and self-mastery. He told him that true noblemen must never yield to the plebeian vice of weariness, and held before him the example of those self-controlled aristocrats who, in service in the field and the Court, had been able to conquer every weakness of the body. Such maxims did not fit in with the slack, petty bourgeois traditions of the Vienna Court. Even Joseph II had done away with much of the elaborate Court etiquette of Charles VI and Maria Theresa, not because he lacked the natural pride of a nobleman, but on better and more rational grounds. Under his successors the House lost the traditional forms as well as the old values. The aristocratic instincts had to be called out afresh in Francis Joseph. Neither his grandfather, nor his father, nor his uncle, could have done this. The task devolved upon his mother and Count Coronini.

As playfellows and schoolmates for the three Princes, Marcus and Charles, the sons of Count Bombelles, and Francis, Coronini's son, were chosen. The choice of teachers, left to Bombelles, was not very happy. Even so loyal and conservative a historian as Baron von Helfert, who devotedly wrote up the youth of the Emperor, allows himself a little criticism. He says the teachers of the Princes were 'men of no deep culture or preparation, with a weakness for hollow affirmations.' So bad was the instruction at times that even the Princes made fun of it. The history lessons seemed to have been particularly weak. What was imposed on the boys was 'a spiritless mixture of sacred and profane history, with much scrambling up and down genealogical trees; a dry enumeration of events, with careful avoidance of any stimulus to original thought.'

Francis Joseph's military education was better. Historically and in the memory of contemporaries the Emperor lives chiefly as a soldier. He was never seen out of his general's uniform; the army always came first with him. Up to his last years he remained a good rider; to the day of his death he never gave

up his famous 'private soldier's' bed. (Only the iron framework resembled the simple soldier's bed, but to the Emperor that stood for a symbol of the Spartanism of the barracks.) Nevertheless, Francis Joseph was no born soldier, any more than the Emperor Francis, or his father, or the Emperor Ferdinand. As a boy he showed all the traits of his family, being self-contained, silent, reserved, and shy. For horses he had, as a well-informed Court historian has said, 'tremendous respect.' He had to be forced to mount a horse, and often would only do so after shedding bitter tears. Out of this boy Colonel von Hauslab, of the 'Bombardier Corps' (the Artillery Staff of that age), had to make a soldier. Hauslab was a man of great learning, who knew all the European languages, including Russian and Turkish, had been an instructor in Turkey, and Professor at the Staff College, and had filled many other posts. He worked out for Francis Joseph's benefit a gigantic programme which was to throw open to his pupil all branches of military knowledge, one by one.

Many habits of the Emperor—his early rising, punctuality, accuracy in the fulfilment of daily tasks—were impressed on him in these early years. In the summer, at Schönbrunn, lessons began at six a.m., and continued, with short breaks, until the evening. The young Archduke, more pedantically than in other princely houses, was plagued with every possible branch of learning in an unsystematic fashion. Chemistry, technology, commercial knowledge, philosophy according to the Abbot Rauscher, ecclesiastical law, and fragments of the civil code, were all elements of this education. There is in existence a school essay by Francis Joseph on the manufacture of glass that the chemical instructor Schrötter set him to write—one wonders why glass should be studied in such great detail. The instruction in judicial and political matters, imparted by Herr Pilgram, consisted of mere lectures. For some time every Sunday the Archduke visited the State Chancery in Ballhausplatz, where Metternich vouchsafed him a glimpse into his workshop. Yet, unsystematic as the education of Francis Joseph may have been, it was the work of one single will, that of his mother, who was determined that her firstborn—'Franzi,' as he was called in the House—should succeed to the throne of the Hapsburgs without

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accident despite the storms of the times. The scheme did not spring from the family circle, nor from any brain in the State Council. It was not the product of a statesman's insight or a field-marshal's ambition, but of maternal zeal, which in those days of indecision seemed to spy a way out of the confusion.

## CHAPTER III

### THE ARCHDUCHESS SOPHIE

THE break-up of the Austrian *ancien régime* surprised nobody except the institution most immediately affected—the Court. Not that all the members of Court circles were of the same way of thinking, or of the same degree of blindness. One can scarcely imagine a more miscellaneous company than the Ministers, advisers, collaborators, and critics, who, as pilots of a great realm, pitted themselves helplessly against the imminent catastrophe. It seemed, indeed, as though history were having a joke when she put the mechanism of absolute government into the hands of such a benevolently impotent crowd as were the rulers before March 1848. Only internal conflicts gave the appearance of life to this Government. Ferdinand was the living negation of personal government; Metternich and Kolowrat hated one another, and were always quarrelling; the Archduke Ludwig was distrustful of every one; Francis Charles was an uncomprehending observer; while even those private citizens who held high positions in the Court and State Assembly, men like Pillersdorf and Doblhoff, the leaders of the bureaucratic revolt in the last years of Francis's reign, failed no less in real statesmanlike capacity and self-confidence. Above all, they lacked knowledge of governmental methods in a free political community. In this complex of confused antagonism and ignorance one will alone strove to preserve the dignity of the reigning House—the will of Francis Joseph's mother.

The daughter of the first King of Bavaria was of a very different type from that of the Viennese Court to which she became attached on marrying the Archduke Francis Charles in 1824. She had many good qualities besides the forcefulness inherited from her father, that descendant of the Counts Palatine of Zweibrücken-Birkenfeld, who was first a French colonel, then an Austrian general, then reigning Count Palatine, and finally, after Charles Theodore's death had ended the Bavarian dynasty, Elector of Bavaria, acquiring by the Peace of Press-

burg in 1805 the title of King. This father of hers was no ordinary man, nor was it quite true, as Treitschke later said of him, that his Rhineland Alliance policy was rooted in mere dynastic ambition. In thought and feeling he resembled all those Palatiners for whom French principles of political equality and free economic competition were a natural heritage. Nowhere on German soil had the seeds of the French Revolution taken such deep root as in the Palatinate. Max Joseph himself would say of the days which he spent as a French colonel in Strasburg that they were the happiest of his youth. Although the Revolution drove him out of Alsace, he remained a lover of France all his life. 'Whenever I hear of the successes of the Republican army,' he said to Alquier, the French chargé d'affaires, after his succession to the throne, 'the joy I feel tells me that I am a Frenchman.'

Nevertheless, he knew how to make himself popular with a very different race when he became King of Bavaria, thanks to his robust simplicity and to the amusement he took in imitating the Bavarians—he did not even shrink from wearing big earrings. At the Munich Court there were plenty of beggars, spongers, and amiable debtors. The failings of the King were notorious. He, who needed so little for himself, needed so much for his nobility that he was never free from indebtedness to Seligmann Eichthal. He earned a reputation for being much more indolent than he really was, because he spent most of his free hours in the streets. He loved loafing about, and did not care for an ordered life. Also, he was not particularly interested in the army, which earned him the reproaches of those who lamented that a force which had become glorious under Napoleon should fall into decay in time of peace. Easily influenced, swayed by momentary impressions, he yet held tenaciously to two political principles: he was so convinced of the impossibility of maintaining the old conditions that he did not shrink from radical reforms, and he hated the pretensions of the Church.

His six daughters by two wives loved him dearly, for he was good-humoured, natural, and benevolent. The eldest, Caroline, became the last wife of the Emperor Francis: she and Sophie, two stepsisters, entered upon a most compli-



cated relationship when the one married a father and the other his son. There were two sets of twins among the sisters, Elizabeth and Amelia, the wives of King Frederick William IV of Prussia and King John of Saxony, and Sophie and Maria, the mother of Francis Joseph and the wife of King Frederick Augustus of Saxony. 'The Bavarian sisters of misfortune,' as they were called, made their way into the oldest German dynasties. The youngest, Ludovica, married Duke Max of Bavaria, the general and poet who wrote dramas and romances under the name of 'Phantassus,' and one of her eight children, a daughter, Elizabeth, was to marry Francis Joseph.

When the Archduchess Sophie came to Vienna she saw the Empire of Francis I with the eyes of her father. She also was convinced that the old order could not be maintained, and was, moreover, certain that the council of greybeards to whom Francis, in his last will, had entrusted the Government was incapable of giving the State a new form. Her ideas met with resistance from the Archduke Ludwig and Metternich, so that she was forced to unite with the Liberal nobility, who, like her, wished to forestall the threatening disaster by reforms. These attempts, and her open opposition to Metternich, have made this woman an almost legendary figure in the fancy of the Austrian people. In the romantic literature of those days, the Vienna Revolution is depicted as the work of a deep conspiracy, with the Archduchess Sophie as the driving force. She had, it is true, spun webs and sought out ways; for days and nights she had pondered over the dreams of her maternal heart; but, for all her secret designs, she was much simpler than the people's fancy depicted her.

In Kübeck, a tailor's son from Iglau, she found her chief helper; indeed, this man's enormous influence on Austrian history is still not sufficiently recognized or appreciated. Kübeck was of the same opinion as the Archduchess Sophie. In the autumn of 1848 he wrote, in a confidential document for the Empress Maria Anna, Ferdinand's wife, that 'the abdication of the Emperor and the transference of the crown to another head were necessary.' The new Emperor must be one 'who has remained aloof from events, and has by no act committed himself to promises and concessions which he would be obliged to carry

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out.' Francis Joseph fulfilled this condition, and it seemed certain, in consequence, that, on mounting the throne, he would accept a code of principles and a personal position in the Government such as would (in Kübeck's words) ensure the consolidation of his throne and the welfare of the Peoples. Kübeck further said that it was not possible or advisable to return to the old pre-March ways. After everything which had happened, there were only three courses open to the sovereign : either he must accept the Constitution which had been brought to premature birth by the Revolution, or he must introduce a military Government, or, finally, he must create such institutions as would harmonize with the interests of the Peoples and historical conditions, and redound to the power of the throne. The first choice was eliminated by the change in the occupancy of the throne. Of the two others, each must be applied in appropriate succession : first must come the restoration of authority by military force, then the new institutions.

Kübeck had supplied the argument which made it possible for the future Emperor's mother to dispel the doubts of Windischgrätz ; from him she learned steadfastness in the repetition of her demands. In March 1848, Windischgrätz had protested : 'Impossible ; the time is not ripe for the Emperor's abdication.' Later, in April and May, the Archduchess Sophie's restless ambition was spurred on by events in Vienna, and by the flight of the Court, but to Ferdinand and his brother Ludwig there came a fresh motive for courage at this moment of stress. Innsbruck and Tyrol presented the picture of such a loyalty as was now rare in the Empire. Deputations from these provinces counterbalanced the disloyalty of Vienna. Sophie remained undisturbed by these deceptive appearances. Influenced from moment to moment, like her father, but without his French-acquired candour, she yielded to the impression of events in Vienna and of Kübeck's change of front, and quickly changed her own opinion. She resented the Revolution, which she called 'the inexcusable ingratitude of the People,' and her only thought now was to prepare a counter-revolution. Liberal so long as she lived only in her imagination, dreaming her dreams of the young Emperor who should renew and rejuvenate the Austrian Empire, she became reactionary as soon as Kübeck convinced

her that only the young Emperor could restore the authority of the crown and bring the rebels to reason. And, having reached this conviction, she changed no more, as the State and the Court had cause to know, up to her death in 1872.

The moment of fulfilment still tarried, but meanwhile her will did not falter. The continuation of Francis Joseph's education during the stormy days of Vienna was not to be thought of. It seemed better to take Windischgrätz's advice and send the boy away from the excitements and the sorry spectacle of the fugitive Court. In April she thought of sending him as Viceroy to Prague, but the atmosphere in that town proved unfavourable to this project. The indefatigable mother wished to see her son in a conspicuous position; she wanted him to be near to the seat of Austria's might, the might of the victorious and avenging sword, and decided finally on the Italian theatre of war. On April 29th the *Wiener Zeitung* announced that the Archduke was joining Radetzky 'in order to view the field-marshal's warlike preparations against enemies and agitators.' It was not a forest of bayonets, nor a grand spectacle of military might, which he was being sent to see in Lombardy, for Radetzky's army was immobile, and did not come into consideration as a sword of vengeance against the rebels, but rather the green plumes and flags which in those troubled times of an Empire's dissolution remained the single symbol of its one-time greatness. But the Archduchess Sophie made her plans without consulting the field-marshal, who, for all his devotion to the dynasty, could not divest himself of his gruff frankness. 'Imperial Highness,' said Radetzky to the Prince, on his arrival, 'what do you want here? Your presence only makes things difficult for me. If anything happens to you, I am to blame; and if you are taken prisoner, I and my army are lost.' The old field-marshal was of course right, and could not be blamed for fearing that the boy might be taken prisoner. He arranged, however, that no misfortune should happen, and kept the Archduke with him, putting him in the care of Lieutenant-General d'Aspre, on whose staff the young Prince remained, and went through the Battle of Santa Lucia on May 6th. This was celebrated as the Emperor's baptism of fire.

From Lombardy, Francis Joseph was called to Innsbruck,

where the Court was preparing for the return to Vienna. Stadion's view was that the Court's exile must not be prolonged, but the Emperor Ferdinand would not leave Innsbruck; Count Medem, the Russian Ambassador, when asked for his advice, backed up the Emperor; but the Reichstag and Cabinet implored for his return. Then Sophie suggested sending her husband and Francis Joseph as Imperial representatives to Vienna. Ferdinand after hesitating resolved to go himself, and on August 12th the Court arrived at the capital. Two days later, the Archduchess Sophie sent Francis Joseph's Chief Lord-in-Waiting, Count Grünne, to Windischgrätz in Prague. Windischgrätz still opposed her plans. His doubts had not yet been set at rest. Only as a last resort would he envisage Ferdinand's abdication. But his practical proposals for the near future gave Sophie the certainty that she had won him over. Only she must put a brake on her impatience. Not until the second flight of the Court—the removal to Olmütz—could her plan be carried out. It did not need much rhetoric on the part of Schwarzenberg to convince his colleagues of the necessity of the abdication. As soon as his brother-in-law, Windischgrätz, had agreed, it only remained to win the confidence of the two other warriors whose prestige propped up the cause of the dynasty, Radetzky and Jellačić. But there was another cause of delay. Ferdinand, usually affable and harmless, had moments and days when, tortured by Hapsburg scepticism (all Hapsburgs were always suspicious of the pre-eminence of others), he felt these preparations for his abdication to be a mere conspiracy. Years after, as a man free of cares, he was walking round Prague, when he heard the news of the Battle of Solferino and remarked, 'So hätt' ich's a troffen,' meaning, with this Viennese slang, that he'd have guessed as much. He was still the same sceptic.

## CHAPTER IV

### KREMSIER AND FRANKFORT

MILITARY force manipulated by Windischgrätz, Radetzky, and Jellačić prepared the way for the new ruler of Austria. First Cracow and Prague, then Milan, finally Vienna, were brought to their knees. Of all the creations of 1848, there survived only the Reichstag, and that hope of the Austrian Peoples awaited the course of events in the little Moravian town of Kremsier. It had been transferred, by Imperial Decree, on October 22nd from the imposing rooms of the Court Winter Riding School in Vienna to this small town, where the Archbishop had placed his palace and its lofty hall at the Parliament's disposal. By the middle of November the first Deputies had arrived, among them the Czechs, Rieger, Palacky, and Brabec, then the Germans and Poles, and last the men of the Left, including Wieland, Schuselka, Kudlich, and Prato, who had only left Vienna after many protests and searchings of heart. Some of them (for instance, Fuster, Fischhof, and Goldmark) had found it no easy matter to escape the clutches of the Viennese military dictatorship. On November 21st, Prince Schwarzenberg's new Cabinet was sworn in. It included Stadion as Minister of the Interior, Baron Krauss as Finance Minister, Bach in charge of Justice, Major-General Cordon, Bruck, and Thiemfeld. On November 27th it proclaimed 'frankly and without reserve' its loyalty to that Constitution which was soon to be blown away by the new wind. 'Firmly determined,' said Schwarzenberg, 'to keep at arm's length any unconstitutional interference, without, however allowing any infringement of the established sovereignty, our aim is to preserve unimpaired the liberty guaranteed to the Peoples of Austria.' This first step made a favourable impression. The simple representatives of the Peoples did not guess that the biggest fraud in Austrian history was being prepared. 'Since the days of March,' wrote the correspondent of the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, 'I know of no official document that

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received such universal applause as this programme.' A still more important point, though few saw it, was that in this little Moravian town the different Peoples, hitherto treated as one by the old régime, now revealed themselves as the constituent units of the Austrian Empire. Their representatives, new to Parliamentary tradition, untrained in handling affairs, without experience or precedent, united in assuming, in accordance with the doctrine of democracy, that a new Austria in which all the Peoples should enjoy equal rights would emerge from their friendly and conciliatory debates.

The miscellaneous assembly that met in this first Austrian Parliament automatically fell into four groups. The Left group, with Pretis as chairman and Schuselka as leader, comprised the one-time Radicals. Their programme was to divide the Austrian territories, with the exception of Hungary, into five national states, each with its own legislative assembly. The 'Union of German Austrians,' the second of the three German groups, agreed with the Slavs on the important question of the re-shaping of the Empire ; they differed only in their attitude towards Frankfort. They believed that for Germany's own sake a strong, undiminished, and single Austria was necessary, and that any union apart from this assumption was unthinkable. The Czech-speaking Deputies from Bohemia and Moravia, with Strohbach, Pinkas, Palacky, and Rieger as their most prominent leaders, formed a group by themselves, and were gradually joined by the South Slavs, the Slovenes and Dalmatians, as well as the Ruthenians of Galicia. The last group comprised the candidates for ministerial office, among them men like Mayer, Lasser, and Doblhoff. 'We are first of all free Austrians,' they said in their programme, 'and, in the second place, Germans, Slavs, Italians, and Roumanians joined in brotherly union.' This group advocated a close attachment to Germany, with, however, the express reservation that 'the form of the Alliance should be left open until Austria and Germany both had their own constitutions.'

The Kremsier Parliament, in which for the first time the Peoples of the Empire met in nominal freedom, exerted itself with much goodwill and harmony to tackle the problem of the Federation of Peoples, and to find a form for the future common

life of the Nations. Germans and Czechs alike, shaken by the defeat of the Revolution, and no longer inebriated by journalistic propaganda, earnestly discussed in the Constitutional Committee of the Kremsier Reichstag various valuable projects for a constitutional order in the inheritance of Maria Theresa and Joseph.

During the forty years' reign of Francis the work of Theresa and Joseph had fallen to pieces. The old order, faced with the trying problem of finding political forms which should respect the traditional power of dynasty, army, and bureaucracy, while doing justice to the new claims of the Peoples, called the sword to its help. The Peoples, however, had no wish to demolish the State, which had, in the course of history, become their common home. What the men of power and political experience neither saw nor recognized, the hitherto powerless Peoples of the Hapsburg Empire were seeking for themselves. The cradle of the new Austria stood ready at Kremsier. Unaided in its birthpangs, this first and best of Austrian Parliaments strove to bring forth a new form for the Empire. The ruling powers had not the smallest share in this effort. The constitutional scheme, which this Parliament produced as the fruit of much quiet cooperation, remained, until the end of the Hapsburg dynasty, the only big plan of reform ever advanced which was based on the free consent of the Peoples. Josef Redlich, the chief authority on Austrian constitutional history, says of it that, in spite of its defects, it should rank beside such great efforts as the Frankfort Constitution of 1791, or the creation of the American Federation at Philadelphia.

The House of Hapsburg might have seen the finger of Fate pointing the way at Kremsier. Here the Empire's problems were clearly and unmistakably revealed. The memory of Viennese despotism and all its apparatus of power, combined with resentment against the impregnable bureaucracy, helped to concentrate the thoughts of Germans and Slavs on the task of guaranteeing the individual and the local unit against an oppressive policy of centralization. The unfinished task of Kremsier was destined to occupy the Empire throughout Francis Joseph's life until the downfall of the Empire itself. As yet the problem was in its infancy. Carried along on the stream of Liberalism, the

Peoples strove to understand one another in spite of their newly awakened nationalism. Their ambitions were pliable, not yet congealed into hopeless hardness; the atmosphere was clear, not yet poisoned by disappointments; national affairs were not yet greatly complicated by social contrasts.

The Germans may have believed all too firmly that the maintenance of centralization was in their national interest; the Czechs may have been all too certain that the way to national freedom lay in strengthening and renewing the historic divisions. But there was still a chance that the two streams would flow into one bed. It was the German Liberal tradition, admirably set forth in Rotteck's *Jurisprudence*, which supplied the basis of the Constitution. The German Liberals also hoped to cast off the shackles of the State by way of enhanced local autonomy. The Slavs were clearer in their view of the best means to reconcile the ambitions of the military and bureaucratic State with the desires of the newly awakened Peoples. Palacky's speeches in Kremsier remain the most generous recognition of the possibility of national autonomy under Austrian suzerainty.

The attempt which was made at Kremsier to turn these diverse historic territories and different Peoples, held together by the might of a dynasty, into a union of living parts, was something such as had never been seen in history before. The opposite process—that of uniting free lands into one whole—had been the aim of the expanding Powers since the seventeenth century. Kremsier was building on virgin soil. Palacky hesitated between the theory of the natural rights of Nations and that of the historic State, but, nevertheless, it was clear to him that Austria, 'it if did not wish to relapse into decay,' must become a federal Empire. And equally clear was Rieger's picture of the future Empire seen as an Alliance of States after the American model. The Kremsier Constitutional Committee knew what storms it had to weather. First came the danger of the contrast of the nationalities: but still more perilous was the cleft between the philosophy of administrative reform on a federal and democratic basis and the philosophy of the dynasty and the bureaucracy. It has been said that the constitutional plan worked out in Kremsier held the germ of its own unfruitfulness. This is not true. The work was finished. Czechs and Ger-



mans had been brought to agreement by Strohbach and Pinkas, and the passage of the project through Parliament was a foregone conclusion, now that it had been passed unanimously by the Constitutional Committee. Only at this moment a rough hand destroyed this fruit of noblest effort.

Acting on Schwarzenberg's instructions, Count Stadion and the Under-Secretary of State, Helfert, appeared in Kremsier on the night of March 6th-7th, 1849, to announce to the unsuspecting Deputies that the last hour of the Parliament had struck. The message produced such a shattering impression on the Deputies that Stadion, conscience-stricken, returned that same night to Olmütz to plead for suspension of the order. At three o'clock in the morning, candle in hand, he roused Bach from his bed. Barely awake, the old renegade excused himself with the words: 'You know very well there's nothing else to be done.' In the grey dawn of the next morning the Olmütz telegraphists were tapping out with stiff fingers the order which dissolved the Kremsier Parliament, as well as orders of arrest against the Deputies who had so recently escaped the clutches of the Vienna police. In spite of Bach's protest, an express dispatch empowered Police-Inspector Felsenthal to undertake the arrests. Stadion, unnerved and shattered by the emotions of the night, did, however, manage to save the Deputies by retarding the arrests until the evening. Schwarzenberg, forgetful of two dark episodes in his own life—the flight to Brazil after his liaison with Lady Ellenborough and his expulsion from Naples—ordered Major Count Huyn to cancel Stadion's act of humanity. It was too late. Fuster, Violand, Kudlich, Goldmark, and Fischhof were in safety.

Loyal Austrian historians have described this first deed of Francis Joseph—the dissolution of the Kremsier Parliament—as inevitable. To them it seemed that the State had been saved by the restoration of the power of the dynasty. It was, they declared, a happy opening to the age of Francis Joseph. In reality, it was the first of many mistakes. Temporarily it may have restored order, and set the wheels of State once more on their right lines. But appearances were deceitful. The shutting down of the first Austrian Peoples' Parliament, like frost in a spring garden, blighted all the germs of natural fertility. What

followed was development by decree, not biological growth. The fact that Austria survived another seventy years, and even witnessed a period of middle-class prosperity and expansion, misled people into looking upon Kremsier as a mere episode, an unfulfilled youthful dream of the new Austrian Empire. Nothing is falsier than this view. Kremsier was Austria's reality, and all that followed it was a dream—the dream of an autocrat that the will of the dynastic House must prevail and the will of the Peoples bend before it. What was throttled in Kremsier returned again and again as *leit-motif* and tragic chorus throughout seventy years, until it finally became the battle-cry of the Great War. The victors solved the problem of Kremsier in their own way, and sentenced the old Austrian Empire to death. It seems, however, as though history were taking up its unfinished task, for the old dream of a union of Austria and Germany which occupied Kremsier and Frankfort is to-day once more an inspiration.

The dissolution of the Kremsier Parliament, and Schwarzenberg's break with the German Deputies at Frankfort, cut the bonds which had united the freely elected German National Parliament, which was then seeking to solve Germany's problem on democratic lines, and the Austrian Constitutionalists. This icy decree took all the warmth out of the stream of German national democratic sentiment. It destroyed the new belief in the possibility of a union of the Austrian hereditary lands with the rest of Germany. The nullification of the work of Kremsier prepared the way for that other solution of the German question—the bloodstained solution of 1866.

After the hopeless breakdown of the democratic nationalist movement, the Hapsburgs claimed to their credit the rise of a moderate Liberalism in the upper and middle German bourgeoisie, which came to terms with the existing situation and sought their welfare in a policy of constitutional centralization. The other nations—above all, the Czechs—had accepted the break with Frankfort without remorse. Palacky delivered a purely negative speech at Frankfort, and it soon became plain why this clearest of Czech thinkers argued against the inclusion of the Bohemian crown lands in the German Federation. He believed that only by a survival of Austria as an independent

Empire could the western Slavs be secure from the menace of the Russian monarchy. Hence his oft-quoted and even oftener misused words : 'Truly, if the Imperial State of Austria had not already long existed, it would have to be created in the immediate interests of Europe and humanity.' He followed up this confession, however, with the question why this State, acknowledged to be a necessity, should be also a torment to its Peoples, a thing unstable and perplexed. And he answered, himself : 'because by its fatal blindness it has failed to recognize, and has disowned, the elementary principles of law and morality, the principles of a free union beneath its sceptre of many nationalities and religions, each enjoying equal rights. Nature,' he continued, 'knows no distinction between ruling and subject Peoples.' And again, 'I am convinced that it is not yet too late for Austria to proclaim openly this principle of justice, the hope of salvation in a threatened shipwreck ; but time is precious ; it must not be delayed an hour longer.' These sentences contain more than the wisdom of a politician who understands the nature of a federation of Peoples. The speaker erred in his noble belief in the convincing power of a truth. Being a Czech, he could not understand the fatal secret of the House of Hapsburg, that secret which the young Emperor gladly learned from his advisers : that in the assertion of the will of the despot lay the source and means of power. No reflection or reasoning (habits alien to the Hapsburg mentality) were needed to revive this ambition. It was passed on to Francis Joseph by his forefathers, who, by artfulness and tenacity, had broken the resistance of the landed classes, and with force and even bloodshed throughout centuries of struggle had built up their sovereign power. Up to the time of Francis I there had been a fair sprinkling of talent amongst his forefathers, there had even been the creative ability of Maria Theresa and the shrewdness of Joseph II, but never had it occurred to a Hapsburg that the idea of the 'State' could signify anything beyond the unquestionable power of the dynasty.

The great changes in Europe since the outbreak of the French Revolution, the national consciousness conjured up by the humanitarian philosophers and by Napoleon, and the exasperated social bitterness with which it combined in 1848, had

wrung some concessions from the House of Hapsburg; and the defeats of 1859 and 1866, with their financial implications, brought into existence a constitutional form which derived vitality from the bourgeois business world; but never, so long as the Empire of the Hapsburgs stood, was the primacy of the monarch disputed. Often, after Kremsier and Frankfort, the dynasty groped for an understanding with the people. But it was too late; the time for willing collaboration had been allowed to slip away.

Thus it appears to-day, in the light of a critical contemplation of history, that Palacky's renunciation at Frankfort was a mistake. 'Do you imagine that the Austrian Empire will continue to exist if you forbid it to defend its hereditary lands with its own independent army—an army over which Frankfort has no jurisdiction? Do you imagine that under any other conditions the Austrian Emperor could maintain his position? In the interests of Europe, Vienna must not sink to the status of a provincial town. We should not think in terms of a union of Austria with Germany, but in those of a union of Germany with Austria.' Palacky did not know the Hapsburgs, and therefore history has proved him wrong. The people won their independence in a different way from that which he imagined, and, in spite of the Emperor's claims, the Hapsburgs lost both realm and crown.

Among the many paradoxes of Austrian history it was surely one of the greatest that Palacky, the most emphatic advocate of national rights at that time, fought at the side of those compromising German-Austrians to whom the State was more important than the Nation. It was not in Vienna, but in Frankfort, that the principle of a federation of equal and free Peoples in one State was understood and clearly formulated, and the following solemn declaration will always remain as a worthy memorial of the spirit of Frankfort: 'The Assembly of Nations recognizes in fullest measure the right of the non-German races in the German Federation to follow the path of their own racial development . . . and to enjoy equal rights in the use of their own language, as they also share equally the rights which the Constitutional Assembly guarantees to the German People.' 'The future united and free Germany,' the declaration ends,

'will be great and mighty enough to be able to concede freely and without jealousy the right of alien races grown up in her own bosom to speak the language they have inherited from nature and history.' Such advocacy of a super-national alliance of Peoples was never voiced in Vienna by the German-Austrians or in the Crown Council. It could only bloom in democratic soil. It was only possible in Frankfort.

Naturally, then, it was the Austrians who frustrated the cause of these ideals, above all, Kuranda, Giskra, Marek, and Wiesner, typical representatives of that short view, not yet extinct, which would reduce Germany to the narrow confines of her own horizon. Naturally, too, it was Arnold Ruge (editor of the *Hallesche Jahrbucher*) who sought a compromise, saluting the 'Aspirations of the Century' voiced by the Czechs, and calling upon the National Assembly 'to work for an understanding with the Slavs in a spirit of modernity, to help them as brothers, and to make it possible for them to realize their own constitutional life along with the other nationalities. They have no interest in the monarchy; they only want to unite among themselves and to join the Alliance, and rank as a German Federal State.' Austria's future misfortunes were foreshadowed by the behaviour of those first spokesmen of German-Austrian Liberalism who, failing to see the connection between national and political freedom, even in Frankfort, sounded the false note of tirades against the 'national enemy.' Giskra, who later became the popular Burgomaster of Brünn and leader of the German Constitutional Party, had already alienated all real thinkers; he altogether misunderstood Ruge, whom he reproached with 'favouring the separatist tendencies of the Czechs.' Even Dr. J. N. Berger, although at least as intelligent as the over-estimated Giskra, showed himself quite uncomprehending in Frankfort; not to speak of the smaller fry, who, for decades after, assisted, by their stupidity and ignorance, in hopelessly confounding Austria's real problem.

The other Austrian group, the 'Black-Yellows,' under the leadership of Anton von Schmerling, though generally superior to the Liberals in political education, were pan-German in the Austrian sense. Among their numbers were the Deputies Wirth, Dr. von Mühlfeld, Baron Andrian, and Count Deym.

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They wished to secure for the Hapsburgs a hegemony in the German Federation—an ideal which without a democratic basis was unthinkable, and in its reliance on the Hapsburg sword proved as weak as that sword itself.

Since the breakdown of the Revolution almost all hopes of a united Germany, to include Austria, had disappeared. The last hope vanished when Schwarzenberg sent his note of March 9th, 1849. The break with Frankfort was accomplished in the same spirit as the order to Kremsier; it breathed the fresh determination of the Hapsburg dynasty to hold its own against the new rival, the democratic ideal. Austria declined to subordinate herself to a German Parliament, but equally refused to step out of Germany. She still claimed a hegemony in Germany, but without democracy; a Federal Council of Princes, with a delegation from each State, was to be the substitute for the Peoples' Parliament. And in this Austria claimed both the presidency and a majority. By this 'provocative act of tyranny' (as it was called) the project of a German National State for all the German Peoples was put off for seventy years.

Schwarzenberg's note was sent to the National Parliament behind the back of Schmerling, the Austrian plenipotentiary in Frankfort. Deeply insulted, he wrote to Schwarzenberg: 'When my duties here are ended, I shall retire from all those posts in Vienna which I held before my nomination to the Federal Assembly; and I beg your Serene Highness to accept this declaration that I shall refuse any advancement or position that might otherwise have been offered me.' He was dismissed without a word of thanks.

## CHAPTER V

### BY GRACE OF RUSSIA

‘**T**HERE are only two powers in the world—the mind and the sword ; but in the long run the mind always conquers the sword.’ The man who said this, Napoleon, was strong in both the mind and the sword, but he too was laid low. The Hapsburgs were strong in neither, and they ruled for centuries. Except for the victories of Prince Eugène, and Radetzky’s successful war against an inferior enemy, the Hapsburgs were beaten in every decisive battle—by Frederick II, by Napoleon I, by Napoleon III, and by Moltke. Mind and sword cannot really be separated in history, but the House of Hapsburg at times lacked even the unassuming, workmanlike mind that operates in wielding the sword. Nevertheless, it had managed to bring Vienna to heel. But Hungary remained unsubdued.

Everything was now ready for the young Emperor to restore the old Austria which Francis had left behind him. The capital was reduced to obedience, Italy tamed, Kremsier out of the picture, Frankfort practically shoved out of the Hapsburg dominions. Only one territory was still in fierce rebellion and still shook a fist at the dynasty—Hungary. The new Constitution, conceded by Windischgrätz and Stadion on the ruins of Kremsier, had as its bold aim the creation of a ‘ united and indivisible Austrian Empire,’ with the elimination of any Hungarian particularism.

The sword of Windischgrätz was to complete this work. Since the battle of Kayolna in February 1849, he had subdued a large part of West Hungary up to the Theiss, but east of this, as well as in the north and in Siebenbürgen, the Revolution was victorious. The enemy held the fortress of Komorn, which lay in the middle of Windischgrätz’s hardly-held lines. Windischgrätz, ‘a methodical, slow, tough, one might even say pig-headed, kind of man, bred in the traditions of the old Bohemian nobility,’ aspired to be a statesman as well as a military leader. Unlike Stadion and his brother-in-law,

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Schwarzenberg, he cherished the dream of a revival of the Empire as it had been before Joseph, when the nobles swore allegiance as the exclusive bearers of all public rights in the kingdoms and provinces. Both as military leader and as statesman Windischgrätz had remained in the eighteenth century.

Friedjung put the matter gently when he said that Windischgrätz had not always been very happy in his choice of generals. The truth is that one of his commanders, Count Wrba, belonged to that type of Austrian strategist of whom Napoleon III said that one could count on their stupidity with as much certainty as one counted on the day following the night ; while his Chief of General Staff, Count Nobili, belonged to that other type perhaps more humanly sympathetic, but equally unsuitable as a leader in times of war—that type of commander who in critical moments is always found in bed. These characteristics were obvious later in Gyulai, in Krismanić, and in Kuhn. One of Nobili's officers, Captain Haller von Hallwald, recounts of him that he would leave letters and important dispatches from the seat of war, even commands from Vienna, unopened for sometimes as much as a week or a fortnight, and to any protest would answer fatalistically, 'They're all rot, anyway.' Doubtless he belonged to that class of remarkable Austrian sceptics who, under their cynicism and indifference, concealed a deep self-knowledge ; but such philosophy was of little use in a Chief of General Staff.

The Hungarian generals, mainly young ex-officers of the Austrian army, who knew their former chiefs only too well, were for the most part, as much superior to the clumsy Austrian commanders as Napoleon's subordinate officers had been to the Austrian commanders pitted against them. They played with them as cats play with mice, and tackled the art of war according to Stendhal's excellent definition. If one is honest, and not hypnotized by the lure of grandiose words, the art of war, he says, consists simply in seeing to it that you have two soldiers on the battlefield to every one of the enemy. The Hungarians had what Windischgrätz and his like lacked—the ability to think and to march quicker than their opponents. After Görgei took over the command of the troops, Hungary was vastly superior to the Imperial army. Görgei's brilliant



manœuvre at the beginning of April, when he attacked Windischgrätz near Gödöllő, threatened Budapest, occupied and held Windischgrätz while the main force pushed on to meet the Austrian corps under Götz, beat this at Waizen, and reopened communications with Komorn—this happy manœuvre of Görgei decided the fate of Windischgrätz. Francis Joseph removed his Alba from the command. On April 22nd, Görgei marched triumphantly into Komorn. The necessary consequence of this was the evacuation of Pest by the Austrians. The Hungarian National Government now ruled from the Carpathians to the Danube. On April 14th, 1849, Kossuth proclaimed in the Rump Parliament the deposition of the House of Hapsburg.

Yet peace with Hungary was now possible. Görgei, unlike Kossuth, had no faith in a new victorious rising in Vienna and Italy. He was ready for a settlement. At this moment, however, another hope gleamed for Austria in the support offered to the Court of Vienna by those of Berlin and Petersburg. To accept help from Berlin would mean renunciation of the Austrian hegemony in Germany, therefore Austria turned to Petersburg. There ensued that sad drama the results of which are inextinguishably graven in the thoughts and feelings of Hungary—the victory of the House of Hapsburg over Hungary by the grace of Russia, the decimation of the Hungarian liberty movement by the help of Russian bayonets. Paskevich, Haynau, and Jellačić prepared the triumph; the executioners completed it. On August 13th, Görgei surrendered with his army to the Russians. Paskevich telegraphed to Nicholas I: 'Hungary lies at your Majesty's feet.' Francis Joseph took it out of the Tsar's hands. It is one of the darkest facts of Austria's history that the Tsar showed himself more human than Francis Joseph, Schwarzenberg, and Haynau. He asked for the pardon of Görgei, and mercy for all the Hungarian leaders. Francis Joseph had them hanged and shot. Nine suffered death by the gallows; four were shot. Three hundred and eighty-six officers were sentenced to imprisonment.

The victims, however, were by no means confined to this number. Every victorious counter-revolution takes revenge on its vanquished foes, but the history of white terrors shows

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scarcely a parallel to the bloodthirstiness with which the Hapsburgs made Hungary feel the renewal of strength granted them by the grace of Russia. In Francis Joseph's name one hundred and fourteen death-sentences were passed, and 1,765 sentences of imprisonment. All magnates and deputies, officials and clergymen who had served the Revolutionary Government lost their positions and were punished. All the possessions of Counts Batthyány, Andrassy, and Teleky were confiscated by the Court.

The greatest outrage was, however, that perpetrated upon Ludwig Batthyány, who was sacrificed to the hatred of the dynasty, and, above all, of the Emperor's mother. The proud aristocrat, disdaining to take flight, and perhaps also trusting in the justice and nobility of the conquerers, had allowed himself to be taken prisoner. His trial went in his favour ; a command of Francis Joseph condemned him to death. And even his death was to be a shameful one ; he was to be hanged. Batthyány tried to open an artery while in prison. Though severely wounded, he did not escape the claws of revenge. He was too weak to be dragged to the gallows, so a section of riflemen were sent to shoot him. In this the young Francis Joseph showed himself to be the equal of Charles IX, who, after the night of St. Bartholomew, when informed by a courtier that the corpse of Admiral Coligny already stank, spoke the memorable words : 'A dead enemy does not smell bad ; a dead enemy smells good.'

## CHAPTER VI

### THE TAILOR'S SON OF IGLAU

**I**N his biography of Francis Joseph, Oswald Redlich, the Viennese historian, delivers judgement on the momentous year of 1851. In his view the excesses of the Revolution, the events in Hungary, and the eruption of national ambitions, had forced Francis Joseph to the conclusion that only by restoring a strong and unrestricted authority, and concentrating all power in the monarch himself, could the Empire and the dynasty be saved; in which opinion he was reinforced by the weighty judgement of Schwarzenberg, by Kübeck, and by the strong will of his own mother. Such, according to Redlich, was the origin of the new despotism. This is partly true, and yet it is not the whole truth. Certainly facts do not justify him in counting Schwarzenberg as one of the joint authors of the new policy.

This nobleman, gifted in his own way, differed from many of his Liberal collaborators as many talented aristocrats differ from middle-class intellectuals; his opinions rose from a deep, instinctive feeling rather than from mental effort. It is hardly necessary to say that he did not prize intellectual thought very highly. Yet he was shrewd enough to recognize the worth of intelligent men. Whatever he may have thought of the Constitution of March 4th, 1849, certain it is that the work of Bruck, Bach, and Schmerling, the final fruit of the Revolution, is associated with his name. Without the Revolution, such men as Bruck and Bach would never have risen to power. But it was Schwarzenberg who appreciated them, listened to their plans, let them have their way. It is the most interesting feature of Francis Joseph's Counter-Revolution that, though but a preface to the new absolutism, it acted, for a short time, in accordance with revolutionary principles. Bruck's tariff-policy, the creation of the Chambers of Commerce, the development of the post as an instrument of traffic, the building of the first mountain railway, the Semmeringbahn, which was put into operation despite the warnings of specialists—these were great achievements crammed into a short space of time.

Moreover, Bruck, the son of an Elberfeld bookbinder, was occupied with bigger plans ; his favourite idea was to bring Austria and Germany into a single customs union, and to absorb the whole Balkan peninsula in the area of the German economic system. This far-seeing, enterprising, and keen German whom chance had led to Trieste, whence later Stadion's keen eye marked him for service in Vienna, was to have a typically Austrian career. He left the Ministry after the suspension of the Constitution, and did not return till 1855, when he became Finance Minister, in which post, however, he was unable to bring much order into the chaos after Solferino. Entangled by his enemies in the Eynatton trial, he was very ungraciously dismissed by the Emperor, and on April 23rd, 1860, was discovered in bed with his throat cut.

No less efficient than the reforms of Bruck were Bach's reorganization of the political administration, Schmerling's reform of justice, and the reorganization of higher education. The then Minister of Education, Count Leo Thun, a clerical, always favoured the Church in any conflict between Church and State. Nevertheless, Thun's term of office included the most creative years in Austrian educational administration. When one remembers, too, that in this short time the work of freeing the peasants from serfdom, begun by Maria Theresa and Joseph II, was completed, and that Schwarzenberg was successful in his foreign policy, inasmuch as at Olmütz he compelled Prussia to renounce her plan of a federation of the non-Austrian States of Germany, we must admit that the political accomplishments of this Government were not small.

True, side by side with these reforms ran the work of the Counter-Revolution. The state of siege was extended to many parts of the Empire, Haynau raged in Hungary, and there were many executions on both sides of the Leitha. In Vienna and Prague, students were condemned to long terms of hard labour. Generals Welden and Kempen were at the head of a strict military administration. The Viennese Director of Police, Weiss von Starkenfels, conducted a terrorist campaign, and in his eyes even the wearing of long hair was a suspicious sign. The Press was silenced. There were numerous floggings, and the General commanding in Prague, Prince Khevenhüller, was heard

to remark gloatingly, on sending orders to Galicia : 'Splendid province, this ; not only in the capital, as in Bohemia, but everywhere—everywhere there is a state of siege.' He was disappointed when the seven German students, members of the staff of the Prague *Marcomannia*, and four members of the Bohemian-Moravian Brotherhood, amongst them boys of scarcely seventeen, originally condemned to the gallows, were let off with ten and twenty years' imprisonment ; his anger was boundless when Havlíček, the most distinguished Czech journalist of his time, and popularizer of Palacky's ideas, was acquitted by the jury at Kuttenberg.

In this, as in a thousand other cases, the notion of a reforming counter-revolution was proved impossible. It was a contradiction in terms. Juries might acquit, but immediately the acquitted were banished by decree. Schmerling's reforms were countered by Bach's 'Austrian Siberia.' Havlíček was sent to Brixen ; the German-Catholic priest, Kutschera, who was acquitted in Graz, was banished to St. Polten ; Kuranda was sent to Graz. Yet this was not enough for the generals and courtiers, advocates of despotic rule. The Court's thoughts are voiced by the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Major von Babarcsy, in his work *Confessions of a Soldier*. 'We may clean the old administrative machine,' he says, 'but we must return to the old order and the old obedience.' Equality amongst nations and classes is to him an abhorrent doctrine. 'Shall we eat of this fruit of Communism ? Shall we wait till these ideas have spread to the Army ? Will the Minister'—and here the satirical equerry directs his shaft at Bach—'will the Minister, the favourite of the populace, answer for it when there is interference with class-privileges and with the rights of property ?' Babarcsy was the mouthpiece and penman of the powerful Military Secretary Count Grünne. His thoughts were the thoughts of the women of the Court, the military and the nobility. The backbone of the movement, however, the man who completely gained the Emperor's confidence because he could give form to this atmosphere, could find expression for these sentiments—in short, could provide an intellectual framework for the Court's instinctive feelings—this man was Kübeck, the tailor's son of Iglau.

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To-day, after so many displays of counter-revolutionary talents in Europe, we can better understand this type. The favourite of the Emperor Francis and friend of Metternich was seventy years old when he made the stroke that changed Austria's history. While he was one of the best connoisseurs of the Court, an expert in the business of government and administration, and the flower of the 'High Bureaucracy' of his time, he was nevertheless no mere 'intelligent lackey.' According to Josef Redlich, he was the creator of the new Hapsburg despotism, which, in its revived form, ruled Austria through the agency of the bureaucracy and a small governing class; the creator, moreover, of that spirit which obstinately survived in Austrian politics until the break-up of the dynasty and the Empire. Kübeck, in the momentous year of 1851, trod lightly over all opposition, and virtually brought the reactionary ideas of the Court, the military, and the bureaucratic circles to victory. He was the Man of Destiny who, in the few years preceding his death by cholera in 1855, influenced the fate of Austria more deeply than any other of Francis Joseph's many counsellors.

His career in the Civil Service began in 1800. After a period of service as a Court official, he became, under Francis I, Finance Minister, Privy Councillor, and, in 1840, Keeper of the Privy Purse. Always in the closest touch with the Court and Metternich, he knew the old régime better than any one else. He recognized its weaknesses and inadequacies, and he was not sparing with his criticism. His diaries remain a fund of information about Francis' methods of government. He was an adept at dressing up the Emperor's whims as 'necessities of State,' and at bringing them into harmony with his own will. The clever plebeian understood the Emperor excellently. He knew, for example, that he looked upon the nobility as the only class which had approach to him, and was in consequence 'privileged'; yet he knew, too, where this favouritism had its limits, no Hapsburg wishing his nobles to be too powerful, least of all Francis. The nobles were there to serve.

'The younger sons of the Bohemian nobility,' says Kübeck in his notes, 'fill all the big positions, usurp the privileges of the throne, and resist everything that threatens their feudal position.'

Hence their exclusiveness in their business and drawing-room life, their hostility to the middle-class and its privileges, and their hatred of all State officials who are not mere writing machines.' He knew how to convince the Emperor that a nobility which thought only of its own benefits, power, and prestige could not further the majesty and welfare of the dynasty. The bureaucratic and bourgeois note in the despotism of Francis was not engrained in the Emperor's character; it was largely formed from Kübeck's ideas. Behind Kübeck's logical criticism of the power of the nobility lay the personal rancour, the inferiority-complex, of the tailor's son.

It is a mistake to describe Kübeck in his early youth as an innovator simply because he knew the literature of the French Revolution, and made use of Liberal arguments for his own ends. He was always an arch-reactionary, but certainly he was convinced that the dynastic despotism system needed the help of his brains; its servants, advisers, and assistants should not always come from the great Bohemian nobility, but should at times be drawn from intelligent tailors' or shoemakers' sons from Moravia, Bohemia, and the Tyrol. In this Kübeck was the prototype of those numerous intellectual servants, lackeys, and place-hunters who, after him, looked upon their talents and knowledge purely as tools in the service of the Court. Friedjung differentiates between the Kübeck of before and after the Revolution, expressing the view that the events of March and October deeply shook him, when he was already weakened by serious illness. On October 7th there was a riot before his house, and the barricaders broke into his dwelling to see whether they could shoot to better effect from the windows. This episode made a deep impression on the excitable old man, whose experiences always served to give colour to his arguments. Such a Machiavellian and realistic programme, however, as that which Kübeck urged on the young Emperor, and defended stoutly against all hesitations, had no casual origin, nor did it spring from his religious feelings. It could only arise out of a strong natural impulse—out of the will to power.

Francis Joseph listened to this greybeard's wisdom as he might have listened to beautiful music which had an intimate appeal for him. Kübeck skilfully won over the youthful

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Emperor by expounding to him that the foundation of the new order was Ministerial rule, with Ministerial responsibility to Parliament, and that this eliminated the monarchy as sole source of authority. How could authority remain single and indivisible if the Emperor's Ministers were responsible to other quarters? The fact was that in the circles round Francis Joseph which eagerly awaited cancellation of all concessions wrung from the dynasty by the Revolution there was nobody ready to carry out the *coup d'état* with a good conscience. The Vienna Court, like the French aristocracy of the eighteenth century and to a great extent the Royal House of Prussia in 1848, lacked self-confidence.

The Courtiers were sceptical, which did not diminish their instinct for self-assertion, but undermined their good conscience. Events had not converted the Court to a new outlook, but practical considerations and a certain anxiety might well have made further measures of conciliation seem inevitable even to Schwarzenberg, the experienced cynic who knew better than any one else that guaranteed rights could be reduced to nullity in practice, without the external appearance of the Constitution in any way suffering.

It was the proletarian Kübeck who restored to the Emperor and his Court the power of decision, a calm conscience, and the arguments necessary for justifying a *coup*. With singular energy the old man broke through the circle of irresolute and hesitating courtiers, and won first the ear and then the heart of the young Emperor. It is a remarkable chapter of Austrian history, this episode of a tailor's son winning over irresolute absolutists to the cause of absolutism. In Prussia an aristocrat of genius seized the wheel of history at the decisive moment and turned it backwards. What Bismarck did in Prussia, Kübeck did in Austria.

The mechanism which Kübeck used for his decisive action was the Reichsrat, a council set up by the Constitution of March 4th, 1849, whose functions were not, however, until Kübeck interposed, clearly defined, nor was the body itself taken seriously. But when Kübeck had reawoken in Francis Joseph what he called 'the theory of Austrian Emperorship,' and had demonstrated to him that the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament



was an Anglo-French invention out of place in the Hapsburg Imperial State, he went on quite logically to demonstrate the impossibility of keeping the Ministry in power. Francis Joseph well understood his teacher, whom, on December 5th, 1850, he appointed to be President of the Reichsrat. Kúbeck at once proceeded to put life into this institution. In his first memorial of June 15th, 1851, he showed clearly what his intention was. He argued that as the Emperor, and the Emperor alone, was the repository of all power, the Reichsrat could claim precedence before the Ministry. The Reichsrat thus appeared to be a revival of the old 'Court Chancery' of the days of the Emperor Francis. Yet it would not have been in keeping with Kúbeck's character that he should have struggled for the establishment of the Reichsrat simply in order to bring down the Schwarzenberg Ministry, as has been suggested. Like dictators of the present day, Kubeck hated the Parliamentary theory, and therefore also rejected the Responsibility of Ministers as laid down in the Constitution. But he differed from the dictators of to-day in wishing to render, not his own will, but that of the Emperor supreme. It is no mere chance that it was a plebeian and not a noble who played this part in reviving the absolute power of the monarch in its extremest form. An aristocrat, accustomed to his own superiority, has no great sense of the superiority of a monarch. It comes naturally to the plebeian, but not to the nobleman, to look upon the peak which he approaches as inaccessible.

Schwarzenberg probably never understood the core of Kúbeck's doctrine. Independent nobleman that he was, he could not easily accept that the twenty-year-old Emperor should conduct all the business of government personally, while he himself, as Prime Minister, was nothing more than the 'long arm' of the monarch. Bach also had no idea to what degree Kúbeck had filled the young Emperor with the determination to get rid of the Constitution. Taking a formal view, they saw nothing more than a competition for power between the Reichsrat and the Ministry. Friedjung's view of Kúbeck's policy, based on careful examination, is that he aimed first to place all authority in the hands of the Emperor, so that the Emperor might then freely decide whether in any single case it was better

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to follow the Reichsrat or the Ministry. But this view is incorrect. Kübeck proposed to the Emperor that he himself should become President of the Reichsrat, and, in virtue of that office, deputy of the Emperor. But in proposing this he had no thought of a struggle for precedence over the Ministry, but simply carried to its logical conclusion his view that the Reichsrat was the 'Emperor's Bureau' and executive organ of his will. Equality of status between the Reichsrat and the Ministry was no part or parcel of this system. The Ministers were simply to be heads of departments charged with carrying out the will of the monarch as formulated by the Reichsrat. Schwarzenberg, on his side, was not out for constitutional discussions. When he realized that all was in the melting-pot, and that he could keep his own position as Prime Minister to an Emperor whose power had been thus augmented, he renounced all resistance and placed himself at the disposal of the Counter-Revolution.

Different was the case of Alexander Bach, the talented product of the Austrian revolutionary bourgeoisie. He was now faced by the difficulty of a final decision. Bach had all the gifts, graces, and weaknesses of the typical Austrian; the Revolution called him to play a leading part in history. At the age of twenty-eight he was one of the most distinguished lawyers of Vienna, so much respected and liked that he rose from the position of Radical member of the Juridical and Political Debating Society to that of Representative of the People, Deputy and Minister of Justice in the Wessenberg and Doblhoff Cabinets. Then, having an eye always for the future, he cautiously weathered the storms of the times outside Vienna. At Olmütz he resumed his political activities, and obtained the Ministry of Justice in the Cabinet of Schwarzenberg, who gave him also his friendship and esteem. Bach was not the only man of his type in the history of Austria. There were others like him, not less accommodating and pliable. Yet none of these 'pleasant greyhounds,' as they have been called, was ever so severely tried by the course of events as Alexander Bach when he had to make a decision between following his inclinations and pursuing his career. He was then thirty-eight years old. The power that he exercised, the work that he had taken in hand, the

world in which he now moved, had caught him in their tentacles.

His excursions into high society were not purchased without humiliation. He remained a suspicious character to many of the mighty ones, and others besides Tsar Nicholas at Olmütz in 1851 showed him their opinion of him. The gossip that would make him out to be of 'Jewish descent' was of no importance; Bach sprang from an old Catholic family of Lower Austria; Bismarck's comment that only his position and respect for the Emperor's name protected Bach 'from being thrown out of aristocratic circles' was certainly the current opinion, which Bach could not alter even when he had his beard removed and went clean-shaven, according to the fashion of the aristocrats of his day. Even before he had made his decision he had tasted the bitterness of the renegade; his old friends and partisans hated him; his new circle despised him. An exception was Schwarzenberg, always chivalrous, who treated his 'honoured colleague and dear friend' as an equal and was really fond of him. Bach was the 'indispensable friend of the house' in the Schwarzenberg home, and, when Princess Mathilde was not present, 'the Prince sat at one end of the table, and Bach at the other, as hosts.' The ruling personality in this partnership was Schwarzenberg, who found Bach invaluable as a 'thinking machine.'

Kübeck, the man of unswerving purpose, was now beginning his preparations for a *coup d'état*. Bach, whose supple bourgeois intellect contrasted with that of the sturdy son of the people, did not seem to take in the gravity of the situation. He could not realize that Kübeck had built up in the Emperor and the Court a new will, and imagined that he could break down this wall by sheer force of argument. His opposition was entirely ineffectual. On realizing the mistake to which his false reading of Austrian circumstances had led him, Bach executed a typically Austrian about-turn. 'In for a penny, in for a pound'—with a header Bach threw himself into the rushing stream that was to destroy the constitutional edifice of the revolutionary years. He remained in office, and became the advocate and executive organ of the new despotism.

The Emperor was impatient. At the opening of the Cabinet

Council he faced the Ministers with propositions which they must either accept or definitely reject. Bach was already tractable. Karl Krauss, the Minister of Justice, and the clerical Count Thun were the only two who had intellectual or moral scruples. Karl Krauss resigned. The Council chosen by the Emperor to put the finishing touches to the work of revision of the Constitution consisted of Kübeck, the three Ministers, Bach, Philipp Krauss, and Baumgartner, and three members of the Reichsrat, Krieg, Purkhart, and Salviotti. The work of destruction proceeded apace. Practically everything that the reformers had executed was razed to the ground. One single point had been retained in the new statute outlined by Kübeck: the equality of rights promised to the Jews in 1848; and Francis Joseph struck out even this point. The final postponements and reflections of the Cabinet Council were brought quickly to an end by the Emperor. On December 2nd, 1851, Louis Bonaparte had his '18th Brumaire.' Francis Joseph would not be far behind him. He waited no longer for the decision of the Ministers, but had the draft read out before a joint conference of Imperial Councillors and Ministers, and the Report says, 'after none of the Ministers had found anything to object to in it His Majesty declared that it represented his will.' 'As often,' says Josef Redlich, 'and in later years with such fatal results, Francis Joseph made this weighty decision in great haste and in a sheer frenzy to see a formal and official conclusion of his plans.' On December 31st the statute received his sanction. The New Year's Eve document sounded the death-knell of the new Austria and the resurrection of the new despotism.

Its originator, Kübeck, scarcely guessed the significance of his work. Kübeck's idea of the Imperial will as the single source of might and right entered into the flesh and blood of the young Emperor. His definition of Ministerial responsibility as an Anglo-French invention contrary to Hapsburg principles was not forgotten throughout the reign of Francis Joseph. In spite of the changes in Austria, which obliged her, under the hard blows of fate, to adapt her State life to modern forms, her Ministers remained Ministers as Kübeck understood the word. The Iglau tailor's son was the real inventor of the Austria of Francis Joseph.

Even as a young man, Francis Joseph was unsentimental and emotionally unapproachable, but an experience in the year 1852 brought the monarch in closer human contact with his Councilor. After the visit to Venice it had been decided to make the return journey by sea, and five battleships were to accompany the Emperor. There was an unusually heavy storm, and prudence suggested delaying the voyage, but Francis Joseph, who would never allow those around to see signs of timidity in him gave the command for the journey. The Emperor's ship and three of the accompanying vessels, after much tossing and wandering, arrived ; but one, the *Marianne*, was lost in the storm. It was never discovered how the ship sank. Kübeck's only son was an officer on the *Marianne*. Francis Joseph himself appeared before Kübeck with the self-accusation that it was due to his insistence on the voyage that the ship had been lost. If Francis Joseph after this felt even more bound to Kübeck, it was because there remained in him a grain of the old Austrian superstitiousness.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE ITALIAN TOUR

THE description of the state of affairs before Solferino, in the essay entitled 'Two Burning Questions,' by Count Hartig, a former Minister of State and negotiator for Emperor Ferdinand, is a true one. 'The Emperor hears, examines, and commands; the subjects wish, make speeches, and obey; these are the only practical methods of government for the Austrian Empire.' But what a spectacle Austria presented under these maxims! Three-quarters of the Empire was under martial law, Hungary and Italy in a state of ferment, while the spirit of opposition showed itself even in Bohemia, Tyrol, and Styria. A conspiracy against Church and State was started in Graz with the help of the Public Prosecutor, Ritter von Waser, a man who later, during the bourgeois Ministry, took an official position under Herbst and made an outward show of being a Liberal. The murder of an old woman who was known as a denouncer of the German-Catholics gave occasion for a persecution such as had not been known in Styria since the Counter-Reformation of Ferdinand II. Broad hats, a special cut of trousers, were sufficient grounds for the arrest and transportation of suspicious characters to the Graz detention prison. At Goisern, Konrad Deubler, the friend of Ludwig Feuerbach, was regarded with suspicion because he burned a light in his room during a whole night. Of what use was it to the accused to be set free after fourteen months' detention? Most of them were ruined by the long imprisonment. Gallows were re-erected all over Austria. Out of fifteen students of the Vienna Polytechnic, seven were condemned to death for high treason, though afterwards the sentence was reduced to long terms of hard labour. The military courts on the Prague citadel did their work with equal assiduity. On March 20th, 1852, seventeen sentences were promulgated, among the victims being Father Stulz, a religious instructor at the Altstadt High School, who had criticized Louis Napoleon. On June 18th there were

eighteen, and on July 19th twenty-one, further condemnations, and on August 6th, once more, fifteen sentences, including one of eight months' confinement in irons for *lèse majesté*. Worse still was the treatment meted out to two correspondents of foreign Radical papers, one a reporter on the *Neue Oderzeitung* of Breslau and the other on the *Weserzeitung*. Both were condemned to three years' imprisonment in irons. The military court had already held another man in detention for many months, instead of the correspondent of the *Weserzeitung*, because his handwriting resembled that of the real culprit. When the poor wretch, upon his release, begged for a proof of his innocence, the judge bawled at him: 'Be thankful that we have set you free at all; a red cap was found in your room.' The Minister of Police, Weiss von Starkenfels, refused to publish the names of the discharged men. 'What are you thinking about?' he shouted. 'There are often nine hundred of them in a week!' In Ofen-Pest and in the Hungarian domains men were arrested for wearing the tri-coloured ribbon, and toy-sellers for stocking dolls or pictures with the Hungarian colours. On May 6th the *Pester Zeitung* announced another forty-nine military sentences, including twenty-four condemnations to the gallows. On February 19th, eleven persons were condemned to death in Este, in Venetia. By the middle of July the sum total of prisoners transported to Mantua was reckoned at 130. The well-known Venetian banker, Lazzoti, lost his five sons in one day.

It was Bach who induced the Emperor to undertake the tour to Hungary of which a contemporary says that 'the open appearance of the Emperor served to generate a hopeful enthusiasm which was then mistaken for approval of the existing form of government. In truth, the applause was partly purchased with money and partly expressive of the desire for a change.' During this journey, and also on his second visit in the autumn, Francis Joseph reprieved many of the condemned Hungarians; the recorded number at that time—two thousand—gives an idea of how the military courts had raged. The red-hot anger of the Hungarian patriots lives for posterity in Széchenyi's fine pamphlet against Bach, *Ein Blick auf den Rückblick*.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *A View of a Review*, the latter word in the sense of retrospect.—*Translator's note*.

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'With promises, threats, and money you have staged a new Austria for the benefit of the unsuspecting young Emperor as only you old Vienna Court actors know how,' he wrote, apostrophizing Bach. 'Your Excellency,' he continues, 'has often, no doubt, attended executions, and you will have remarked that the public may not esteem, but certainly does not loathe, a genuine robber who has never pretended to be anything else, whereas when a prayer-mumbling hypocrite swings, it only causes a hearty laugh. . . . You should have gone to Prince Schwarzenberg and said to him, "Your Highness, one of my nearest relatives is, I am not ashamed to say, a carpenter, and smells of glue ; another is a cobbler, and smells of pitch ; but nevertheless your company is obnoxious to me, for you smell of blood." And you should have said to His Majesty : "As a professional jurist I have the sacred duty to make Your Majesty aware of what your confessor does not know, that Your Majesty must not play a double rôle in Hungary ; that you cannot be at the same time legitimate King by the law of heredity and also conqueror by arms. You cannot hang the people as traitors and at the same time annul the Constitution and independence of Hungary, because it is a conquered territory".'

Did Francis Joseph guess what was the real atmosphere in his domains ? If the Imperial tour was meant as an attempt at reconciliation, it failed in its object. That autumn in Pest, book-dealers and merchants were put in irons for selling forbidden works ; in Venice, advocates, doctors, and estate-owners who had bought tickets for the Mazzini lottery were taken to Mantua in chains, and five of them were hanged on December 7th. On February 6th, 1853, the main guard was stormed in Milan. 'In Vienna,' Varnhagen von Ense writes, 'every one is grumbling about Gyulai, who holds a command in Lombardy and is amusing himself in Florence. In military circles, diversion flourishes and the spirit of service languishes.' The hangman's service, however, was no sinecure. Six conspirators were hanged and three shot. Radetzky proclaimed a state of siege of 'the most rigorous type.' A connection between the Milan rising and revolutionary Hungary was deduced ; a sentence in Mazzini's manifesto was taken as proof of a Hungarian-Italian plot. The



*attentat* of the Hungarian smith, Janos Libényi, on February 18th, confirmed this suspicion. Libényi, a former member of the Honved regiment, whose father had perished at the gallows, assaulted the Emperor at midday on the Kärntner Bastion. The knife, which he wielded with great strength, was averted by the Emperor's tie-fastener. The second blow which Libényi delivered was parried by the Viennese master-butcher, Etenreich. He and Count O'Donnel, the aide-de-camp who was accompanying the Emperor, overpowered the assassin. Libényi was executed on February 26th. Francis Joseph, who had received a wound, was well again by March 12th.

The authorities assumed a wide conspiracy. The trials in Vienna, Pest, Prague, and Milan were always treated as though they were all part of a whole. On March 3rd the former leader of insurgents, Nosslogy, an advocate named Sarközy, Professor Jubal, and a former lieutenant of Guards named Andrassffy, were hanged in Pest. In Vienna, the military court condemned six Hungarians, amongst them a woman, a Franciscan monk named Gasparich, and Ruth and Ajer, two former Honved officers, to hard labour in irons, and the young Salviotti, son of the Councillor, to twelve years' imprisonment. One of the most celebrated actions of this time was that brought against a former artillery officer named May and Cäsar von Bezard, an assistant at the Technical High School, who were accused of having planned a conspiracy. A corn-merchant from Moravia had denounced them; the police had found plans of an Austrian fortress and an infernal machine amongst their possessions. Cäsar von Bezard died on the gallows; May made an end of himself in the most ghastly way in prison. He tore up his straw pallet, set fire to some wisps of the straw by reaching a lamp in the passage through an air-hole, set fire to the pallet, rolled himself up in it, clenched his handkerchief between his teeth, and so waited his fiery death. Half choked by the smoke, terribly burnt, and moaning quietly to himself, he was found next morning by the prison-warder. The Prague military court was milder; it let off a whole batch of young students of the Technical High School with thirty to sixty strokes of the rod. The most criminal of all the measures taken was the condemnation of three women of Budapest high society, Countess

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Blanka Teleki, Klara Lövei, and Elisabeth Erdélyi, to long years of imprisonment in a fortress.

The authorities in Vienna would not understand that the incarceration and flogging of women had bitten deeper into the soul of the people than any other act of the Counter-Revolution. An accurate student of the Austrian military régime in Lombardy and Venetia, Reuchlin, recounts, in his *History of Italy*, that nothing stirred up so much hatred as the mishandling of women by the Austrian military forces. Even Italian Liberals, who held that it was wiser to put aside the national question and to concentrate in uniting against despotic rule, finally came to the conclusion that a compromise with the Austrians was impossible, since they were 'outside the pale of civilization' because they permitted woman to be chastised. Rogge relates what an indelible impression it made in Milan when, after a demonstration in honour of the Emperor's birthday, two women were ordered to be flogged in the castle by the provost-marshal for having sung national songs. The 'Museum of Austrian Infamies' still preserves the hazel rods—those weapons which were pitilessly used on the wretched victims of military justice. The history of this thrashing on August 18th, 1856, is also preserved. The Austrian report speaks of 'two disorderly women,' the Italian of two singers whose only offence was having sung a song with political allusions while in company with young men in a café. The procedure, which took place in the provost-marshal's room in the castle, scarcely bears describing. Dressed only in light chemises, the girls were fastened securely with straps to the flogging-bench. The performance of the prescribed formalities before the physical chastisement—the reading aloud of the court's order, the examination by the military doctor—made the deed even more repulsive. Then the provost-marshal began. He swished down the supple rod with vigour, then paused, so that each stroke might be thoroughly tasted. The two singers were each struck thirty times. Their screams did not pierce the thick walls of the castle. They were badly injured, and had to spend some days in the castle infirmary before they could be taken to their homes in an ambulance. Nor were the customary methods of the Austrian military doctors omitted in the case of women; after their punishment their chastised, bleeding

bodies were washed in vinegar. The most revolting part of this deed was that the military authorities were not ashamed to send in a bill to the Milan Commune for two split sticks, for brushes, vinegar, and bandages.

The hatred of the Italians reached an absolute maximum during the last years of Austrian rule. It meant primarily that the officers were 'sent to Coventry.' Baron Burger, the Governor of Milan, might have mitigated the antagonism, but he was powerless beside the military command which did not spare the Milanese any petty annoyance. Visitors to the Fenice Theatre or the Scala still enjoyed the spectacle of two soldiers, one on the right and one on the left of the stage, who, during the performance and in the intervals, faced the public with loaded weapons. Men from a border regiment, usually Croats, were preferably chosen for this service—fellows who would often noisily blow their noses with their five fingers on the stage. The Director of Police, Martinec, a Bohemian, made it his pleasure to force the haughty dukes and marquesses in the boxes to feel the might of the Imperial and Royal officials. Woe to any one who remained seated when the Imperial Hymn was played. The Milanese thought that Martinec, who came from Prague, was a Spaniard, because of the sound of his name. 'The terrible Spaniard has certainly done this' was an explanation generally given when an especially maddening order was issued.

The monstrous contributions levied from town and country by Radetzky were a further torment. Single families had their whole property confiscated : 800,000 lire were taken from the Count and Duke of Litta ; from the Borromeo, Viscontò, and Mellerio families, 100,000 lire ; from Arese, Napoleon's friend, 500,000 ; from Princess Belgiojoso, 800,000. After the quelling of the Milan insurrection, 209 people were exiled, and a third, the half, or the whole of their property confiscated. At the end of January 1849, the Minister Gioberti in Turin informed the foreign Ambassadors that, in the half-year after the truce, Lombardy, with a population of two and a half out of the thirty-six millions of the whole Empire, paid, apart from special extortions from individuals, seventy millions in taxation, or nearly half of the whole amount collected from Austria. It was as difficult to ascertain the black list of executions as it was to learn the precise

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number of fines and war-taxes that were levied. Father Coggi reckoned that there were 960 sacrifices to martial law after Radetzky's return, and after the Milan insurrection the number had doubled.

In Italian descriptions of this time, such as Alessandro Luzio's *Martyrs of Belfiore*, Francis Joseph was held personally responsible for the extraordinary harshness of the Austrian régime in Lombardy and Venetia. In proof of this, Radetzky's attitude was cited, and particularly the words he spoke to the Bishop of Mantua, who begged him to show mercy, in 1851: 'I cannot do it. It is not in my power to grant pardon. Irrevocable decisions have been made above me.' At that time the Austrian police had discovered a conspiracy which, according to their reports, extended from Milan, Mantua, and Venice to Brescia, Cremona, and Verona. The reports of the Austrian police that came before the Emperor's eyes read to-day like badly-written novelettes; in them the priest Don Enrico Tazzoli figures as the driving force of the conspiracy, the imaginative Scarsellini as a sheer devil. It is difficult to say what truth there was in the police story that Scarsellini had formed the plan of seizing Francis Joseph during his visit to Venetia and making him prisoner. The police, never sparing with details, professed to know that it was intended to take the Emperor prisoner after his visit to the Fenice Theatre, simultaneously to seize the little fort of San Secondo, near Venice, to bring the Emperor there, and to face him with an alternative: either to renounce Lombardy and Venetia or to be blown into the air, with the conspirators, in the fort. Francis Joseph was later to learn that the police occasionally invented details. In the year 1852 he was still credulous, and an order went forth from Vienna to show no mercy. The man who carried out his wishes, the military advocate Kraus, did not need to be told this twice. This scion of a petty-bourgeois Bohemian family, destined later to become a general, was by natural taste a hangman. He was a good example of a constantly recurring phenomenon in the history of Francis Joseph: minor intellectuals called to power showed themselves able to surpass any military swashbuckler or provost-marshal in terrorism. The history of that gloomy fort of Belfiore, in Mantua, where the guilty were incarcerated and

executed, reveals his savagery on every page ; he introduced flogging and the rack as methods of interrogation, and utilized every kind of horror to strengthen a weak accusation by cruelly extorted confessions. What Alessandro Luzio, the reliable Mantuan Director of Archives, reports of him is completed by the testimony of Emilio Casa, who describes the behaviour of Kraus in Parma, where he was sent in 1848 to avenge the murder of Duke Charles. Not even the loss of the Italian provinces caused Francis Joseph to revise his opinion of his Italian administration. He remained well disposed towards this blood-thirsty official, and appointed him, during Taaffe's Ministry, to be Governor of Bohemia at the moment when the idea of adjusting the differences between Germans and Czechs by the sword was gaining ground. There were certainly other moments when Francis Joseph thought of altering the administration of Lombardy and Venetia, but they were fleeting, and led to no results. So, in the summer of 1853, Count Rechberg was sent to Italy to take control of the administration. Radetzky was not pleased with this appointment ; on July 27th, 1853, he wrote to his daughter Friederike, Countess Wenckheim : 'Too many Privy Councillors spoil the broth was the old proverb ; I don't know the new one.'

This was how matters stood in Italy when the Imperial couple began their Italian trip, and arrived in Venice on November 25th, 1856. The popular Hackländer, known as the 'darling of all officers' wives,' accompanied the Royal couple to record the incidents of the journey. He sent reports to the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* of the days in Venice, Brescia, and Bergamo ; of the excursions to Padua, Vicenza, and Rovigo ; of 'endless heartfelt enthusiastic jubulations.' At Milan, where the Imperial couple made their entry on January 15th, 1857, Francis Joseph was joined by the whole Court household, by the Ministers Bach, Bruck, and Buol ; besides Grünne with the military Chancellery. What Hackländer reports is semi-official chatter, but it seems certain that the Empress won the hearts of the sensitive Italians by her tact, gentleness, and loveliness. The good work she did was entirely destroyed by Martinec and his underlings, who imprisoned a number of innocent people (among them some aristocrats) as 'a precaution making for

safety' and so provoked new bitterness. The atmosphere improved after a wide amnesty had been recorded, but even then the Milanese insisted upon 'grading the warmth of their applause in the theatre and at receptions according to the amnesty announcements of the preceding morning.' If the official organ had not announced a new amnesty in the morning, 'no hand was raised in the Scala that evening, and half-mourning and black gloves were seen in the boxes.'

When the Epiphany Carnival began, the Emperor wished to give some balls; the Empress earnestly advised him to take the opportunity of getting into contact with the nobility. The command went to Vienna to send the heavy silver to Milan; but the projected balls fell through, because of the petition conveyed to the Emperor that no officer should ask any of the Italian society women to dance. The correspondent of the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* reported that at the big ball at the Scala 'every one deplored the absence of the beautiful ladies of the Milanese nobility.' Persons of culture and character in the town were not to be won. The popular *Crepusculo* gave no intimation of the sojourn of the Imperial couple; its owner, Tenca, preferred to discontinue the publication of that remunerative and important paper rather than fall in with the wishes of the police that he should at least report the facts.

It is an erroneous belief that at that time Lombardy and Venetia could still have been saved for the Hapsburgs, but doubtless Francis Joseph's generous amnesty healed many wounds. It was granted against the opposition of the military and police; a fit of crying on the part of the Empress decided matters. It opened the doors of the criminal prisons of Milan, Como, Brescia, Mantua, and Pavia, and granted freedom to thousands. The Emperor relieved Radetzky from the post of Supreme Commander and appointed his own brother, the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, then twenty-five years old, to be Governor-General of Lombardy and Venetia. Old Radetzky took his dismissal grumblingly. 'Your Highness must do as he wishes,' he said. He died soon after, on January 5th, 1858, in the Castle of Monza, nearly ninety-two years old. The Emperor ordered an imposing funeral for this soldier so typical of

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The Emperor may have received a better impression in the provinces, above all in the German-inhabited districts such as Pressburg and Ödenburg, and in the centre of Slav Upper Hungary, at Kaschau. Although Bach's officials used every effort to make Hungary appear a patriotic and devoted country, and to this end did the most nonsensical things, worthy of Potemkin, the decisive factors, the high nobility and gentry, failed to attend any receptions. 'Therewith,' it was said, 'the fate of the tour was decided, for the true Hungary was not present when the Deáks were absent.'

Meanwhile, another event took place which lay like a black shadow over the whole tour. On May 28th one of the Emperor's daughters, the little Archduchess Sophie, was suddenly taken ill in Ofen Castle. No one had the courage to recall the parents from Debreczin; but on May 30th this had to be done, for the child was dead. The Imperial couple interrupted their receptions and travelled from Csege, on the left of the Theiss, back to Ofen. 'A tour,' wrote the accompanying reporter, 'which could only intensify the depression; pools of water as big as lakes, but without depth and dried up in summer; endless steppes without any sign of human habitation, save here and there disconsolate camps of ragged gypsies.' A few days later, Francis Joseph and Elizabeth were in Laxenburg, near Vienna. The Emperor's mother forced her son to undertake a pilgrimage to Mariazell. On this occasion Francis Joseph visited, in July, Graz, Laibach, and Trieste.

The amnesties that were granted during these tours were in harmony with the principle of the new despotic rule. They were issued in no petty spirit, and included all political crimes, giving back part of the sequestered possessions and making it possible for the emigrants to return. But a letter, written in Francis Joseph's own handwriting, from Laxenburg, which in a way marks the end of the Imperial journeys, leaves no room for political hope: 'Resolved to uphold unswervingly the fundamental principles which have till now guided me in the governing of my Empire, I desire that they should be generally recognized and more particularly adopted for guidance by all the organs of my government.' So decided Francis Joseph, and so for a while it was still to be.

## CHAPTER VIII

### SOLFERINO

**I**N a letter to Metternich, Kübeck gave the following definition of his aim : 'Restoration of the externals as well as of the essence of the Imperial authority, and demonstration of the Emperor's freedom of action to his Peoples.' This aim was now achieved, but Kübeck failed to see that the new despotism could not prosper with the methods of the old. Francis had been forced to a policy of no change by the sheer impossibility of governing the vast Empire from his study table. The concentration of the indivisible power in a single man led to the so-called 'stability system.' But then Francis had had Metternich at his side. Young Francis Joseph, schooled to the exercise of absolute power, could not let affairs stand still. He had to make decisions. In the first decade of his government, following the newly kindled instinct of domination, he made his decisions on grounds of personal preference, as his forefathers had done in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and as the Bourbons had done in France. Only Ministers and generals who were entirely devoted to his cause exerted any influence upon him.

The Emperor's will was now law, and it was only natural that, not content with maintaining the Empire in its traditional position and integrity as a family possession, he should wish to raise the prestige of the dynasty in Germany, Italy, and the Balkans, even in the teeth of Russian opposition, and even though it should mean an offensive war. Centralism and absolutism had triumphed at home ; considerations of dynastic prestige must be the corollary in foreign policy. Francis Joseph's absolute rule from now on was to stand or fall with this foreign policy. His power was dependent on his military forces. The cause of the fall of the House of Hapsburg and of its Empire must be sought in the dynasty's hunger for prestige, and in its determination to enjoy its prestige without taking account of the real balance of power. The application of feudal family principles to politics rendered a rational compromise impossible.



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The Emperor and the Empire appeared an indivisible whole, and conflicts of Empire were solved as if they were personal concerns. Hunger for prestige led to Solferino, to Königgrätz, later to the annexation of Bosnia. It stirred up the new movement in the Balkans, and the appetite was roused once more in Francis Joseph's declining years by his nephew and his satellites, to become, after Sarajevo, the fatal problem of Austria.

Francis Joseph's first acts as an absolute monarch were inspired by his lust for prestige. He was spurred on by Radetzky's successes in Italy, Schwarzenberg's victory at Olmütz, and the subjection of his own Empire. His ambitious intentions, however, often blinded him to the fact that the old Austria had owed her position more to her allies than to her own sword. From Maximilian I onwards all the monarchs and their counsellors had held fast to the principle that the Hapsburg dynasty needed firm alliances to repair the damages of an uncertain fortune in war. This policy of alliances was the continuation of the policy of marriages to which Austria owed her existence. From the days of Prince Eugène to those of Maria Theresa, England and Holland had been Austria's great allies. It had been the skilful work of Kaunitz to unite almost the whole continent against Prussia. Metternich had led the hereditary monarchies to the victorious fight for counter-revolution in Europe. All these alliances were based on identity of interests; but Kaunitz, Thugut, Philipp Stadion, Metternich, and Schwarzenberg, in contracting them, were also led by a peculiarly Austrian scepticism regarding the capacities of their own country. They knew Austria too well; they knew too well the limited capacity of their own companions in high office; too well they knew the Austrian army. The motto 'Viribus unitis' was only applicable to their allies. Francis Joseph lacked this deep understanding of Austria. He had to gain it through painful defeats. After Schwarzenberg's death he lost it altogether.

Schwarzenberg owed his successes against Prussia not only to his own self-confidence and to the excessive estimation in which the Austrian army was held. His most powerful ally in the conflict over Schleswig-Holstein and the Electorate of Hesse

in 1850 was Tsar Nicholas, who considered every movement of a people in the West struggling for independence to be an offence against his own majesty. In the case of Schleswig-Holstein, Denmark appealed for help to the German Federation as the legitimate guardians of the peace. This gave Austria occasion to restore the Federal Assembly once more to the performance of its forgotten functions, while at the same time rendering a service to the Tsar. On September 2nd, 1850, one day after its constitution, the Assembly began the discussion of the fate of Schleswig-Holstein. It was the Tsar's influence also which brought a decision in the case of Hesse, which really had nothing to do with him. Since 1831 the Electorate of Hesse had enjoyed an admirable constitutional practice, such as one would wish to see in force in Germany to-day. As in the British Constitution, not only the Ministers, but all employees and officers, were responsible for any breach of the Constitution in which they had participated by giving or executing illegal orders.

When the Elector and his Minister, Hassenpflug, began to undermine the Constitution, the Diet protested, and refused to levy taxes. In May 1850, Hassenpflug effected the detachment of the Electorate of Hesse from the North German Union, rightly calculating that Austria would be a more energetic policeman against the rebellious subject. A state of war was proclaimed. The Hessians responded to this overbearing act with great spirit. Almost all the employees proclaimed their obedience to the Government in conformity with their oath, while nine-tenths of the officers handed in their resignations. The Elector and Hassenpflug fled to Frankfort, invoking the help of the Federal Assembly. It was the moment for Schwarzenberg to show his art. In the ensuing dispute Prussia lost the day, principally because the Tsar was on the side of Austria. It is, however, a misreading of history to represent this skirmish between the two rivals for leadership of the German States as a competition for the position of bailiff in the Electorate of Hesse. The Constitution of Hesse was an abomination also in the eyes of the King of Prussia, but he had sufficient respect for written promises to deter him from immediately coming forward as executor of the desires of Russia.

If Prussia advanced her guns in the cause of the Hessian Constitution, and against the Elector, she was impelled, not only by a sense of justice, but also by a sense of her own advantage.

Till the preliminaries of the world war of 1914, when the punitive expedition against Serbia was planned, Francis Joseph's Government never again used such language against a hostile State as that which Schwarzenberg used against Prussia on December 27th, 1850, in his instructions to the Austrian Minister in Munich. 'The Berlin Cabinet, in its reckless arrogance,' he wrote, 'evidently intends to leap the boundaries beyond which any further concession by the Federation would be shameful and disastrous.' Francis Joseph followed his Minister. At Bregenz on October 12th, 1850, the assembled sovereigns of Austria, Bavaria, and Württemberg concluded the offensive alliance against Prussia by which Austria pledged herself to hold in readiness 150,000 men against the eventuality of Prussia intercepting the aid destined for the Elector of Hesse, while Bavaria promised 50,000 and Württemberg 20,000 men. At the gala dinner the King of Württemberg toasted the Emperor with the words : 'When the Emperor calls, we march.' Francis Joseph replied : 'I am proud to march against a foe with such comrades.'

The patriotic history writers of Austria strike a more sober note when, in recounting what followed, they revealed the Tsar as the true arbiter in the affairs of Germany. The meeting in Warsaw from the 17th up to the end of October 1850 was nothing more than a competition between the two parties striving for the favour of Nicholas I. Schwarzenberg was the more skilful at the task of kindling the Tsar's wrath. The Prussian Minister, Radowitz, had said to the Austrian delegate in Frankfort, Prokesch, more than stood in his instructions : 'Believe me, I have weighed all the chances, military as well as political, and I say to you our resolution is firm ; we will suffer no foreign troops in Hesse, and if there is war we will mobilize immediately all nine army corps.' Schwarzenberg repeated this to the Tsar. At luncheon, Nicholas, deathly pale, remarked : 'The hour has struck. I will invade Prussia and occupy it to the Vistula.' Schwarzenberg had capped the agreement of

Bregenz with that of Warsaw. It was Francis Joseph's first and last triumph, the fateful hour of Austria. It remained to be seen whether Schwarzenberg had the creative power to bring about an Austrian solution of the German question. But this Austrian gentleman was no Bismarck. His concern was not the organization of Germany but the humiliation of Prussia, and he chewed the cud of his success.

It was of no avail to Prussia that she dissolved the union. Schwarzenberg demanded the evacuation of Hesse. It was not due to him that war did not follow upon the shots of Bronzell. His instructions to Prokesch amounted to a declaration of war. The Austrian Delegate and Manteuffel, Radowitz's successor, had to be thanked if a bloodless discussion followed upon the first volley. Prokesch's disobedience was perhaps explained also by the picture presented by Prussia at this moment : 200,000 Prussian soldiers, and the reserves of the Landwehr, hurrying to the flags, were a stronger argument than the hesitating attitude of the King. In the last resort, Schwarzenberg's unyielding insistence could not have bent the will of Prussia if the Tsar had not once again come to Austria's help. Nicholas's threats to Berlin combined with the accession of Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt to the Alliance of Bregenz to back the demand that the will of the Federal Assembly should be executed in the Electorate of Hesse. Schwarzenberg could now present this ultimatum to hesitating Prussia : 'If Berlin is obstinate, then it is war.' On November 26th a telegram from the King of Prussia reached Vienna, in which he asked for a meeting at Olmütz, and gave notice that Manteuffel would be the bearer of letters to Francis Joseph and the Archduchess Sophie.

It has been much disputed whether Austria was really ready for a war. The Austrian Chief of Staff at that time, Baron von Hess, had taken measures for bringing the army up to its full complement, so that at the end of November it numbered 180,000 men. The Austrian army, in combination with the allied forces, would have been equal to Prussia. The plan of war was ready, and old Radetzky had been appointed to the supreme command. Hess's idea was to march with five corps along the Elbe, join up with the Saxon forces, and give battle to the Prussians as soon as possible. The Austrians would have

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had the advantage of holding an inner line against Prussia's divided forces. Austria's position was better than that of sixteen years later, but it would be erroneous to suggest that there was a warlike spirit in Vienna and in the Austrian army directed against Prussia. Neither Radetzky nor his generals were enthusiastic at the idea of a campaign in Bohemia. The old field-marshal had been delighted to be able to return to Italy. Clam-Gallas refused to take a command against Prussia, and Welden, Wallmoden, Degenfeld, and Schönhals desired, no less than Hess, a peaceful settlement. Bourgeois Vienna had no more use for Schwarzenberg's policy than for an armed expedition. The war spirit was in truth active only in the Courts of the German Central States, who feared a diminution of their sovereignty in the event of Prussian success. The Saxon Count Vitzthum spoke for the others when he said in a letter: 'It is agreed by all those whose thoughts go ahead of the immediate moment that the German problem cannot begin to be definitely solved until the Prussian State, as such, ceases to exist.' During this whole crisis Francis Joseph allowed himself to be guided by Schwarzenberg. He was impressed by the dignity of the Bohemian nobleman, and by his way of conducting political affairs. Yet at the last decisive moment, when Schwarzenberg would have been capable of letting the guns have their say, the counsel of the Archduchess Sophie outweighed the will of the Minister. We have evidence to-day which proves that the correspondence between the Bavarian sisters (the Emperor's mother, the Queen of Prussia, and the Queen of Saxony) was in those days much more frequent than usual. It was chiefly due to them that the settlement of accounts in Germany was delayed for another sixteen years. Some weeks after Olmütz, Schwarzenberg confessed to Beust: 'Like yourself, I would sooner have seen things through.'

In January 1853, Francis Joseph arrived in Berlin, and, in a speech to the corps of Prussian officers, recalled Leipzig and 1813 as proving the necessity of standing fast together. Such was the change that had come since Schwarzenberg's death. These were the only German nationalist words which ever fell from the lips of Francis Joseph, and this was the first time that a ruling Hapsburg had set foot in the Prussian capital. There

was no antagonism between Francis Joseph and Frederick William IV, whose favourite plan was that of crowning the Austrian monarch with the Imperial Crown of Rome while he himself held the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Empire. Such plans did not signify a lowering of Austria's position in Germany for the advantage of Berlin. The two even dreamed of a joint march against Napoleon. But the dream was of short duration. For at this moment there appeared on the horizon a thinker of a very different order from the fanciful King—Bismarck.

Francis Joseph had at his side only Count Buol, of whom Bismarck wrote in 1852 that his lack of knowledge was 'truly incredible.' Buol succeeded in so squandering the respectable heritage of Schwarzenberg that at the beginning of the Crimean War Austria was in total isolation. By preserving neutrality she could earn the gratitude of Russia, or, equally, she could attach herself to the Western Powers. She did neither, but in April 1854 signed a neutrality treaty with Prussia, and in December concluded an alliance with France and England. The value of this alliance for the Western Powers was much diminished by the fact that Austria did not offer her services until after the fall of Sebastopol. Russia's friendship had been lost. The Tsar Nicholas spoke of Hapsburg ingratitude. 'Do you know,' he said to the Austrian Ambassador, Count George Esterházy, 'who were the two most foolish Kings of Poland? Sobieski was one, and I am the other; both of us saved Austria, and earned the harshest ingratitude.' The Western Powers were similarly out of humour. Austria had shown herself unreliable. Bismarck recorded on December 21st, 1865: 'Buol has managed to deprive Austria of the world's confidence and himself of the world's esteem. He is like a steam-engine which does not know where it is running, but just emits steam and hoots.' A year before, Bismarck had written to General von Gerlach: 'The good Austrians are like Bottom the weaver in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*. In the east they have to bear their cross; then they want to play a great part in Italy; and finally they wish to be the lions of Germany while keeping us at their disposal for purposes of European policy, without bidding us so much as a polite god-speed in the German question.'

The isolation of Austria, the destruction of the diplomatic heritage of Metternich, did not suffice to raise doubts in the mind of Francis Joseph about the merits of the system. There was no public opinion, no Parliament, no societies, and none but the most indirect criticism in the Press. Francis Joseph heard nothing but praise, such as the words of the Saxon Diplomat Count Vitzthum, who gave the following impression of the Emperor: 'The highest expectations are justified by the spectacle of his virtues—contempt of cheap popularity, silent reserve, acute intuition, astounding memory, keen sense of duty, conscientiousness verging upon self-torment, chivalry, and generosity. Nothing shakes him from his standpoint. The Emperor is free from sentimental illusions, but he is firmly persuaded that he has a providential mission to fulfil.'

At that time a great change had come over Austria, which could be observed above all in the German bourgeoisie. The hopes of 1848 had evaporated before the visible and sensible manifestations of the restored absolute power of the dynasty. From now on, in all the Peoples of the monarchy could be observed a dual want of confidence—confidence in the State as central organizing power and confidence in their own force and ability. Hand in hand with this went the sense of the overpowering strength of the dynasty, in which it now seemed better to acquiesce. Not that criticism was silenced. The State was still an evil. Criticism against it was, if anything, sharper and more malicious. But the Emperor, symbol of the Absolute, stood outside such criticism. The subjects of the Emperor Francis had seen in that monarch the personal wielder of power who moved among them as the master who issued orders and was obeyed. But with the neo-absolutism of Francis Joseph the Emperor's majesty had become impersonal. The youthful Francis Joseph was a symbol. The word 'Emperor' took on a new sound. He himself may have realized this on his journeys through Austria, after the attempt upon his life by the Hungarian, Libényi, and during the marriage celebrations. He may have so far absorbed the faith of his still indefatigable mother as to read into it a personal success achieved by divine aid.

But these were years of disappointment, failures, and defeat.

Not even a genius, relying only on himself and on the Austrian army, could have defied the dangers that threatened the House of Hapsburg. How could the tradition of dynastic prestige prevail against the might of the national idea that had sprung out of the Revolution? The struggle was too unequal. On one side stood the selfish ambitions of a Court without any conspicuous personality, on the other side the Italy of Cavour, struggling for liberty, and Germany groaning in its birth-pangs under the leadership of the great adversary now arising into prominence—Bismarck. Napoleon III made an alliance with Cavour; England sympathized with Italy; Russia stood on one side, delighted. And what of Germany? In Vienna they were dreaming of two German armies, of which one, the Austrian, should subdue the 'Sardinians,' while the other, the Federal army, destroyed Napoleon. The Archduke Albert went to Berlin to win over William, the Prince Regent, to the cause of war. The same Austria which had suppressed every national movement, and had conceived her part in Germany to be one of merely satisfying her own dynastic ambitions, now talked of a 'national war.' Prussia and South Germany were to take up arms in defence of the Hapsburg possessions in Italy. Only a democracy at the mercy of sentiment could approve this plan. There was no enthusiasm for it in Berlin.

The decision was made overnight. Not even Count Buol was informed of the Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia, which was dispatched directly from the Emperor's military Chancellery to Turin. On May 27th, 1859, Buol had been forced to resign from office. At the important Cabinet meeting of May 26th he was no longer functioning as Foreign Minister, while Count Rechberg, his successor, had not yet taken over. General von Eynatten, representing the army, and Count Grunne, the Emperor's Military Secretary, led the discussions. There was at this time no Ministry of War whatever. It was the successful result of Kübeck's arguments that the Emperor had abolished the War Ministry and had become his own Minister for War, or let his Military Secretary take charge of the work. The Finance Minister, Bruck, took pains to point out that the hopeless state of the Exchequer rendered it impossible to put an army of three-quarters of a million men in the field. The conversations which



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took place between Bruck and Count Grünne recall a later occasion when, in 1912, Conrad argued, 'Misplaced economies average themselves. Austria must act as behoves her dignity.'

Two days later there was another Cabinet meeting, under the presidency of the Emperor, who had summoned the Archdukes Albert and Rainer, as well as the Chief of General Staff, Field-Marshal Hess. Count Rechberg was also present. Bruck put up a bold show against the soldiers. The Emperor, however, as the report of the meeting shows, was pleased to point out that the question must not be considered either from the financial or the military standpoint alone, but mainly from the political standpoint. 'The political circumstances of the moment necessitate the enlargement of the sphere of war from Italy to Europe. Only if the struggle takes the form of a European war can a speedy, decisive, and favourable result be expected for Austria.' These were the Emperor's words. They mean that it was not sufficient to conduct war in Italy. The hostilities must be extended to Germany, to the Rhine. Napoleon, who was threatening the historic position of the House of Hapsburg, must be encountered by German arms.

At that time Prussia began to carry out that army reform which was the wonderful accompaniment to Bismarck's developing projects. The traditional Austrian attitude of distrust against her own army had disappeared, but neither criticism nor reforming zeal were at work to justify the optimism that took its place. Francis Joseph's relation to his army is one of the unprobed mysteries of his life. He was a soldier from the beginning, and it was an essential part of the tradition of the Austrian Emperor which he built up that, unlike his predecessors Francis and Ferdinand, who wore civilian attire, he never appeared out of uniform. But the lack of historical sense peculiar to the Hapsburgs deprived him of the power to criticize the institution of State which he most prized—the army. Wallenstein had created the Austrian army which until Maria Theresa's time had served under some great commanders and many lucky ones. The Empress herself was too much of a woman to have a good eye for generals; she could not distinguish the gifted men from those without any talents. She ranked Lacy above Laudon, and towards her military comman-

ders showed an altogether unwonted clemency, consoling them when they lost her battles. After Maria Theresa the army fell into decadence. It was not a decadence like that which submerged the work of Frederick the Great up to the time of Jena and Auerstädt. The mechanism of the curious institution continued to function. The Austrian army had its own peculiar form, its own life, one might even say its own science—a strange mixture of old experience, geography, and speculation. Certain ancient families, however, had acquired almost a monopoly of the superior posts, and these prevented any modernization along popular lines, with the result that the armed forces became a heavy and insensitive instrument carrying the trade mark of the nobility and of military officialdom. The one thing which linked the army to the people was the glamour of the uniforms, and even this was done away with for the most part after 1866. The nobility provided a cavalry officers' mentality; and the bureaucracy saw to it that the army was thoroughly well shod. Stendhal relates the story of a certain Lieutenant Robert, 'the handsomest officer' in the Italian army of young Bonaparte, who, together with two other lieutenants in his company, shared a single pair of boots which they had removed from a dead Austrian officer on the battlefield of Lodi. It is true the Austrian army marched on well-shod feet. The trouble was that the heads of its commanders were not similarly well equipped. There was an army which marched with bare feet, but it was led by Bonaparte!

It would have been too much to expect that any monarchical army should prevail against a revolutionary army led by Napoleon. During and after the Napoleonic wars the Austrian army could boast two men of talent, the Archduke Charles and Radetzky. The Emperor Francis, more Austrian in this than his successor Francis Joseph, accepted military defeats as something imposed by destiny against which it was useless to revolt. When he nominated Radetzky Chief of General Staff to the army which had just been defeated at Wagram, he said to him: 'I know enough of your character to be sure that you won't do anything foolish on purpose, and, as for casual foolishness, even if you are guilty of it, it will be nothing new in my experience.' At the beginning of the battle, which he had

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watched from Bisamberg, the Emperor had remarked : 'Rosenberg is commanding the left wing, so we can be quite sure everything will go wrong on that side.' The Emperor Francis knew his servants, but he stuck to his principles and did not break the tradition of giving high commands to the Rosenberg family. The two distinguished soldiers of the time, the Archduke Charles and Radetzky, he removed from their posts, the one in 1809, the other in 1814. Radetzky, symbol of the old Austrian army who still lives for us in Strauss's marches, would have mouldered in the fortress of Olmütz, of which he was placed in charge, had not his fellow campaigner, Frimont, rescued him from oblivion by calling him to his staff in Italy. For many long years the victorious flags of Radetzky's Italian army supplied decorative borders to Austrian military pictures. Thanks to them, many defeats were forgotten, though it was difficult to cover up the fact that these victories themselves had been won against an untrained opponent.

The experiences of the Revolution induced the Austrian army authorities to extinguish what had hitherto to some extent replaced the inspiring patriotism which was the strength of national armies—namely, the regimental spirit of local units. The aim now being to break up the racial unity of the various elements of the army, Hungarians were introduced into German regiments, Italians into Hungarian, Slavs into Italian, German, and Hungarian regiments, while the units themselves, so far as possible, were quartered far from their own regions, in parts of the Empire of different race and speech. It was doubtless in consequence of the prolonged application of this method that the army became so striking a reflection of the variegated population of the Empire, and that the well-known type of Austrian officer was developed. The military music of the Austrian army similarly reflected all the varieties of language, dialect, and musical tradition throughout the Empire. But from the military angle this method of accommodating the parts to the whole was highly unpractical ; as was shown in 1866, when the mobilization order obliged the soldiers of the reserve to travel often from one end of the Empire to another before they could report themselves to their own units.

The strategy and tactics of the army, whose task was to

maintain the dynastic prestige of the Hapsburgs against all opponents, were out of date. The strategy was compounded of methods evolved in the Seven Years' War, of ideas of the Archduke Charles, and of deductions made from experiences on the Italian fronts. In the sphere of tactics nothing had been learned from the French Revolutionary armies or from Napoleon. The Austrian army had crystallized into a kind of magnificent police force, designed to protect the Empire in the south-east along the military frontier, and to keep down Italy. The cordon system, introduced by General Lacy on the military frontier, was established equally in Italy, so that the whole of Lombardy was caught in a network of detached units posted on all the main roads. But when danger really threatened, this dissemination of the forces proved highly inconvenient. The famous Quadrilateral of fortresses in northern Italy was regarded, by these police strategists as a kind of barracks, into which the army could retire if it found itself inferior to the rebellious forces or was unable to conquer an opposing army in the open field.

Francis Joseph at nine-and-twenty years of age must needs have had such a nature as Charles XII of Sweden or Frederick the Great if he could hope to combine the posts of absolute monarch and commander-in-chief in the field. He had, indeed, so far overcome his natural disposition as to become a soldier. He considered that the army was the real pillar of his authority, and valued it accordingly. Yet if he made great efforts to surround the old army with new glory, they were efforts which did not get beyond externals to the root of the matter. Francis Joseph's military education never passed beyond an elementary stage. And it proved a lamentable mistake when he decided to transfer central administration of the army to the precincts of his own palace.

The Military Secretary Count Grünne was now in the key position. The appointments to the commands, in view of the imminent war against Sardinia, were made largely on his advice. Radetzky had just died at the age of ninety-two. His Quartermaster-General, Baron von Hess, had also reached the age of seventy-one. Yet the army saw in him the destined successor to the old commander-in-chief. But Grünne decided in favour of

his friend, Count Gyulai. Of the seven corps commands, five were given to elderly claimants, who included one member each of the Liechtenstein and Schwarzenberg families, Count Clam-Gallas, Stadion, and Schaafgotsche. The professor of strategy at the Vienna Military Academy, Colonel Kuhn, was appointed Chief of General Staff to Gyulai.

Few military campaigns of the last century have been so abundantly described and discussed as the war of 1859, which began with Stadion's assault on the French at Montebello. Above all, we have the observations of the Prussian General Staff upon the campaign, almost wholly from the pen of Moltke, who exhaustively discussed the lessons of the war. The Austrians were in a favoured situation, since, before Napoleon III appeared, they could have overcome the Piedmontese with greatly superior forces and captured Turin. Kuhn recommended this obvious plan; but Gyulai lost valuable weeks before he could make any decision. Even when the French had circled round and threatened Milan there was still time to attack their foes while they were divided. But Gyulai remained on the defensive, and retired with 115,000 men behind the Ticino. Not till the campaign was half lost was any criticism heard in Vienna. Just as seven years later, before the Battle of Königgrätz, the commander-in-chief was placed, one might say, under the supervision of trustees, but the measures which were recognized as necessary were only half carried out. The Emperor called the aged Hess to his aid, and placed him beside Gyulai, without, however, giving him any definite authority.

On the morning of the 4th June the French crossed the Ticino, Napoleon at Buffolora and MacMahon farther north at Turbigo. Napoleon's guard, in the centre, succeeded in thrusting back Clam-Gallas's corps, but the brigade commanded by Gablenz withstood the attack. On the Austrian left flank the struggle against Marshal Canrobert remained undecided; but meanwhile MacMahon had advanced across the northernmost bridge over the Ticino against the right wing of the Austrians, and had captured Magenta from Clam-Gallas. Yet on the evening of the battle the Austrians were still unvanquished on two-thirds of the battlefield, and two of their corps were quite

fresh, so that they could have well continued the battle on the following day. But Clam-Gallas, on his own initiative, withdrew his corps during the night, after which nothing remained for Austrian headquarters but to retire into the Quadrilateral and to evacuate Milan, where Napoleon III, on his entry on June 8th, was received with enthusiasm.

Clam-Gallas's behaviour went beyond the limits of the 'casual foolishness' which Emperor Francis had tolerated. Yet the Austrian defeat was not due to that alone. Gyulai, with his hesitating and fragmentary advance, had frustrated the successful efforts of the central Austrian forces. In a condition of indecision and distress, he remained aloof from the battlefield in the morning, and only appeared there in the afternoon.

After these irritating and depressing experiences, Francis Joseph himself assumed supreme command. It was the first and last time in his life that he placed himself at the head of his troops as Commander-in-Chief in the Field. Unfortunately, his two advisers, Hess, who was now appointed Chief of General Staff, and General Ramming, were not in agreement. Hess advocated expectant withdrawal to the Quadrilateral, while Ramming desired a speedy offensive.

Meanwhile, however, the French had advanced, and on June 24th the two armies encountered each other at Solferino. When the Emperor Francis Joseph arrived with his staff after half-past eight in the morning on the battlefield where the contest had already begun, Count Schlick, the commander of the forces engaged, had not yet arrived, and had to be fetched from his breakfast. A somewhat aimless debate on the plan of action followed, in which Count Grünne took part, and it was decided that an attempt should be made to encircle the enemy. Count Wimpffen was to undertake decisive action against the right wing of the French, while Benedek was to surround the French left wing.

Napoleon III concentrated his attack on the centre of the Austrian position at Solferino. This point could only be held if Wimpffen fulfilled the task assigned to him, attacking the French right wing with all energy at the appointed moment. But Wimpffen did not act. The Emperor sent one aide-de-camp after another to stir him up ; it was in vain. At two

o'clock in the afternoon the news came that Wimpffen had failed in his effort, and was retiring. The collapse of the Austrian centre could not now be delayed. Reserves were brought into action, but could only cover the rear of the retreating army. Wimpffen now attempted to go back on his decision and to undertake a new attack, but it was too late. By three o'clock the fate of the day was decided, although on Benedek's flank fighting continued until the evening. The defeated army was obliged once more to retire into the Quadrilateral. Lombardy was lost to the House of Hapsburg.

At Solferino, as later at Königgrätz, it became evident how great a gap there was between the aim of upholding Hapsburg prestige by force of arms and the capacity of these arms to perform that function. The end proposed by the neo-absolutists in Vienna was out of all proportion to the means at their disposal.

It is said that, after his entry into Milan, Napoleon III acknowledged a greater degree of chance in the development of this campaign than in any previous war. Certainly, on the Austrian side, chance was made responsible for all that had gone wrong. A letter of General von Kuhn, written in 1893, has preserved the record of one or two of those little 'chances' which were so fatal to Austria in 1859. Kuhn was anxious to rectify some statements of Count Zichy's, an ex-cavalry captain, who had been attached to General Headquarters in 1859. Zichy had recounted that, during the Battle of Magenta, Count Gyulai and his Chief of Staff had kept to their beds during some of the decisive hours. Kuhn, in his letter, acknowledged that in fact both Gyulai and he himself had been found in bed on the day of Magenta. It was necessary to make a decision whether the battle should be continued, and Kuhn was for continuance. He relates : 'As soon as I came to my quarters I lay down without undressing on my bed, and dictated precise orders for the continuance of the battle. I was suffering from very painful boils, or abscesses, of a kind always accompanied by fever. I think they had been brought on by the bad food and the damp climate of Lomellina. One of these boils on my calf had been pressed in the tumult of the battle, causing me great pain and obliging me to lie down. I had just concluded dictating the

orders for Mensdorff's cavalry division when Count Zichy came into my room and handed me a report from the corps commander on the right wing. This report greatly annoyed me, and I ordered my assistant, Colonel Poschacher, immediately to proceed to Count Gyulai. Captain Zichy found Count Gyulai in a deep slumber. Having been shaken to his senses and having taken note of the report (which announced that Clam-Gallas had retired on his own initiative), he gave the order for retreat, nor could any efforts of Poschacher persuade him to change this decision.'

This story bears the stamp of truth, nor does the judgement which the Chief of Staff passes on one of the corps commanders and upon his own immediate chief require any amplification. The scenes on the battlefield did not fail to make an impression upon the Emperor. For the first time his pride was deeply wounded. The war of 1859 had been his war in a peculiar sense. He had sent the ultimatum to Turin, and he was convinced that he could bring a campaign which had begun so badly to a successful end by himself assuming the Supreme Command. All had failed him—the leaders, the strategy, tactics, and even in some cases the troops. He had to deal with cases like that of Clam-Gallas and that of a division of the second corps which had to be disbanded. Even the trusted cavalry, with the exception of the Hussars under Edelsheim, fell short of their reputation, and there was the unprecedented scandal of a cavalry general, Baron Lauingen, yielding on the field of battle to a sudden transport of fear and behaving in such a manner that the Emperor ordered him before a court-martial. Lauingen, who had for a short time commanded the reserve cavalry of Schlick's army in place of Count Zedwitz, was condemned to death by the court, but pardoned by the Emperor.

There has been much discussion why Francis Joseph accepted so quickly and with so little hesitation the terms proposed to him by Napoleon III on July 8th at Villafranca, which included renunciation of Lombardy. Bismarck was closely watching the trend of events from Petersburg. Despite his warnings, Berlin was inclined to consider armed intervention in favour of Austria. Bismarck was wrathful, but his observations were essentially just. 'It is worse than if we were Austria's



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reserve army,' he said ; 'we are sacrificing ourselves for Austria, saving her from the consequences of her own war. But when the first shot is fired on the Rhine, and Paris is threatened, then the German war will put everything else in the shade. Austria will draw her breath ; but how will she use her liberty of action ? Will it be to assist us in playing a great part ?'

But Berlin's policy remained uncertain, for from South Germany there came forth a unanimous invitation to her to take up arms on behalf of brother Germans in peril. The sentiments of South Germany were still with Austria. An end was put to all these discussions by Francis Joseph's sudden decision to renounce Lombardy and to make peace. This painful step was taken, not in consequence of false information spread by Napoleon, nor of political alarms, but as the result of unfortunate experiences in the battlefield and of the distressing report brought to headquarters from Vienna by Count Rechberg. His report told of an atmosphere in the Empire which called for immediate action, 'if the very existence of the monarchy were not to be imperilled.' The report followed upon a Cabinet Council on June 9th, 1859, in which the possible consequences of the war were discussed. 'Such is the general dissatisfaction,' we read in the minutes of that meeting, 'that even in public places in Vienna shameless criticisms are directed against the course of military operations, and even the majority of the army do not conceal their sympathy with such views. Reports from Hungary and the provinces show a similar situation there ; in these circumstances the Ministers took it to be their sacred duty respectfully to bring these matters to His Majesty's knowledge without any concealment.'

## CHAPTER IX

### THE REVOLT OF THE NOBILITY

THERE now occurred one of the most remarkable chapters in the history of Francis Joseph. The preface to these events was a military defeat for which the nobility who stood at the head of the army were in no small part responsible. Yet the consequence of the defeat was that the bourgeois element was removed from the mechanism of absolute government, while the position of the nobility was strengthened.

In July, Alexander Bach was dismissed, and the Ministry was partly reconstituted. The Governor of Galicia, Count Agenor Goluchowski, became Minister of the Interior, Hübner became Minister of Police, while Bruck and Thun maintained their posts. When Count Goluchowski took over the Ministry of the Interior, he decided to use the library as a dining-room, and, with this end in view, had the books bundled out anyhow. 'He is not a European, he is a pure Tartar,' complained a highly cultivated civil servant, who in the days of Bach had carefully catalogued the fine library of the Ministry of the Interior and now saw all his work reduced to nothing.

The Government's programme was published in August 1859 in the *Wiener Zeitung*, but it gave little information. A concession to the business world, which was, in view of the altogether lamentable condition of the State's credit, quite paltry, consisted in a promise that the expenditure of the civil and military administration would henceforth be subjected to 'effective control,' and that 'the position of the Jews would be regulated along modern lines, though with consideration of local and provincial circumstances.' The Emperor did not let the notion of a change of system—that is, of a return to the Constitution—even cross his mind, nor was such a thought once expressed in the wearisome debates of the Cabinet. It was quite alien to Francis Joseph to see in defeats and misfortunes the results of the 'system.' He could not properly understand the meaning of the word 'system,' which implies a belief in the value of ideas and in historical evolution. He was so completely convinced

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of his own omnipotence that no doubt ever arose for him about it. When errors occurred, he attributed them to the mistakes of individuals ; which explains why, after disasters and misfortunes, he so quickly and harshly got rid of men to whom very shortly before he had given his full confidence.

Two matters now preoccupied the Emperor—Hungary and the financial situation. He knew, with the instinctive wisdom of his family, that the discontent in Vienna, the open and concealed social conflicts, the resentment of the educated classes, and the bitter satisfaction of the opposition at seeing things go badly, were unsubstantial forces ; the only substantial and dangerous force was Hungary. Long experience had taught the Hapsburgs this lesson, and Francis Joseph was more than ever bitterly aware of this truth now that he had only subjected Hungary thanks to Russian aid. Francis Joseph knew, that until he reached a settlement with Hungary, there could be no revival of the monarchy.

But if the Emperor was ready to acknowledge this, in all else he maintained his attitude of distrust against the whole of Hungary. Even the aristocratic group, known as the Hungarian Old Conservatives, were highly suspect to him, as is shown in an order from his own pen to the Supreme Chief of Police, Baron Kempen, ordering him to keep under close observation the association known as the Hungarian Old Conservatives. 'I require you to have the activities of this Association both in Vienna and the suburbs, and in Hungary, and more particularly Pest, closely observed by reliable and competent persons, and from time to time to give me a full report of the result of these observations.' In a further letter to the Archduke Rainer, in his capacity as President of the State Assembly bearing the name of 'Reichsrat,' the Emperor ordered him, in the strictest terms, to reproach Ladislaus von Szögyény, a member of the Reichsrat, for his participation in the meetings of the Old Conservatives. 'You are to call attention expressly, in my name, to his conduct, and to warn him severely never in the future to take part in such consultations or meetings.' But three years later the object of these admonitions was to be a member of the Vienna Government as Second Chancellor of the Court of Hungary.

Hungary was the Emperor's perpetual preoccupation. Rechberg, with the assistance of Hübner, attempted to open relations with the Hungarian politicians. The only result of these first attempts was that one of the spokesmen of the Hungarian Old Conservatives, Count Dessewffy, composed a memorial recommending a *coup d'état* in the name and cause of historical tradition. But the moment was not yet ripe. Hübner, who had taken up the cause of the Old Conservatives, was obliged to resign.

The approach to Hungary, which the Emperor could not bring about by direct means, was to be realized by indirect means. The financial situation was quite out of hand; the exchange rates sank from month to month; the London rate, which from the end of 1858 to the middle of January 1859 had fluctuated between 101.4 and 101.8 moved in April to 136 and in June to 146. For war purposes, Austria had not only expended the whole result of the National Loan, that was 611,000,000 gulden, but had also had to sell the Southern Railway. In the eyes of the financiers, Austria was a State whose peoples were discontented, whose armies had been defeated, whose National Debt was large, and whose coffers were empty. Nor could the power of finance be silenced by those methods which had silenced the Peoples of Austria. A casual promise to control State expenditure and to tolerate the Jews was not enough.

It must be recalled that the most peculiar special regulations were still at this time in force against the Jewish population. Not till 1859 were Jews permitted to employ Christian servants. Even later than this, Jews could not marry without the approval of the local Government authorities. It was not till January 6th, 1860, that regulations previously in force throughout Galicia, South Tyrol, and Venetia, forbidding Jews to give evidence against a Christian in favour of a Jew, were repealed. There still remained limitations on liberty of movement and property rights. In most of the provinces, Jews were only permitted to purchase farms if they themselves settled on the land and worked it with their own hands.

The Jews were thus subject to treatment dating from before the March Revolution. The treatment of the Hungarian Pro-

testants was worse than it had been before that date. Count Dessewffy, Old Conservative as he was, and an aristocrat of the most uncompromising colour, yet described Count Thun's order against the Protestants of Hungary as 'the most colossal piece of idiocy since 1848.' The effect of the order was to break up the organization of the Evangelical Church, to limit its financial independence, to place the schools under severe State control, and, above all, to sanction arbitrary interference by the authorities in the building of churches. Hungary had scarcely settled down when the promulgation of this order fanned passions once more into flame. Numerous petitions addressed to the Emperor produced no effect whatever.

The Emperor now, after much hesitation, made a concession to the insistences of the Hungarian Conservative nobility, and to the suspicions of the financiers. In March 1860 he appointed ten life-long and thirty-eight temporary councillors to be extraordinary members of the Reichsrat, which at that moment existed as a purely official body of ten members, according to Kübeck's design. In this way the Emperor was enabled to open his ear to fresh advice ; though it was only under compulsion that he did so, and without sacrificing a jot or tittle of the principles he had learned from Kübeck. It was enough, however, to permit the problem of Austria to revive from the lethargy which had enveloped it, albeit in a different form. The driving force no longer came, as at Kremsier, from the Peoples themselves, but from the nobility, and, above all, the Hungarian nobility. The most important part fell to the Old Conservative Party, led by Count Anton Szécsen, which, in the reconstituted Reichsrat, showed a great superiority, both in political thought and in debating capacity. This is not surprising, for the Magyar nobility had behind them many centuries of traditional liberty and privileges. There was one fact, however, which quite escaped Francis Joseph when he conversed with the Old Conservative nobility of Hungary. He did not realize that those whom he now desired to employ as instruments of conciliation were without power in their own country. Their constitutional programme was received in Hungary with outbursts of wrath and mockery, and was completely defeated by the united resistance of the lesser nobility, the peasantry,

and the small, but very active, bourgeoisie of the towns and villages.

✓ An evolution had taken place in Hungary which was without parallel in Austria. The small nobility had allied themselves with the educated classes and with the new bourgeoisie to form a middle-class which became the bearer of the national political conscience. —

This small nobility of Hungary marched under the flag of a full national and constitutional programme, advocating Hungarian independence and autonomy without in any way countenancing the feudal ambitions of the Dessewffy, Jósika, and Szécsen families. Of popular feeling throughout the country there could be no doubt. The Hungarians did not flinch before persecution, nor did they respond to any approaches. On March 15th, the anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution, students deposited laurel wreaths on the graves of the fallen. The military police fired on them, and wounded a university student. The student's funeral gave occasion for a demonstration such as the Hungarian capital had not seen for twelve years; half the population accompanied the hearse to the cemetery, and in the procession were to be seen the most prosperous citizens, with their wives and daughters, together with the nobility and their wives in deep mourning, marching in the midst of the crowd.

A few days afterwards a fresh excitement spread in the city. Stephan Széchenyi had been almost forgotten since in 1848, a prey to melancholia, he had been transported to a sanatorium in Vienna half as a patient and half as a prisoner. But now a police search in his house recalled old memories. News came, further, that Baron Jósika, the last Court Chancellor for Siebenbürgen, the count's faithful friend, had died immediately after visiting him. In truth, Vienna was guiltless, but every Hungarian was ready to swear that Jósika had been poisoned. When, a few days afterwards, on April 7th, Széchenyi shot himself in the sanatorium, the Hungarian capital was so convinced that both men had been murdered that, it was said, 'even in the best society it was impossible to show the slightest doubt without being marked out and avoided as a police spy.'

The Vienna police did its best to give colour to the legend by sanctioning for the funeral the date of April 11th, but secretly

ordering that the dead man should be buried on April 10th, so that the Hungarian students might be prevented from participating in the procession. The only result of this was that the Prince Primate of Hungary, Cardinal Sztotvski, celebrated a requiem in the Minster of Pest which was attended by 80,000 persons.

The picture of Hungarian opinion which resulted both from these outstanding events and from innumerable and daily minor occurrences, made the strongest impression upon Francis Joseph, and from this time for many years this impression determined the internal policy of the Empire. True, the Emperor's belief that constitutional aspirations were an abomination remained undisturbed either by the events in Hungary or by the financial difficulties of the Empire. This is shown by the report of a Cabinet meeting which took place at this time. 'His Majesty the Emperor was pleased to declare that it was absolutely necessary to expound the position of the Government with regard to the question of internal policy for guidance of the provincial governors specially in their duty of controlling the Press. Constitutional aspirations are being expressed more and more openly in the newspapers, and are frankly asserted even in highly placed quarters. His Majesty is firmly determined not to yield to this pressure. He holds it to be his duty not to sanction an elective constitution which would be absolutely unsuited to Austria. In order that no doubt may exist on this important matter, His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty intends hereafter to make a positive declaration in the Conference of State that he will suffer no limitation of the Royal power, but will rather face the stormiest demonstrations.' The ceremonial language of this report reveals with how much passion the young Emperor defended himself against the assault of constitutional principles. For him, these principles were still, as Kübeck had taught him, 'an Anglo-French invention,' for which Austria was quite unfitted.

Now, therefore, he introduced changes, not in the system of Government, but in personnel. The Archduke Albert was removed from the post of Governor-General and Viceroy of Hungary, and replaced by General Benedek. Benedek, son of a doctor at Ödenburg, of German race and Protestant

religion, had incurred displeasure through his criticisms of the conduct of the Supreme Command at the Battle of Solferino. But he was popular as the only successful general in that unfortunate campaign. His picture was to be seen in the shop windows of Pest, encouraging the Hungarian regiments at San Martino with the words, 'Rajta Magyarok, én is Magyar vagyok' ('Forward, Hungarians! One Hungarian does not desert another').

Benedek took over his new duties in the spirit of a respectable gentleman and a soldier. He invited citizens of Pest to his table. He discussed the ecclesiastical controversy with evangelical clergy, and asked for information, because, as he remarked, whenever he went to Vienna, 'the Emperor worried him with questions about it.' Often he carried frankness to excess, but, however that may be, he treated his Hungarians better than they had been treated for some time. On May 15th, 1860, he withdrew the unhappy decree against the Protestants, and amnestied the martyrs. None the less, the report which he submitted to the Cabinet at the memorable meeting of June 29th was anxious in tone. In plain language he declared that, if Hungary were not allowed her Diet and the rights of self-government which she demanded, revolution must be expected. The Minister of Justice, Count Nádasdy, concurred, and the Minister of Police, von Thierry, declared that the information given was altogether correct. The Minister of Finance, Ignaz von Plener, said that 'half-measures were of no avail, and to attempt them would be irrevocably to lose the moment for a settlement.'

The Emperor now added his word. 'His Majesty, holding fast to his declarations of May 29th, was pleased once more to express his firm intention not to grant an elective constitution.' In a written memorial to Benedek, however, the Emperor had promised that he intended 'to introduce a system of political administration through the mechanism of councils, to link up these councils by calling general meetings, and to advance proposals for reviving the Diets, in order that the system of self-government by Diets and Diet Commissions, which it was intended to introduce in all provinces, might apply also to Hungary.' The Emperor hoped that this memorial and the enlarge-



ment of the Reichsrat would suffice to calm the threatened agitation in Hungary, and would enable him to tackle the financial distress of the Empire.

Kübeck had intended the Reichsrat to crown the most intense system of despotic rule. The Reichsrat was to render the monarch independent of his Ministers, acting as a kind of private bureau of advice to a completely irresponsible despot. If now the character of the Reichsrat were altered, and 'important questions of general legislation and control of the State budget' were placed within its competence, this resulted, not from the Emperor's wishes, but from the necessity of the Empire. The thirty-year-old monarch put up a stern fight for the maintenance of his absolute power, and, at almost every Cabinet meeting at this time, declared, in brief but generally energetic terms, that he was determined not to yield one jot of his power. How thoroughly it had been dinned into him never to advance along the path of constitutional concessions can be clearly gathered from these energetic repudiations.

He could justify before his conscience a petty enlargement of the competency of the Reichsrat, for, after all, this body was composed of devoted servants chosen by himself—archdukes, archbishops, generals, civil servants, and nobles. Even when he promised to grant a certain measure of self-government to the provinces he had no thought of giving them legislative powers. And yet, despite all his efforts to defend the principle of absolute rule against criticism of any kind, and to exclude any discussion of it, he could not prevent the Austrian question from becoming the preoccupation, the sole serious concern even, of the enlarged Reichsrat. How was it possible for that body to discuss the budget and the financial need of the Empire without passing judgement on the accomplishments of the absolute Government of the last ten years? The sessions of the Reichsrat were as formal as a Court ceremony. The language of the debates was careful, courtly, and involved. The speakers concealed their thoughts beneath the veil of general political maxims and philosophic arguments. Yet, even in this drawing-room Parliament, the problem of the Empire came uppermost, demanding definite formulation.

True, it was a sad falling off since the days of Kremsier. At

Kremsier the real forces of the Empire had been represented fully and frankly, the variance of classes and nations had been faithfully mirrored. The hall of the Government Palace of Vienna, where the Reichsrat met, gave only a crooked reflection. Those Councillors on whom, to all appearance, the Imperial nomination had descended quite fortuitously, represented only one part of the true forces of the Empire, namely, the landowning nobility and the higher bureaucracy. The bourgeoisie was quite excluded, save in so far as its view of the problems of the Empire corresponded with that of the Liberal constitutionalist minority in the Reichsrat. Yet it would be false to describe this remarkable body which met in the Herrengasse in Vienna as merely a 'limited class representation.' The debates which followed on the presentation of the majority resolution by Count Szécsen were rich in historical and political thought, in clear insight, and in polite but keen argument. The questions at issue were dealt with from a lofty standpoint, and this, together with the wealth of administrative experience and political knowledge displayed in many speeches, gave an impressive and attractive picture of the gifts and qualifications of the uppermost class in Austrian society. But the voice of the Nations was not heard in this assembly, nor did the political ambition and self-consciousness of the rising classes find any expression in it. Yet a reform of the Empire was unthinkable without these two elements.

To a great extent the Cabinet meetings were devoted to discussion of the same questions, which thus came directly to the Emperor's attention. Yet he altogether failed to understand the nature of the struggle which underlay these debates. He had no idea how fraught with consequences would be the new proposal of Count Szécsen to renounce the idea of a unified State and to reform the Austrian monarchy according to the 'historical and political individualities' of the provinces and the races. He did not dream how significant it was to the future that the German and Bohemian nobility should support the Hungarian Old Conservatives and put their name to the Hungarian project.

Even as a young man, Francis Joseph was quite lacking in that creative imagination which enables a man to view history as

something living, and so to recognize the links between past and present which alone render the present comprehensible. Thus it did not cross his mind that the Austrian nobility, in recognizing the Hungarian doctrine of historic rights, was dealing a deadly blow against the work of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. The champions in Hungary of the novel idea of a national State were the small nobility, the intellectual class, and the Press. The 'modern wing' of the old Hungarian feudal nobility—such men as Szécsen, Dessewffy, and Vay—who now had the Emperor's ear, sought to realize this project of a national State on Conservative lines within the framework of the monarchy; and in this aim they called the Hungarian nobility to their aid. Their first goal was to restore in Hungary the Constitution of 1847. This section of the nobility naturally attached great importance to the incompatibility of the ideas of French Liberalism and Parliamentarianism with the historic rights recognized by the old feudal Constitution; it was probably, however, political opportunism which caused them to stress this incompatibility so largely. By decrying the democratic constitution as 'vulgar,' and the theory of the constitutionalists as 'untrue to history' and 'colourless,' they awoke delighted response in the Emperor. It is a pity that he never read a serious book and never attempted to understand the problem of his Empire. There were two volumes of Joseph von Eötvös, *An Essay on the Equality of the Races of Austria* and *The Guarantees of Austria's Power and Unity*, which he might have read at this time. They would have suggested lines of thought to him which might have spared him many errors in the future. But it was alien to the nature of this unimaginative man, who cared only for the power and the so-called prestige of his family, to take the trouble to understand the inner significance of the crisis of 1860. In all the numerous projects advanced in the Reichsrat he saw nothing but their bearing on one question: he wished to feel quite sure that, having recovered her autonomy, Hungary would recognize the Emperor's word as the supreme law of the Empire. Naturally, then, he listened to those Hungarian Old Conservatives who promised him that it would be so; naturally he encouraged his advisers to deliver him discourses on the 'historic and political individualities' of his territories, and never gave a thought to the

possibility that by extending the principle of local autonomy to Austria itself he might be disturbing the foundations of the unified State created by Maria Theresa as the instrument of the power of the House of Hapsburg.

Before these plans came to maturity in the celebrated October Proclamation, Francis Joseph had to face a bid for supremacy by the Austrian nobility. From the days of Ferdinand II to those of Maria Theresa, the Hapsburg dynasty had built up its absolute power in struggles against the nobility and the feudal system ; in the first place, by military means, and later, by the creation of the centralized bureaucracy. Francis Joseph had inherited this tradition from his ancestors. The dynasty, the army, and the German bureaucracy were the three pillars which sustained the family state of the Hapsburgs. Thanks to these, the family had maintained itself as a great power in its wars against Frederick the Great, the French Revolution, and Napoleon. Even the despotic ruler Francis had relied upon these three pillars. Kübeck and Schwarzenberg had worked to strengthen them ; while the Centralist policy of Bach had been a continuation of the old tradition in a new form. The nobility dominated society, enjoyed privileges in the army, but it had no special rights secured by law as a heritage from ancient times. When the old Hungarian nobility sought to transform the Constitution, the Austrian nobility was altogether seduced by the romantic evocation of feudal traditions ; all the more so because since the days of Schwarzenberg and Bach it had suffered somewhat of an eclipse, and felt itself shoved aside. Schwarzenberg's allies, the intellectual originators of Francis Joseph's revived absolutism, were clever persons from the bourgeoisie. Some of them had started as revolutionaries before they transferred their loyalty to reaction. Some of them had sprung from families traditionally devoted to the Austrian civil service.

The dislike felt by the High Conservatives, by the old noble families, against Vienna and the centralized bureaucracy, was not without grounds. Yet they were aware of the difference between them and their Hungarian allies. Even the Conservative wing in the Hungarian nobility was fighting to secure for a national State the enjoyment of the greatest possible measure of autonomy, and could point to rights which had been handed

down throughout a thousand years without interruption. The Austrian nobility, seeking to apply the Hungarian theory of 'the rights of the nation as a historic and political individuality' to the circumstances of Austria, were demanding, on the other hand, a return to the situation which had prevailed in Austria before the State had been organized. This meant the destruction of the fruit of centuries of labour, to which the Hapsburg dynasty had devoted their whole force and energy.

We can learn what were the aims of the Austrian noble party at this time from a *Memorial by Nine Gentlemen of the High Nobility*, rescued from the secrecy of the Imperial Private Archives in Vienna by Josef Redlich. On the last page of this document is written in the Emperor's hand the indication '*ad Acta.*' It bears the signature of the following members of the great noble families of Bohemia : Prince Adolf zu Schwarzenberg ; Hugo, Prince and Count zu Salm ; Vinzenz Karl, Prince zu Auersperg ; Karl, Count Wallenstein-Trachtburg ; Josef, Prince zu Colloredo-Mansfeld ; Albert, Count Nostitz ; Anton Alexander, Count Auersperg ; Leopold, Count zu Wallenstein-Trachtburg ; Heinrich Jaroslav, Count Clam-Martinitz. The noble lords represented to the Emperor, in the name of their peers, that it was necessary to revive the feudal provincial Constitutions, on the basis of differentiation into the following classes ; the Church, the landowners, the citizens, the peasants, the small landowners, and industry. 'It is our desire'—so one sentence of this document runs—'that the bourgeoisie should not be dominated by cosmopolitan, financial elements, nor yet by the detached intellectuals, but that those elements which are more closely bound to the land should play the leading part.' Rights of self-government were to be conceded to these feudal bodies, the same rights which had been annihilated by the 'successful advance of the bureaucratic administration.' 'There are only two possible ways ; one making for the re-shaping of Austria as a uniform State with a modern Constitution. The other way, which we recommend, would place public life not upon a fictitious basis, but upon the basis of actual conditions and historic right.'

This bid for power by the nobility against the bureaucracy was the last great attempt made by the Austrian nobles to ob-

tain for their class a decisive influence upon the development of the State. Count Clam, who must be considered principal author of the memorial and ring-leader of his peers, was inspired by the vision of transforming the Imperial central administration of the last one hundred and fifty years into a provincial and feudal administration, with partial self-government for the towns—a system comparable with that aristocratic self-government which the great landowners of England had established between 1700 and 1850 in alliance with the highest section of the bourgeoisie.

The 'October Proclamation' is the name given to a general exposition of the internal reforms which Francis Joseph now determined to put through. In this proclamation, the Emperor asserted that his right 'to make, modify, and annul laws' would henceforth be exercised, 'with the co-operation of legally assembled Diets.' Attached to it were autograph letters to the Prime Minister, Count Rechberg; to the Minister of State, Goluchowski; to the Banus of Croatia, and to the Chancellor of the Hungarian Court, Baron Vay. Finally, there appeared a manifesto addressed 'to my Peoples' in which the significance of the proclamation was once more expounded.

The circumstances of the origin of the proclamation were characteristic of this period of the reign. The Emperor had acted upon the advice of Count Szécsen, who had persuaded him in the course of a conversation in the Imperial saloon car of a railway train. Rechberg was let into the secret, and Francis Joseph's correspondence with Szécsen went through his hands. Till the middle of October, Count Goluchowski was kept in the dark. When he was informed, he had to work night and day preparing the decrees. The Minister of Finance, Ignaz von Plener, was kept altogether out of the secret, and, thanks to his ignorance of the Emperor's intentions, was able to defend the cause of the Liberal bureaucratic centralist system with much courage and ability against the autonomists both in the Reichsrat and in the Cabinet. At all events, the Emperor appeared himself to be the originator of the new constitutional legislation, and it was upon him that the entire moral responsibility fell.

The October Proclamation had a disastrous effect upon public opinion. Hungary was uncertain whether a patriot should

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illuminate his windows in honour of the event, or smash the windows of those who did so. On the third and fourth evenings there were still some illuminated windows in Budapest, but they were soon smashed in, as a result of the police granting permission to illuminate, which spurred on the students to window-smashing exploits. What everybody realized was that pressure upon Hungary was relaxing ; in consequence, the hatred which for ten years the Hungarians had been concealing now broke forth in the most primitive form. Imperial eagles disappeared from all the public buildings ; if the authorities did not take the initiative, the populace removed the hated symbols with violence. No token of Imperial or Austrian rule could be suffered to remain. The Municipal Council of Clausenburg ordered the trees on the circular boulevard to be cut down for no other reason than that they had been planted during this oppressive period. Blood flowed at Ketskemet, where the peasants revolted against the demands of the taxation authorities. Inventories were burned, legal records destroyed, notifications and summonses returned unopened to the authorities.

The promise which had been made of a restoration of local councils was taken in deadly earnest. Szécsen, the prime author of the new legislation, conceived the idea of proclaiming a state of siege, and carrying out the elections to the Diets with all speed under the protection thus afforded. But the Austrian territories protested, if possible, still more forcibly against the October Proclamation. The concession of Diets in which citizens should be represented, alongside prelates, nobles, and peasants, was taken as an insult to the bourgeoisie. — The severest governmental measures, Press censorship, and a great show of police authority, could not drown the noise of the uproar. The Municipal Councils of Graz and Salzburg resigned. The Press unanimously took up an attitude of opposition against the reforms. By the end of November, it was quite clear that the October programme could not be carried out. The Vienna Press singled out Count Goluchowski, and directed its sharpest attacks upon him as being primarily responsible for the scheme.

It was not, however, in consequence of this external pressure that the Emperor now decided to drop Goluchowski, but because of the financial distress of Austria, which was now even worse

than the year before—and war was on the horizon. Everywhere there were threatening signs : Garibaldi had marched into Naples, the Papal troops had been thoroughly beaten at Castelfidardo, Napoleon was furious at the attempt to isolate him which had been made at the Warsaw conference, and a French pamphlet entitled *Francis Joseph I and Europe* was an attack upon the Austrian Emperor which obviously sprang from official inspiration. Once more there was a dearth of ready money. Silver coinage found its way across the frontiers, and the currency requirements of retail trade had to be helped out with postage stamps and with private money, consisting in promises to pay, issued by café proprietors and commissionaires.

The records of the Cabinet meetings at this time make gloomy reading. At the meeting of November 17th, the Emperor showed great annoyance at the language of the Press, which, he declared, was responsible for the general unrest. Goluchowski proposed ruthless suppression of the offending organs ; but the Minister for Police, Meccséry, advocated a more modern and conciliatory proceeding, namely, 'To get at the newspaper proprietors, either with the help of money or with that of personal influence.' Plener seconded this proposal, declaring that : 'It would be untimely to render journalism impossible in Austria.' Goluchowski, however, refused to be convinced. 'The carrying on of Government will be rendered impossible,' he declared, 'if we do not soon set bounds to the corrupting influence of the newspapers.' Count Szécsen replied that the unpleasant situation had not been occasioned by the Press, which was simply 'a channel of public intelligence,' but by failure to execute the reforms in a sufficiently resolute manner. Minister von Plener then raised his voice against suppression of the newspapers, and thereby revealed that Goluchowski was isolated and his position untenable. The good Minister of Finance was so much preoccupied with the cares of his own department that he quite naturally introduced a metaphor from the Bourse, declaring that it was beyond the power of a mere price-marker to bring about depression on the Bourse, or an adverse situation of the exchange, if there were not already a considerable lack of confidence about, and if the letters of foreign business men did not already make it clear that credit was bad. Suppression of the



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newspapers would do no good. An internal remedy must be found to counteract the malady ; Austria's financial distress, Plener concluded, was a result of the political situation.

The Emperor, who had taken part in this meeting, was obliged, a few days later, to listen to still less comforting words. The Minister of War demanded funds for new military preparations against Italy ; but Plener declared it was utterly impossible to raise money. His words were, 'Once more I repeat that our financial problem cannot be solved by other means than a modernization of our political conditions at home. The financial question is a radically political question.' Minister von Lasser was equally clear. In the Emperor's presence he asserted that it would be dishonourable to refrain from declaring that since October 20th the atmosphere in Austria had taken a decided change for the worse, that the demands for political equality with Hungary were becoming louder and louder, and that this demand would not be satisfied by merely placing the Diets on a formal equality, which would simply mean favouring separatism. Count Szécsen replied that Hungary had not desired any special privileges. The non-Hungarian Diets were to be called into active collaboration, with the single limit that 'His Majesty must retain an influence sufficient to modify undue pressure by the majorities.' Redlich remarks that this observation of Count Szécsen supplies an incomparably clever definition of the quasi-constitutionalism of Francis Joseph.

Plener now seized the occasion to deliver his opinion on the responsibility of Ministers, which elicited from Count Goluchowski the melancholy remark : 'Here we are, then, in the middle of introducing a modern Constitution, with responsible Ministers.' It was true : Goluchowski, in his inattentiveness to what was going on around, while he was wholly absorbed in working out the details of the October Proclamation, had not observed that, in the month following the issue of that document, yet another change had become ripe. It was Szécsen once again who gave the lead, persuading the Emperor that the mistake of the October Proclamation was its failure to accord a sufficient measure of 'Liberalism' to the German and Slav territories. It would be necessary, therefore, to entrust somebody

less unpopular in Vienna than Count Goluchowski with the execution of the reform. Szécsen had realized that the aristocratic party could not do without the help of the bureaucracy.

So it was that the revolt of the nobles ended in a compromise with the civil service. The only way of satisfying the Austrian territories, and so preserving something of the October programme, was to enlist the help of the Liberal bureaucracy. And the bureaucracy was once more clever enough not to refuse, knowing that the transference of a considerable measure of executive authority to autonomous local bodies must be a step in the direction of Liberal and constitutional Parliamentary rule. Szécsen and Plener both stood at the point of confluence of the two currents. Szécsen plotted the fall of Goluchowski, and Plener accomplished it. It was Plener's advice which now led the Emperor to summon a representative of the Liberal bureaucracy to his service, Anton von Schmerling.

## CHAPTER X

### SCHMERLING

PRESCOTT recounts, in his history of the reign of Philip II, the scene which occurred in the harbour of Flushing on August 20th, 1559, when the King left the Netherlands for Spain. On taking leave of his courtiers, he suddenly turned to the Prince of Orange, and asked him what was the root of the resistance of the Estates General. Prince William, taken aback by the sudden question, answered that the nation itself was in revolt against the monarchical authority. 'No,' shouted the King in excitement, violently shaking the Prince's hand, 'it is not the nation, it is you, you, you !' Three hundred years later, Francis Joseph was asking where was the root of Hungary's resistance. To whom could responsibility be brought home for the disturbance of order in the Holy Empire ? Since the day when he received the crown from his uncle at Olmutz, Francis Joseph never questioned his own right to supreme and absolute power of decision over all matters affecting his subjects' rights, over the laws which governed them, the wars they had to wage. Right of decision, he assumed, belonged to him alone, and his decisions had to be justified only before his own conscience.

Neither the October Proclamation nor the February Constitution had in any way modified this conviction. In both cases the Emperor had made concessions of his own free will, without in any way limiting his own absolute power. These and the following years were full of sudden shifts, which have been described as the effect of 'acrobatic changes of standpoint' in the Emperor. Thus Bach was suddenly dropped in favour of the diametrically opposed Goluchowski ; the method of bureaucratic centralism suddenly gave way to the policy of the autonomists ; then followed Schmerling, and the three counts, Belcredi, Larisch, and Mensdorff. Then the Conservatives were thrown over in favour of Karl Auersperg's bourgeois Ministry, to be followed by Hohenwart's and Schaffle's experiments in Federalism, this in its turn giving place to the constitutional

rule of Adolf Auersperg. These changes, however much they may appear to reflect a great uncertainty of feeling, in fact did nothing to modify the Emperor's secure consciousness of absolute power. And, indeed, an observer, viewing Francis Joseph against a background of national and class struggle, of feudal and social conflicts, and of all the true and fallacious ideas, all the accurate visions of the future, and romantic visions of the past which these implied, could not but find his proceeding spasmodic and changeable. While Francis Joseph, undisturbed by any comprehension of history, found no guidance save in the indications of his own will, the Hapsburg Empire, fruit of matrimonial alliances and of warlike struggles, of cunning guile and of statesmanlike wisdom, could be compared to a great expanse of country viewed through distorted glasses, which turned the shapes of reality to caricature. The contradictions inherent in the opposing forces which made up this Empire seemed beyond solution.

Francis Joseph had no eye for any other resistance than that of Hungary. The resistance of the hereditary territories did not reach his ear, while in Vienna he saw only her new and more friendly aspect. Hungary was the dark point in the picture, for without Hungary there could be no assurance of absolute power, no certain military force to back the will of the dynasty, and no maintenance of its position in Germany. It was the triple fear of a diminution in the European importance of the dynasty and the Empire, of danger threatening from the houses of Savoy and Hohenzollern, and of the plots which might be hatched by the Hungarian emigrants in their quiet activities in Paris and Turin, which kept Francis Joseph in constant alarm.

It was the resistance of Hungary which induced Francis Joseph, after long hesitation, to approach the Hungarian Old Conservatives ; but for this the October Proclamation would never have come into being, and the path which culminated with the Constitution of February and the nomination of Schmerling would never have been trodden. The tradition of Austrian Liberalism sees in Anton von Schmerling the image of a new era and the apostle of Liberalism. He sprang from a notable circle of families active in the higher civil service, in industry, finance, and trade, which during the reign of Emperor Francis

had been known as the 'Second Society,' to distinguish them from the 'First Society' of the high hereditary nobility. From this circle of wealthy citizens sprang the finest flower of Austrian history, the culture of old Vienna, of the Viennese *bourgeois gentilhomme*. But it was an autumn flower, born in the last days of an age which permitted freedom of thought of the second rank only, limited, that is, to such affairs as lay outside politics. Lack of political freedom led to an extreme liberty in the pursuit of private passions. Such periods are favourable to the arts ; music, above all, which comes in the last phase of every culture, now reached its fullest maturity. The sole heritage of the absolute rule of Francis was the charm of the transition period between the *ancien régime* and 1848.

The age of Francis Joseph did not produce anything worthy to be set up beside it. The letters and diaries of the circle of Grillparzer, Schubert, Schreyvogel, Bauernfeld, and Lenau depict this society, with its subdued love of life, its gay pessimism, and its tragic sense of the passage of time.

It was in this circle that Schmerling, son of the Clerk of the Court of Appeal, was brought up. His mother, a daughter of the well-known journalist von Zeiller, also belonged to the 'Second Society.' They moved among such people as the Barons Stifft, Sommaruga, Pratobevera, Löwenthal, Koudelka, Kiesewetter ; and the banker families of Arnstein, Perera, Wertheimstein, and Gomperz. Schmerling was wholly unconnected with the men of 1848. He belonged more than a little to the *ancien régime*, and confessed that he would sooner have been a military officer, like his brother the general. His manner was sharp and authoritative ; the pathetic airs of the Liberal petty bourgeoisie were altogether distasteful to him. Freedom of opinion was a matter which little interested him. He was quite capable of utilizing the newspapers, and even created his own Press Bureau, but at heart he hated the Press. 'His Majesty,' he declared in the Reichstag, 'is the organ of executive authority, which he exercises without limitation. His responsible Ministers give him advice of which he may make use, but their views are no more than suggestions which must crystallize into personal opinions of His Majesty before they can be given practical effect.' It was thus that the leader of the

Viennese Liberals, the Father of the Constitution, visualized the nature of the Constitution and of responsible government. His ideas coincided altogether with the philosophy of Kübeck ; the formula quoted above exactly describes Francis Joseph's system. Yet it must not be thought that Schmerling cut an undignified figure before Francis Joseph. He was, on the contrary, one of the Ministers that the Emperor found less easy to deal with. In one sense he was pliable enough, being always ready to follow the directions and desires of the Emperor, so that a clash of opinions never arose ; but his haughty personal manner was displeasing to the monarch. Francis Joseph himself was accustomed to express his desire in brief military language ; to give orders which brooked no contradiction. Schmerling annoyed him, yet beyond doubt this sturdy individual made a strong impression on Francis Joseph. Moreover this typical member of the German-Austrian upper class, inheritor of the tradition of Maria Theresa, was the man who gave its final shape to the political doctrine of the Austrian Germans, and thereby prepared their doom.

The two fatal notions which he bequeathed to them were, first of all, his view of the German question, and, secondly, his devotion to the Centralist and bureaucratic system of Imperial rule. It was not out of national feeling that he had become a Pan-German of Austrian nuance ; his Pan-Germanism was of the type to which Franz Grillparzer gave its highest expression. After the reign of Joseph II the educated and literary circles of Austria had once more established their close connection with the greater German Fatherland. The libraries formed the link between the heirs of this philosophy on either side of the frontier. Behind the library stood, however, more material considerations ; Austria's claim to a senior partnership in the affairs of Germany was advanced under colour of the interests of culture.

The dynasty and the educated bourgeoisie were altogether in agreement on this point—that the House of Hapsburg, which for centuries had carried the crown of the Holy Roman Empire, must remain the supreme power in Germany. But, if this were to be so, it was absolutely necessary that the State should retain its German appearance. That meant that it must be

ruled by a German bureaucracy, and that the Germans in general must enjoy a preferential position. Schmerling took this absolutely for granted, and, in consequence, viewed the policy of the Hungarians with distaste, and turned a blind eye to the efforts of the non-German Peoples to find expression for their national energy by participating in the life of the State. It was he who taught the Liberals to identify the aims of the dynasty with those of the State, and to this doctrine, despite the events of 1866, the German Austrian Liberals remained faithful for decades, and finally, it might be said, sacrificed themselves. But if it is true that the German Liberals lost their cause when the middle classes and the petty bourgeoisie commenced to tread the path of popular nationalism, it is also true that this doctrine, inherited from Schmerling, to no small extent put off a settlement of the racial question until the time for such a settlement had passed beyond recall. 'We can wait,' declared Schmerling, and the full force of this remark can be understood if one realizes that he was the originator of that remarkable and peculiarly Austrian method of politics which consisted in renouncing any effort to resolve political problems. From him originated that highly superior indifference which so many Austrian Prime Ministers adopted after him, observing the conflicting Peoples with condescension, and leaving them to fight out their own struggles. There were moments when it seemed possible that the Empire of the Hapsburgs might be converted into a modern State ; but those who might have exerted themselves to accomplish this difficult but important task were withheld from such an expenditure of energy by the consoling motto of Schmerling, 'We can wait'—the motto, it might be called, of the pall-bearers of Austria.

The problem of Austria had now arisen for the third time since Kremsier. The present task was to convert the terms of the October Proclamation into reality. It needed no small art to realize the impossible. The task consisted in creating a Constitution which, under the pressure of Hungary, would establish Parliamentary rights without affecting the exclusive power of the Emperor ; which would revive the Hungarian Diet without disturbing the unity of the Empire. The method now adopted was to create Diets in Austria simultaneously with

the Diet in Hungary, and to convoke a Reichsrat to represent the entire Empire. The main lines of this scheme had been traced in the October Proclamation. Schmerling entrusted a Tyrolese magistrate, Perthaler (a pupil of that Prussian jurist, Rudolph von Gneist, who had been deeply influenced by the study of British local self-government), with the invention of a Parliamentary procedure for a Parliament without legislative powers. The citizens of Austria were not to participate in the work of government; but they were to be allowed to manage their own local affairs for themselves to some extent. This doctrine, adorned with massive erudition, was set forth in Perthaler's proposals. The municipalities and the districts were to be the units of this system of self-government, and upon that basis certain rights were assured to the Diets. These rights did not include that of making laws. The Diets were allowed only to deal with questions of the Churches, the schools, the municipalities, transport, army billeting, and so forth; and this, of course, only 'within the framework of Imperial laws,' and so far as was authorized by special provincial laws.

Thus was this pseudo-Constitution born of the spirit of despotism, with much expenditure of ink. In the person of Perthaler it is hard to distinguish where he ceases to be a true apostle of local government and becomes an intellectual lackey of the Court; for it may be recalled that he had formerly been tutor to the Emperor's brothers. At any rate, when Perthaler's scheme took final shape in the proclamation of February 26th, 1861, it appeared as a fusion of incompatible political and constitutional theories, as though aimed at preserving to outward appearance the federal principles enunciated by the noble authors of the October Proclamation, while at the same time restoring the principle of the unified Imperial State.

Twenty brief paragraphs in the *Central Law* established the composition of the body which was to represent the whole Empire. Schmerling had proposed that it should be called 'Reichstag,' but the Emperor had cancelled this name and substituted that of 'Reichsrat.' Under this name it was to consist of a House of Peers and a Chamber of Deputies. The 'Peers' were the Archdukes and Prince-Bishops, heads of the great land-owning families who had attained their majority, representatives



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of science, art, industry, finance, or even simply of wealth, if the Emperor thought them worthy to be called to the House of Peers. Their number was unlimited. The Chamber of Deputies numbered 343 members, of whom the 17 Diets elected 203, the provincial councils of Venetia, 20, and the Diets of Hungary, Croatia, and Siebenbürgen, 120.

The hybrid character of the Constitution became apparent in the mechanism which it established for changing the composition of the 'Reichsrat' according to the different tasks it had to deal with. Thus when matters came up which concerned Austria alone and not the Hungarian territories, the 203 Deputies representing the non-Hungarian territories could be constituted into a central Parliament for the hereditary territories alone. Outside Austria, the new Constitution appeared too complicated to be understood. But its text was laconic, and might well be, since it established virtually no rights. The 'Reichsrat' was a class representation limited by every conceivable kind of safeguard, and beyond this the Constitution had no semblance of a Liberal character. It laid no limits on the executive power and gave no guarantees for the independence of the judiciary. It did not provide for ministerial responsibility; it did not give Parliament the right to vote taxes or raise levies; it did not render offences against the Constitution and against the electoral law penal; it established no supreme court, and gave no assurance that the citizens would be left in possession of their fundamental rights. What it did contain was paragraph 13, the model of the later paragraph 14, which was the faithful friend in need of all following Austrian Governments, and was tantamount to a negation of all constitutional principles. This paragraph permitted any governing statesman to proclaim that his own incompetence constituted a State of Emergency for the Empire, and thereupon to suspend the Constitution. Throughout the reign of Francis Joseph, from the days of Schmerling onwards, this paragraph proved the most useful instrument for governing Austria, and as such was repeatedly utilized.

Miserably sketchy though this Constitution might be, Francis Joseph yet considered that it represented the uttermost concession which he could give to his Peoples without encroaching

on his own sovereignty. Two days after the Proclamation, Francis Joseph called his Ministers and pronounced a discourse in which, as is recorded in the minutes of the meeting, he extracted from them a solemn promise 'to defend with all energy and single-mindedness the authority of the throne against the demand for further concessions, whether voiced by the Reichsrat or the Diets or by revolutionary demonstrations of the masses.' The fundamental laws now promulgated, he continued, had reached the uttermost possible limit, so that a further diminution of the Imperial authority was unthinkable and impermissible. 'It would be the duty of the Government to keep the activities of the Reichsrat strictly within the limits laid down, and to reject in the most decisive manner any interference by it in the region of foreign affairs or in the questions connected with the control of the army.' There is perhaps no other document which shows Francis Joseph's views upon the Constitution with so little disguise as does this appeal to his Ministers. In it he views the Constitution as a gift which he had extracted from himself with the uttermost exertion under the pressure of three preoccupations : Hungary, Hohenzollern's alliance with Savoy, and financial need.

It passed his understanding that his domain was no longer identical with that which had been constituted by Charles VI, and developed by Maria Theresa and their children. That Old Austria had been, indeed, to some extent created with the help of force ; yet solemn treaties had consecrated its establishment, and in the eyes of the feudal classes and of the Peoples the Emperor was the 'Lawful Lord.' Francis Joseph's Empire, on the contrary, was established upon the consent of no single people, was not consecrated by any treaty, and was maintained by force alone. From the first day of his reign he had lacked 'the consecration of lawful recognition.' This is the thread which runs through the history of the whole reign. It was in vain that the German Liberals, representing the middle-class citizens of the towns, became reconciled with the idea of the unified State reposing upon the might of the crown, the army, and the civil service, and thereby became 'participants in the crime of violence.' All the other races entered protests against the February Constitution, and the appeals which they made

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were to the historic rights of the various territories and to those treaties which the Emperor's predecessors had concluded and respected. Though the German Liberals could not understand it, behind the struggle for the old legal privileges the living force of rising Nations was at work ; the fruit of to-morrow was ripening within the shell of old forms. The historic treaties might be compared to the last citadels from which the Nations were able to conduct their struggle against the despotism of Francis Joseph.

Hungarians, Istrians, and Venetians had not appeared at the assembly of the Reichsrat. There were protest demonstrations at Prague, in Galicia, in Venice, in South Tyrol, and in Dalmatia. At the opening meeting of the Hungarian House of Peers there was an outburst of cheering for Count Ludwig Batthyányi, the victim of Haynau. In the Lower Chamber, one party disputed Francis Joseph's right to the Royal Crown of Hungary, while the other demanded the old Constitution.

The debate on Deák's motion was interrupted by the shot with which Count Teleky took his own life. Napoleon's police in Paris had played off on the Austrian Embassy certain documents purporting to show that Teleky, who had just been pardoned and had returned to Hungary, had once more entered into relation with the Hungarian exiles. Teleky received these letters in an envelope carrying the seal of the Imperial secretariat, without any accompanying observation.

On June 25th the Chamber of Deputies had passed a motion expressing sympathy for the death of Cavour. A few days later the Emperor, in a pronouncement penned by Perthaler, declared that he had observed 'with the greatest concern' certain outbursts directed against 'hereditary rights indisputably pertaining to the Emperor.' He therefore held it to be his duty to reject an address which was offensive both to 'Royal privileges' and to 'the dutiful respect of subjects.' Deák's address was thereupon modified, and presented on July 8th to the Emperor in Vienna. It was a masterly criticism of Francis Joseph's whole administration. The weighty tone of the accusations it contained, and the logical acumen with which restoration of the Hungarian Constitution and establishment of a Parliamentary Government were demanded, could not well be surpassed. It

was in vain that the Hungarian Lord Chamberlain, Vay, argued in the Cabinet in favour of a conciliatory reply to the address. The only result was that he had to retire, followed by Count Szécsen. Schmerling replaced him with Count Moritz Esterházy.

Deák now replied again to the Emperor's second message to the Diet, and in detailed language, recalling that of ancient legal proceedings, he rebutted the Emperor's arguments point by point. 'It is with the greatest distress,' he concluded, 'that we observe how Your Majesty renders a good understanding impossible, and has cut the threads which might have led to it. Therefore, with the deepest regret, we on our side are bound to consider that negotiations have broken down.'

A special message from the Emperor to the Vienna Reichsrat now conveyed to it the decree by which the Hungarian Diet was dissolved. 'His Majesty,' wrote Schmerling, 'had graciously and mercifully proffered the hand of forgiveness to the kingdom of Hungary, which had been brought back to a sense of its duty by the exercise of force, after a period in which agitation had been carried to the limit of crime.' There followed a new effusion of the old theory of Bach, the so-called forfeit theory, according to which the Hungarian Constitution had not only been suspended, but had, in fact, ceased to be in force. It was a theory derived from the nursery—this notion that privileges could be lost permanently because those who benefited by them had not been good. The Liberal Constitutionalists were delighted, and applauded this childish explanation of the motive for an act of violence with lively hurrahs on the left and in the centre. The usual series of police measures followed upon the dissolution of the Diet: a state of emergency was proclaimed, laws were suspended, and a general was appointed as governor. Francis Joseph sent Lieutenant-General Moritz Pálffy to Pest with the most extensive powers.

Schmerling thought he had won a victory. But he was very far from knowing Francis Joseph as well as he thought he did if he supposed that all would now proceed along the path he had traced out, and that Hungary would be compelled by force to accommodate itself to his constitutional scheme. The rigidity of his convictions as a Centralist blinded him to realities

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and to personalities, nor could he comprehend the weak point in Francis Joseph's mental equipment as a despot. Even while Schmerling had pitched his throne as supreme advocate of the Centralist Bureaucratic State high up in the clouds, and cheerfully proposed chasing away the tiresome flocks of journalists who got in his path, Francis Joseph, in all secrecy, had entered into relations with Franz Deák.

The Emperor had one weakness—he could not stand up against the resistance of an inflexible will. When he came across one, he was afraid ; it raised doubts in his mind about the future of the military and political power of his dynasty in Europe. Baron von Auguss had been an employee in the service of the governor of Hungary. After earning the hatred of the whole country for the intensity of his monarchical sentiment and for the nature of the services which he rendered as Head of the Political Police, he finally embarked on a political career. He wrote memorandums urging the Emperor to form a Governmental party in Hungary in order to obtain personal adherents. Francis Joseph never forgot this advice, which he subsequently applied in the case of any territory which was giving trouble.

At the end of 1864, as is now known from the recently revealed secret documents of the Imperial Cabinet, Baron von Auguss brought Franz Deák into communication with the Emperor, probably at the instance of the Archduke Albert, and certainly with the approval of the Emperor himself. On January 26th, 1865, the Hungarian Lord Chamberlain, Count Zichy, together with Count Nádasdy, spontaneously resigned their posts. Schmerling now realized what was happening. With an implicit allusion to the position of Bismarck at the side of the King of Prussia, he remarked : 'The Emperor has not stuck by me.' On July 27th the Reichsrat was closed, and three days later the order of dissolution was promulgated. The era of 'Liberal' Imperialism was at an end ; an unknown and mysterious personage was to lead Francis Joseph along another path.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE SORROWS OF THE YOUNG ELIZABETH

FOR four and twenty years the Emperor's mother was the power behind the throne. As Kübeck supplied the intellectual armour for the revival of despotism, so the Archduchess Sophie lent it her temperament and the whole weight of her personality. This woman has, very unfairly, been compared with Maria Theresa. The mother of Joseph II was as different from the mother of Francis Joseph as the Emperor Joseph was different from the Emperor Francis Joseph. It was the Archduchess Sophie's priggish superiority which was the chief difference between her and the clever, practical-minded Empress. Maria Theresa governed ; the Archduchess Sophie preached. She was convinced that mankind must be improved ; improved, that is, according to her own ideas. She would fasten on the smallest excuse to air her opinions and to proselytize. Once, during a walk in Innsbruck, she made the acquaintance of the Tyrolese poetess, Walpurga Schindl, the daughter of an innkeeper. For a long time after she kept up a correspondence with this victim of patriotic and religious frenzies. She could be kind, even against her instincts, when she felt herself to be an instrument of heavenly justice, but she persecuted, with all the more austerity, any sign of free opinion. After the attempted assassination of the Emperor, she went to 'pray for the murderer of her son,' and persuaded Francis Joseph to provide for the mother of the executed would-be assassin, but at the same time she approved of the gallows as a method of dealing with political offenders, and herself took care that no criminal escaped it. It was she who instigated the hateful persecution of the peasant-philosopher of Goisern, Konrad Deubler.

At the same time, she was not at all puritanical. She saw to it that the Emperor amused himself and enjoyed life. In the short period between 1849 and February 1851 she alone gave seven balls. During this period Francis Joseph showed himself by all his acts to be a model son. He danced because his

mother wished it. Baroness Scharnhorst refers to his dancing in letters to a friend : 'The Emperor thoroughly enjoys dancing, and is an excellent performer. Without flattery, he is the best dancer and also the most indefatigable. It is impossible to say where this will lead. The officers dance out of duty and inclination to the best of their abilities ; the countesses swoon with delight when the Emperor singles them out. They rush there as though inspired by Oberon's horn, and drink in their luck with full draughts. Besides His Majesty there are six Archdukes who dance—the Archduke William, the Emperor's two brothers, and Rainer's three sons, and all with passion. There are fewer fine young girls than there used to be, but there are some beautiful young married women who grace the balls and dance furiously.' Among these married women was the lovely twenty-nine-year-old Countess Elizabeth Ugarte, who was specially singled out by the Emperor. She herself reported to a friend : 'I am greatly taken up with the Court balls, as I dance each time with our delicious Emperor. It created quite a sensation, as you may well believe, when I danced twice with him in the cotillon, and it flattered my vanity. I am charmed by our most delightful monarch, who combines in his person all the virtues one can think of. He is also agreeable in conversation, and improves each time one talks to him.' The Emperor was very much attracted by the Countess ; not so the Emperor's mother. Shortly after this obvious favouritism the Countess fell from grace. Baroness Scharnhorst observes : 'The Ugarte woman dances like an eighteen-year-old. But something has changed. Think of it—His Majesty very seldom or never dances with her now. She lacks the talent to retain his affection, and has fallen into a fast set.'

The Emperor's mother called him off a second time when he approached the Archduchess Elizabeth, daughter of Joseph of the Palatinate. This charming woman was the widow of Ferdinand Este. The mother not only objected to this, but also to the slight difference in their ages. She had other plans. Princess Helen, the eldest daughter of her sister Ludovica, was to be Francis Joseph's bride. And when, in the autumn of 1853, Ludovica, with her two daughters, came to Ischl, Francis Joseph betrothed himself, but not to Helen. He took the six-

teen-year-old sister. It was the first time that the son acted against his mother's wishes.

When the beautiful and eccentric Princess accepted his proposal, she did not guess what a hard fate was in store for her. She had inherited much from her father, Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, the 'Phantasus' of travel-letters and romances, particularly the independent spirit which had urged him as a young man to go his own way, to study philosophy and the history of literature at Munich University, to travel to Greece and Turkey, and roam through Egypt and Nubia as far as the Second Cataract. Duke Max was an aristocratic Bohemian who preferred his Bavarian costume—shooting-jacket and knee-breeches—to his cavalry general's uniform. He felt at his best in the company of his 'Court musician,' that strange son of a Viennese innkeeper, Johann Petzmacher, whom he had met in 1837 in Bamberg. Petzmacher, a virtuoso on the mountain-zither, was a favourite of the aristocratic houses in Vienna. With his music and his originality he brought relish to the dinner-table. Elizabeth's father learnt to play the zither from Petzmacher, and kept the gay Viennese by him till his death. The zither-player accompanied the Duke on his long journeys. The story told by Clara Tschudi of how they played the zither on the summit of the pyramid of Cheops is no invention. The Duke loved such whims.

Her decisive qualities came from her father, her pride from her mother. Her home was the ducal castle of Possenhofen, on the Lake of Starnberg, where she grew up in complete freedom. Sisi, as she was called in the family circle, had to play second fiddle to her elder sister Helen, but what she lacked in the way of attention she made up for in liberty. She herself once said to her tutor, Christomanos, that when she became Empress she would be 'the most ignorant Princess in Europe.' Her favourite occupations were riding, swimming, and romping about the park and along the side of the lake. She had her father's light walk and swinging gait. Her favourite spot was her father's stable. The saddest day of the year was when she had to take leave of Possenhofen. When the fifteen-year-old Princess left this beloved spot in the autumn of 1852 she little knew that she had said good-bye to it for ever.



The two sisters, the Emperor's mother and the mother of Elizabeth, the Archduchess Sophie and the Duchess Ludovica, had arranged a meeting for next summer in Ischl. The meeting was not without a purpose, for the sisters were in secret agreement to bring together Helen (then twenty-three years old) and Francis Joseph. Elizabeth's mother and the children stayed in the Hotel Elizabeth, the Emperor's parents in their summer castle. On August 17th, Francis Joseph went to dine with his aunt. Only Helen was allowed to come to the table. Elizabeth ate alone with the governess. The Emperor's attention was drawn to her by a little scene which arose out of her parents' forbidding her to leave the hotel. The parents called Sisi into the room, and Francis Joseph met her for the first time. In the evening, Archduchess Sophie gave a ball, still with the intention of furthering her scheme. The Emperor had already decided on Sisi. The betrothal took place on August 18th, his birthday; and on August 24th the *Wiener Zeitung* announced that 'His Imperial and Royal Highness Francis Joseph I is engaged to be married to Princess Elizabeth Amalie Eugénie, Duchess of the House of Bavaria.'

On April 20th, 1854, Elizabeth took her departure from Munich. The next day she travelled in the steamer *Stadt Regensburg* from Straubing down the Danube to Linz, and on April 22nd, at half-past five in the afternoon, the bridal ship arrived at Nussdorf, outside Vienna. The entry into Vienna, the following day, was accomplished with all the splendour of Hapsburg ceremony. An accurate observer of the wedding on April 24th is able to describe the Princess's every step. The heavy magnificence, the ponderous white silk robes stitched with gold and silver, the long train, the diamond tiara on the soft dark hair, could not hide the girlishness of her slender figure. When she passed through these serried ranks of Archdukes, Chamberlains, Privy Councillors, Ministers, Generals, Court officials, and Ambassadors from foreign Courts, Elizabeth was still a child. She was alarmed when the battalion of infantry posted in the Josephsplatz shot their volley into the air, according to ritual. In the sermon preached by Archbishop Rauscher, Francis Joseph's former tutor, the sentences rang out: 'From Lake Constance to the boundaries of Siebenbürgen, from the Po to the

shores of the Vistula, one hundred and thirty million people look up to him and implore the protection and help of his art and wisdom. But this burden that has been entrusted to his care has demanded a great sacrifice from him, the sacrifice of his youth. You, Princess, are called upon to make up for him what he has lost of the happiness of youth.'

The child of nature did not suspect what these words meant. It would be impossible to imagine a greater contrast than that between the happy freedom at Lake Starnberg and the Court ceremonial of Schönbrunn, life in her father's house and the life of an Austrian Empress pledged to continual entertainment and hospitality ; the easy manners of aristocratic Bohemia and a severe routine of Spanish Court etiquette. She was continually watched by her mother-in-law, and kept to the observance of her prescribed duties with a thousand pointed glances. Even in the first few days there were frowns and reproaches from above, surprised shakings of the head from below. The Empress did not attend the official breakfast ; it did not correspond with her routine of life. The Controller of the Imperial Household, keeping strictly to the letter of his duties, daily repeated the summons. The staff was astonished that Elizabeth wore the same shoes for a whole month, instead of the prescribed new pair every day. The Empress could not bear to keep on her gloves, as was the custom, at receptions. The Court ladies were startled. She found it very hard never to be alone ; she felt herself always under observation, and a prisoner. The halls and rooms of the Vienna Palace oppressed her. Only by degrees was she able to impress her own taste on a couple of rooms. There was an old toilet arrangement in the Town Palace and in Schönbrunn which she found abominable. The Court ladies were obliged to have resort to a convenience behind a screen in the passage, regardless of the gendarme on sentry-go. She could not bear the atmosphere of the old castle.

The first conflicts between the Emperor's mother and the older ladies of the Court on the one hand, and the Empress on the other, were, on the surface, purely questions of formality, receptions, and going to church, but in reality the cause of dissension lay deeper. It was the contrast in their temperaments,

their thoughts and feelings. From the point of view of the Archduchess Sophie, Elizabeth lacked piety. She felt no inner urge to perform her religious duties according to the calendar. Nor did she devote her energies so fully to ceremonial requirements as to fill up what little free time she had with receptions.

'Madame Mère,' as she was called, was pitiless. She wished Elizabeth to feel what immense luck had fallen to her lot ; but Elizabeth's pride surged up against the mother-in-law's innuendoes. 'Your Majesty evidently thinks you are still in the Bavarian mountains.' This was said on an occasion when Elizabeth stopped her carriage in the Vienna Ring and, accompanied by her lady-in-waiting, went into a shop in the Kärntnerstrasse to buy something that had pleased her in the window. Passers-by pressed in front of the shop ; an over-zealous proprietor called the police ; there was a scene, and the chief of police sent in a report to Schönbrunn. The Empress was blamed for such scenes. Her Majesty had ventured to leave the frame of the symbolical picture.

After this Elizabeth shunned mankind. She was eighteen years old, and inclined to be shy. She withdrew herself, lived within the Court, read and learnt languages. The anti-Hungarian atmosphere of the Court was perhaps the origin of her special liking for that language, besides the fact that a new world was thus opened to her through her instructor in Hungarian, Dr. Max Falk, the future editor of the *Pester Lloyd*.

Elizabeth's life did not change when she became a mother. The Archduchess Sophie chose the mode of upbringing, and, separating the child from its mother, took it under her own protection. Until the birth of the Crown Prince Rudolph, who came into the world as a 'delicate but pretty boy,' as it was said, on August 21st, 1858, she felt the cheated expectation of an heir to be a standing reproach against herself. He also was taken from his mother. The mother-in-law was not going to allow the heir to a mighty Empire to be brought up by a young Empress who, according to the older woman, 'did not know how to bring up herself.' The Court shared the mother-in-law's opinion, and so did the Archduchess Elizabeth, mother of the Queen Regent of Spain, a woman much approved of by Francis Joseph, and Maximilian's wife, Charlotte, who quickly won the affection of

Madame Mère. In 1860, after six years of marriage and still only twenty-three years old, Elizabeth was an isolated figure. The situation was truly dramatic : for once Fate had willed that a born Empress should ascend the throne, but neither Sophie nor the Court recognized this woman's ability. It was not of the Spanish mould nor of the Austrian ; it bore, rather, the stamp of the Viennese poet, Peter Altenberg.

In the new year of 1861, Elizabeth left Vienna and the Court for the first time for many years. She was seriously ill, but not in the way described by the official reports. It was no weakness of the lungs, nor was it what unofficial Vienna called 'Empress's ache'—a consequence of the infidelity of the Emperor. Physically Elizabeth had developed great powers of resistance, otherwise she could not have stood her mode of life. She ate little, and then seldom warm foods ; even at the banquets she only took white bread, broth, and fruit. She had come into the world seventy years too soon. Her continual care to keep a slim figure is one of the preoccupations of to-day. Only in one point did she deviate from the diet of slimness : she had a passion for iced fruit. A meal without ice was no meal. Although the Emperor's kitchen provided the best sweet delicacies in the world, she would order ices and cakes from Demels, the pastrycook's., The Empress's account-book betrays many a little secret of the digestion. One single bill from the pastrycook amounts to a hundred gulden. A little general dealer's shop in Ischl claimed 37 gulden 54 kreuzer—heaven knows what particular sweetmeat Elizabeth had discovered there. Another time 500 gulden were spent on crayfish. It was common talk at the Court that the Empress's teeth were prematurely decayed as a result of too many ices. While the Court was in residence at Vienna the dentist was a constant visitor. The Empress also smoked, sometimes even cigars. She weighed herself daily, kept her body in the best training, rode, had her *masseur*, the Amsterdam doctor Metzger, whom she visited yearly. She was an indefatigable horsewoman. There is a well-known story told, how a strange woman burst into the home of the President of Maynooth College, dripping from head to foot. It was the Empress, who had ridden through a pond during a

fox-hunt. She loved such exploits, and often, even in Vienna, would arrive home exhausted from a ride, a habit that would not have been possible had her health been ailing.

It was of a female complaint that she became aware for the first time in 1860. This was followed later by gouty swellings around the knees. In 1861 her nerves drove her away from Vienna. Four months in Madeira largely cured her; one month in Vienna undid the good work. In June, Elizabeth went to Corfu, and her new existence dates from this period—the existence of a solitary, restless, wandering woman. ‘The goal of a journey is fascinating,’ she said once to Christomanos, ‘chiefly because of the travelling that lies ahead. If I were anywhere, and knew that I could never leave that place, it would at once become a hell to me, even if it were paradise. The thought that I must soon leave the place where I am at that moment touches me and helps me to enjoy it.’ She loved unrest; her nerves drew her to the sea. ‘The sea makes me young; it takes away all strangeness from me,’ she once said. ‘Everything I know I have learnt from the sea.’ The ocean held no fears for her. When her companions were laid low by sea-sickness, she would sit leaning quietly back in her chair during the severest storms. Whenever possible, she indulged in sea-bathing. Her yacht *Miramare*, in which she sailed round half the world, was specially provided with a large round glass pavilion on deck, with a free view on all sides. The blue silk curtains were drawn when she had her hair arranged in the morning. The conning-bridge, where she sat during the day, was covered with canvas, so that the Empress could remain hidden from the crew.

For nearly five years, with one small interruption, Elizabeth avoided Vienna. An attempt at reconciliation on the part of the Emperor did not succeed. Not till 1866 did husband and wife come together again. The coronation in Budapest in the summer of 1867 brought a big triumph for Elizabeth. Despite her distaste for festivities, she graciously received the feudal homage of the Hungarian nobles. These were the last days of Royal glamour. In April 1868, Marie Valerie, the third daughter, was born in Budapest. About this time she met Julius Andrassy and Maurus Jókai. ‘The Royal Court is at present

in residence in Ofen,' wrote the poet. 'I presented a copy of my book to the Queen. She talked to me for a long time and in great detail about Hungary. When I rose to go, she said : "Wait a minute. I will show you my daughter." She opened the side door and beckoned to the nurse to bring in the little one. The Queen took the child in her arms and pressed it to her.'

At this time many stories were spread with the intention of awakening prejudice against the Empress. Much guilt lies at the door of Count Grünne, to whom Elizabeth's pure nature was always an enigma. The following episode is recounted by Friedjung. Some years after his resignation, Grünne was laid low by a serious illness. As he believed he was going to die, he felt a strong desire to see the Empress once again and to right the wrong he had done her. Elizabeth, hearing of his wish, came to his bed of sickness, and Count Grünne begged her forgiveness for all the evil he had done. The Empress forgave him. The sick man's daughter, Countess Széchenyi, thanked the Empress so fervently that she was with difficulty prevented from throwing herself at Elizabeth's feet.

The Emperor's all-powerful Military Secretary and his adherents were largely responsible for the fact that the Empress had not a single friend at the Court. Only one person remained at her side throughout the years : the hairdresser Fanny Angerer. This Viennese girl came originally to braid the Empress's beautiful hair, which she wore in plaits round her head like a crown. Little by little Fanny Angerer became the intimate friend of the lonely Royal lady. The Empress needed some one to whom she could confide her little cares and at the same time her hidden secrets. In this relationship with the hairdresser Elizabeth acted like many women, letting the person who knows the secrets of the body know also those of the soul. Elizabeth could be certain that the hairdresser would not betray her secrets to the Court spies.

Already the Empress was watched by a little army of secret police, employed not only to ensure her safety. There lies in the archives of the former Cabinet Secretariat a whole bundle of documents, dating from 1867 to 1870, from which it transpires that the Office of the Household Controller knew through secret sources of every step taken by Elizabeth.

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The agents of the Vienna police, L. Erz, L. Huber, and Dr. Zeichner, handed in most of their reports to be filed in this dossier. They reported that the Empress gave her confidence only to Fanny Angerer, and they recounted with whom Angerer spent her time, whom she visited, and how long she remained with the Empress. 'When Fanny Angerer was married to Hugo Feifalik, the newly appointed secretary, a Court servant appeared in the church and summoned the newly-married couple to the Empress, who was awaiting them. The Empress embraced the young woman, and kissed her on the cheek.' So runs one report. Another secret agent writes, 'It is not to be wondered at that Fanny Angerer gives herself great airs and feels herself superior to all the Court employees. She has information which is not intended for the public, and she does not keep it to herself. She writes from Rome to her family giving news of important impending developments in the relations between Rome and Vienna.' Such reports of the secret police, passed on immediately to the Controller's Office, show convincingly that the Empress was under observation during all her journeys, that the letters of her intimates were opened, and that, even in the 'seventies, the Vienna Black Cabinet was still at work, the object of its attentions being, not the Emperor's subjects, but his wife.

The Empress's household expenses were likewise submitted to a rigorous control. The Court Secretary, Kokula, whose duty it was to balance Elizabeth's accounts, did not always find it an easy task, for the Empress often spent more than the household allowance. During her wanderings she received 46,000 gulden a month, besides the 200,000 gulden a year allowed her for personal expenditure, which were paid to her in monthly instalments. Another 1000 gulden were thrown in for pin-money. The Empress dressed simply, preferring English fashions—a narrow, well-fitting walking skirt, blouse, and English shoes ; but, in spite of this, her wardrobe expenses were considerable. It was more the fascination of shopping that enticed her than the actual purchases. One of her peculiarities shown up by the account-books was that she took her favourite cows with her on her travels. She was fond of fresh milk, which she drank several times a day, and nothing would satisfy her but

that her favourites from the Schönbrunn dairy should accompany her. The cost of the shipping and unshipping of these animals recurs again and again in the account-books. She also drank the milk of the country wherever she went. Countess Sztaray tells of a cow transaction in Aix-les-Bains, where the Empress discovered a special relish for the milk of the native cows. In Kokula's accounts we come across the following entry : 'To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Imperial Household, for two cows, Frs. 1473.53; (707 Fl. 67 Kr.).'

It was out of these little peculiarities, the caprices and fancies of disordered nerves, that the picture of the 'Eccentric Empress' was built up. She herself knew that she did not correspond to the citizens' conception of a sovereign. 'People don't know what to make of me,' she said. 'I don't fit in with their notions, and they don't like me to be different. I don't put myself out to help them in their perplexity. In any case, they think what they are used to is best.'

She was blamed very much on account of the little nigger-boy, Mahmud, presented to her by the Khedive of Egypt. The little servant from the Cairo Pavilion in the Vienna World Exhibition was treated by the Empress as though he were her own son ; she nursed him when he was ill, and let him play with her daughter Valerie. There is in existence a photograph which shows Valerie with the nigger-boy ; the picture was Elizabeth's answer to the critics in the Court circle, who considered it unbecoming for the Emperor's daughter to have a nigger-child as playmate. In these matters Francis Joseph was more tolerant than the aristocracy. Even if the woman who had come closest to him remained a stranger to him, he gave way to all her whims as long as they did not interfere with his way of life. He could do so the more easily as the Empress was of a passive nature, always ready to relinquish her share in any joint action, nervous of ever interfering in any way in Francis Joseph's scheme of life. She had never known any yearning for power ; the glamour of the Court meant nothing to her. There were no dramatic scenes in the Vienna Court. Elizabeth avoided conflicts ; in fact, she fled from them.

Brantôme recounts of Elizabeth of Valois, Philip's third wife, that she was too well-educated from the moment she left her



cradle not to be able to hide her feelings. Empress Elizabeth's sensitiveness was a gift of nature. Not every one of the sayings that her tutor and companion, Dr. Chrystomanos, quotes was really spoken by her. This Greek philosopher in Viennese make-up, in spite of his nearness to the Empress, saw everything from a romantic standpoint—he saw only the maladjustment of a noble nature to an ignoble world. Elizabeth's liking for Heine is often referred to, without a word explaining that it was the young girl's version of Heine, not the favourite of Liberal intellectuals, that she loved. She was sentimental. Had her temperament been of an active type, she would have openly rebelled. For a merely passive disgust, flight is the only escape. Such disgust will lead a man of genius and independent means to become a Schopenhauer; an Empress has the liberty to choose isolation. She read Schopenhauer, and is said to have translated a few chapters of *Parerga and Paralipomena* into modern Greek. In the Villa Hermes, hidden away in the deer-park of Lainz, a picture of the philosopher was found in the Empress's bedroom.

This secluded house, still standing to-day in the middle of the former Imperial deer-park, was the refuge Elizabeth had built for herself during her Vienna days. Surrounded by miles of forest, it was at that time hard to find. Like all the shooting-lodges of the Hapsburgs, it is lacking in taste, in style, and decoration, and is more like a sanatorium than an Imperial residence. It was not Elizabeth who had designed it; she was no more responsible for it than she was for many of her other surroundings. And Francis Joseph had no sense of beauty with regard to architecture. His abstract temperament had not even this contact with reality. In this he was a Lorrainer rather than a Hapsburg. Emperor Francis, his great-uncle, had found a style to fit the abstemiousness of the Lorrainian House; Francis Joseph left all questions of style to his architects. The tastelessness of the 'seventies has its monument in the Villa Hermes. It swarmed with brackets and overmantels, bronze vases, and that hateful style of furniture that was, in reality, no style, but a fancy of the wealthy stock-exchange society of the time. The villa had none of the advantages and all the disadvantages of a palace; it was uninhabitable. Even in summer it was miser-

ably cold as soon as the sun had disappeared behind the wooded hills. Mankind seldom strayed to this desolate spot among the forest mists. The park's wild stock would wander right into the house.

Here Elizabeth lived when she was Austria's guest, up to the time of the Crown Prince Rudolph's death. Then she disappeared for ever from the eyes of her Empire.

## CHAPTER XII

### FRANCIS JOSEPH AND THE GERMAN UNITY MOVEMENT

A PORTRAIT of the Emperor at this time is sketched by Orges, the editor of the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung*, who was called to an audience at Schönbrunn, as representative of the Duke of Coburg, in February 1860. Francis Joseph had preserved his youthful appearance. He was still slim, but a hint of age beyond his years was given by the 'Imperial beard' as worn by all three monarchs of the former Holy Alliance. In his own way he was majestic. It was not the majesty of Francis or of honest, humdrum Ferdinand. During the time of his reign hardly any change had been made in the apartments of the Vienna Palace or the Castle of Schönbrunn; but there was something different about them—a greater dignity.

The Emperor Francis had been on friendly and intimate terms with his counsellors, Metternich and Kübeck. When Metternich came to present his New Year's wishes, the Emperor remembered that he had left the Chancellor's scheme for reconstituting the State Council in a drawer of his desk for a whole year. 'Once again,' he said, 'I meet you as a repentant sinner. Your work is still in my drawer, but I give you my word of honour that the year 1835 shall not conclude without my dealing with it.' Francis Joseph could never have behaved like that. Even with his intimates he spoke in a different tone, and never of himself. Moreover, he never left documents in drawers. His life was mapped out hour by hour. His study in the Hofburg, in the new wing of Charles VI, was smaller and simpler than the study in Schönbrunn. The two windows gave on to a courtyard. By the writing-table was an upright desk. Dark red hangings spread a gloom. The style and magnificence of the most ancient Court of Europe, introduced by his forefathers, lay outside the personal sphere of Francis Joseph, which was really impersonal, and bore, as Orges remarks, the imprint of work. Nothing of his great ancestors' instinct for the decora-

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tive aspect of monarchy penetrated into this dark and narrow room. Francis Joseph had accepted without questioning the stage machinery and scenery of the Hapsburg Court ; his own true domain amid this magnificence was his 'Chancery,' where nothing remained of ancestral tradition save that hovering spectre, the hidden but ever-present fear of coming catastrophe.

In Imperial Vienna the legend ran of an ancestress whose warning spirit appeared sometimes at night in the mazy passages of the rambling Hofburg. The legend had a basis of historic truth in the memory of three great crises of the dynasty known by the dates 1621, 1740, and 1809. On all three occasions everything was at stake : in the first days of the reign of Ferdinand II, on the accession of Maria Theresa, and when Napoleon threatened the Hapsburg position in the world. The dynasty had won through all its crises, thanks to its proverbial luck—in other words, to the quarrels of the other European Great Powers. Yet the fear of a sudden collapse of the Empire persisted, outside the Court, in the form of the scepticism of the Austrians, who felt there was something insecure, some insoluble problem, in the Imperial State of the Hapsburgs. Francis Joseph was often enough made aware of it when in the Cabinet Council there was talk of imminent danger of ruin. Not for one day was his deep anxiety allayed. Every movement among the European Peoples stirred it up afresh, every movement on the frontiers of the Empire.

Looking back over fifteen years of his reign, Francis Joseph could not find cause to allay his fears. He had renounced a portion of Hapsburg territory. Could he renounce Austria's privileged position in Germany ? Schmerling advised him to embark on a policy of Empire in the grand style ; for Schmerling lived in the dream of an Austria with the commanding voice in a German Federation. Count Rechberg, the successor of Thun and Prokesh-Osten as plenipotentiary at Frankfort, at which post he remained four years, now Francis Joseph's Foreign Minister, stuck to the old methods of diplomacy. Prussia's initiative in suggesting the creation of a smaller federation under her own leadership was the first summons to battle. Schmerling, who got the ear of the Emperor, was the prime author of the answer of the four German kingdoms, and of the

Darmstadt and Nassau principalities. But a mere refusal of the Prussian proposals was not enough : Austria submitted a draft federal constitution to the Federal Council in Frankfort. It was the idea of Austrian union with Germany, that idea which could neither die nor yet wholly live after 1848, and now reappeared in an altered form. Austria and seven other States proposed a common form of civil law procedure and a common law of trusteeship with a joint delegate assembly to advise on these matters. Prussia could not agree to withdraw from the jurisdiction of her chambers a portion of the work of State ; that would impair her sovereignty. According to the existing Federal Constitution, Austria's suggestion fell to the ground unless accepted unanimously. Prussia refused it. At this moment Bismarck appeared on the scene.

He had left the representation of his country in Paris to become Prime Minister. On taking leave of Napoleon III, he declared to Count Seherr-Thoss : 'I mean to put Prussia on her feet and to give her the place in Germany which belongs to her as a purely German State. I don't deny that Hungary's help may be of great value to us. The Hungarians are not revolutionary, in the usual sense of the word. If we are successful, Hungary shall be free. Take my word for it.' In his conversation with Count Károlyi, the Austrian Minister, he put before Vienna the choice between solidarity with the small German Courts or solidarity with Prussia. When Károlyi reminded him of the traditional claims of Austria, he replied with the suggestion : 'Austria had better shift her balance to the East.'

The crisis was not to come yet. Schmerling's thrust against Prussia was parried by the minor Princes, who were unwilling to sacrifice any of their sovereignty for the advantage either of Austria or of Prussia. Meanwhile, however, since Bismarck's appearance on the scene, the sympathies of the emotional politicians, not only of south but also of north Germany, flowed towards Austria. All the Federalists, the clericals, and the feudal classes were on Austria's side. Vienna encouraged these sentiments. The rifle competition in Frankfort in 1862, the Jurists' Congress in Vienna, the Art Congress in Salzburg, were festivals of loquacity, the enthusiasm of which was echoed joyfully in the

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Hofburg. Julius Fröbel, once condemned by Windischgrätz to death, converted from these revolutionary persuasions to enthusiastic approval of the riflemen's celebrations, originated the proposal of a meeting of German Princes. He enlisted Schmerling's interest in the project with a memorial, and obtained the support of the heir to the principality of Thurn and Taxis, brother-in-law to Francis Joseph. Fröbel proposed that a standard Parliament of the Princes in Frankfort should, in co-operation with a Chamber drawn from the various Diets, conduct the government of Germany. In 1863 the Prince sent Baron von Dörnberg and one of his agents, Gruben, said to be deeply versed in the policy of the Jesuits, to Vienna, to win Francis Joseph for the plan. The Emperor was so delighted with it that he took it under his protection as his own idea. Schmerling was informed by Fröbel; Rechberg was left in the dark. Only Baron von Biegeleben, head of the German Affairs Department in the Vienna Chancery, named by Walter Rogge 'the evil genius of the Empire,' was let into the secret and entrusted with the preparations. At last Francis Joseph made known his intentions to his Ministers. Schmerling recalled the days of Frankfort and his own cherished projects, and applauded the Emperor. Rechberg was deeply offended. Whatever part personal feeling may have played in forming his opinion, he was none the less perfectly right when he said that the project could not be put through by peaceful means. Francis Joseph refused to be convinced, but would not grant the offended Minister's request to be allowed to resign. 'I will not have my path blocked by my Ministers.' Rechberg remained, and accompanied the Emperor to Frankfort. Schmerling stayed at home.

Francis Joseph took a keen share in the meeting devoted to drafting the proposed new Federal Constitution. He held the scales between Schmerling and Rechberg, but most often his decisions went in favour of the Princes. On August 2nd, 1863, Francis Joseph handed to the King of Prussia at Gastein a memorial laying down the absolute necessity of a reform of the Federal Constitution. The memorial culminated with the sentence: 'The *status quo* is absolutely chaotic. The German Governments carry on side by side, haunted by the premonition of a veritable catastrophe. The revolution, whose embers are

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in all secrecy being fanned, awaits its hour.' The vision and the language are both those of a Hapsburg.

The King of Prussia refused on August 4th, declaring that Prussia could not view kindly the proposal to send a Prince of the House of Hohenzollern to Frankfort. Bismarck's note of August 14th to Baron Werther summed up Prussian opinion with the words : 'The Prussian Government could not take any measures which would to any considerable extent entail a subordination of its own independent sovereignty save in the case that new federal institutions might arise based upon the undisputed authority of a popular assembly elected by direct suffrage, account being taken of the relative size of the various populations.' Prussia demanded general suffrage ; and in 1866 she was to lead the German nation along that path.

Yet the sentiments of the German nation were for the moment still favourable to Austria. Men like Wydenbrugk acclaimed the Princes' Meeting as 'a work of patriotism,' while Gustave Freytag congratulated Austria on her 'fearless audacity,' and declared that 'Austrian policy was inspired by a victorious optimism to gestures of a youthful brilliance such as had never before been witnessed in her history.'

After this prelude, the Emperor opened the Princes' Meeting at Frankfort on August 17th. Almost all the German Princes, except the King of Prussia, had turned up. The atmosphere of the federal capital was anti-Prussian, and Francis Joseph, received with sincere outbursts of applause, enjoyed a triumph. His introductory speech, in its unadorned way, was quite effective. Biegeleben had submitted to him a draft for the speech full of pathos ; but Francis Joseph declared that he did not want to speak otherwise than in his normal style. To the end of his life he preserved this distaste for emotional language.

He performed the functions of President with skill, being assisted by King John of Saxony, the spokesman of the majority. The Austrian draft, as expected, was accepted with slight alterations by the majority, but, as a clause was appended determining that the decisions should not have binding value until Prussia accepted them, the victory was purely platonic.

The King of Saxony now conveyed another invitation to King William to proceed to Frankfort, but this was refused on August

20th. Bismarck explained the next day that if Prussia accepted these proposals she would run the risk of 'placing the forces of the country at the service of ends which were not those of Prussia herself.' In the Eighth Article of the draft Constitution he discovered its nature as a purely Hapsburg concoction. This article ran: 'If there is danger of a war between one of the Federated States, which has possessions outside the Federation, and a foreign Power, then the Committee of the Federation—Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, and two elected representatives of the other States—must call upon the Federal Council to decide whether the Federation shall make war or not, and this decision will be made by a simple majority vote.' The situation was the same as in 1854, when Bismarck wrote to General Gerlach that Austria desired 'to play her great part in Italy while retaining Germany at her service for purposes of European policy.' Prussia and South Germany were to defend with their arms the power of the Hapsburgs in Italy. This was the second time that Bismarck had come up against this leading motive of Hapsburg policy. He was to do so a third time when he declared that the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier were too good to be buried in the Balkans for the sake of Hapsburg prestige. In 1914, Austria made the same demand again, but Bismarck was no longer there to say no.

Inflexible and unsparing of energy, Bismarck in 1863 held his now enfeebled monarch to the strict line of his policy. Once, after an excited discussion with King William, Bismarck lost control of his nerves, pulled off the handle of the door, and subsequently vented his pent-up exasperation by smashing a wash-basin to pieces. But the King was kept up to the mark.

After Frankfort, there remained nothing for Prussia to do but to get to work in a wider sphere. Napoleon III viewed with alarm the prospect of a rising German-Austrian Empire. Queen Victoria feared that if Austria were victorious her children in Berlin would cut a smaller figure.

The Federal Assembly at Frankfort meanwhile appealed to Austria to lead the nation along the path of general suffrage. But Austria could not at one and the same time play the hangman in her own domains and the herald of democracy in Germany. Rechberg held to the decisions of the Princes' Meeting,



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and, at the Conference of Ministers in Nürnberg, proposed the formation of a strong Federation without Prussia. The proposal was doomed before it was formulated, and the conference broke up, leaving Austria saddled with the responsibility of having occasioned Prussia's absence.

The Emperor, returning to Vienna, was received with loud applause by the House of Peers. The city was illuminated. Yet Bismarck had the best of the affair when he nicely summed it up, saying that Austria's only success in Frankfort had been the reception of Emperor Francis Joseph by 'Princes in white uniforms.'

## CHAPTER XIII

### FRANCIS JOSEPH AND BISMARCK

**S**HORTLY after the Princes' Meeting at Frankfort had broken down, Count Moritz Esterházy, recalling a famous saying of the Tsar Nicholas, remarked to a group of high officers: 'You had better prepare your mounts.' Did this mean that he knew more than they did? Was there already a war party? Had it been so, then at least some of Francis Joseph's counsellors must have cherished a plan for years ahead. But there was no such plan in existence; there was nothing but the perpetual fear that the House of Hapsburg could not maintain its historic position without humbling Prussia in the battle field. Bismarck himself, as he confessed in 1890, was at that earlier date only 'vaguely aware' that the German question could not be solved without a war. 'It would argue fundamental ignorance of politics,' he added, 'to suppose that a statesman could plan out a programme for long ahead and abide by his plan as by a law.' In his Memoirs in 1890, Bismarck recalls the efforts made for a pacific solution, comparing himself with 'a wanderer in the wood who knows the general direction of his goal,' but does not exactly know which path he will follow. 'I should have gladly seized upon any solution which brought about the unity of Germany without a war.' The breakdown of the Frankfort Princes' Meeting was the end of Francis Joseph's initiative in the German question; henceforth not Vienna, but Berlin, gave the lead. The game was now set between Bismarck and Francis Joseph.

When Bismarck informed King William what he proposed to do in the matter of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, the monarch in astonishment asked him: 'Are you one of these Germans?' How far Bismarck's plans were contrary to the King's own intentions is further shown by an episode related by Bismarck. Immediately after the death of Frederick VII of Denmark, Bismarck set forth his view in the Prussian Cabinet, remarking quite simply that Schleswig and Holstein must be conquered for Prussia. At this the King was so horrified that

he instructed the secretary not to record Bismarck's words in the minutes of the meeting. 'His Majesty,' Bismarck wrote in his *Memoirs*, 'appeared to think that I had spoken under the convivial inspiration of a heavy lunch, and that I would be glad if my words went no further.'

The Duchies in question were secured by a general treaty to Denmark, even if the Danish dynasty should die out. The treaty expressly laid down the indivisibility of the territory of Denmark. When Frederick VII, the last of his dynasty, died, controversy arose about the future of Schleswig-Holstein. Holstein had recognized claims to be considered an independent State, and was a member of the German Federation. But, according to the Treaty of London, it could not be severed from Schleswig. Duke Christian of Augustenburg, anticipating the future destiny of the German Princes, sold his hereditary rights for a respectable sum of money. But his son Frederick declared that his father had sold only his own rights, not those of his successor, and therefore maintained his claim to the Duchy. The sentimental German people warmly espoused the cause of Frederick—an attitude which at least in part reflected sincere national feeling. Unfortunately, the great current of national democratic enthusiasm had nothing more substantial to carry along with it than the toy barque of a petty princeling. Bismarck was free from German sentimentality. The King had asked him whether he was a German ; certainly he was an exceptional German.

Might not Austria, however, as spokesman of German popular tradition, take measures to execute the dictates of popular feeling ? This was the expectation of the more important minor German States, which stood behind Austria, awaiting the great decision. But when, on December 7th, 1863, the Municipal Council of Vienna appeared before Francis Joseph in a fine frenzy of excitement, the Emperor received the councillors very coldly, and dismissed them with the short observation that they had best turn their attention to the condition of the roads in the Imperial capital. Bismarck also, little caring for the 'soul of the German people,' had no patience with the Augustenburg princeling. He did not, indeed, wish to offend against the Treaty of London without due cause, but still less did he feel himself

called upon to support a claimant to the throne if the Duchies in the long run could be obtained for Prussia. He, at any rate, knew what he wanted, while Francis Joseph's Minister, Rechberg, was not bold enough to have a plan. Schwarzenberg might have hazarded a clear-cut policy, even if that entailed the risk of acting jointly with the forces of Liberalism, known to the Court as 'forces of revolution.' But Rechberg was too weak to exploit the popular agitation for his own ends. He was incapable of definitely taking sides. On the one hand, as spokesman of the principal German Powers he desired to insist upon fulfilment of the Treaty of London, to break down the resistance of Denmark, and to secure an independent Constitution for the Duchies; on the other hand, he could not bring himself to follow a line of policy which was popular and democratic and smacked of 'the Revolution itself.' On the one hand he raised an accusing voice against Denmark, and on the other hand he denied the validity of the German accusations against Denmark. When the Duke Frederick conveyed one of his harmless proclamations to the Austrian House of Deputies, Rechberg scolded the Duke's representative in Vienna like a bold bad boy. 'We cannot tolerate such noisy demonstrations,' he said.

Yet if Rechberg delayed, hesitated, and allowed himself to be a prey to anxiety, perhaps this was the result of his close knowledge of the Austrian situation. Palmerston contemptuously remarked that the Emperor had nothing to do but to intervene in the quarrels of his own Ministers. Later historians have somewhat revised the harsh judgement of contemporaries upon Rechberg. An Austrian not by birth but by election, Rechberg had a keen eye for the weaknesses of the Empire, and was genuinely afraid of war. This fear, meanwhile, well served the ends of Bismarck. The Prussian Minister, so lately the advocate of general suffrage, now depicted to Francis Joseph in the gloomiest colours the dangers of a popular movement and of the Parliamentary system. The Emperor listened eagerly to such a tale. Bismarck, dominated by no theory, improvising his policy in the light of events from day to day, had determined to act jointly with Austria. What should happen after the first shot had been fired could be left for the morrow. Thus it was that the rivals acted in alliance, a situation all the disadvantages

of which fell upon Austria, who thereby lost the sympathies of the remainder of Germany. 'Why are we at the side of Prussia?' Schindler demanded in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies. 'Prussia has hardly yet digested her robberies in Silesia, and now already she pushes her claws towards the Duchies to the accompaniment of our regimental bands. To what tune will our troops march out again?' The Emperor himself was privately asking the same question. At the Cabinet Meeting of January 10th, 1864, he approved a draft treaty, by the terms of which Schleswig-Holstein should only be separated from Denmark at the conclusion of a successful war, if both the German Great Powers agreed. Bismarck naturally would not concur, but, relying on the triumph of his cause, proposed leaving the future of the Duchies an open question. Rechberg hesitated, fearing that 'if this door were left open, war might march in by it.' Bismarck now threatened to rescue the Duchies independently of Austria if need be. Austria was placed in the position in which she could neither go forward as champion of the deserted cause of German national enthusiasm, nor could she go backwards without leaving Prussia alone in the field. Francis Joseph therefore agreed to the proposed alliance, and Austria marched side by side with Prussia into Schleswig.

The Austrian troops under Gablenz bore their part in the short campaign well, and this military success brought a renewal of self-confidence to Vienna. Yet this military expedition was fatal for Austria, who derived from it a false judgement of Prussia's military power. The Prussian leadership was inferior; Moltke had no part in it, nor was his advice even listened to. Only in one small skirmish had the new 'needle guns' come successfully into action. The Austrians held to their old view that mass bayonet attacks must be ultimately decisive. The aim of the expedition was soon attained. Denmark was subdued, and the plain of Jutland fell into Prussia's hand.

Bismarck at first did not see how he could bring his plans to a successful conclusion. At the conference of the Great Powers in London, Prussia and Austria made a joint proposal that Schleswig-Holstein should be constituted as an independent State, and linked only by the person of a joint monarch to Denmark, but Denmark refused to consider this compromise. Mean-

while, Duke Frederick of Augustenburg used the good offices of the Prussian Crown Prince to approach Prussia once more, promising that if his claims were supported he would act in the closest union with her. For more than one reason Bismarck objected to the Duke, in whom he saw the main obstacle to annexation of the Duchies. But this time King William was stronger than Bismarck, and compelled him to accept the Duke's offer, by the terms of which Prussia was assured military and economic supremacy in Schleswig-Holstein. Now Bismarck turned to Austria, and took her altogether by surprise with the proposal that the Duchies should be left to the Augustenburg dynasty. Rechberg felt himself betrayed. He endeavoured to win Duke Frederick to himself, promising him Austria's support on the single condition that the Duke should sign no separate peace with Prussia. On the strength of this, Duke Frederick turned once more to Bismarck and tried to evade part of the conditions he had accepted. Bismarck saw through the game, and abandoned the Duke to disaster. Finally, by desire of the King, Vienna and Berlin agreed to resolve the question of the Duchies peacefully.

King William and Bismarck arrived at Schönbrunn on August 22nd, 1864. Bismarck, clear-sighted, cold, and cynical, was soon able to put the alliance in such a light that Francis Joseph could tolerate it, comparing it to a 'hunting expedition from which each party would return with his own bag.' Bismarck himself has depicted the scene in a conversation of which the record is preserved by Heinrich Friedjung: 'The four of us sat alone in an apartment in the Palace of Schönbrunn, His Austrian Majesty, my own Royal master, Count Rechberg, and I. The question we had to decide was the fate of Schleswig-Holstein. Count Rechberg declared that the provinces could only be handed to Prussia if Austria received compensation, and he hinted at the county of Glatz. Of this, however, the King could not so much as hear. . . . I pointed out to the Emperor of Austria that it would really be in accordance with the spirit of our alliance if the Duchies fell to Prussia without any such sacrifice. I said that our alliance was not a trading company, whose profits should be distributed proportionately among the partners, but was rather like a hunting

expedition. . . . Supposing we waged war together against France and Italy, so that Milan fell once more into Austria's possession in consequence of the support of Prussia. In such a case, Prussia certainly would not demand territorial compensation, but would be content with payment of a sum of money to cover her cost in the war. This argument made some impression upon the Emperor, as I was able to judge from the question which he put to me whether Prussia then regarded annexation as a desirable solution of the question of the Duchies. I was very pleased that he put the question to me so directly in the presence of my monarch, for the King of Prussia had thitherto always been very much reserved when we discussed together the future of the Duchies, and I had never yet been able to obtain a direct statement of his views. I therefore turned to him and said : "I am not in a position to answer this question." The King hesitated once more, and said that he had not really contemplated the possibility of incorporating Schleswig-Holstein in his territory. Thereupon I was naturally obliged to desist from further discussion of the question.'

Rechberg later recounted the efforts he had made to avoid war with Prussia. The plans which Bismarck so ruthlessly expounded to Francis Joseph would have been realized within the framework of Rechberg's own programme, with conditions safeguarding the prestige of the Hapsburg monarchy. 'The aim for which I worked was a peace treaty by which Schleswig should fall to Prussia and Holstein to Austria. This situation should remain in force until the moment of some great European complication, which would probably bring Austria and Prussia jointly up against France. Then a swap could be arranged. My idea was that in return for Holstein we could, at any rate, obtain a guarantee of the possession of our Italian provinces, so that Venice would have been saved.' Rechberg's view was that the breach for which he rendered Biegeleben and Esterházy responsible could well have been avoided. 'My relations with Bismarck had been good since the time of my activity at Frankfort, although his outlook was always distasteful to me. For instance, there was at that time a charming and talented young man at the Prussian Legation in Vienna. He was suddenly recalled, and, when I asked Bismarck the reason,

he answered : "He's useless to me ; he doesn't know how to lie".'

What is certain is that, in the days following the Schönbrunn meeting, Rechberg followed the Hapsburg tradition more enthusiastically than even Francis Joseph. He desired to form an Austro-Prussian Alliance directed against France with the idea of thereby securing Venice, Trieste, and Dalmatia. But after 1866 he remarked : 'The best thing Austria could have done would have been to leave Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia and to obtain in return a guarantee for her Italian possessions.' Bismarck, on his side, declared after 1866 : 'There was nothing really to impede an understanding with Rechberg. I was very sorry when he left his post shortly after the meeting at Schönbrunn. At that time I advised King William to make some concession to Austria, such as Rechberg considered necessary if he were to maintain himself in office. Rechberg wished Prussia to renew a clause of a former treaty in the new commercial treaty with Austria, namely, the clause which left the way open for Austria to enter the Customs Union. While these negotiations were in force I was at Biarritz with Emperor Napoleon, and in the meanwhile my colleagues succeeded in getting round the old King and persuading him to reject this Austrian proposal, by which my attempt to remain on peaceful relations with Austria was frustrated.' Bismarck continues, however : 'It would have been very difficult to avoid war with Austria. But any one with the smallest sense of responsibility for millions of human beings would shrink from making war before he had exhausted all other possibilities. . . . There were various methods of making for the goal. It was my destiny to try them one after another, until finally I had to resort to the most dangerous.'



## CHAPTER XIV

### WHO DECLARED WAR IN 1866 ?

THERE is a suggestion in Bismarck's Memoirs that he regretted Rechberg's retirement ; but we know to-day that Rechberg was a finished man even before his fall. It was not the refusal of his proposal that Austria should be taken into the Customs Union, it was not the attacks in the Vienna Chamber of Deputies, nor the enmity of Schmerling, which decided matters. Both he and his rival Schmerling were brought low by that group of Hungarian Old Conservatives whose spokesman, Count Moritz Esterházy, was Francis Joseph's real adviser at this time.

As usual, the Emperor's ear was turned attentively towards Hungary as the dangerous point in the interior. The Hungarian Old Conservatives were the link between Francis Joseph and the rebellious kingdom, and it was they who gave the impetus to every new line of policy. The Emperor listened to them even after the breakdown of the Hungarian Diet, which had shown that they had not the influence to which they laid claim in their own country. Apponyi, Dessewffy, Szécsen, Szögyényi, and their friends withdrew for a time, but their influence as a political factor was still strong in the Court society of Vienna. They still held fast to their old plan of reconciling the Emperor to Hungary, and themselves taking the lead in this achievement, so as to maintain the might and the position of their class and their families.

These Old Conservative Hungarian noblemen certainly showed more political versatility, cunning, and persistence than all the other classes in Austria put together. In pursuit of their task they had, after the session of the Hungarian Diet, approached very close to Franz Deák, the rising star of the nation, and, with a fine sense of which way the wind was blowing, had made their programme practically identical with his. Schmerling was now the obstacle in their path. They had themselves recommended him to the Emperor after the failure of the October Proclamation, with the idea that the Austrian territories

would be more likely to become reconciled to the restoration of a constitutional order in Hungary if they themselves were to enjoy a little dose of Constitutionalism under a Minister who was so popular in Vienna. Schmerling brought them a wholly unexpected disappointment. This convinced apostle of the Centralized Bureaucracy became the most stubborn opponent of their plans. Schmerling devoted his whole energy to denouncing the aims of this group of nobles, and their resistance against his own authority, as a conspiracy against the Emperor. Yet he could not banish the influence of the Hungarian magnates from the Hofburg. From the aristocratic drawing-rooms their political influence penetrated to the Cabinet meetings, where Count Forgách, Secretary to the Court of Hungary, and Esterházy seized every opportunity to bring up the Hungarian question and to advance the views of their own circle. Schmerling had no idea that he was more or less under Hungarian supervision with the Emperor's full knowledge, since Count Zichy, Forgách's successor, had received the order to keep Esterházy well informed about all Schmerling's plans in so far as they affected Hungary.

Francis Joseph had not yet decided to bow his head to the Hungarian demands, but in this most difficult of all the problems which confronted him he wished to act alone, and not on the advice of Schmerling. The man who sustained the Emperor in this thought, his only close counsellor, was Moritz Esterházy, who has been called Francis Joseph's 'man of destiny.' It was he who forged the link between the Emperor and Deák ; it was he who furthered the formation of a Hungarian Governmental party by 'the unknown man,' Baron von Auguss. It was he who finally provoked Schmerling's fall, and counselled the departure of Rechberg, as the latter himself relates. 'One day,' writes Rechberg, 'Esterházy came to me and said : "The Emperor wishes you to do him the service of handing in your resignation".' It was Baron von Biegeleben, a fanatical anti-Prussian from Hesse, Rechberg's literary expert in the Foreign Office, who occasioned the retirement of his chief by submitting to the Cabinet a draft note to Prussia which extracted from Rechberg the spontaneous exclamation : 'That means war : I cannot remain in office.'

The remarkable man who played the chief part in the decisive days before Königsgrätz was a complex individual. His post was that of Minister without Portfolio, yet, after Rechberg's departure, he became the real master at the Foreign Office. 'When I came to see Mensdorff,' related Beust, 'and had sat down beside his table, the door opened, little Count Esterházy entered, and, placing a chair next to that of the Minister, he sat down beside him like a music-master watching his pupil play the piano.' It was said that neither men nor women could resist the nature of this delicate, inconspicuous man with his clean-shaven, nervously mobile face. He had almost forgotten his Hungarian mother tongue, and disliked the German language. He talked French, generally in a paradoxical style, which was not so much clever as provocative. Sometimes he was witty, often obscure, but, whichever way he spoke, it was said that he always left more than one possibility open, and preferred dubious hints to clear formulations. He was lively in company and loquacious in discussion, while in his work he preserved an evenness which could not be ruffled. The post of 'Minister without Portfolio,' which the Emperor had given him, precisely suited him, for it enabled him to tender his advice in every sphere without having any responsibility on his shoulders. Sometimes he passed through periods of indolence, when he would be disagreeable and untractable. He had been recalled from Rome, where he was Ambassador, because for months he had given no news of himself, leaving letters and documents unread and unanswered. At such times he would shut himself up in a dark room and receive nobody, neither eating nor speaking more than was barely necessary. 'The Count is in the abyss,' his attendants used to whisper.

After Schmerling's retirement he had a free field of action. The new Prime Minister in succession to the Archduke Rainer, Count Richard Belcredi, who held at the same time the post of Minister of Police, was altogether the man for him. Belcredi shared Esterházy's dislike of the bureaucracy and of the Central Parliament—indeed, of what were known as 'ideas from the West'; the two were as one in considering that the nobility and the Church, the feudal representatives in the Diets, as well as the civil service, infected with Liberal notions, and the German

bourgeoisie, were all to be kept well in their places. After what had already been done in that direction, it was fairly easy to bring Francis Joseph back to the policy with which he had broken in October 1860. Resentment against the Parliament which had curtailed necessary military expenditure had made it easy for the Emperor to take leave of Schmerling ; while Esterházy's view of the Hungarian situation, his argument that the Constitution of the years before 1848 had represented an 'historic' privilege with which revolutionary notions had had nothing to do were comforting to Francis Joseph, as was also Esterházy's opinion that understanding with Hungary would now be increasingly possible.

It was now time to reveal the principal aim of the new policy, which was the withdrawal of the Constitution of February. On September 17th, 1865, the Emperor opened the Cabinet Council with a question addressed to Belcredi—'whether it was possible still to keep in force the fundamental law regarding the representation of the Empire.' Of course, everything had been prepared ; the Prime Minister needed but to feel in his pocket for the declaration and the decree which were to announce the withdrawal of the Constitution. Only the Ritter von Komers, Belcredi's Minister of Justice, expressed his doubts ; but he was the *enfant terrible* of this Government. 'His Majesty,' concludes the official record of this Council, 'having ordered the strictest secrecy regarding the proceedings, was pleased to declare the sitting at an end.' On the next day the suspension order was made public.

'At last !' This was the headline with which the Viennese daily paper of the Austrian nobility, the *Vaterland*, which had been founded in 1860, welcomed the announcement, interpreting the general feeling of the Court and of Conservative society. In the circle of the Archduchess Sophie it was said : 'C'est le triomphe complet et définitive.' At last she saw her son returning to the principles with which Schwarzenberg and Kübeck had saved the dynasty and the Empire, fortified the Imperial Government, and restored the Church and the nobility to the positions which properly belonged to them. What was called in society 'the Liberal swindle' had long been felt as intolerable by the all-powerful, intriguing, pious ladies, priests, generals,

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and aides. They had long held Schmerling's days as numbered, and impatiently awaited his departure. Now was the moment of their triumph.

But painful was the awakening of the citizens of Vienna from the dreams of the Liberal period. The Liberal Press began a violent campaign of opposition. For the first time the Liberals became aware how they had deceived themselves. With the collapse of the Constitution collapsed also their faith in the identity of the interests of the German bourgeoisie and of the dynasty. These were the classical days of Vienna journalism. Despite severe censorship, the newspapers conducted their campaign against the Ministry of the Three Counts with wit, wisdom, and energy. The lead was taken by the *Neue Freie Presse*, founded in 1864 by M. Etienne, Max Friedländer, and Adolf Werthner. It was this newspaper which performed the service of bringing to light an all too material motive which may have contributed to Esterházy's hatred of the Schmerling régime. Since the death of his father, nine years before, Esterházy had owed the State death-duties to the sum of 283,000 gulden. Schmerling and Plener were not to be got round; they let matters take their course. Three days after the change, Esterházy submitted to his friend and colleague, Count Larisch, the new Minister of Finance, a request for suspension of legal action, for reduction of the tax estimate, and for permission to pay by instalments. Ten days later the taxation authorities of Ofen received the order to send the documents regarding the Esterházy estate directly to the Ministry of Finance, and within a week Larisch could inform his colleague that the estimate had been greatly reduced, and that payment would be taken in nine yearly instalments. 'Naturally, for a tip of almost 90,000 gulden,' wrote the *Neue Freie Presse*, any one would overthrow a Government.'

Yet it would be quite mistaken to suppose that such petty motives alone inspired the policy of Esterházy, or, as Vienna called him, 'the mysterious Moritz.' Like his class in general, he considered an exceptional position over against the law to be the natural privilege of the Peer. The influence which he exercised over the Emperor was, in truth, more costly than any tip. 'It was said of him that he might have pointed out the

dangers of war to an Emperor whose youthful ardour was deeply incensed against Prussia. In former days he had shown special talent in pointing out the defects of any project whatever with a devastatingly minute criticism. Now, on the contrary, he plunged headlong into the stream, and approved the wildest schemes.'

Rechberg's successor, Alexander, Count Mensdorff-Pouilly, related to most of the dynasties of Europe through his father's marriage with a Princess of Coburg, himself married to the richest heiress in Austria, a daughter of Prince Dietrichstein, was far from being a man of war. He had been a general commanding a cavalry division in 1859, which had given him a full opportunity of understanding the weaknesses of the Austrian army. After Rechberg's departure, Bismarck suggested that it would be six of one against half a dozen of the other, since Francis Joseph himself really laid down the line of foreign policy. There was a difference, however, and it was soon felt. Mensdorff was fundamentally a soft and hesitating character, possessed only of 'the idle charm which goes down in Austria as the mark of the perfect gentleman, together with a sensible outlook, but without an effective will.' He was much more susceptible to influence than Rechberg. The notes which were sent to Prussia in 1864 were prepared by Mensdorff and written by Biegeleben, but it was Esterházy who approved them. They were unusually sharp in tone, and demanded restoration of the Augustenburg claimant, deploring the protraction of the situation in Schleswig-Holstein. Bismarck laid Biegeleben's glowing phrases on ice : by New Year 1865 there was still no answer from Berlin.

Francis Joseph now became impatient, and, by his order, Károlyi, the Austrian Ambassador, insistently demanded an answer, but Bismarck quietly answered that he saw no reason for changing the provisional situation in Schleswig-Holstein. 'We are like two guests seated in front of a tempting dish. One of them has no appetite, and prevents the other hungry one from helping himself. Well, we must wait !'

On February 30th, Francis Joseph received the news which he had awaited with so much anxiety. Prussia agreed to restore the Augustenburg claimant, but only on the conditions

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already indicated, of which the principal was that the military forces of Schleswig-Holstein must come under Prussian command. This was exactly what Austria could not countenance.

The drama now reached its culminating point. Francis Joseph was torn in two directions. When he resolved to take up the struggle for Austrian primacy, the thought that the two Conservative Powers should cling together blunted the edge of his resolution. A party in the high society of Vienna considered that if Austria and Prussia were to fight, 'the Revolution,' meaning the Parliamentary and democratic system, would triumph. Yet there was another opinion, voiced by the Archduchess Sophie, which was opposed to any compromise, insisting that the House of Hapsburg must stand up for its existence and its faith.

To begin with, the sense of the unity of interest of the Conservative Powers exerted the greater force. The Treaty of Gastein, signed on August 14th, 1865, 'glued together the hole in the fabric.' By the terms of this treaty, Austria took over the administration of Holstein, and Prussia that of Schleswig. The Imperial family was blind enough to believe that the common interests of Legitimists was still a binding force in 1865, as it had been in 1814. The Court of Vienna, absorbed in memories of the past, innocent of any sense of history, either did not guess, or could not understand, that, though Bismarck might cut a pleasing figure as a reactionary, yet behind him lowered the urge to national unity; that Bismarck, like the colours he served, black and white, represented a contradiction which had to be resolved even though it might be by force of arms, and with Napoleon's help.

Bismarck's visit to Napoleon III in October 1865 was the significant prologue to the drama of 1866. Napoleon understood the times. As protector of the principle of nationality he must be the enemy of the Hapsburg dynasty. He perceived that these were the birth-pangs of Germany, and dreaded the clash with the 'nation of the future' in which later he was to be laid low. Yet this time he was going to cover the flank of Prussia. It was a living idea which at this historic moment united the two men who paced the sand of Biarritz together. Vienna and Berlin were united by no more than a memory of the past.

On January 26th, 1866, a telegram arrived in Vienna from Berlin accusing Austria of causing unrest in the Duchies. On February 28th there had been a Cabinet Council in Berlin. King William had half agreed to Bismarck's bold plans, and Moltke's scheme of campaign for an offensive war was ready. At the same time Berlin was negotiating with France and Italy.

Esterházy was afraid. 'The risk,' he declared, 'is too great ; whether we emerge from the war as conquerors or as conquered, we shall have to deal with a different Austria from the one we now know.' On March 14th the Italian General Gavone arrived in Berlin, and two days later Francis Joseph asked the Prussian Court whether it really meant to tear up the agreement of Gastein. Bismarck replied to Károlyi, the Austrian Ambassador, that this was not the case.

On March 24th, Prussia openly accused Austria of concentrating troops in Bohemia, and four days later King William signed the order for military preparations. In her reply, Austria denounced the accusation that she was herself making warlike preparations as a false imputation by the Prussian Government. Francis Joseph, declared the note, had no thought of attacking Prussia. Italy, meanwhile, had already pledged herself for three months ahead. Now Bismarck played his great card, demanding the election of a German Parliament by universal suffrage. Then followed more delays. Napoleon had become increasingly suspicious, and this made King William hesitate again. On April 7th came a note from Francis Joseph proposing that Prussia should withdraw her order for military preparations. The Emperor once more gave solemn assurance that he was not preparing to attack his neighbour. On April 15th Prussia agreed to cancel her preparations if Austria should do the same.

A Cabinet Council was held in Vienna on April 17th. Francis Joseph declared that now was the time to decide definitely for or against war. 'If war be really considered inevitable,' he announced, 'then, far from interrupting the preparations we have already begun, we must, on the contrary, with all speed complete such measures as are necessary for war. But if war can be avoided, the question then is how to formulate our reply.' Esterházy was the next speaker. 'Beyond doubt,' he



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insisted, 'Bismarck desires war, and is looking for a pretext to begin it ; so far he has not found one. It is the task of the Imperial Government to see that his search still remains a vain one. We should now take him at his word and accept the proposal for restoration of the *status quo*.' After Count Mensdorff had spoken in the same tone, Belcredi addressed the Council : 'Prussia, in this note, does indeed demand from Austria restoration of the *status quo*, without, however, saying what she, on her side, will do. A question like this cannot be resolved by a mere exchange of notes, especially with a man like Count Bismarck on the other side. The present situation, however, is intolerable, and some solution must urgently be sought.' He proposed now that the German Federation should put Article XI. of the Federal Charter into operation. This would avoid the necessity of continuing an exchange of correspondence with Prussia, which could lead nowhere. But Francis Joseph once more raised his voice. 'There are only two possibilities ahead. Either we agree to the Prussian demand and restore the *status quo*, or else we leave the note unanswered, and in this case we must immediately make all preparations for war. This Prussian answer is given out as pacific, and is generally taken to be so. Even before we had received its text, the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior had informed us that its tone would be pacific. I hold it to be my duty to make a last attempt to preserve the peace. We must therefore agree to the proposal that the *status quo* be restored, but on condition that the demobilization order be issued by both sides on one and the same day, and also be simultaneously put into effect. There is no reason whatever publicly to discuss the measures of preparation which have already been taken. But sooner or later the question will have to be brought up before the Federation.' In conclusion, according to the minutes of the meeting, 'His Majesty expressed his desire that the answer of the Imperial Government should be drawn up in calm and perfectly clear terms, and that it should contain no passage whatever which might carry an ambiguous interpretation.'

On April 18th, Austria declared her readiness to countermand all concentration of troops, and suggested April 25th as the day on which Austria and Prussia should give the order for demo-

bilization. This was the last move in the interests of peace. 'Count Bismarck is not at all pleased with the turn of events,' wrote the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Count Barral, to his Government. Bismarck wished to delay answering this last Austrian proposal, but the King would not agree. On April 21st a Prussian note, generally accepting Vienna's proposals, but without mention of a date for demobilization, was dispatched. The omission was King William's concession to his 'Dæmon.' Yet so far there had been no final rupture. All that was needed was an understanding regarding the commencement of demobilization. King William was determined to reach such an understanding, and Bismarck had almost lost hope. It was difficult, he said to Barral, to refuse the Austrian offer ; for his part, he only hoped that he would be able to stick to the horses which had been bought for the artillery as part of the military preparations. 'One has the impression,' the Italian Ambassador ended, 'that Bismarck is discouraged by this turn of events.' Europe certainly believed that war was to be avoided.

The passage of events had so far been clear and comprehensible, and the historians have been able to relate them without leaving any point in obscurity. But what happened on April 21st, the day when King William conveyed to Vienna his readiness to disarm ? Heinrich Friedjung, in his great work, here introduces a pause in the narrative, and writes : 'The historian can only record that a broken link now interrupts the logical chain of events. Not one of those Ministers who at this moment urged Austria to make precipitate military preparations has yet explained what Austrian policy at this juncture was aiming at. . . . Possibly their loyalty to the crown imposed silence upon them.' On April 20th, one day before the arrival of Prussia's pacific note, the Chief of General Staff, Alfred Baron von Henikstein, had handed a memorial to the Emperor which was almost a cry of despair. If Austria desired to acquit herself with honour in a double war, it was high time, he said, to bring the whole army on a war footing. The memorial sounded, indeed, a note of alarm, revealing, as it did, the great difficulties entailed in mobilization.

On April 21st a Cabinet Council was held. Francis Joseph opened the session with the observation that he had demanded

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a frank answer from the High Command at Verona to the question whether the alarming reports of warlike preparations by Piedmont were accurate. Such measures as it would be necessary to take in reply to these preparations would be aimed only at securing the Empire against Italy. If Prussia should make such action a pretext for warlike alarums, this must not be taken as an excuse for neglecting measures absolutely necessary for the security of the monarchy. Belcredi now read out the report of a police officer, who was, he confessed, 'frequently given to exaggeration,' but in this case deserved credence when he related that an army corps was being concentrated at Bologna. Ritter von Franck took the view that the situation was very serious, and required mobilization of the southern army, but he must have the necessary funds from the Minister of Finance. When the Emperor asked whether Mensdorff agreed to the military preparations, it transpired that the Foreign Minister was unwell and had excused himself from attendance. Esterházy also was absent. On April 21st he was in bed, nor did he attend any of the three following sessions of the Cabinet. Had his view been obtained on April 21st? Evidently not, since he himself asked for news of what had happened. After the meeting the Emperor had received his answer from Verona, and, with agreement of the Minister of War, had given a telegraphic order for mobilization of the southern army. On the same day General Benedek was nominated to the command of the troops in the north, and the Archduke Albert to the command of those in the south. That meant war.

Not only Friedjung, but public opinion in general, designated Esterházy as the real author of the war. It was on this 'man of destiny' of Francis Joseph, who died in 1890 in a mad-house, that the reproach of having brought about the catastrophe of 1866 fell. After his death his family thought of publishing a rectification of this view. Belcredi dissuaded them, declaring that 'so long as the monarch lives our lips must remain sealed.' But since 1926 we have the letters which Esterházy addressed from his sick-bed to Mensdorff between April 21st and 25th. They were discovered by Josef Redlich among the secret documents of the Vienna State Archives.

On April 23rd Esterházy wrote: 'DEAR MENSENDORFF, . . . I

am still very low with fever, but if I could be of any use, be assured I would not let this hinder me from assisting you with all my powers. . . . It is absolutely maddening that all this business should arise just at this moment. I say this, not because my presence could do much to assist a good cause, but because I have no outlet for my passionate and hopeless devotion to it. Please give me some information about the text of the Prussian note and the decisions of the Council.' In a second letter, written on the same day, Esterházy 'conjures' Mensdorff to do his utmost to delay the announced departure of Archduke Albert for the southern army.

On April 25th, Francis Joseph summoned his Ministers to a 'confidential discussion.' On the same day Baron Gablenz, Grand-Ducal Chamberlain of Saxony, was introduced with a recommendation from Esterházy, offering his services as mediator, not, he said, in the spirit of an armchair politician.

Later Esterházy wrote : 'In the name of the monarchy, I thank you for your success in delaying the departure of the Archduke. Apart from all other considerations, it would be sheer foolishness to recall Benedek from his post an hour sooner than the mobilization of the proposed northern army renders necessary.'

The mobilization order against Italy, which was now issued at Vienna, was a bombshell. After April 21st there could be no retreat. The pacific tone of the Prussian note passed unnoticed amid the clamour of war. On April 25th there was a Cabinet Council described in the minutes as 'a confidential discussion.' The Emperor concluded it with the words : 'It is urgently necessary to put an end to the present strange situation, which becomes every day more intolerable, and this must be done by decisive action which will entail the likelihood of war.' On April 26th the Emperor's closest advisers had already decided upon war, yet Mensdorff wrote to Berlin that Austria could disarm in the north, but was obliged to defend herself against Italy in the south. It was not difficult for Bismarck to answer that Prussia could not possibly distinguish between those Austrian corps and regiments which were being mobilized for use to the north, and those destined for the south. On April 27th, Francis Joseph gave the order for mobilization of the Austrian army, and war was declared against Prussia.

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Many of the events of 1866 recall the fatal weeks in 1914, when the decision was reached, half in the Vienna Foreign Office and half in Ischl, to mobilize against Serbia. But what of the opinion which saw in Moritz Esterházy the 'man of destiny' who was solely responsible for the war of 1866? The documents which have been so far brought to light suggest that this is a patriotic legend designed simply to cover the fault of the Emperor. Esterházy doubtless exercised a disastrous influence in determining Francis Joseph's policy, but responsibility for a war can only be placed on somebody who has definitely said yes when the fateful question was asked. This Esterházy did not do. As in 1914, it was the General Staff which asked the fateful question, and Francis Joseph, both in 1866 and in 1914, answered yes.

It lay in Francis Joseph's nature to take sudden decisions, and the one just recorded was the most fateful which he had yet taken. A critical situation arose; and the Emperor, upon the inspiration of a moment, laid down the course of action with a despotic declaration. When affairs had reached an intolerable pass, Francis Joseph resorted to a 'leap in the dark.' This seems to contrast with the sober colour of his character, and, indeed, it was this habit which led him to disaster. As soon as the General Staff demanded 'the word of authority,' Francis Joseph uprooted himself from his everyday habits of mind, and, on the spur of the moment, decided the fate of millions. During the Emperor's lifetime Austrian historians avoided touching upon this undeniable characteristic of the Emperor; duty demands that it should be clearly affirmed to-day.

## CHAPTER XV

### EXPULSION FROM GERMANY

**F**RANCIS JOSEPH'S policy in 1866 appears full of contradictions and obscurities. On April 21st, Bismarck calculated that there was no prospect of war, but on that very day the Emperor mobilized against Italy, and thus slammed the door on negotiations. Yet a week later the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Prince Metternich, was ordered to invite Napoleon to act as mediator in the dispute with Italy. Yesterday Italy had been the principal enemy, to be dealt with by brute force; to-day this hatred was transferred entirely to Prussia.

Who was responsible for this new and sudden change of atmosphere and opinion? Count Mensdorff was more than usually in the dark, and himself writes of this time: 'I understood nothing about politics, as I have repeatedly informed the Emperor. I was a general, and my commander-in-chief ordered me to accept the post of Minister. I had to obey.' After the Battle of Königgrätz the Saxon diplomat, Count Vitzthum, asked him why he had not resigned his post. He answered: 'You may well ask; you are not a soldier.'

The generals showed no war spirit. The Chief of General Staff, Alfred, Baron von Henikstein, was a grandson of the Jewish commercial magnate Hönigstein, and son of a wealthy patron of the arts. A man of education and social qualities, a Court general rather than an active service officer, Henikstein had no desire whatever to earn laurels in the field. He had obtained his high post through his friend Benedek, and confessed that he had no knowledge of strategy. None the less, it was his memorial of April 20th, calling attention to the defects of the army and advising mobilization of the southern army without delay, which brought the Emperor to his decision.

Hostilities against Italy necessarily implied the order for mobilization against Prussia. But, now that the spectre of a double war was near at hand, the Emperor lost his courage, and determined to buy off Italy with the cession of Venetia. The

first proposal made to Napoleon was that Austria should cede Venetia as soon as she had reconquered Silesia. It was not acceptable, and Francis Joseph had to yield to Napoleon's demand that he should unconditionally cede Venetia in return for Italian neutrality. This hesitating and changeful policy in 1866 was similar to the irresolute line followed by Austria in 1915. Napoleon, suspicious of Bismarck's inscrutable plans, was favourably inclined to Austria. But he did not exercise his mediatorial functions with the needful energy, and, on their part, the Italian diplomats were no more in a position to fall in with his plans. War had become a popular cry in Italy, and the Italians refused to receive the coveted province of Venetia from Napoleon's hands. La Marmora, the Italian Foreign Minister, refused Napoleon's mediation.

It was now mid May. For three weeks Austrian military trains had been speeding towards Olmütz and Verona, and for a week, Prussia, the home of conscription, had been calling to arms every man capable of bearing them. Bismarck was for delaying active operations till they became inevitable. Moltke was for immediate action, and had advised the King to declare war on the first day of mobilization, arguing that herein lay Prussia's only chance of overcoming geographical disadvantages, and parrying the danger which threatened from Bavaria and the hostile Central States. Day by day Austria's position was strengthened and Prussia's weakened. 'War,' wrote Moltke, 'can no longer be avoided : every further delay imperils the security of our Fatherland.' But the Prussian King, with inexorable tenacity, still refused to speak the fateful words. King William delayed the war, and opposed the strongest resistance to the method of bloodshed in settling accounts between the two German Great Powers. Only after long and wearisome insinuations could Bismarck and Moltke obtain his assent.

The King was not alone in taking this attitude. His son and the whole Court of Berlin, the Queen and her relatives, the Parliament and the people, were against war. Moltke's plans were almost frustrated by William's refusal to make the cruel decision. Twice Bismarck almost gave up hope. After the disarmament proposals of April, war had seemed definitely eliminated. But Austria played into Bismarck's hands. On April

27th the Austrian northern army was mobilized, but even then it required a further week to persuade the Prussian King to mobilize on his side, and the decision was made, so he subsequently told Beust, 'with bleeding heart after eight sleepless nights,' and, as he told Archbishop Melchers of Cologne, 'after wrestling with my God in prayer' ; and this must be the simple truth, for William was a plain man, who hated talk for talk's sake.

Historical tradition subsequently gives to all great decisions an impersonal character, showing them as the result of a play of forces. We must here point out the part played by the will of the decisive personalities. The events of 1866 were like those of 1914. It was no more 'necessary' then to solve the German question by force of arms than it was at a subsequent date necessary to call in the sword to settle accounts between Austria and Serbia. General staff officers and the philosophers of war are fond of adducing mobilization as a 'mechanical force' rendering war inevitable, but in 1866 there was no such irresistible mechanical force, as history understands these terms.

While the armies were gathering, two proposals of mediation were received, both of them worthy of consideration. One came from Anton von Gablenz, the other from Napoleon. The brothers Gablenz were Saxons by birth. One of them was an Austrian general, the other Chamberlain in the Grand Ducal family of Saxony, and together they endeavoured to keep the peace of Germany. Anton, the Chamberlain, described by Esterházy in a letter to Mensdorff as 'an excellent man, of straight and honourable intentions as regards Austria,' had a project all ready : namely, that the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia should reach an agreement about the future structure of Germany, and obtain for it the assent of the German Princes. If one of the latter did not agree, he must expect to find his territory occupied by a Prussian corps, if in the north, and an Austrian corps, if in the south. Then a Parliament would be summoned. Foreign Powers would have to hold their tongue, for no State in the world could resist an army of a million Austro-German soldiers.

Gablenz appeared first in Vienna, with a recommendation from Esterházy to Mensdorff, and Mensdorff listened to him.



Between May 13th and 20th he was in Berlin ; and Bismarck also listened to him, discussing with him a possible basis for a German Parliament. A plan for the partition of Germany was also prepared. 'The Emperor of Austria shall be Federal Commander-in-Chief for War and Peace in the south, and the King of Prussia the same in the north.' The two Empires were to be linked by a close alliance guaranteeing the territorial possessions of both. Austria's position in Venice would be guaranteed by the whole of the armed forces of Central Europe.

It was not as a temporizing expedient that the project interested Bismarck. If Prussia desired war, she had every reason to make the decision at once. Every day was precious. But Bismarck took the project seriously, and this was not illogical on his part. It was natural to him to test every means to see whether it would serve the one great end. Speaking of the Gablenz project, he declares : 'Nobody at that time could have withstood us. The two German Powers were heavily armed ; they could make their word a law in Europe. . . . I suggested that, ready for war as we were, we should immediately unite against France in order to compel her to cede Alsace. Austria could take Strasburg, Prussia would take Mainz.'

Bismarck took the plan so seriously that he drew the attention of Italy, who was still Prussia's ally, to the project. For one moment a great perspective opened. Internecine war could be avoided, Germany could be reconstructed, the ancient question of north and south resolved, Austria saved from isolation, and Eastern Europe brought into the zone of German culture. Such visions, and not only these, loomed in the future. The German Federation would have become the greatest Empire in Europe.

Gablenz proceeded to Vienna with these plans in his pocket. But Francis Joseph, strange as it may seem, refused. For an hour and a quarter the Emperor listened to all Bismarck's proposals, and had them carefully explained to him. At the end he remarked : 'If only you had come six weeks ago !' According to the historians, Francis Joseph had by this time become very suspicious, remembering that Bismarck had, some weeks before, given Bavaria the Supreme Command in the south. But suspicion was not the only cause of Francis Joseph's refusal. A delay in the outbreak of hostilities could not but be advanta-

geous to Austria, for mobilization was taking much longer than had been expected. Why, then, did Francis Joseph refuse to negotiate on this basis? The historians of this age, from Rogge to Friedjung, all make Belcredi and Esterházy responsible for Francis Joseph's refusal, suggesting that the aristocratic Ministry required war in order to master the internal situation. But this view cannot be upheld. The Cabinet reports of these days confirm that Belcredi was given to a facile optimism, and that he alone underrated the dangers of a double war, but they confirm also that his influence was not decisive. Internal difficulties were no greater now than a few weeks earlier. Vienna was calm enough; the more serious organs of the Press advised caution; in Hungary, Deák was paving the way towards reconciliation, and war would only disturb the work which Francis Joseph had so much at heart. The fact is that, in refusing this final offer of mediation, Francis Joseph was led by no political motive, but by feelings of dynastic pride and by aristocratic instincts. He felt himself bound to the German Central States by the agreements he had entered into. His friend, the Saxon Crown Prince Albert, was already discussing the plan of campaign with Benedek. Francis Joseph would not leave him in the lurch.

It was a tragic aspect of Francis Joseph's character that he was unable to distinguish between a rational understanding of a political situation and his own private feelings about it. Hegel says that all the great events of history happen twice. This is true of Francis Joseph's life. In 1866 he faced the methods of Bismarck—the man of no prejudices who sought to extract every possible profit from each hour—in the spirit of an old Frankish chieftain, esteeming the fate of millions as a private concern of his own. And, forty-eight years later, sober weighing of the situation was equally eclipsed by considerations of prestige and chivalry. At the later date the murder of Francis Ferdinand appeared as an assault on the sanctity of the dynasty which must be punished. To conjure up gigantic perils was a policy against which all prudence militated, but prudence was thrown overboard when it came into conflict with the dream of an isolated plan of campaign against Serbia.

On May 28th, 1866, Francis Joseph's refusal arrived in

Berlin, and on July 1st he also rejected Napoleon's plan. Prussia had been the first State to concur in Napoleon's project of a conference ; Italy had followed, and then the German Federation. Now, at any rate, Bismarck had a chance of persuading his monarch that even love's labour would be lost. 'I have been accused,' said King William to the Italian Ambassador, 'of desiring war for reasons of ambition. But, now that Austria refuses to participate in the Conference, all the world knows who is the aggressor.'

On June 11th, General Gablenz, Imperial Viceroy of Holstein, summoned the estates at the Emperor's command. On the same day Prussia gave her answer to this infringement of her sovereign rights by arresting the Austrian Commissioner Lesser. Austria proposed that the German Federation should mobilize the seven corps at its disposal ; whereupon Bismarck laid upon the table his project for a Federal Constitution, which comprised the exclusion of Austria, Parliament, and general suffrage ; thus far Bismarck was prepared to go in the direction of Liberalism. On June 14th the Federal Diet voted on Austria's proposal after Bavaria had introduced two formal alterations in the text. The Austrian proposal was carried by nine to six votes, whereupon the Prussian representative, Savigny, proclaimed that the terms of the Federation had been violated.

On June 21st the outposts at Zwickau and Oswiecim exchanged declarations of war. There followed the shortest recorded campaign of any historical importance. It took only a few days, beginning on June 26th, to determine which way victory and defeat were to fall in the conflict between the two armies, each numbering a quarter of a million soldiers. The great struggle only lasted seven days, from the skirmishes at Hühnerwasser and Liebau to the Battle of Königgrätz. By the evening of July 3rd the fate of Germany had been sealed with the blood of 31,424 dead or wounded Austrians and 9,172 fallen or wounded Prussians.

The drama had been swift and fierce as a hurricane. First there was total uncertainty and groping in the dark. \* Then Königgrätz came like a flash of lightning. Benedek, after much show of reluctance, had taken over the northern command, the Emperor promising him that there should be no interference by

the Court in the conduct of the war. The Emperor, the War Minister Franck, the Military Secretary Count Crenneville, and Belcredi were cautious men. They trusted Benedek. But, when the expected thrust of the northern army from Olmütz did not take place, Francis Joseph grew anxious, and sought to speed up matters through the agency of Lieutenant-Colonel von Beck, later Chief of Staff. Four telegrams and two letters reached the Emperor from Bohemia during the critical days preceding the tragic night of June 28th-29th, when Benedek finally gave up his idea of an offensive. The letter of June 26th revealed Benedek's plan to muster the army round Josephstadt and to deliver the strongest possible attack against the army of Prince Frederick Charles on the Iser. On June 27th, after the first skirmish at Nachod, which ended in the defeat of Ramming, Benedek reported an Austrian victory. On the next day, June 28th, he announced the victory of Gablenz at Trautenau, and in the evening he talked of his continued intention to march against the first Prussian army, in utter ignorance of what had happened at two hours' walking distance from him at Skalitz, at Trautenau-Soor, and on the Iser.

Can it be wondered that Francis Joseph was convinced that Krismanich's plan was being carried out, and that what had so far happened was only a preamble to a great offensive? When Benedek sent his telegram, he knew nothing of the defeat of Clam-Gallas's corps, of the rout of Gablenz at Trautenau-Soor, or of the skirmish at Skalitz in which the Archduke Leopold's corps was severely beaten. He himself had been present in the morning at the battlefield of Skalitz. When he left it before noon he had no idea that his soldier's fortune was to break down irretrievably behind his back. But, when he had sent his report to Francis Joseph, one misfortune after another was announced at the General Headquarters in Josephstadt.

The war was now virtually lost for Francis Joseph. The Prussian Crown Prince had united his three army groups and had fought his way to the Elbe. Prince Frederick Charles, marching from the Iser to the Elbe, was only two days distant from the Crown Prince. The presumed advantage of the inner lines was now lost to the Austrians. They had expected to be able to bring their united army against the two sections of

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the Prussian forces, and to crush each in succession. Krismanič and Benedek had counted on first repulsing Prince Frederick Charles and then the Prussian Crown Prince.

Later critics, notably the Prussian General von Schlichting, have convincingly emphasized the fact that Benedek could not have won the war, even if he had been able to carry out his plan of holding the inner lines. They point out that the Austrian commanders were hopelessly nonplussed by Moltke's surprising new strategy and by the Prussian tactics. But Benedek never had a chance of putting his project into effect. By June 28th the marching orders of the Austrian corps were hopelessly confused, and a third of the army had suffered severe defeat, while the whole army was threatened at such close quarters by the Prussian forces that an offensive was no more to be thought of.

Krismanič's strategy was derived from the War of Bavarian Succession. He led the half-routed army to the plateau of Dubenetz, and there assembled it. It was there that, in 1778, Joseph II and General Lacy had drawn a line against the advance of Frederick the Great, and here Benedek and Krismanič proposed to resist the onrush of the two Prussian armies.

On June 29th, Francis Joseph received the news that the great plan of attack had been given up, and the position of Dubenetz occupied. It was disquieting but not disastrous news. Benedek's telegram gave no inkling of the condition of the staff and the army. In keen expectation, Vienna awaited Benedek's great stroke. From day to day the Viennese were encouraged to expect it, being told that Benedek had only sent out a few corps, to lure the enemy into the interior, against the rocky wall of the Riesengebirge. He himself, it was said, was crouching like a proud lion, waiting to tear the foe asunder. But the lion never sprang. On June 30th, Francis Joseph learnt from Benedek, not the whole truth, but part of it, and that was depressing enough: 'Collapse of the first corps and of the Saxons obliges me to retreat upon Königgrätz.' Benedek wrote to his wife: 'It were better if a bullet finished me off.'

The same evening Francis Joseph summoned his counsellors, Mensdorff, Esterházy, the War Minister Franck, Military Secretary Count Crenneville, and Lieutenant-Colonel von Beck.

It was a memorable meeting, for there could no longer be any doubt about the military disaster ; the echoes of rejoicing in Berlin sounded too clearly in Vienna. But how was the catastrophe to be explained ? Amid a storm of reproaches, the Emperor could not understand why Benedek and his army had failed. In the Danish war the Austrians had felt themselves superior to the Prussian army. Only four days before, the Archduke Albert had won a victory at Custoza. How, then, had this catastrophe in the north come about ?

The origins of this tragedy were concealed from Francis Joseph. He could not understand how everything had combined to thrust the greatest army which Austria had ever sent against an enemy, after four days, into a defensive position which offered no prospects. None of his counsellors was able to explain to him that altogether new elements were at work. These elements were : firstly, the strategy of Moltke, who ordered detachments to undertake separate marches in order to meet at the critical point at a precise moment, and, further, the Prussian infantry tactics and the greatly improved rifles, which were worth three times those still served out to the Austrian army. Nothing in the Great War caused more surprise than the novel Prussian conduct of war, in 1866 used against an army whose method, under the guidance of antediluvian strategists, was still to advance with fixed bayonets into the mouth of concentrated rifle fire.

The fact that on June 30th the Cabinet seriously discussed whether the Emperor should not himself assume supreme command of the army, as in 1859, shows how little Francis Joseph and his counsellors understood the situation. It was Esterházy who made the suggestion, being supported by Franck, while Mensdorff kept silent. Francis Joseph approved of it ; but, had he actually carried out the suggestion, he would have witnessed the disaster of Königgrätz, which would for ever have been associated with his name. However, before undertaking the journey to Bohemia he wished to have the most reliable information from some one enjoying his complete confidence. The same evening, on June 30th, therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel von Beck arrived at the battlefield. At the same time Francis Joseph telegraphed to Benedek : 'Although I know no-

thing of what has happened beyond the news contained in your reports of June 27th and 28th from Josephstadt, and your telegram of June 29th from Dubenetz, I trust firmly, despite the fact that you have had to retire upon Königgrätz, that your energetic leadership will soon realize favourable results for us, and that order will be preserved by the force of your will.' This was the last message which the Emperor sent to express his confidence in the hopelessly beaten commander. It reached Benedek on the morning of July 1st, during the retreat from Dubenetz to Königgrätz, in the middle of confusions, forced halts, and entanglements of the various detachments of the weary and hungry army, hopelessly struggling along insufficient roads, after being senselessly rushed hither and thither on vain errands. Even Dubenetz, the high plateau from which Krismanič had expected so much, had proved impossible to hold.

Colonel von Beck, charged with the Emperor's instructions, found Benedek in the headquarters at Neu-Königgrätz, a suburb of the fortified town. Beck was at that time the Emperor's most sensible friend. Born in Baden, a contemporary of the Emperor, he had entered the Imperial army as a youth. His mission at this moment was like that of Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch in the Battle of the Marne, though he had not the latter officer's authority to act. Beck advised that the army should be brought as soon as possible—that is, on July 2nd—behind the bend of the River Elbe at Pardubitz, and that, if the Prussians should thrust forward even there, a retreat should be made, not upon Olmütz, but upon Vienna. This was the most sensible advice under the circumstances, and in giving it Beck did not exceed his orders, nor did he in any way interfere with the independence of the army leader. Schlieffen once remarked that there are two kinds of independence, one of which is the instrument of victory and the other an almost sure means of being beaten. The independence of the Austrian army chiefs was of the second type. Benedek did not wish to retire on Vienna, nor did he wish to fight. He wanted 'peace at any price,' and urged Beck to persuade the Emperor to ask for it. Beck would not assume so heavy a responsibility, which properly could be shouldered only by an army commander enjoying the greatest independence. Benedek himself, therefore, at noon on July 1st,

sent the following telegram : 'I urgently beg Your Majesty to conclude peace. Military catastrophe cannot be avoided. Colonel von Beck is returning immediately.'

The very next day, at 2 a.m. on July 2nd, Beck was in Vienna, and five hours later he was giving his report to the Emperor. What happened at this meeting in Francis Joseph's study Beck never betrayed. In the afternoon, Benedek received Francis Joseph's answer : 'Impossible to conclude peace. If retreat necessary, undertake same. Has any battle been fought ?' The last sentence had been added by Count Crenneville. In later times the Austrian General Staff endeavoured to uphold that Benedek had resolved to join battle on his own initiative, without any order from the Emperor. Thus Francis Joseph was to be absolved from all responsibility for Königgrätz. The effort was superfluous : history has never held the Emperor responsible for that disaster. The question whether a battle had been fought was not an extraordinary one to put. No doubt pride and aristocratic instinct were reflected in it ; but, apart from such feelings, a decision to conclude peace without any decisive action in the field would have been difficult, even taking the worst view of the circumstances. Francis Joseph, however, assumed that Benedek would follow Beck's advice and retire behind the Elbe, thereby delaying the decisive moment.

Was Austria altogether at the mercy of her enemy ? The southern army, under the leadership of the Archduke Albert and Baron von John, was free to move, now that Venetia had been abandoned. Would it not have been possible to stem the victorious onrush of the Prussians and to fight a decisive action against them with the united force of the northern and southern armies ? Naturally such considerations were weighed.

Beck showed much acumen in pointing out to the Emperor where lay the greatest weakness in the Austrian leadership—at a point, namely, which had not hitherto come under close scrutiny—the person of Krismanič. The extensive literature which has been devoted to the campaign of 1866 places Benedek in the centre of the Austrian picture. Moltke and the Prussian military writers judge him, as is natural, with some generosity. The official Austrian writers, first and foremost those of the



Austrian General Staff, knew in him the sole culprit for the disaster. Private critics such as Friedjung portray him as an unfortunate victim of his own loyalty. There is no doubt that Francis Joseph made a great mistake when he allowed Benedek's popularity to persuade him to force the command of the northern army upon him against his own desire. He did it, of course, because he thought that Benedek and the Archduke Albert were the only possible candidates, and that, if Albert were defeated in the north, it would be a severe blow to the dynasty. But if Benedek was not big enough man for the task, would any other Austrian general have served the purpose better ?

Worse, however, was the mistake made in the appointment of the Chief of General Staff, for which the Archduke Albert was responsible. Albert took for his own Chief of General Staff in the south, John, who was certainly the best man for the appointment. But it was he who had professed to discover in Krismanić a great genius, and had seduced him away from his studies in the science of war. Nobody else had paid much attention to this singular individual. The officers of the General Staff were doubtful about him, but would not question the authority of the Archduke, who was held to be a great general. Krismanić was one of those dangerous individuals gifted with exceptional powers of expression, and able to dazzle the listener with their command of an array of facts, which in this case was altogether useless, if not actually harmful. Later it was recognized that the so-called 'local strategy' of Krismanić was sheer foolishness. He swore by 'descriptive maps,' with all the chief geographical positions marked where actions had taken place during the wars of Frederick the Great against Austria. The young officers of the General Staff mockingly called this system 'sausage strategy,' because the positions in question were marked on the maps in the shape of sausages. This autocratic, self-willed, and morbidly sensitive general, who had never given any proof of practical ability, was held by the Archduke Albert to be a genius ; but Krismanić, besides being eccentric, was lazy. The following example illustrates both this, and also, in an interesting way, the habits of the Austrian headquarters in 1866.

It was the day of the Battle of Nachod on June 27th. Stein-

metz was opening the only possible way into Bohemia for the army of the Crown Prince. Benedek meanwhile lay in bed in the headquarters at Josephstadt with a catarrh of the stomach. Nachod was only two hours' ride from Josephstadt, and the sound of the cannon could clearly be heard, but this did not interfere with the usual luncheon at general headquarters. After luncheon, one or two officers, including the Engineer-in-chief Baron Pidoll, proposed riding to the battlefield. The noise of the guns had at least roused their curiosity. But Krismanič refused, saying : ' Not for me, thank you. I'm going to have a rest.' Captain von Wersebe, then attached to headquarters, later a cavalry general, tells this story, and adds : ' When we heard this we were all angry, particularly as Krismanič immediately proceeded to carry out his suggestion.' But that is incidental to the main story. There was, after all, no particular reason at that moment for the man in charge of operations to be on the spot. Up till June 30th, Moltke was conducting his campaign from Berlin with the aid of maps, compasses, and telegrams. The point is that Krismanič was dangerous as well as lazy. It would be difficult to imagine a more unfortunate combination than that of Benedek and Krismanič. Benedek was independent, yet his own lack of culture gave him a deep respect for knowledge and theory. Unfortunately, he had no means of discerning true knowledge from false knowledge, and he therefore accepted Krismanič's outworn theories with deep respect. Benedek, who was a kind of miniature Blücher, deserved to have by him somebody like Gneisenau, or at least a General Staff officer of normal brains such as were not lacking in the army at that time. Instead of this, he had at his side Krismanič and Henikstein. The latter was properly Chief of General Staff, but acted only as an adviser without responsibility, while Krismanič was the real conductor of the operations. Benedek had himself to blame for the appointment of Henikstein. But it was Francis Joseph's blindness which had led in the first place to the appointment of Benedek as Chief of the General Staff, or, as it was then called, the Quartermaster-General's Staff. Francis Joseph, in his ignorance of the most important military considerations, had a special affection for this loyal and pleasant officer. Benedek had the good sense not

to take his position very seriously between 1860 and 1864, remaining with the troops in Italy and leaving General Nágy to manage matters in Vienna. But when, in 1866, suggestions were made for placing some really first-class officer in this most important of all military posts, it was Benedek who impeded them, not with any ill intention, but rather out of such unconscious jealousy as the successful routine officer is apt to feel against a scientifically educated rival. There were several officers of high reputation of whom the Emperor might have availed himself: in the first place, John and Ramming; then Gallina, one of the founders of General Staff strategy; and Friedrich von Fischer, military historian of this period; and Schönfeld; or, finally, there was the possibility, despite his youth, of appointing Beck. It is positively distressing to read the letters which Benedek wrote on this matter to the Military Secretary, Count Crenneville, and the War Minister, Degenfeld, so clearly does it transpire that he had no idea what was the real business of a Chief of General Staff. None the less on this account did he succeed in impeding the appointment of one of these well-equipped men to that post. To please his favourite, Francis Joseph appointed Benedek's candidate, Henikstein, who neither desired nor aspired to the post.

But on July 2nd, the day before the decisive battle, it was too late to repent of such errors. Beck did what he could in the circumstances. His advice to retire behind the Elbe, and, if necessary, to retreat upon Vienna, was altogether right, and, in advising the Emperor immediately to replace Krismanič and Henikstein, he had shown a clear eye for the realities of the situation. Nothing as yet was known of Benedek's slowly maturing decision to give battle in front of the Elbe, on the heights of Chlum and Lipa. In the night of July 1st-2nd, while Beck was on his way to Vienna, Benedek sent another more detailed telegram to the Emperor in less despairing terms than that of the morning. 'Am glad to report,' it ran, 'that the enemy is not so far pressing us. Consequently to-morrow, July 2nd, I will let the army rest, and will rearrange the transport section. But I cannot remain here long, as by the day after to-morrow our drinking water will have run out. Therefore on the 3rd I will continue the retreat upon Pardubitz. If I am not outflanked, I

can rely once more upon my troops, and, if opportunity offers for offensive action, I shall take it. Otherwise I will attempt to bring the army to Olmutz in the best possible order, and to carry out Your Majesty's gracious orders with such means as are in my power, but with unconditional devotion.'

Benedek did not carry out Beck's advice. He could not rid himself of the fascination which the fortress of Olmutz exercised upon his imagination. But not yet did all seem lost. Francis Joseph, following Beck's advice, removed Krismanič and Henikstein from their posts, and, further, the commander of the first corps, Count Clam-Gallas, who was held responsible for the defeat of the Iser army, consisting of his own corps and of the Saxon forces. Benedek himself was to choose the new Chief of Staff, and he appointed Major-General Baumgarten. The Emperor nominated Count Gondrecourt in succession to Clam-Gallas. These orders were issued by the Emperor on the morning of July 2nd in Beck's presence, and arrived the same evening at Benedek's headquarters.

The next news that the Emperor had was a telegram from Major-General Weigl, commander of the fortress of Königgrätz, as follows: 'The whole corps is in disorder and swarming in and around the fortress. Men are mounting the palisades, swimming in the trenches and in the Elbe, and clambering up the principal wall. Our defensive action is altogether frustrated. I request further orders. This telegram is dispatched in cipher to His Majesty and the Minister of War by order of His Imperial Highness Archduke Ernest, 7.15 p.m.' The excellent Weigl was concerned for the fortress which he had hermetically sealed up, flooding the trenches with water, regardless of the fate of the thousands of fugitives who thus met their destruction.

The brief words of this telegram conveyed a picture of terror which foreshadowed the great catastrophe. Francis Joseph's anxiety was all the more painful for lack of information. During the night, King John of Saxony arrived in Vienna, but he too brought no news. Not till five the next morning did a telegram arrive from Benedek beginning with the words: 'The disaster already foreseen the day before yesterday is to-day complete.' There followed a description of the catastrophe which is not

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only inexact, but in places infantile. Thus Benedek blames 'heavy rainfall, which kept the smoke of the guns on the ground,' for the 'unperceived advance of the Prussian Crown Prince upon the key position of the Austrian army.' It is strange, too, in view of the magnitude of the battle and of the losses incurred, to find Benedek reporting, in his first announcement to the Emperor, the number of horses lost by his staff officers. 'Lieutenant Prince Esterházy lost his horse beneath him ; Lieutenant-General Henikstein's horse was wounded under him ; Captain Wersebe's horse was shot under him.'

Francis Joseph has been very much blamed for abandoning Benedek as he did after the war—Benedek, who willingly sacrificed himself, becoming the scapegoat for this catastrophe. The Emperor could not understand the cause of the defeat. He felt that his confidence had been betrayed, while his pride and Royal dignity were deeply wounded. Königrätz was the worst stroke he had yet suffered. But this was not the moment for self-accusations. At the twelfth hour an attempt must be made to save what a few weeks before had been so frivolously risked. On July 4th, the day of the arrival of Benedek's telegram, the Emperor had a conversation with King John of Saxony, in which Esterházy and the Saxon Prime Minister, Beust, took part, and decided immediately to renounce Venetia in favour of France, according to the terms of the French Treaty. The Emperor of the French was to save the situation. Simultaneously, Archduke Albert was ordered to retire on the Danube with the southern army.

Such schemes quite overlooked the great change in the situation brought about by the disaster of Königrätz. True, Napoleon's Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, took Austria's part, and was in this supported by the Empress. There were, none the less, at the Court of Paris powerful persons, headed by Prince Napoleon, the son-in-law of Victor Emmanuel, who took part against Austria with energy, terming the Hapsburg Empire 'the corpse.' Even on July 4th, Francis Joseph had no idea how deeply the prestige of Austria had sunk, nor could he conceive how easily his opponents were winning over the French Emperor to their side from his previous hesitancy. That very

day there was a Cabinet Meeting at Vienna, in which Belcredi referred to Napoleon's readiness to mediate as a reason for refusing a 'disgraceful peace.' It was just the same language as Austrian Ministers were to use in 1917 and 1918. Belcredi declared that peace concluded at this moment would be 'an eternal blot on the scutcheon of the monarchy'; and that 'the whole existence of the Empire was at stake, and therefore everything must be risked for the object of driving out the Prussians.' It showed a singular blindness in him that he could warn the Cabinet that 'a peace which failed to give us satisfaction might provoke revolution, with the great bitterness against Prussia that was prevalent'!

There were no visible signs of this bitterness. The very day after the battle of Königgrätz, when the news of the catastrophe was known throughout Vienna, the Imperial capital diverted itself with a summer carnival in the Prater, culminating in a Venetian race. Ludwig August Frankl, a poet of swollen expressions and small political insight, records this event with lamentations in a letter to Anastasius Grün. 'It is maddening,' he wrote, 'to think of two thousand of our citizens and their wives playing the fool, drinking, eating, laughing, and dancing in the Prater. Doesn't such a mob deserve all it gets? After wandering for hours in the Prater, weary with wrath and pain, I stumbled into a café garden. It was full of some three hundred men and women of wealthy appearance. Suddenly there appeared musicians and chorus girls in provocative costume. These sang the most wretched songs from the slums, and acted popular scenes, while the company applauded, and often insisted upon an encore. I asked myself if it could be more than a dream. Could it be that we had really received a bloody blow on the head? Are not fire and shame pouring in floods over us?'

Frankl's portrayal of Vienna is too true to admit of modification. Vienna was out for amusement. Johann Strauss was having a famous success with his concerts in the Volksgarten; the summer cafés and the *Heurigen* (where you could drink wine of the new vintage) were full of apparently cheerful and careless people on these July evenings. But it is a mistake to designate people of Vienna as 'a mob' for this reason. In

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1848, Francis Joseph had broken the back of political Vienna. With his revival of absolute government he had instilled into the Viennese that indifference to affairs of State which later became their characteristic. After all, what really bound the Viennese to a State in whose destiny they had no say, for whose disasters they bore no responsibility? Under the new despotism, as under the old, the business of the citizen was to obey, not to assist in the work of government. Even the pseudo-parliament created by Schmerling had been suppressed by Belcredi. The crown was the sole source of power, wisdom, and foresight; as in the days of Emperor Francis.

The Viennese had shown a fine spirit in 1848, but it had been crushed out of them, and now the suppressed forces had to find another form of expression. Vienna in 1866 was reconciled with the despotic system, but in a different way from the Vienna of Francis. In exchange for the political freedom of which it was deprived it seized upon freedom in matters of daily existence. Such was the will of the dynasty, which deprived the Viennese of their debating club, their assembly hall, and their Parliament, but left them the parks, the Prater, the *Heurigen*, and the summer cafés. Forbidden to make political speeches, the Viennese let off their energies in song. The cheerfully resigned man of pleasure, who regarded the State as a tiresome invention, was the creation of the despotic system; so, however, was that peculiarly Viennese type of mockery and irony with which the intellectuals avenged themselves upon their masters for the slavery in which they were kept. This was the one weapon which remained at the service of the Viennese, once so bold and proud. Vienna before the Revolution had grumbled, but after the Revolution her wit became bitter, sharp, and often cruel. Grillparzer, who provides the best expression of all that was good and bad in the Austrian tradition, wrote in 1866 the following epigram on the occasion of the Archbishop of Vienna imploring blessings of heaven for the Austrian arms:

Die Hilfe Gottes, muß ich vermuten,  
Liegt für uns heute ein wenig im weiten;  
Denn nach diesem Leben hilft er den Guten,  
In diesem Leben aber—den Gescheiten.

'Tis somewhat off the mark for us, I fear,  
To seek assistance from a heavenly sphere;  
Beyond the grave the good may live for ever,  
But in this life heaven's help assists the clever.

It would be impossible to sum up better the feelings of Vienna at this juncture. What possible interests had the educated or the uneducated citizen in this war which had been waged in the interests of the Court and the dynasty? It was difficult for any serious political thinker to attribute importance to a bloody encounter which on both sides bore the appearance of a private diplomatic war. Even in Germany only a small minority suspected the great national plans which lay behind Bismarck's campaign.

The work of Bismarck has now been subjected to the criticism of history; and can we, who have witnessed this process, condemn a Liberal opposition which could well plead that it was altogether in the dark? What was there to provoke enthusiasm or approval in Austria? The few who, like Ferdinand Kürnberger, took sides, secretly favoured Prussia. The others saw in this crushing defeat a proper judgement passed upon a frivolous Government and incompetent military leaders. The Austrian army was not the people in arms, but only, despite Radetzky and despite the glamour of tradition, a popular spectacle. When Vienna learnt who was to command the corps of the northern army—the Archdukes Leopold and Ernest, Count Festetics, Count Clam-Gallas, and Count Thun—it knew what to expect from them—neglect of superior commands, breaches of discipline, antiquated methods, and defeats. Popular opinion was brutally summed up in the verse which a bold ironist affixed to the walls of the palace:

Die Freiwilligen haben kein' Knopf,  
Die Generale haben kein' Kopf,  
Die Minister haben kein' Hirn—  
So müssen wir alles verlieren.

There aren't enough uniforms for the soldiers,  
The generals have no head on their shoulders,  
The Ministers haven't an ounce of brain,  
And so we're going to be beaten again.



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No, those who met the defeat of 1866 with indifference or with mockery were not to be classed as 'mob.' Only a minority allowed themselves to be carried away by the journalistic demagogues. The serious Press of Vienna was on the side of the opposition—not as in 1914. The best men were filled with wrath, resentment, bitterness, and despair, and the pained exclamation of Anastasius Grün in a letter sounds to-day like a prophecy: 'May Germany one day recompense our children and grandchildren for this loss of which they will not feel the weight as we did. But it is the end of Austria!'

## CHAPTER XVI

### THE SETTLEMENT WITH HUNGARY

**M**ICHELET, in his history of France, says of the reign of Louis XIV that it falls into two sharply divided sections. In the first section come Colbert and the Victories ; in the second, Madame Scarron and the Defeats. Francis Joseph's life shows a turning-point which is neither a physical malady nor a love-affair, but a battle—Königgrätz. The defeats of 1866, the loss of Venetia and of the supremacy in Germany, would have destroyed the most unbounded self-confidence. With the World War behind us, we can now see the events of 1866 in perspective. The settlement of accounts between the two great German Powers, the expulsion of Austria from Germany, the Prussian solution of the German question, decided the fate of the Germans and of Europe in the succeeding era. Their effect could still be felt in 1914. Prussia's triumph and the success of Bismarck's plans not only modified the balance of power, but exercised a decisive influence on thought, guiding it towards that outlook which sees in Bismarck's victory a just verdict of history. Contemporaries did not understand how much was at stake. The Emperor, by reason of the divinity which hedged him, could not in 1866 recognize the cause and the effect of the defeat. To a deputation from the city of Frankfort he remarked : 'I have a poor hand,' and to Schäßle : 'I'm an unlucky bird'—two sighs from the depths of a soul which could not see. He could not place the blame where it belonged. He had nobody by him to lighten his darkness. His counsellors, co-partners in responsibility, threw the blame on each other. Mensdorff, to begin with, swears he never wanted the war. Mensdorff's appeal to his own weakness is certainly no excuse, but he is best entitled to plead innocent. Next, Esterházy repudiates authorship of the catastrophe. Belcredi, in his Memoirs, recalls that in 1865 he discovered a situation from which war was the only way out.

In these hours of perplexity Francis Joseph looked anxiously to Hungary. Could the war possibly be continued across the

Danube with Hungary as a doubtful quantity on the flank ? Bismarck's long-considered plan of winning over the rebellious elements in Hungary was well known ; so was his connection with the Hungarian revolutionary Klapka, and his intention to form out of Hungarian prisoners of war a legion to fight against Austria. If the plot seemed devilish, moral indignation was misplaced. Austria did no less when in 1866 she decided to raise a band of some thousands of individuals for a revolt in Naples, through the agency of Major Franzel, aide-de-camp to the exiled Neapolitan King, and to lend the King a million francs for the purpose. The Emperor was afraid of Hungary, and this fear sped up the peace negotiations in Nikolsburg. Compared with this, what did it matter if Vienna murmured ? The Mayor of Vienna, Andreas Zelinka, dared no more than hint at the desire of Vienna for a Constitution and a change of system. The Vienna City Council little guessed to how small a degree its views mattered to Francis Joseph when it resolved to put before the Emperor, in an address, its desire for a restoration of the suspended Constitution, while in proof of patriotic sentiments it simultaneously urged the formation of volunteer battalions. What Francis Joseph thought of such efforts he revealed in a statement to the Cabinet. He declared he had no use for volunteer corps unless they could serve as a means of 'freeing the cities and the country from the mob.' The City Council's address was in quiet language ; it ended with an assurance of unshakable devotion. The Emperor received it ungraciously, declaring 'actions must be brought into harmony with words.' This answer cut like a whip. The councillors considered laying down their mandates. Once more the Mayor tried to make the Emperor understand the state of mind of the city. Francis Joseph listened attentively, and, by way of answer, proclaimed a state of siege in Vienna on July 26th.

On the same day he decided, in a Cabinet Council, to accept Prussia's conditions for a preliminary peace. Francis Joseph's words are preserved in the report of the meeting. It had been, he said, a matter of honour to preserve the integrity of Saxony. But Prussia put up an opposition which seemed invincible against Saxony's desire to enter the South German Federation. After the Emperor, the Archduke Albert spoke. He found it

distasteful that the enemy should haggle over a few millions. Marshal von John, Albert's Chief of General Staff, now Minister of War, was against continuing the war with Prussia. He wanted a speedy peace in the north in order to be able to make a powerful advance in the south. Esterházy, still a member of the Crown Council, looked for a third alternative besides those of 'an almost certainly disastrous continuance of the war' and 'a hasty conclusion of peace.' 'Were there true patriotism, true devotion to the dynasty,' he said, 'there would be hope of salvation out of our own strength. But this alternative does not exist. Hungary in particular cannot be counted upon.' After these remarks the Emperor broke off the debate, and gave the order to telegraph to the negotiators in Nikolsburg that the preliminary conditions were, in the main, acceptable.

Some days before this, Francis Joseph had entrusted the Empress with a task. He asked her to spend some time in Pest, and to further the cause of the dynasty there. During the last days of the war Elizabeth had been at Ischl with the children. She obeyed the Emperor's request, and succeeded in doing what no man of the dynasty could have done. She got into communication with the most important man of the city, Franz Deák. On July 9th she arrived with the children at Pest, and was received at the railway station by Deák, Count Julius Andrassy, and some friends of both. Deák later remarked: 'I should have considered it an act of cowardice to turn my back on the Empress in the day of her misfortune, after we had done homage to her when all was going well with the dynasty.'

During this time Elizabeth was Francis Joseph's best correspondent. She told him of her unexpectedly cordial reception, but did not hide from him the state of opinion in the country. She told him all that she heard: how at Ketskemet thousands had greeted the Italian prisoners with enthusiasm, how in other places the young men of military age had sworn rather to flee to the woods than to serve as cannon-fodder for the Hapsburgs. In Pest the students carried red plumes in their hats as token of revolutionary sentiment. Hungary would have sunk under a new revolutionary reign but for Deák, who enjoyed the firm trust and high respect of the whole country, and Andrassy. The excitement was there; it needed only a spark to set light to it.

Francis Joseph acted quickly. He asked Deák to come to Vienna. On July 18th the man on whose decision so much depended arrived, travelling as 'Dr. Ferenczy,' and put up in a small hotel in the suburb of Meidling. Thence on the next day he drove in a cab, with a handbag, to the Palace, where the Emperor at once received him. Francis Joseph was taken by surprise at Deák's noble conduct. The advocate of the Hungarian cause did not exploit the weaknesses of the dynasty. In the hour of its misfortune he asked no more of it than he had previously demanded of it in his addresses. Deák was moved to this course of conduct by his political wisdom. It was the same wisdom which made him decisively reject the Emperor's suggestion that he should form a Ministry. He recommended Andrassy, without knowing that the same advice had been previously tendered by the Empress. She had written to Andrassy on July 16th, saying, in the Hungarian language: 'I have just heard that the Emperor awaits you in Vienna. We will discuss all that remains to be settled this afternoon at Countess Konigsegg's.' Three days later, Andrassy was in the Audience Chamber in Vienna. It was a notable meeting. The former major of the Hungarian army of 1848, so lately a rebel, who had even represented the Revolutionary Government at the Court of Constantinople, had come to the rescue of that Emperor who, in 1850, after the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, had caused him to be condemned to death by military court-martial, and had had the sentence executed in effigy. Even if it were Francis Joseph's own sore need which moved him to this broadmindedness, the story shows that he knew how to forget. When Francis Joseph came up against a will stronger than his own, he not only listened to the voice of reason, but himself earned respect.

Andrassy did not succeed in convincing the Emperor, or in winning his confidence, at the first meeting. The advice he gave was wise and politic. He urged the Emperor to adopt Deák's programme before he concluded peace with Prussia. He demonstrated to him that it would be to the advantage of the dynasty to talk to the enemy only when a settlement of Hungary had fortified it in the rear. Illuminating as his argument was, it was hard for the Emperor to take kindly to it. The proposals

Centralism. Dualism, Andrassy argued, was no peril. It must be built upon the two pillars of the Empire, the Hungarians and the Germans. This basic demand, which Andrassy put before the Emperor in the spirit of Deák, was the foundation of a new political programme for the Empire.

On July 29th, Andrassy had a fourth audience with the Emperor. He pressed for the appointment of an independent Hungarian Ministry. He declared that a regularly appointed Hungarian Ministry would find it no unduly difficult task to carry through the Constitution. But it must consist of men enjoying the confidence both of the people and of the monarch, and an assured legal position. He did not shirk the fundamental issue. He implored Francis Joseph to lay aside his distrust, because the task could only be accomplished by means of openness and confidence. But this audience too passed without the Emperor giving his consent. It was by a long and painful process that Francis Joseph arrived at the decision to throw overboard the principle of indivisible power and to give the Empire an altogether new shape. At the critical moment the Empress again intervened. On July 31st she invited Andrassy to Schönbrunn. He noted in his diary: 'If we are successful, Hungary owes more than she guesses to the beautiful providence watching over her.' The next reception of Andrassy by the Emperor was Elizabeth's work. The steadfast man, with his unfailing store of argument, found his power of persuasion growing. In the third memorial which he handed to the Emperor he answered his objections and anxieties regarding the policy of national economy. The memorial attacked the ideas of Belcredi, but also those of the Federalists. These hours in which the Hungarian Count wrestled with the Emperor can be termed the birth-pangs of the new Austria. Never before had Francis Joseph listened to such frank and urgent language from the mouth of a subject. Andrassy, with all the warmth at his command, exhorted the Emperor to break away from the prejudices of Absolutism and to give the Empire the needs of the times. 'I pledge my life,' he exclaimed to the Emperor, 'that when Hungary has a Liberal Government no Revolution will thenceforth be conceivable. If Austria does not develop her internal resources, I foresee the day when she will be excluded,

not only from the German Federation, but from civilized Europe, and she cannot develop those resources without a thoroughgoing reorganization.'

Despite all his wealth of argument, Andrassy failed once again to convince the Emperor, and left Vienna with the impression that Francis Joseph would never be won over. In point of fact, a few weeks sufficed to render the Emperor more intransigent than ever. Immediately after the battle of Königgrätz, anxious at the prospect of a continuance of the struggle, he had seemed to accept Deák's programme. But, now that peace with Prussia was assured, Belcredi again had his way with him. Belcredi and his friends must have found the doctrine that Germans and Hungarians were the twin props of the Empire a most dangerous one. Despite the failure of Federalist schemes, Belcredi felt no doubt but that some day the programme of the feudal nobility, as the Bohemian chiefs had laid it before the Emperor, would be carried out. Belcredi's stubborn opposition to Andrassy was not the expression of mere individual prejudices, but rather of those of a mighty caste, which saw its deadliest enemy in a union of the two Liberal forces in the Empire, the Hungarian Liberals and the German bourgeoisie. Under Belcredi's influence, Francis Joseph refused to make any concession to the Hungarians. At the same time, however, he called to Vienna Count Hübner, formerly Ambassador in Paris, and spent hours every day in solitary conversation with him. Hübner by no means favoured the acceptance of Andrassy's proposals, but urged that the link with him should not be broken. Consequently, at the end of August, Andrassy was again recalled to Vienna to continue with the Emperor, under the shadow of Belcredi and Hübner, discussions regarding the Hungarian settlement. Andrassy brought to this conference, as his financial expert, Melchior von Lonyay, a respected member of Deák's party. The standpoint of the Hungarians remained unchanged. They could only urge the Emperor to constitute a Hungarian Cabinet answerable to a Hungarian Parliament, and to restore immediately to Hungary the benefits of a constitutional order like that enjoyed by Austria. But if the Hungarians were clear and unanimous, the case was far otherwise with the Emperor's Austrian counsellors.

Count Moritz Esterházy, recently an intimate adviser of the Crown, had been given leave of absence which was never to expire. Count Mensdorff was oppressed with the burden of office ; he could agree neither with Andrassy nor with Belcredi. Like Belcredi himself, he was accustomed, not to bring forward positive suggestions, but to confine himself to criticizing the conduct of others. Andrassy saw that further negotiations were useless. At the same time he wanted to bring home to the Emperor the urgency of his proposals, and the Emperor promised that he would give them his earnest reflections during a short retreat to the solitude of Ischl.

From Ischl, however, he returned without having decided upon the great step. Meanwhile the situation remained unchanged. Belcredi, in his *Memoirs*, suggests that his own opposition in the autumn of 1866 had rendered possible the settlement of 1867. 'I alone,' he writes, 'stood firm. I had the satisfaction of seeing the Emperor entirely won over by my arguments. It was, in consequence, possible to obtain in January a result which ensured the survival of the monarchy. This success, which I can claim for myself, and myself alone, others have taken to their credit. History will deliver its verdict upon them. My consolation is the knowledge that my aims were pure and my activity fruitful.'

Belcredi is claiming a great deal in making himself out the veritable author of the settlement. Against his self-praise should be weighed the words of Andrassy's biographer, Eduard von Wertheimer, which restore Belcredi's part to its proper proportion. Wertheimer writes that, in the judgement of Deák, 'the settlement could never have been brought about on the lines advocated by Belcredi. Perhaps it could not have been concluded by any other statesman at that time. Brought up in the old Austrian tradition, none of them could face up to the ideal of an independent Hungary. Even the opponents of the dualist system must recognize that if Belcredi's line had been followed the monarchy would have sunk steadily lower.' That may or may not be. It is certain, however, that, while Belcredi regarded his own position as absolutely assured, and was preparing to summon the Diets, he suddenly learned, a few days later, that Francis Joseph had quietly appointed a new



Minister of Foreign Affairs, the former Saxon Premier, Baron von Beust.

This appointment, which was an entirely personal choice by Francis Joseph, roused widespread comment, not only among the Emperor's subjects, but in the Cabinets of the Great Powers. Beust himself said he owed his appointment to Bismarck, who, by compelling his resignation from the service of the Saxon State, enabled him to offer his services to Austria. Bismarck, indeed, hated him. He called him a vain and malicious intriguer. Treitschke accounts him 'a first-class journalist who had mistaken his career.' Naturally, in the view of Treitschke and Heinrich von Sybel, who wrote from the standpoint of Bismarck's successes, all statesmen and journalists who opposed Prussia's expansion policy before 1866 rank as dwarflings or something less. But their severest verdict is delivered against Beust, the champion of the triangle scheme, whose plan was to bring in the mass of the smaller and middle-sized German States as a third equal partner alongside of the great German Powers, Austria and Prussia. The catastrophe of the Great War throws a new light upon this judgement. Beust's plan was one of the alternative solutions of the German question, of which Bismarck himself spoke when his own plan was threatened with failure. To-day, at any rate, it is indisputable that Beust incarnated for Francis Joseph the desire for revenge against Prussia after Austria had been driven out of the German Federation.

Beust, the Saxon, the Protestant, had one advantage over the Austrian statesman in the unfamiliar and difficult task he had accepted. He came as a stranger to an unknown city. His eye was fresher in its appreciation of Austrian affairs. He was able to take matters less seriously than the men who were burdened with the knowledge of Austria's maladies. When Beust took his first steps in Vienna the Emperor was in Bohemia, on a journey undertaken to show his gratitude for the loyal conduct of that country. Count Mensdorff received Beust (so he relates) in the beautiful baroque palace built by Maria Theresa for her Minister, Kaunitz. 'Mensdorf was seated in Metternich's chair. He politely asked for a few days' grace, and for a fortnight I shared the house with him and with his family.' Less friendly was Beust's reception by Belcredi. The latter saw in

Beust a threat to his own omnipotence. Still more, he saw in him a man who lived in a different world of ideas. Belcredi, the Catholic Conservative, was cut off by too much from Beust, the Liberal and Protestant. With a sincerity that was positively unfriendly he expressed his anxiety lest Beust should have no luck in Austria: 'You are a foreigner, a German, a Protestant.'

Beust's first action was to speed up the most important business of the moment, the Hungarian negotiations. With his co-operation the Declaration of November 17th, 1867, came into being. In this the Vienna Government proclaimed its readiness to resume conversations with the qualified representatives of Hungary. The most important heads of discussion were named—the united army, the customs tariff, and indirect taxation. A closer approach to the wishes of the Hungarian majority was made in the concessions offered, but their formulation was so vague that Andrassy wrote to his wife: 'It would be impossible to make important promises in a more tactless manner. As I have always said, the worst error of these Ministers is that they are asses.' Hungary refused the proffered conditions. The Hungarian Parliament adopted an address of Deák, which, 'clear as a trumpet' (it was said), called upon the monarch to cease to attach conditions to the granting of a Constitution. The atmosphere was not improved by Beust's own effort in Budapest. Andrassy wrote with still greater bitterness: 'Beust is a clever fellow, but superficial, vain, and lacking in insight. He has not the faintest understanding of the matter in hand.' For all that, the thread spun between Vienna and Budapest was not snapped again.

In the great States of the west the settlement between the claim of the monarch to absolute power and that of the nation to constitutional government was effected not without bloodshed. Here there was bitter strife only round a conference-table. Beust's motives must have been to win a success as quickly as possible. A settlement with Hungary could raise Austria's sunken prestige and improve the financial conditions. Francis Joseph's position in Europe had suffered. He had no credit left either with the Cabinets of the Great Powers or with the Liberal public opinion of Europe. There was general doubt whether an Empire in which the Constitution, conceded a few years earlier,

had been withdrawn, and nothing done to satisfy the reasonable wishes of the Peoples, was capable of development. The negotiations were able to proceed rapidly, because Andrassy and Beust, despite the incidental criticism levelled by the Hungarian at the other's nature, were essentially able to understand each other. This only widened the personal and political breach between Beust and Belcredi. Their political conflict rose out of the question in what manner Austrian Parliamentary life, which before the war Belcredi had suspended, could be called to life again. For there was a political kernel to the conflict, though its surface was concerned apparently with juridical forms. Belcredi, as always, was inspired by the dream of ordering the Austrian crown lands in accordance with the historical and political notions of the Bohemian nobility, while Beust understood perfectly well that the restoration of Hapsburg dynastic power in this antiquated form was impossible. Alongside of this political cleft was the personal antagonism between the two men. Belcredi, in his Memoirs, accuses Beust of having attempted to shake the position of the Ministers of State through Press manœuvres and intrigues. Francis Joseph in this struggle took the side of Beust, not only for the reason given by Belcredi, who says that the monarch's impatience to be crowned in Budapest made him expect a speedier conciliation with Hungary through the agency of Beust. In this decision Francis Joseph followed a proper historical instinct. If he had at this moment followed Belcredi, he would have had to approve a feudal régime in Austria, which would have brought complications into the negotiations with Hungary. The climax of the Beust-Belcredi dissension was reached in the Emperor's presence at the Cabinet Council of February 1st, 1867. That very day Belcredi handed in a letter of resignation. After this the Hungarian settlement could be brought safely into port.

Once Francis Joseph had accomplished the feat of accepting the idea of an independent Hungary beneath his own sceptre, one question only was his concern—the question how to keep the army and foreign policy within the zone of his own untrammelled Royal authority. On February 18th the appointment of the autonomist Hungarian Government was announced. On March 30th the Settlement Bill was passed by the Hun-

garian Parliament, and on April 3rd by the House of Magnates. The recovery by Hungary of her old autonomy was an event of the greatest importance for the future of the Hapsburg monarchy. It was rendered possible by the steadfastness with which Hungary stuck to her political rights, by the statesmanship of Deák, but, above all, at the critical moment, by Julius Andrassy's influence upon the Emperor and the Empress. As soon as Francis Joseph was convinced that the restoration of the kingdom of Hungary would redound to his own advantage and to that of the Imperial army, he was ready to grant Hungary that freedom and independence which his ancestors had had to concede. Deák and Andrassy had the skill to win over the Emperor to a notion which was wholly alien to his nature, namely, to acceptance of the principle of 'responsible government.' It was these two who got the better of the mental construction which Francis Joseph had derived from his teacher Kübeck; and the victory took time and cost trouble. The unimaginative Emperor had to be brought to realize that a nation of ancient aristocracy and small landed nobility would be a new sort of strength to his dynasty once it was allowed to develop its own resources. The price which had to be paid was not small if measured by the scheme of values of the despotic Francis Joseph. It was renunciation of control over the internal government and administration of Hungary. The victory of the Hungarians over Francis Joseph's preconceived ideas opened the way also for constitutional development in the Austrian half of the dominions. But what Hungary received as the reward of fierce struggles, Austria got more or less as a gift. The Hungarian settlement was certainly the event which made the greatest impression on the Emperor's outlook and feelings, of all which he received during his long reign.

Francis Joseph was in a hurry to complete the work. After Deák had once more refused to lead the independent Hungarian Ministry, Andrassy was entrusted with the post. On the day on which he tendered the oath to the Emperor in the Hofburg he was invited to dine by the Emperor's mother, the Archduchess Sophie. It seemed that a sudden transformation had come over the entire Imperial family. The Archduke Albert, who, ten years earlier, had struck off the name of Andrassy from the

list of the amnestied, and who, only two months before, at the first meeting, had been very ungracious, now shook him by the hand. The Emperor waited until the new Hungarian Parliament had voted him his recruits. As soon as this was done—and the news was conveyed to the Emperor in his bed at night—the way was open for the final symbolical act of coronation.

Francis Joseph took the ceremony more seriously than had Joseph II, 'the King with the hat.' When the Hungarian crown of St. Stephen was conveyed to the Treasure Chamber in Vienna, Joseph spoke in far from respectful language of the sentimental Hungarians, who symbolized their grief at the loss of their liberties by transferring their treasures to Vienna. The crown of St. Stephen later found its way back to Budapest, but it was only by luck that it escaped being lost in 1849, after the Hungarian Revolution. When the Revolutionary Government fled, its president, Bartholomäus Szemere, took the crown, placed it in an iron chest, and had it buried at Orsowa, at the foot of the Allion Mountain. Francis Joseph was much concerned to rediscover the crown of St. Stephen; the thousand-year-old symbol would be a real source of strength. But it was not immediately possible to locate its hiding-place. Even to-day it is not certain whether breach of faith played its part in the discovery. Stephan von Vargha was long accused of revealing the hiding-place. History names as the discoverer of the crown Judge-Advocate Captain Titus Karger, who dug it up in September 1853, thereby earning the Knight's Cross of the Order of St. Stephen.

The date on which Francis Joseph planned to set this crown upon his head was June 8th, 1867. It was the most solemn of the festal occasions which Francis Joseph had experienced. A few days before, malicious rumours were still current in the Hungarian capital recounting that there was a plot to blow up King, Ministers, and spectators. Deák received threatening letters prophesying his death. An atmosphere of mingled anxiety, expectation, and joy lay over the capital.

The coronation took place in the Church of St. Matthew. The culminating moment was reached when Count Andrassy placed the crown on the King's head, and cried out, in ringing accents: 'Long live the crowned King!' Elizabeth, 'looking

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lovelier than ever,' it was said, trembled as the crown was placed on her head. It was an exciting and an exhausting day. Francis Joseph returned exceedingly tired to the Royal Castle of Ofen. His old valet, Hannakampf, had to bring him a glass of champagne. Beust says in his Memoirs : 'I shall never forget that day. I rode about twenty paces ahead of the Emperor in my capacity as Senior Knight of the Order of St. Stephen. As we crossed the bridge the shout "*Eljen*" was raised so lustily that my horse shied. In the square, when the cannon thundered, I had considerable difficulty with my steed, though I avoided the fate of two Bishops, who were dismounted against their will.' Beust's Hungarian steed behaved well. He respected the man who had helped Francis Joseph to accomplish the work of the Hungarian settlement.

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE SCHOOL OF LIBERALISM

EVERY king is the prisoner of his illusions. The Hapsburg illusion was that the family could maintain its possessions as a European Great Power. The illusion proved stronger than reality for some hundreds of years. The Hapsburgs accomplished miracles : they made Protestants into Catholics, they bartered human beings. They implanted in the minds of a Bavarian Alpine stock a new vision of eternal things, a southern picture of heaven and hell. They created a new race, breaking down the might of ancient traditions, and the power of the estates. Out of the varied sections of their Empire they made a single dynastic property. In the person of Joseph II they reached a point of boldly opposing reason against reality. But in the long run reality rebelled against the tyranny of illusion. The Peoples, hitherto passive counters in this historical game, asserted themselves against the ambitious Hapsburgs as active players.

During the period of Francis Joseph's reign from 1848 to 1866 the Emperor remained the prisoner of his illusions. On the battlefields of his own Empire he defeated the rebellious forces of reality ; but on the battlefields of world history it is reality which wins the day. In vain he gathered, in defence of his Hapsburg dream, all the tangible forces at his disposal ; the forces at the disposal of reality put the spirits of his dream to flight.

But now a change came over him. Still hesitating, after his long resistance, he emerged at last from the magic circle of illusion which had separated him, as by a glass wall, from reality. Hitherto he had only been surrounded by men who knelt before the glass wall. Now a representative of reality held out his hand to him. It was Count Andrassy who guided Francis Joseph along the path of reality, and helped him to take the first decisive step on firm ground. After that, Francis Joseph became his own educator. Hindered at first by his deep dislike of seeing the world as it is, he gradually won confidence. But

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while he was winning contact with reality, and learning to apply his despotic will to concrete tasks in the modest execution of daily duties, a strange spectacle met his eye.

Austria came to life. The dream of the indivisible power of the Emperor had held the Nations in fetters. Once the fetters were released, all the inner contradictions of the real Austrian Empire became apparent, all the contrasts of the Peoples and the classes. Yet, marvellous to relate, and counter to all rational expectations, it seemed that the century-old dream had, to some extent, become reality. For all their contrasts, the Peoples and the classes had something in common. The fellow prisoners had come to accept the prison as their home.

Let us consider how this renewal of Austria had come about. Inevitably the restoration of the Hungarian Constitution put life into the constitutional movement in Austria. Beust wanted to revert to the February Constitution, but Belcredi (it must be added, with Beust's approval) had proclaimed that Constitution not only suspended, but dead and buried. On its ruins an extraordinary Reichsrat, elected by the seventeen provincial Diets, was to be summoned. Beust was now not only Foreign Minister, but Prime Minister and Minister of Police—that is, virtually, Minister of the Interior, with jurisdiction over religion and education. But he had one task which it was necessary to fulfil before all others. By some means or other he had to compel the Vienna Reichsrat to accept the Hungarian settlement in legal form. The means to this end were : first to summon the provincial Diets, elected according to Belcredi's instructions, and next to cause them to execute the elections for the Austrian Reichsrat. If any individual Diet should be recalcitrant against this centralizing measure it would have to be dissolved, and the object attained by means of new elections. The edict of February 18th, 1867, by which the seventeen German and Slav Diets were summoned, took its stand on the February Constitution, and announced that the constitutional changes necessitated by the Hungarian settlement would be submitted to the Reichsrat. A law regarding the responsibility of Ministers and a military law enforcing conscription were among the projected changes.

With the exception of the Tyrolese, all the German Diets



favoured the change. Their protests against the arbitrary methods of the military administration were altogether honourable. Beust managed also to win the Poles for his policy. From this period dates one of Francis Joseph's weightiest political maxims. Henceforth the Poles were an abiding support of his Government. Resistance came only from Prague, Brünn, and Laibach. The Czechs realized that an historic hour had struck. Were they to accept without resistance the grant of State autonomy to Hungary, then they would lose the right to claim restoration of their own historic statute. The recalcitrant Diets were dissolved. At the new elections the nobility of Bohemia and Moravia, who played the determining part, voted, at Vienna's behest, for the German Liberal list. 'Once already,' stormed the Czech leader Rieger, 'you nobles have betrayed the nation. The nation has generously pardoned you. Beware!'

Beust had succeeded in bringing all the Peoples of the monarchy, except the Czechs and the Croats, into the Dual Scheme. His next concern was to appear before the Reichsrat with a more or less complete Ministry. He took on young Count Taaffe, who in his thirty-four years had made unexampled progress in his career. Count Taaffe was the son of the President of the Court of Appeal. As a boy he had been one of Francis Joseph's playmates. He sat in the Bohemian Diet in virtue of his property of Ellischau, famed for its cheeses. Beust says of him that he was an admirable Minister when seated before green baize, but that he had no talent as a speaker, being equally bad at improvising speeches and at composing them with care.

The Police Ministry was suppressed. The police were placed under the Ministry of the Interior, a solution which disturbed many anxious spirits. Beust wanted to reduce the enormous organization of the political police, which had a finger in every pie. He himself said: 'If the Austrian police had been somewhat less concerned over the European Revolution, then the European Revolution would have left Austria somewhat less disturbed.' He added: 'The police put out feelers in every direction, and are the terror of the European revolutionary party. One might have expected that they should at least have had men of genius in their midst, and that the odium which they incurred would be made up for by their

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accomplishments. How great was my disillusion ! I found no trace of those special police talents which are to be found in Paris and Berlin—only a mass of agents who exchanged personal gossip. I pressed for an end to this abuse, and thereby won no thanks, but plenty of personal enemies.'

On May 22nd, Beust's new Ministry appeared before the public. The Emperor opened the Reichsrat. The President of the Parliament was Dr. Karl Giskra. He it was who led the campaign for a revival of the Constitution. He was the most popular speaker among the Vienna Liberals, Mayor of Brunn, highly gifted, and with a great appetite for wealth and power. Five years later he had to explain his business operations to his Vienna electors. Tearfully he told the tale of his ragamuffin boyhood. Daniel Spitzer, the most malicious of journalists, made the comment that no fair-minded man would wish to see the Giskra children running about with holes in their boots in the Palace in the Ringstrasse. The only thing against Giskra, said Spitzer, was that while, in the interests of the family's boots, he had taken the railway from Lemberg to Czernowitz, the shareholders of this railway line had to run about barefoot.

Under Liberal leadership the Reichsrat immediately made it clear that it was less interested in the Hungarian settlement than in guarantees for the Constitution. But, before all, it demanded the cancellation of the Concordat, which placed the State so largely under the supervision of the Church. The fight against the Treaty with Rome, the fight for equality of treatment for all religious sects, touched Francis Joseph on a sensitive spot ; but his resolve to grant liberty in internal legislation was strong enough to resist the reproaches of his mother, the angry threats of the Bishops, and the stormy opposition of the Court clique. Andrassy's reports from Hungary, and Beust's capable administration, had given him a feeling of confidence. He made up his mind to face the signs of new life in the Vienna Parliament. After a dark year the horizon seemed to brighten. Francis Joseph's eyes were fixed on Paris.

But at Regensburg, on June 30th, as he was on his way with Elizabeth to the World Exhibition, he received news of the death of his brother Maximilian. The telegram simply said,

in English : 'Emperor Maximilian condemned and shot.' In fact, on June 19th, 1867, he had been shot by sentence of court-martial at Queretaro. The Imperial couple renounced the journey. On June 31st Francis Joseph was with his mother. It was three years since Maximilian had left Austria. Could he have been saved ?

Francis Joseph had done his best to be just to his younger brother's nature. As children they had been fond of each other, but since Francis Joseph's ascent to the throne Max had changed. He was a sentimentalist, the poet of the family. He had been destined for the Navy, and sent on long journeys to Greece, Spain, Algiers, and Asia Minor. Four volumes of travel sketches relate his impressions. As Naval Commander-in-Chief, Francis Joseph gave him, in 1854, seventeen men-o'-war to take to Greece and Palestine. But his restless ambition drove him ever forward. After his marriage with Charlotte of Belgium he became even more tempestuous. In 1857, Francis Joseph sent him to Lombardy and Venetia with the title of Governor-General. His real position was rather that of Viceroy. In 1859, Maximilian wrote in resignation : 'It is hard to see one's patient work nipped in the bud, and never to know whether one has the approval of headquarters.'

In 1862 there was a minor conflict between the brothers, occasioned by August Zang, former editor of the old *Presse*. Zang was the son of a wealthy and respected Vienna doctor. As a young man he had been a Lieutenant in the Rifles, and after his father's death tried to play a part in society on the strength of his fortune. He did not succeed. He then conceived the idea of introducing Viennese pastries to Paris. Vienna *Kipfel* and *Semmel* (rolls) helped him to make a new fortune. In Revolutionary Paris, where talents and speculative audacity flourished in rivalry, where new reputations were made and new fortunes acquired every day, Zang learned to respect the power of the Press. Virardin, editor of the Paris *Presse*, made the greatest impression upon him. He made an exhaustive study of newspapers, took leave of the golden-brown Vienna pastries, and became a newspaper man.

His *Presse* was an imitation of the Parisian original. He had the gift of attracting talented young men. He succeeded even,

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after the Revolution, in attracting Count Stadion. He had no political principles and was a cynic, save that, in the words of one of the editorial writers of the *Presse*, Friedrich Uhl : 'Zang was, from the beginning to the end of his career, a good Austrian patriot.' He paid his collaborators, Uhl and Michael Etienne, and, later, Dr. Max Friedländer, far from generously. These three gifted journalists, who for years were the whole editorial staff of a newspaper appearing daily, were admitted to so small a share in the high profits of the enterprise that the two latter finally left Zang and founded the *Neue Freie Presse*. The birth of this latter newspaper, which came to play as important a part in the life of latter-day Vienna as the *Presse* played up to the Battle of Solferino, was thus due to Zang's avarice.

The *Presse* was at one time forbidden in Vienna, and had to emigrate to Brünn, in consequence of an article criticizing the army command. After this Zang did not refrain from attacking the Court itself. Two articles, one of which unmistakably dealt with the Emperor's beard, and another with the Empress's sojourn in Kissingen in 1862, roused Francis Joseph's anger. He had never liked the newspapers. Now he talked of 'cancellable like Zang.' Maximilian tried to patch matters up, and, not altogether tactfully, spoke of the Empress's 'wounded woman's vanity' as an obstacle to official favour for the *Presse*.

In Maximilian's efforts to keep well in with the Press, to which he was spurred on by his wife, there was no doubt a large element of pandering to popular taste. Zang, however, with total lack of scruple, went straight to the Emperor and told him what he had in his pocket. Francis Joseph wrote in anger to his brother : 'He has the letter in his hands, and politely threatens to raise a scandal. I cannot allow members of the Imperial family, least of all the Empress, to be compromised in so frivolous and so inconsiderate a manner. I cannot believe that Papa takes much notice of Herr Zang. I think rather that the whole affair has more to do with your request for Zang's pardon. Please, then, write to me, before I apply to Papa, to let me know whether you have written to Zang. I need not tell you that Sisi has paid not the slightest attention to the article, and that reference to "female vanity" is absolutely off the mark.'

Maximilian, in his answer, had to confess that the whole

affair had originated with him. 'Papa has nothing whatever to do with it,' he wrote. 'My request for Zang's pardon was prompted by the fact that his journal was the only one which has taken any interest in our poor neglected navy. Through the medium of a third person I had it conveyed to Zang that he ought to repair the error he had made in offending members of our family.' Maximilian went on to report that he had given his friend Herzfeld the order to make serious representations regarding 'the incredible articles about the Empress's sojourn in Kissingen and Your Majesty's beard.' Herzfeld thereupon 'somewhat hastily sent an unsigned note to Zang. Herzfeld is afraid that he did use the expression "vanity in high quarters" in this note, the purpose of which was to draw the attention of this sensitive and dangerous journalist to his own malicious errors.'

This incident did nothing to improve the relations of the two brothers. Nevertheless, the Emperor tried to dissuade Maximilian from the Mexican adventure. When the inducements of Napoleon were evidently beginning to entice Maximilian and his wife into it, Francis Joseph urged him at least to obtain England's backing as well as that of France. England would, however, hear none of it. There was reason in the hard conditions which Francis Joseph now imposed in the family agreement. He insisted that, as Emperor of Mexico, Maximilian must resign all rights whatever to the Austrian throne. Neither the Pope's nor Napoleon's representation could move him from this decision.

Maximilian sent his brother a report of his reception in Mexico. The Emperor followed his adventurous career with interest. When danger loomed, when the troops of the Republican General Escobeda were besieging Maximilian's central fortress, Queretaro, Francis Joseph, acting upon Beust's advice, called a family council and cancelled Maximilian's act of abdication, restoring his brother to the privileges of a member of the Imperial House. The transatlantic cable had just been laid. Francis Joseph utilized it to inform the Republican Government of Mexico of his action. Thereby he hoped to save his brother, imagining that the Republican Government would not venture to use physical violence against a member of

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the House of Hapsburg. The attempt was vain. The Mexicans resolved to give a fearful example of warning to the reigning houses of Europe. Despite Francis Joseph's appeal, Maximilian was mercilessly dispatched. The one concession made to the Court of Vienna was permission to take the body. The Emperor entrusted Admiral von Tegetthoff with the task of conducting the negotiations in America, and bringing home the body on the Austrian frigate *Novara*. Beust declared that even before Maximilian embarked upon the Mexican adventure there were good reasons for Francis Joseph's annoyance with him. Round Maximilian were dangerous counsellors, who had made all kinds of suggestions to him. It had not escaped the Emperor's attention that, after the defeat of Königgrätz, shouts of 'Long live Maximilian!' were raised as he drove from Schönbrunn to Vienna.

The journey to Paris, delayed on account of Maximilian's death, was not altogether renounced. Prince Metternich, Austrian Ambassador in Paris, arranged that Napoleon and the Empress Eugénie should meet Francis Joseph and Elizabeth at Salzburg on August 18th, the Emperor's birthday. Early in the morning came a telegram from Berlin: 'My best wishes to the French Imperial couple.' Napoleon came without any Minister, only General Fleury. Francis Joseph arrived with all the Ministers. Beust caused a soothing report to be sent to Berlin, and Bismarck instructed the Prussian chargé d'affaires in Vienna to report that Prussia was satisfied with Beust's explanations, and accepted them as sincere.

No agreements were made in Salzburg. Napoleon did not succeed in putting binding engagements on Francis Joseph in the German question. Beust did not succeed in obtaining definite undertakings from the French Emperor for the eventuality of disturbances in the Near East. Beust, some time later, writing to Andrassy from London, referred as follows to the conversations at Salzburg: 'You must have smiled to see the interview depicted so as to represent you holding my coat-tails to prevent me from jumping straight into a French alliance. Emperor Napoleon and I were like two horsemen of whom each thinks that the other wants to lead him to a big jump. In consequence, neither takes the initiative.'

The Salzburg meeting, at all events, opened the way for later communications, and first of all for Francis Joseph's visit to Paris. When King William of Prussia, sojourning in Baden-Baden, learned that Francis Joseph was on the way to Paris, and would pass by Oos on October 21st, he wired to Bismarck to ask whether it would not be well to profit by the Emperor's journey to arrange a meeting. Bismarck advised him to accept such a proposal if it were made by Austria, but not himself to take the initiative. Bismarck caused the telegrams between himself and King William to be shown in confidence to Beust. But Beust's manner of handling the affair shows that it was not his intention to remove all unpleasantness out of relations with Prussia. He suggested that the King of Prussia should salute Francis Joseph at four in the morning, the hour when the Imperial train would pass. Bismarck advised his monarch not to accept this invitation. The arrangements made by Beust were, however, not to the Emperor's taste. During the journey Francis Joseph had them modified, so that Beust had to wire from Linz to the Prussian Legation in Vienna that the arrival at Oos would be not at four a.m., but at seven a.m. At this hour King William was on the platform. This was the first meeting of the monarchs since Königsgrätz. Beust took pains to emphasize that it was of a casual nature.

Francis Joseph stayed half a day at Nancy, where he visited the tombs of the Lorraine dynasty. The arrival in Paris was at midday. The Emperor Napoleon and Prince Napoleon were waiting for him at the Strasburg Station. They drove through the broad boulevards to the Élysée, where the Empress Eugénie was ready to receive them. The Emperor's time was fully occupied during the Paris visit. His brothers, Charles Ludwig and Ludwig Victor, found time to sample the delights of Paris beyond the limit of official receptions, but it was said of them afterwards that they had 'roused admiring surprise by refraining from touching that side of Paris life which has a special attraction for the stranger.'

There were no negotiations in Paris. Napoleon sent round a circular dispatch to his diplomatic representatives indicating that any other supposition would be erroneous. Bismarck passed the ironical comment : 'Then we can take it that peace

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in Europe is assured.' On Francis Joseph's return there was a little episode which illustrates the mood of Vienna in 1867. The Mayor, Zelinka, wired in the name of the city requesting that the Emperor might arrive in civilian attire. Although supported by Count Taaffe, this request was not fulfilled. A year later the request to appear in civilian attire was repeated, when the Emperor was invited to the city ball. On the programme was put his portrait in a tail-coat, but this time also he appeared in military uniform. 'You had best spare your pains,' he remarked ; 'they will be of no avail.'

Vienna was at this time a charming city. The black cloud had passed. She was enjoying the new measure of freedom like a sunny day. Many reproaches have been levelled against the Liberal Party of German Austria, which now saw the fulfilment of its dreams. It has been accused of putting resounding names upon modest achievements, without having accomplished any real changes in the balance of power or brought any real advantages to the bourgeois class. Later critics have complained that it showed no real understanding of the principles of European democracy, no real will to draw near to the broad masses. It has been complained that its leaders—lawyers and industrialists, professors and superior State employees—were altogether entangled in class prejudices. This is true to no small extent. The Liberal leaders—lawyers and factory-owners from German Bohemia, Prague, and Brünn—plainly bore the mark of their origin. They displayed a mixture of culture and possessive pride, in which was mingled the idealism of Schiller and the haughtiness of the wealthy bourgeois. Their heads touched the cloudy heights of the German classics, but their feet were firmly fixed in the narrow ways of German Bohemian provincial life. The pedantically constructed ideal of Austria which held their imaginations, was that of a unified State run by German employees. Their hero was Joseph II. Among them were also those who had made quick fortunes out of the economic revival. They had their own way of reading the lesson of the times, these Liberals of whom Daniel Spitzer says that their lives contained three chapters entitled 'The Cast-iron Countenance,' 'The Iron Safe,' and 'The Iron Crown.'

At the same time Austria, emerging from the swaddling-clothes



of absolute rule, had much for which to thank these German Liberals. The fundamental laws of the State, which established the general rights of the citizens, defended the dispensers of justice against interference, and determined the responsibility of officials, were due to them. The Liberals had to build up Austria out of their own heads. Only after the granting of freedom of faith and conscience was it possible to remove matrimonial jurisdiction from the hands of the priests, and to give it to civil judges. It was the Liberals who took education out of ecclesiastical control and handed it to the State authorities ; it was they who removed from the ecclesiastical authorities the power to decide in what religion children of mixed marriages should be educated. They took the gag from the mouth of the citizen, allowed him to form unions and to hold meetings. In short, the Europeanization of Austria was the work of Herbst and Giskra, of Lasser and Kaiserfeld.

Vienna, in her external appearance, showed the mark of the improved situation of the German bourgeoisie in the State, and of its participation in administration. Already, some years before, a great change had begun. Out of the walled fortress, with its bastions, gates, bridges, and narrow lanes, had arisen an open, comfortable, and friendly city. The first houses were constructed in almost a timid spirit on the site of the great entrenchments and of the former glacis. Vienna's business received a great impulse from the growth of industry, the greater economic freedom, and, not least, from the expansion of the city itself. On the Ringstrasse arose the palaces of the new financial magnates—Rothschild, Todesco and Springer, Wiener and Schey, Königswarter and Epstein. This new powerful caste, which soon began to play an important part, expressed itself in magnificent display, not in the taste of the old Viennese nobility, and far from that of the ordinary citizen, yet inspired by an artistic sense which was soon to make of the new Vienna one of the loveliest cities of the world. Vienna took on a new appearance. She went at a new pace ; she became enterprising and wealthy. The foundation of the Credit Institute for Trade and Exchange (*Kreditanstalt für Handel und Gewerbe*) attracted foreign capital to the city. New banks were founded. The rate of emigration from the provinces increased month by

month. Vienna became the goal of every one in the Empire who had initiative. It was a bloodless revolution that was taking place. New elements, new individuals, broke the fetters of the old Viennese society. The old values were lost, but there was a corresponding gain in breadth and intensity of life. The origin of the new wealth might be different from the origin of the old, yet the manners of the old society remained, and were absorbed by the new-comers. It became the aim of each rising clique of industrial and trading gentry to adapt itself to these manners.

The new wealth of Vienna sat in the boxes of the theatres, it galloped on the finest horses, rode in the best carriages in the Prater, built villas and summer residences at Hietzing and Mödling, Baden and Vöslau, like those which the great noble families had once built at the gates of Vienna. The bankers became big landed proprietors. With freedom of faith and conscience had come freedom in the transference of property. Liberalism left its mark on the politics and the society of Vienna.

It seems strange that it was possible to reconcile the Emperor so quickly with this new world, to get over his dislike and suspicion of Liberalism. Francis Joseph himself was hypnotized by these abstract forces; it was, however, the two leading statesmen of his Empire, Andrassy and Beust, who made Liberalism presentable at Court, and made the Court itself Liberal. Andrassy, the clever and strong-willed Hungarian, did much; Beust, the shrewd and experienced Saxon, did the rest. Andrassy had convinced the Emperor that he had nothing to fear from a Hungary restored to her rights; Beust taught him he had nothing to fear from the German Liberals. The German citizen of 1868 was not the same as he had been in 1848. He had lost his unkempt hair and gained a 'corporation.' In the many years of his statesmanship Beust had accumulated too much experience not to know that Liberalism is something other than an inexorable principle. He was clear-sighted enough to perceive that in all the Peoples of Austria there was no likelihood of a Parliamentarian of Cromwellian stature arising. Beust does not say in words, but he implies that he had somewhat weaned Francis Joseph from the deadly seriousness of his outlook on humanity, and had given him in its stead some-

thing of his own cynical cleverness. It was no fault of Francis Joseph's if Parliamentary Government did not at once come into being. The Liberals themselves caused the delay by internal quarrels among the friends of the Constitution. They had to keep up an outward show of unity, for they were vaguely afraid lest the Liberal Constitution and the Liberal laws directed against the Pope and the Concordat should, after all, be refused by the Emperor. But each one in his heart was expecting that the Emperor would summon him, and each one grudged the other the enjoyment of such a favour.

In a report to Francis Joseph relating the results of his conversations with various Deputies, Beust proposed that Prince Karl Auersperg be nominated Prime Minister. He called him 'Carlos,' believing in good faith that this was the Prince's Christian name. In fact, it was only a nickname given him by his peers, the use of the Spanish form being intended as an ironical comment upon the unapproachable pride of this most exclusive Austrian aristocrat. Francis Joseph was astounded to find the name 'Carlos' in the formal report, but he laughed when he was told how the mistake had arisen. To Auersperg's extreme annoyance, the nickname stuck to him. The Press and the historians used it in all good faith.

The final incentive to the creation of a Parliamentary Cabinet came from Hungary. The Hungarians would not undertake elections for the joint assemblies until a strong Ministry was functioning in the crown lands. On January 1st, 1868, the official *Wiener Zeitung* announced the formation of a Parliamentary Ministry. It is known in history as the 'Bourgeois Ministry.' It was certainly a Ministry of the Talents. Dr. Giskra, Minister of the Interior, Dr. Brestel, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Berger, Minister without Portfolio, were veterans of 1848. Dr. Giskra was the son of a Moravian master-tanner, and had started as a Radical representative of the impoverished classes. At the age of twenty-eight he had taken his degree, and was a Deputy at the Parliament of Frankfort. Bach, himself a prototype of such careers, after the Revolution refused to admit Giskra's name to the roll of advocates. 'Never so long as I live,' he swore. In 1868 his *bête noir* had become a Minister, and Bach was a dead man. Berger, father of the manager of

the Burg Theatre, was also a Moravian. He too had a bad police record, had been compromised in 1848, and had been a Deputy at Frankfort. His humour, which stayed with him till his death, was celebrated. In his will he forbade his sons to invest a penny of their large inheritance in Austrian State Securities. The third veteran of 1848, Brestel, had an equally bad reputation. He was a professor of mathematics who had been suspended in 1848. After that he had had to fight his way until he found means of support in the 'Kreditanstalt.'

The real leader of the Liberals, Dr. Eduard Herbst, accepted the Ministry of Justice after a period of hesitation. He had hoped to be Premier. Like many of the German Bohemian politicians, Herbst came of a family of Slav blood. He had been Professor of Penal Law, first at Lemberg and then at Prague, where he gained his reputation. The Minister of Commerce was Ignaz von Plener, a veteran in the State service, who had been Minister of Finance under Schmerling, and was a model representative of the centralizing bureaucracy. Two members of the House of Peers were added to their number—Ritter von Hasner as Minister of Education and Count Potocki as Minister of Agriculture. Beust had very cleverly overcome the Emperor's objections. Although Herbst was reputed at Court to be an enemy of the Church and no friend of the dynasty, it was not only these supposed moral defects in Herbst and his friends which had made Beust's task in forming the Cabinet so difficult. Beust set to work to smooth out these difficulties, submitting lengthy reports to the Emperor, in which he gave repeated assurances that the Liberal statesmen 'are prepared to work without a programme, and to accept nomination from Your Majesty by Royal favour alone. The leading personages of the new Ministry,' he continues, 'including Berger, Giskra, and Herbst, are animated by the most conciliatory sentiments towards those nationalities which have not yet fallen into line.' This was the matter over which the Emperor had really been disturbed. He held fast to Beust, and was determined to stick to the path he had chosen, but he was well informed about the state of opinions in Prague, where Czech opposition against the Dual System and the German Liberal régime took the form of public demonstrations.

Francis Joseph would have desired a Coalition Government, with representatives of the Slav Nations. Beust made it clear to the Emperor that as far as the Czechs were concerned this was impossible, because there was no Czech party which recognized the Constitution. This was only a formal objection. It may have been valid, but the national question continued to obtrude itself in the minds of the law-makers. Twenty years earlier, at Kremsier, the nationality problem had made its first appearance on the open stage of Austrian politics. Two decades of suppression of all public spirit had changed the terms of the problem. The first symptom of a new fanatical nationalism was to be found in window-smashing exploits in Prague. The first signs of social conflict also flamed up. In the industrial zone of Vienna, at Wiener Neustadt, in Graz, and in North Bohemia, the workers arose to independent action. The unsolved questions of the past cropped up anew to complicate the tasks of the present and the future.

At this time Vienna was deeply exercised by the *Kulturkampf*, or culture dispute, which reached its highest point in March 1868 in the debates of the House of Peers. An imposing array of eighty aristocrats pledged to the Constitution, bearers of old and noble names, leading figures in the scientific and official world, upheld the constitutional cause for three days against the opposition of the Right, and assisted the anti-Church measures on to the Statute Book. Never again did the citizens of Vienna demonstrate their hostility to the Church on such a scale. Thick crowds filled the Herrengasse, the street in which the Peers assembled, and the two adjoining squares, which are among the most charming in Vienna—the Hof and the Freyung. When Count Auersperg rose and spoke of the ‘Canossa in print by which nineteenth-century Austria was to atone for the errors of Emperor Joseph in the eighteenth century,’ the applause spread from the House to the street. ‘If the Concordat stands,’ declared old Baron Lichtenfels, ‘chaos and night will fall upon Austria.’

The dramatic division took place on March 21st. Great was the excitement when it was the turn of the Emperor’s Lord Chamberlain, Prince Hohenlohe, to deliver his vote. It was a vote in favour of the measure. Loud applause broke out,

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acclaiming Francis Joseph, for the first and only time in his life, as an anti-clerical. That evening Vienna was illuminated. The whole city was astir. Crowds collected in front of improvised tribunes before the Ministries, in the public squares, and in the outer court of the Hofburg, where there was a statue of Joseph II. In the vast procession, alone, walked Franz Grillparzer, now seventy-seven years old.

Beust thus relates his experiences in the throng that evening : 'Accompanied by my brother, I was going along the Graben, when suddenly my name was called out, and from the Kärntnerstrasse, the Stephansplatz, and other side-streets, thousands of voices were lifted in acclamation. I tried to escape into the Trattnerhof, but somebody took hold of my knee, shouting : "You have delivered us from the shackles of the Concordat." To which I answered : "Then kindly deliver my knee".' The crowd accompanied Beust as far as the Ballhausplatz, where, from his bedroom, he still heard the enthusiasts shouting in Viennese dialect : '*Aussi muss er*' ('Bring him out').

But from the building across the way, the Burg, exaggerated and disquieting telegrams were dispatched to the Emperor in Hungary, comparing the scenes in the Vienna streets with those of 1848. Count Taaffe, the Minister of Police, sent reassuring information, while Beust filled in the gaps of the telegraphic report with a long dispatch in which he assured the Emperor that this was not a case of 'organized pressure,' but 'an explosion of excitement which, if the division had had another result, might have taken a different form. The demonstrators were not hired men, but well-dressed persons of various classes.'

Beust was not out to compose a brief for street demonstrations, but in his clever way he drew a comparison with an event in Britain. 'I myself was in London in 1846,' he wrote, 'when the Corn Law went through the House of Lords, and with it a state of affairs which had endured for centuries passed away. Crowds stood in front of the Parliament, and greeted the departing Dukes with applause or hoots, according as they had voted. The next day the city was illuminated.' The implied conclusion was that Britain had survived. Francis Joseph was duly pacified.

The Emperor now spent much time in the Hungarian capital, breathing in the atmosphere of reconciliation, and for the first

time enjoying his position as King of Hungary. It was as if the Empire's centre of gravity had shifted to the east. The Empress, who liked Magyar chivalry and temperament, also preferred Pest to Vienna. Her establishment now had an almost wholly Hungarian character, since Countess Andrassy had succeeded Countess Königsegg as Mistress of the Household. The Empress sent the children in spring and summer to Gódöllő, the castle presented by the Hungarian nobility to the Emperor as a coronation gift. Elizabeth's youngest daughter, Marie Valerie, was born at Pest on April 22nd, 1868. This retreat to Hungary enabled Francis Joseph to elude the noise of the battle which the Church was now conducting against the new religious legislation. To a deputation of the Vienna Reichsrat he declared : " Let us advance quickly and resolutely along the path we have chosen, and so reach a desirable consummation as soon as possible."

In June the Emperor went to Prague, a journey suggested by Beust in the hope of conciliating the restive Czechs. The official motive of the journey was the dedication of a new bridge. The Prime Minister, Karl Auersperg, accompanied the Emperor, but whether it was that he had no great confidence in Auersperg's diplomatic gift, or that he desired himself to pluck the fruits of reconciliation with the Czechs, Beust himself hastened to Prague and requested the Governor of Bohemia, Baron Kellersberg, to arrange for him a meeting with the two Czech leaders, Palacky and Rieger, without informing Auersperg. In seeking direct contact with the Czech politicians, Beust doubtless meant well, but his plan did not meet with success. Auersperg's dignity was offended ; so much that, without regard for the celebrations, he left Prague and the Emperor there and then, and, on Francis Joseph's return to Vienna, handed him a letter of resignation, in which he had written : 'I have struggled against the painful suspicion, awakened by various experiences, that Your Majesty does not think me worthy of that complete confidence which could alone permit me to expect that my efforts would be crowned with success.' On which Beust somewhat cruelly remarked : 'In the supposition that he no longer enjoyed the Imperial confidence Prince Carlos was not mistaken.'

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Auersperg's resignation did not cause much excitement. Vienna had become a city of congresses and celebrations, toasts and merrymaking. In August 1868 there was a great rifle competition, which took on a certain importance because it was termed a 'rendezvous for the vanquished of 1866.' It was said that 'whoever had a bone to pick with Count Bismarck joined up with the pensioners of the Guelph crown and the Royal Hanoverian democrats.' Throughout a fortnight a vast and varied throng congregated at the Vienna shooting-butts and in the drawing-rooms. It needed a prejudiced eye to discover in this festival any hint of its alleged anti-Prussian character; but it was in truth a kind of farewell ceremony to mark the end of the South German spirit, with its strong attachment to Austria. At the same time it was, in the words of the *Spenersche Zeitung*, 'a manifestation of the new zest for liberty in Austria, where it was thought that the fetters of dynastic and ecclesiastical tyranny had once for all been broken.'

In the provincial Diets, long repressed forces now burst forth, and it was here that Austria appeared in her true colours. Since Hungary had been recognized as an independent State, all the other races had turned to memories of their historic past, above all the Czechs. The Czechs boycotted the Prague Diet, but Rieger submitted a declaration on their behalf in which for the first time it was plainly declared that 'the territories of the Bohemian crown had never been united by other than a personal link to anything which could be termed an Austrian State, and are linked to the other Hapsburg domains solely by the common dynasty.'

From now on, romantic memories of Czech history, such as the Battle of the White Mountain, took on new life, and the revival of an autonomous Czech State became a real political possibility. At the same time the struggle of the races flamed up at the Diet of Galicia, at Zara, and at Trieste. The Hungarian settlement had placated one race, but left unsolved the problem of the Hapsburg hereditary territories.

The Liberal Ministry, charged with the task of making the most necessary preparations for the conversion of Austria into a Constitutional State, turned a deaf ear to all explosions of racial sentiment. A state of emergency was declared in Prague and



its suburbs, while Lieutenant-General Baron Koller was appointed to the dual office of Commander of the Forces in Bohemia and Provincial Governor at Prague. The Government got a law passed enabling it to suspend a large number of constitutional guarantees. It then made an abortive attempt to buy off the awakening races with a schedule of questions. The Ministry submitted to each of the seventeen provincial Diets a list of seven questions, such as : Should the members of the Vienna Reichsrat be elected, as hitherto, by the Diets, or by direct consultation of the people ? Should the four 'Curias,' representing the towns, the country, the big landowners, and the Chambers of Commerce, be maintained, or should the people be directly consulted ? It was a ludicrous idea on the part of the Liberal Government to submit these questions, which contained the kernel of the general suffrage question, to the class-conscious representatives of the provinces. The answer was what might have been expected. The Diets declared in favour of provincial autonomy, with supreme power in the hands of the Diets, which should maintain their feudal character. They declared against centralism, against the united Empire, and against Vienna.

Beust had meanwhile undertaken a journey for the purpose of improving Austria's relations with Russia, and awakening in South Germany slumbering memories of the House of Hapsburg. After visiting Stuttgart and Baden-Baden, he proceeded to Ouchy, where he met Prince Gorchakov. There was a connection between Beust's attempt to make contact with Russia once more, and the Dalmatian uprising. The Emperor was alarmed by the suspicion that Russia had fomented the trouble in Dalmatia through the agency of Montenegro. An atmosphere of resentment between Berlin and Vienna, occasioned by an indiscretion, was also dissipated. Unknown to Beust, the Austrian General Staff had intercepted a telegram addressed by Bismarck to Count Goltz, the Prussian Ambassador in Paris, in 1866. Bismarck and the King were offended. The Prussian Crown Prince, however, took advantage of his journey to the opening of the Suez Canal to step off at Vienna in demonstration of good feeling.

On October 25th the Emperor, accompanied by Beust and

the Minister of Commerce, Plener, followed the Prussian Crown Prince to Suez. This six weeks' trip to the East was Francis Joseph's first long journey. He left by a night train from Pest for Athens and Constantinople, via Serbia. At Orsowa, according to an account which some have declared untrue, a member of the suite observed that this must be the place where Kossuth had hidden the crown jewels. Beust relates : ' I turned to Count Andrassy, the Hungarian Premier, and in a subdued voice remarked to him : " You must, of course, know that," but Andrassy made no reply.' During the sea-trip, Francis Joseph, aware of Beust's tendency to sea-sickness, signalled from his ship : 'How is Beust !' By a signalman's error, the reply received was : 'Unverschämt' ('Behaving badly'), instead of 'Er schläft' ('He is asleep').

On the arrival at Constantinople the Sultan put out to meet Francis Joseph, but his corpulence made embarkation very difficult. Conversation was no easier, as he did not understand a word of French. Andrassy said of life in the palace that there was mandolin music at night, but that sleep was impossible for less poetic reasons than this. There was a grand parade, at which Beust mounted the white Arab steed presented to him, but, being unfamiliar with the Turkish saddle and stirrup, he worried the horse until it bolted with him.

The voyage in the *Elizabeth* was trying. The whole company suffered from sea-sickness, and the primitive arrangements on the ship made life still more unpleasant. Beust lamented that his cabin was separated only by a thin wooden partition from 'a source of disgusting smells.' On disembarking at Suez, he wrote in an autograph book the lines : <sup>1</sup>

Imperial Elizabeth, thy beauty dazzles and amazes,  
But this old ship, named after thee, for all I care can go to blazes !

On the way from Jaffa to Jerusalem the Emperor accepted the homage of two bold persons whose fine horses specially delighted him. They were bandit chiefs, and had agreed in ad-

<sup>1</sup> O Kaiserin Elisabeth,  
Nichts Schöneres kenn' ich auf Erden,  
Doch wenn als Schiff sie vor mir steht,  
Dann kann sie mir gestohlen werden.

vance to act this part in return for a considerable sum of money. The Emperor was much amused by the dromedaries, who were somewhat refractory. Sometimes it was necessary to adopt the ruse of heavily overloading them and then unloading before they would consent to get up. 'Just like the Committees with the military budget,' remarked the Emperor.

On arrival at the point whence Jerusalem could for the first time be espied, Francis Joseph dismounted and kissed the earth. At the dedication ceremony at Port Said he led in the Empress Eugénie. The main festivities took place at Ismailia, a township of five thousand inhabitants. The party slept on board, but the great ball was held in the new Canal Administration Buildings. The carriages were so late that the guests had to make their way on foot through the dirty streets of Ismailia. Beust, attired in ministerial frock-coat, with full-dress decorations, arrived on a donkey, to the great amusement of the Empress Eugénie.

The ball was attended by guests of the highest distinction, but also by a number of quite unknown personages. Beust held his jewelled Grand Crosses firm in his left hand. The supper menu promised twenty-four items, but only the first four were served, the remainder existing solely on paper. At the embarkation at Suez the Austrian Vice-Consul fell into the sea. Andrassy immediately stripped to jump in after him, but he had meanwhile been rescued by a sailor. The Emperor expressed a wish that Lesseps should be presented to him, and the sexagenarian builder of the canal appeared with his sixteen-year-old newly wedded wife on his arm.

At Cairo the party sought to recover from the effects of the sea voyage. The Emperor rode out to the Pyramids with Brugsch Pasha. The gentlemen of his retinue—Beust, Andrassy, von Hoffmann of the Foreign Office, and Consul-General Baron Schreiner—let themselves be conducted to the shady quarter of Cairo, where the attractions of a 'leg-dancer' kept them up so long that at three in the morning Beust was found in her house, seated in Oriental fashion, cross-legged, and singing Arab songs to a drum accompaniment. On returning to the hotel it was discovered that the Emperor had looked for his Ministers in the evening.

It had been arranged that in the course of the return journey the Emperor should meet King Victor Emmanuel at Brindisi ; but Victor Emmanuel asked to be excused, as he was suffering from measles. 'After my resignation,' Beust writes, 'the Emperor gave a demonstration of great forbearance—too great in my opinion—by returning the Italian King's visit to Vienna at Venice. Think if Henry V had become King of France in 1873 (and it was entirely his own fault if he did not), and had paid a visit to the Emperor William at Strasburg ! True, Francis Joseph did not cut the figure of a conquered monarch at Venice, but, even so, the Emperor was visiting, in the full glare of publicity, territories which had been violently detached from the Empire. Even the momentary pleasure done to others does not immediately balance the outrage done to certain estimable sentiments.'

The Emperor sent Beust to Florence, and thence he went on to Trieste, where Elizabeth was awaiting the Emperor, to report to her. Count Taaffe had also come to Trieste with messages from Vienna. 'This will be no good news,' remarked the Emperor. On December 6th he was back in Vienna, where his anticipation proved correct.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### WAR PERILS AND CORONATION PLANS

**F**RANCIS JOSEPH was now confronted by three problems. These concerned respectively the Labour Movement, now acquiring self-consciousness, the resistance of racial groups to the German Liberal mode of government, and the formation of a united Germany, not including Austria.

In the populace of Vienna there was an element naturally prone to revolution. A policy at once skilful and forceful might, for a time, restrain this element from noisy outbreaks, but nothing could altogether suppress it. In 1848 it had suddenly broken out, for in that year the movement of the working classes was visibly distinct from that of the middle classes. Often the fire seemed extinguished beneath the ashes of disappointed hopes, but always it broke out afresh. This natural emotional disposition of the Vienna populace generally appeared harmless enough, for, like the pent-up forces of nature, it would find sudden relief in a lightning outburst and so pass quickly over. The Vienna working classes so far held no political views, and had never been mustered to support any political programme. But, at the time we are speaking of, the theories of German Socialism, as propounded by Lassalle, had begun to make headway in Vienna.

On the day of the opening of Parliament, December 13th, 1869, Vienna was surprised by an imposing demonstration of workmen. The crowd proceeded in excellent order from the Paradeplatz to the Josephstädter Glacis in front of the Parliament, and then through the city to the residence of the Prime Minister. Count Taaffe had been at the head of the Cabinet since the retirement of Auersperg. He was informed of this demonstration, and passed on the news to the Emperor. With the Emperor's agreement, he put no obstacles in the way of the demonstrating masses, but received a deputation and took note of their demands for freedom of association, freedom of the Press, and freedom of assembly. The Emperor and his Prime

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Minister did not lose their nerve in face of this first great workmen's demonstration, which passed off without the police having any reason to interfere. But it was enough to compel the Liberals to show themselves in a new light. The House of Peers gave vent to loud expressions of alarm, and successfully demanded the arrest of the originators of the demonstration, who included Oberwinder, Scheu, Most, and Papst ; but Lassalle's disciple, Hartung, was able to escape. Count Taaffe and the Emperor had the good sense immediately after the demonstration, on December 14th, to introduce a law guaranteeing freedom of association, which was accepted by the Reichsrat on February 10th, 1870.

The second question which faced the Government was more difficult. The 'bourgeois Ministry' had done much to bring Austria along the path of Constitutionalism, but it had left untouched the problem of the structure of the Empire. The Ministry was perhaps by nature incapable of comprehending the racial question, or, if not incapable, at any rate impotent to do so. A minority in the Cabinet, including Taaffe, Berger, and Potocki, realized that it was impossible simply to ignore the opposition of the Czechs, the South Slavs, and the Poles, or to reply to their demands with stereotyped phrases about the Constitution. Once more Austria was at a point where she needed, before all else, a statesman. Was the problem insoluble ? Was it only a dream of the Hapsburgs that they could hold a dozen Peoples under a single sceptre ? Had the House of Hapsburg neglected the hour when solution was possible ?

Now, at all events, the Emperor and the minority in the Cabinet had more understanding of the problem than the five members of the majority, Giskra, Herbst, Brestel, Plener, and Hasner. These men deserve all credit for their work in liberalizing the institutions of the Empire, but nothing could shake in their minds the dogma that Austria must be governed from one centre under German predominance. Their recommendations to the Emperor were to the effect that 'the best that can be done in the circumstances is to proceed along the present path ; any attempt further to extend the autonomy of the provinces should be resolutely resisted.' Taaffe projected an electoral reform favourable to the parties which differed from the govern-

ment on fundamental constitutional questions. Even the majority in the Cabinet did not deny that it was necessary to extend the electoral law, but desired a reform which would strengthen the Centralist system and weaken the opposition.

The outlines of the problem are not difficult to trace. It was the time for a courageous statesman to take the step which Bismarck had found necessary in Germany, to grant general suffrage, and thus associate the monarchy with the broad masses of the people. The awakening races of the Austrian Empire in 1870 found no way of self-expression save the debates in the Diets, where they could bring forward their desires and their remonstrances, not directly, but only through the representatives of the classes—hereditary aristocrats, bishops, and wealthy citizens who sat as mouthpieces, not of the Nations, but of the classes. The only direct advocates of the awakening races were the men of the middle-class intelligentsia. Berger knew well what he was about when he declared to the Emperor that a reform of the suffrage with the aim of bringing into existence a pliable German Government Party would only make matters worse. He refused also to resort to the facile remedy of Government by exceptional decrees, recommended by the romantic devotees of authority. 'If the majority programme be successful,' he declared, 'we shall certainly have to suspend the Constitution in Bohemia, and probably also in other provinces.'

The Emperor inclined to agree with Taaffe, Berger, and Potocki in this dissension within the Cabinet, but he remained neutral, and sanctioned the unusual proceeding of letting both parties in the Cabinet publish in the official *Wiener Zeitung* the memorials which they had submitted to him. The House of Peers upheld the majority Ministers, whereupon the Emperor, sacrificing his own views, dismissed Taaffe, Berger, and Potocki. The Liberals now made no secret of their resentment against the Ministers, whose downfall they greeted with fierce applause. Their wrath burst out the more tumultuously because it had hitherto been concealed. In the House of Deputies the principal object of attack was Beust, but this wily politician did not fail to placate the Liberal Panjandrum Giskra by a little compromise with his conscience.

The Ministry was now reconstructed. The Minister of

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Education, Hasner, became Prime Minister, Deputy Banhans, Administrator of the Waldstein Properties in Bohemia, took the portfolio of Agriculture, while Stremayr, an eighty-year-old Styrian who had sat in the Frankfort Parliament with Giskra, took charge of Education. Thus Francis Joseph, despite his strong dislike for emotional Liberals like Giskra and Herbst, met their views even in the matter of the appointment of Ministers, which hitherto he had always considered to be his own most private concern.

But alterations in the Cabinet left the great question, how to reconcile the races to Austria, no nearer solution. Francis Joseph was now all out for reconciliation. His conversion to Liberalism was the immediate result of the reconciliation with Hungary. He had accepted as a principle that the Hungarian settlement could only thrive if Austria, simultaneously with Hungary, were given a Liberal Constitution. He accepted the view of Andrassy that the Hungarians should be the pillars of Empire in the east, and the Germans in the west. The Hungarians had established their domination over their subject Peoples so firmly that the protests of these remained inaudible. But in Austria the case was necessarily otherwise, if only because of the great power of resistance shown by the Czechs. Three years of the Liberal experiment had brought considerable surprises. It had been proved that Francis Joseph could govern in contrast with his own most intimate preferences, and that he could even be brought to enter into conflict with the Church. It was the incapacity of the Liberals to deal with the racial problem of Austria which undermined the Emperor's faith in the scheme of 1867.

The reconstructed Ministry, at Francis Joseph's urgent insistence, sent Giskra to attempt to bring about a settlement with the Czechs. The young Czechs of the National Radical Party, whose strength lay in the support of peasants and the humbler middle classes, were disposed to accept Giskra's invitation, but Rieger, leader of the old Czechs, rejected it. Negotiations with the Poles were equally unsuccessful.

It was on the question of electoral reform that the much-battered Government finally fell to pieces. Giskra was the author of a project for electoral reform so drawn up as to be



acceptable to two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies. The Emperor refused his approval, and Giskra had to retire from the Government. On March 30th the Government brought forward an emergency electoral law, designed to prevent the obstruction of the provincial Diets against the elections for the Reichsrat. The result was that the Czechs and Poles immediately resigned their seats. The Government demanded dissolution of those Diets whose members had left the Reichsrat.

Francis Joseph now needed a counsellor to lead him along the path to universal suffrage, as Andrassy had led him three years before to reconciliation with Hungary. Following his instinct, the Emperor refused to dissolve the Diets. The Ministry, in consequence, fell. Kaiserfeld, the Brutus of German Liberalism, delivered a funeral oration, in the words of which breathes that fine obstinacy and tragic incomprehension which prevented the Liberals from understanding Austria's vital necessities. 'We shall discover once again our union and our strength,' he declared; 'we shall discover them in our past and in the future, so far as we can see it. We shall discover them in the vision which is within us, and in the stern resistance which we will oppose to every attempt directed against the united political structure which is our strength, our law, and our safety. We shall discover them in our determination not to be the victims or the dupes of nebulous programmes of conciliation, but to maintain the bond which holds us to the Constitution.'

It was usual in Vienna to look for personal motives in the play of political events. Brutus's sermon was supplied with a piquant and trivial text. It was said—and nothing could destroy this belief—that the real reason of the fall of the Ministry had been the refusal of Finance Minister Brestel to permit quotation of the new Turkish Bonds on the Vienna Stock Exchange, this being a security in which Beust was interested. From this may be seen how large the Stock Exchange now loomed in the popular imagination. That this allegation was pure legend was clearly shown in a libel action instituted against persons who had spread the rumour. The reason of the fall of the Government was shown in the joy openly expressed by all the enemies of Liberalism, who now felt themselves relieved from a nightmare anxiety. Shortly after the fall of the first Parliamentary Minis-

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try, Beust asked Princess Eleonore Schwarzenberg at a reception if she was pleased with this final turn of events. She replied, with a charming smile, 'You are a pet.'

The Emperor now, as might have been expected, resorted to the minority members of the Ministry, and summoned Potocki and Taaffe. Berger had had to retire from political life, having become totally deaf. The Ministry had now lost its Parliamentary character. The Potocki Cabinet bore the marks of a Ministry of Civil Servants, such as Francis Joseph from now onwards frequently called into existence to stop the gap when Parliament proved incapable of producing a Government. It was not any private views of Francis Joseph, but the concrete difficulties of the Austrian problem, which brought about this interruption in Parliamentary government. Francis Joseph had, since 1867, recognized that Parliamentary government was a necessary consequence of the Constitution—a point which Germany did not reach till after the Great War. It was not the Emperor's fault if he had to resort to the expedient of a Cabinet of Civil Servants.

The Emperor was the central personage in the great changes which came over Austria during the 'seventies. He did not close his eyes to this transformation of persons and institutions, but it was only later that he gradually came to see the other side of the rise of Liberalism. Owing to the narrowness of the circle in which he passed his daily life, and his isolation from all persons whose position did not give them access to him, he lacked insight into the changed circumstances of Society. He could understand aspiration for power, but not the fierce hunger for riches which in these years of economic development was the ruling passion. Francis Joseph's contemporaries and their descendants have often wondered why the Emperor put so much confidence in Count Taaffe. It was not youthful memories which produced this confidence so much as Taaffe's character as an unselfish man of aristocratic qualities, with an eye for human weaknesses. From him Francis Joseph learned to see behind the words of the idealists to where their little defects and vanities lay. In Beust, he liked an absence of emotion verging upon cynicism. In Taaffe, he appreciated a sceptical attitude towards ideas, similar to his own, and also a familiarity with the

methods of 'peeping behind the official curtain.' Taaffe was Francis Joseph's informer. When Taaffe read out to the Emperor the letters which Berger was accustomed to write to him, this supplied a background to the official Parliamentary reports of the great Liberal Minister's speeches. Thus Berger wrote, 'What does your Excellency think of the affair of Schindler and Giskra?' (Schindler was a Deputy whose Parliamentary activities had enabled him to put together a large fortune and to acquire the castle of Leopoldskron at Salzburg.) 'Which is the bigger rascal, the unsophisticated brigand, or the croupier of elegant pretensions who sits and shovels in money at the roulette-table? Which do you like better, the one who cheerfully does his job on the highway, or the one who does it at the green table with an appearance of high official seriousness? . . . In my view, they both stink.' Schindler, the man of whom this portrait could be drawn, sent Taaffe his New Year greetings, asking him 'please to accept them, as the sentiments of a man whom neither the wagging tongues of a crowd of fools, nor the attacks of a Press in part venal and in part despicable for other reasons, has ever misled in his attitude towards the work of others or his own work.' Taaffe had a perpetual store of such delicacies in his portfolio. Schmerling wrote to him in 1870, 'In course of the last changes in the army, my son-in-law, Brigadier Baron von Bienerth, not only failed to achieve promotion to the rank of major-general, but was passed over in the most extraordinary way, since Colonel Count Bylandt and Colonel Catty, who respectively came in the eighth and twenty-seventh place after my son-in-law, were promoted out of their turn to general's rank.' Taaffe delighted in serving up such little human episodes to the Emperor.

His keen eye for human weakness and vanity rendered him fearless, and gave him a kind of quiet gaiety, like that of a doctor who, in treating wealthy patients, is so much accustomed to their exaggerations of their own complaints that, whatever they say to him, he always answers, 'I don't think there's anything serious the matter with you.' His habit of always looking for human frailty induced in him a scepticism which concentrated his view altogether upon the individual, and left nations out of account. His system was to place more reliance in the reports

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of confidential agents, and even of secret spies and emissaries than in the official statements of politicians. Thus he brought into the new Austria something of the old governmental methods of the Emperor Francis.

The information which he gave to the Emperor was based upon these secret reports. During these years Francis Joseph received reports about Bohemia and the Czechs which were in essence patched up from the information supplied by Taaffe's secret agents. Thanks to this method, no doubt, he very often learnt of facts of which the official governors could not have informed him. Even after the Police Ministry was abolished, it remained the practice, in the case of very confidential information, that the Minister of the Interior should take reports directly from the police. The Prague police had, in particular, specialized in the political service, and had informers in all quarters. These informers gave a close account of Rieger's sojourn in Paris in 1869, of his attempts to obtain an audience with Napoleon and his son, and of the visit he actually paid to the French Minister of Commerce, Rohner. They were able to report, moreover, the most intimate proceedings in the internal organization of the Czech parties, and to give a close picture of the state of public opinion in the country. The Emperor had not yet come to the method of direct conversations with the leaders of the people, and it was from these informers that he learnt how earnestly the Czechs were striving for their ideal of an autonomous State. 'Without doubt,' an informer wrote in the year 1870, 'both the parties, old Czechs and young Czechs, have one end in view, and will not compromise on their principles. Equally undoubted is the close sympathy which binds them to the Smolka party in Galicia and to the leaders of the Slovene movement. They are also active in promoting the spread of their propaganda abroad by word and by deed; all the Bohemian "Besedas"<sup>1</sup> in Germany, Italy, France, and England are entrusted with this task, most of all the Beseda in Paris. The basic principle underlying this movement is that German superiority is not recognized. On the contrary, the aim is to restore the autonomous rights of Bohemia in accordance with

<sup>1</sup> A Bohemian word originally meaning inn or café, hence "group" or "cell."

the principle of political equality, and to guarantee these rights for the future. Any other policy, however democratic, is rejected as out of touch with the needs of the times. There is no current of opinion in favour of the Government or of the dual system. Hatred of the Government is common to them all.'

This is the report of a secret informer, but it gives a more accurate picture of Bohemia than did the Vienna newspapers in 1870. Out of one of these letters of the year 1870, reporting Sladkovsky's secret journey to Giskra in Vienna, the suspicion arose that the author, Sabina, was in the service of the Prague political police. Sabina subsequently became famous as the author of the libretto of Smetana's *The Bartered Bride*. A man of singular talent, his life ran a typically Austrian course. In 1849 he was condemned to death by hanging, but the penalty was commuted to one of imprisonment for life. In 1857 he enjoyed the benefit of an amnesty. Subsequently he wrote *The Bartered Bride* and other works, but, being still regarded as suspect, emigrated to Dresden, whence he returned to Prague, a prey to home-sickness, and died there in 1872 in miserable poverty. During his life his name was known to Vienna only from police reports. His work was not appreciated there till many years after his death.

The new Government's attempts to win over the Czechs were vain. Potocki's journey to Prague was of no avail, for the situation had changed, if anything, for the worse, since the Bohemian nobility had subscribed to the 'Declaration,' and thereby accepted the principle that the territories of the Bohemian Crown were linked to the other territories of the Empire by nothing but the person of the monarch. No doubt the nobility was led to this by other motives than those which were active in the nationalistic circles of humbler birth, and dreamed that a revival of Bohemian autonomy would bring in its train a revival of feudal privileges. But at this moment the Czech people was drawing all its inspiration from romantic memory of the great national past, and was thankful for the support of the nobility in the national campaign.

The Emperor's faith in the Liberal constitutional system was inevitably shaken by these experiences, and most particularly by

the news that the Czech opposition was playing its game on an international field. The *Neue Freie Presse* brought knowledge of Rieger's aggressive activity in Paris to the broad public by printing Rieger's appeal to Louis Napoleon for the help of France in the cause of the Austrian Slavs. 'When Bohemia is independent,' Rieger had written, 'it will be in a position to separate northern from southern Germany, so that a French army could be brought more quickly into Bohemia than a Prussian army to the upper Rhine. The Czech nation has progressed to a much higher level of civilization than the Hungarian, and could very quickly create a diversion to the advantage of France. The Hapsburg dynasty is engaged in an error which may cost it its existence when it sacrifices the Slavs to the Magyars and the Germans ; for outraged national sentiment may well break out in the course of a war, and be the occasion of a partition of the monarchy.' This cruel prophecy was proved true forty-eight years later. Meanwhile, nothing could be more painful to Francis Joseph than such a complaint addressed by one of his Peoples to the French throne, above all at a moment when the Emperor was thinking of throwing the weight of his position in Europe into the scales in the coming conflict between Prussia and France.

Beust was the man who guided the international destiny of the Empire on Francis Joseph's behalf. When, three years earlier, Francis Joseph had summoned this most conspicuous of Bismarck's German opponents to his service, it was certainly not with a view to making a final exit from German politics ; nor had the settlement with Hungary and the establishment of German Liberal domination in Austria been brought about simply with a view to restoring internal peace. From 1866 on, Beust kept steadily in view the aim of opposing an Austria, strengthened by the adoption of liberal institutions, to the military ambitions of Prussia. Bismarck had created the North German Federation ; Beust's dream was to create a corresponding South German Federation under Austrian leadership, and, in steadfast prosecution of this policy, he was at one with the powerful Court Party, at whose head stood the Archduke Albert. But there was one strong man who stood in the way—Andrássy, Prime Minister of Hungary. Beust could not prevent

Andrássy from playing an ever more important part in directing the policy of the joint Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

An intimate associate of Andrássy, Baron Béla Orczy, had been appointed in 1868 head of a department in the Ministry, and it was his special task, and a delicate one, to uphold Andrássy's views against Beust. Andrássy's unconcealed aim was that the settlement of 1866 should remain undisputed, and that Austria should once and for all renounce her German ambitions. In Andrássy's view, Austria's task was to strengthen her position in the Balkans, so as to prevent Russia from completely dominating the Near East. He could only conceive one case for turning against Prussia, which would be if Bismarck showed signs of supporting Russia or another Power against Austria in the Near East. Beust, on the contrary, viewed the Near East as a means to an end, thanks to which he might win freedom of action in the pursuit of his anti-Prussian plans. Andrássy was simply following his own instinct when he concurred in Bismarck's advice that the centre of gravity of the Empire should be shifted eastwards ; but Beust had no notion of renouncing his ambitions in Germany, and remained on the watch for any occasion to revenge himself against Prussia for his own banishment from Germany.

It is easy to understand why these two Ministers of Francis Joseph took such strongly divergent views. Andrássy, being a Hungarian, saw the East from near at hand. His outlook upon European politics took into consideration, first and foremost, the interests of his own country. Beust, the Saxon, had been Bismarck's principal opponent in the great drama of the settlement of Prussia's relations to South Germany. When he became Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, he did not throw off the German atmosphere. He could not shake off the memories of a lifetime. Thus Andrássy watched with discomfort and anxiety the course of Beust's policy, and the series of irritations which Beust prepared for Bismarck he could neither like nor approve. By 1869 there was such hostility between Vienna and Berlin that the diplomatic world was prepared for a breach of relations. At that moment the Emperor was won over by Andrássy to the cause of peace ; Beust, though certain of the support of the powerful war party for his anti-Prussian plans,

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yielded. The high aristocracy of Vienna was on Beust's side, expecting that a victorious war would lead to the collapse of Liberalism. The same views animated the old nobility of French traditions, and there were allies in the dethroned dynasty of the Hanoverian Guelphs and in the Viennese military party, headed by the Archduke Albert.

Beust had in view a triple alliance to unite Austria, France, and Italy against Prussia, while Poland could also be brought into play as a bulwark against Russia. 'As long as Beust remains at the head of affairs,' wrote the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, Bismarck's organ, 'the maintenance of peace is uncertain.' Nor can Andrassy's biographer be accused of exaggeration if he says that at that moment 'Europe was near to the dreadful drama of a general world conflagration in which every State would be involved.' Beust certainly did not wish for that. War, as an instrument of policy, did not enter into any of his plans, but his opportunist tactics might well have set fire to Europe, producing a general war desired by none of the participants, as in 1914. It was not Beust's fault if the alliance with France and Italy did not become a reality; the plan failed in consequence of Italy's demand that she should be allowed to plant her new flag in Rome. That these projects were very earnestly mooted in Vienna was shown by the journey to Paris which the Archduke Albert undertook in March 1870. It is now known that the aim of this journey was to submit to the French Emperor general plans for a spring campaign of the three Powers against Prussia. Austria required six weeks to mobilize her forces. Meanwhile, a minor French army was to engage Prussia on the Saar, while the main army would cross the upper Rhine and cut off south Germany from the north. Following on this, the French main army was to join up with the forces of Austria and Italy, while the Archduke Albert proposed fighting the great decisive battle on the plain of Leipzig.

For the Emperor these were years of severe internal conflict. It had been no easy matter for him to renounce the century-old claims of the House of Hapsburg in Germany; and, while there might be urgent reasons for Austria to shift the centre of her active policy to the Balkans, the process was not the less painful for Francis Joseph. He viewed history, not with the eye of the



historian who could regard Austria's dismissal from Italy and Germany as a necessary phase in the struggle of the nations for the right to an independent political existence, but with that of the heir to a heritage, saddened by the loss of substantial portions of it. Andrassy advised him to cease wishing for what could not be restored to life ; but Beust and the military party prevented him from dismissing the old dreams from his head. Francis Joseph, in consequence, inclined at one moment to sober meditations, while at another moment he indulged in a gambler's dangerous dreams, according to the varying phases of the general condition of Europe. 'I desire peace,' he wrote on June 14th, 1870, from the Castle of Laxenburg to General Lebrun. 'If I come into the war, it must be the result of irresistible forces.'

Meanwhile, Bismarck was assuring the Vienna Cabinet of Prussia's goodwill, when suddenly the danger of war between Prussia and France arose, and a tempest seemed imminent. Napoleon was convinced that he could count upon Austria's thirst for revenge against Prussia ; so much is evident from the statements of the Duc de Gramont in the Cabinet. Such expectations were naturally confirmed by Beust's conduct and policy, and in particular by the interpretations placed upon them by the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Prince Richard Metternich, as well as by the Archduke Albert's visit. 'The fact is,' Richard Metternich declared with amiable frankness, 'that I was altogether in favour of a common defensive, and even in certain circumstances offensive, action between France and Austria.' But when Beust stood before a decision his courage failed him. He tried to mediate.

Now the Vienna War Party came into action. We often find in history repetition of situations and, as it were, of persons. It is thus that in 1870 we find a forerunner of the Generalissimo of 1914 ; Baron von Kuhn, in 1870, corresponds to Conrad in the World War. Kuhn had formerly been Gyulay's Chief of General Staff in the campaign of 1859. He was well known as a critic of the war of 1866, and was highly prized for his theoretical knowledge, though, so far, he had given no practical indication of military gifts. Schäffle terms him a highly superficial professor of everything. 'There was nothing he did not talk

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about, from æsthetics to political economy and finance. He knew everything about everything, and always better than anybody else. Only he seemed not to have paid very much attention to his principal task, which was to reform the army.'

At the time when the Franco-German War appeared inevitable, Kuhn was Minister of War. He favoured Austria's participation in the war, advocating this course with all the passion and rhetoric of which he was capable, and spurred on by the Archduke Albert. But the arguments he used were not strong. He kept in view both possibilities—a French victory and a Prussian victory—and urged that in neither case could Austria stand aside in complete neutrality. If France were to be victorious, then Austria must come on the scene as Germany's advocate, and so recover the position she had lost at Königgrätz. If Prussia were to be victorious, then Austria's business evidently was 'to defend her own existence with the sword ; for a victorious Prussia would dethrone all the German Princes. Once the *Pickelhaube* [spiked helmets] reached the River Inn, that would be the end of Austria. Hungary, too, would be lost. Germany, in her power, would never suffer the Danube to remain in foreign hands. Thus a Prussian victory would be the greater danger. If Austria-Hungary were to participate in the war against Prussia, that would mean an army 1,700,000 strong, and victory would be certain.'

Kuhn's memorial showed the same want of real foresight as Conrad's memorials in the time of Aehrenthal. He, too, recommended the fomenting of revolution in Poland if Russia should join Prussia, declaring, 'If you hesitate to do this, then sooner or later North America and Russia will divide the world between them.' He was ready to sacrifice Galicia and to leave south Tyrol to Italy, for his triumphant imagination furnished him with the prospect of recompensing Austria with the Danube principalities, Bosnia, Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg. Out of the victory Austria was to emerge reborn. Like every general meddling in politics, he proposed 'restoring order' at the end of the victorious war, and the conclusion of his argument is highly reminiscent of Conrad. 'Should it happen beyond all reasonable expectation' that Austria remained alone in face of a victorious Prussia, then, he said, 'the monarchy would meet

its inevitable destiny, no more and no less than if it had preserved neutrality: it would perish.'

Beust did not contribute to these warlike tones, but he, too, did not purpose strict neutrality, desiring rather to keep his hand free for all eventualities. The Crown Council held on July 18th, 1870, gives a vivid picture of the currents in the Court of Vienna, as represented by the Emperor, the Ministers, and the generals. We can also observe with interest, in the history of this important meeting, that a greater sense of responsibility was shown by the participants than in those which preceded and determined the outbreak of the World War. Investigation of the motives of the responsible statesmen shows that in 1914 it was exclusively sentiments of a private order, and chivalric considerations, which led to the fateful decisions. The monarch's sense of his own prestige became the leading motive of State policy, and brought about the war. In 1870, also, considerations of prestige were prominent, but they were modified by rational calculations.

It was Bismarck's achievement that he inflated the incident of Ems into a matter of popular emotion, and converted a diplomatic war into a popular war. The arguments in the Vienna Crown Council at Vienna on July 18th were altogether in the old diplomatic style, seasoned, however, by practical and rational considerations. Beust spoke as an inheritor of the tradition of Metternich. He did not openly declare his desires, but advocated a waiting policy which would permit Austria to take an active line when the moment arrived. In other words, Beust was for war-preparedness, so that if opportunity offered he could fulfil his secret desires. Andrassy also favoured a certain measure of military preparation, for he did not wish Austria to lie altogether at the mercy of her neighbours. Unlike Beust, he based this demand upon the requirements of a strict neutrality. Andrassy would take up arms only in self-defence, and wished to make this policy known and comprehensible to Prussia. Without replying to Andrassy's political arguments, the Emperor declared against partial mobilization for military reasons, stating that half-measures were impossible, and that a choice must be made between unarmed passivity and full preparations for war. The Archduke Albert could

not get away from his dream of a new Battle of Leipzig, and declared that a decisive battle would be fought in the Plain of Saxony in the beginning of September, by which time Austria must be thoroughly armed. At risk of dropping altogether out of the picture, Austria must immediately, and with all energy, prepare for war. Kuhn's tone was still more warlike. Nor is it conceivable that Francis Joseph would have resisted the generals' and Beust's arguments in favour of mobilization had not Andr ssy entered the lists for neutrality with all the force of his temperament and with all the resources of his mind.

Once more a melancholy comparison with the Crown Council of 1914 is apt. On the later date, Stephen Tisza, Andr ssy's compatriot and successor, stood up as sole advocate of a reasonable policy against a horde of generals and Ministers who acclaimed Berchtold's project of war against Serbia. Alas that Tisza did not possess Andr ssy's power of endurance, but finally gave up the struggle. Yet Andr ssy's task in 1870 was the more difficult since Beust and the generals had already almost wholly won over the Emperor. It was at the end of interminable discussions and revisions that Francis Joseph brought the Crown Council to a conclusion, having resolved to preserve neutrality for the time being while undertaking certain preparations, such as the building of siege works and purchase of horses.

Andr ssy was largely to thank for this decision, yet another element which greatly contributed to it may have been the knowledge that Austria could not deliver a decisive stroke because the army was not in a condition to do so. Shortly before the Crown Council, the Emperor had summoned General John, Chief of General Staff to the Archduke Albert, and had bluntly asked him whether the army was fit for war. For three days John took the greatest pains to discover all he could from the evidence afforded by the documents at the Ministry of War. He had to acknowledge to the Emperor that the army was not fit for war. Meanwhile, however, the question ceased to be of practical importance, for the bulletins announcing German victories put a sudden end to the hopes of the war party. Thiers, in the course of his diplomatic tour, arrived on September 23rd in Vienna. He was received by Francis Joseph a fortnight

later, and had to content himself with kind expressions of sympathy. The French statesman consoled himself by remarking to Leopold von Ranke, who was at work in the Vienna archives and met Thiers at his hotel with the words : 'This is our Jena, but we shall not need seven years to recover from it.'

Although, to all appearance, Francis Joseph quickly accommodated himself to historical changes, he was yet incapable of comprehending the natural development which now took place. Behind the events of the war the Germans of Austria began to envisage the true significance of the rebirth of the German State. In all the German provinces of Austria, even beyond the line of the Alps, the victory of Sedan was celebrated with illuminations and bonfires. In Vienna, and in the German circles of Prague, the best journalists, like Ferdinand Kürnberger and David Kuh, employed their pens to express the feelings of the intellectuals. But these demonstrations of German nationalism appeared to Court circles treasonable. Nor were these circles greatly consoled when, a few days later, the news of the defeat of a German army under General von der Tann at Coulmiers was greeted with flags and bunting by the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians of Prague, Lemberg, and Pest. The divisions of the Empire were made manifest in this Battle of the Bonfires. When, in 1914, the Great War broke out in the west, the internal war of the Peoples of Austria fanned it to hotter flames. And now, while the German students in Vienna chanted the new national hymn, 'The Watch on the Rhine,' the notes of the 'Marseillaise' were heard in the Czech national theatre at Prague, where it was taken up by the crowd celebrating the mournful anniversary of the Battle of the White Mountain.

Propaganda bureaux in favour of France and Garibaldi now sprang up, and for the first time cases were noted in which men called up for the territorial army refused to take the oath of loyalty to the Emperor. In such circumstances the efforts of the new Prime Minister, Potocki, to bring about the reconciliation with the Czechs had little prospect of success. Before the Government was properly in harness, its position was imperilled by a general attack delivered by the Liberals of the House of Peers, who put up their best men to denounce the Potocki Cabinet. Schmerling, Unger, Lichtenfels, Auersperg,

one after another, accused Potocki of 'annihilating the Constitution by means of the Constitution' and 'conjuring up anarchy' in Bohemia.

These Liberals had a simple and unchanging programme summed up in the two words 'Constitution' and 'police.' But this programme was insufficient to remedy Austria's new and smarting wounds. In comparison with this monotonous cry for police measures, which was all the Liberals had to offer in alleviation of the woes of the State of many Nations, even Potocki's efforts for a settlement looked like the work of a statesman. 'Attempts to reach a compromise between two mutually exclusive extremes,' declared the Liberals of the House of Peers, 'are inevitably doomed to be sterile. When the law condescends to negotiate with those who do not conceal their hostility to the law, it runs counter to itself, and undermines public confidence.' The men who used such words were later honoured with marble monuments in the elegant classic House of Parliament built by Hansen in the Franzensring. Fifty years later their marble gaze was to look out upon an Austria of dwarf-like stature. The problem of the races was not to be solved by iron adherence to the doctrine of the Liberals, even if helped out by manifestations of high culture, as when Unger quoted the verses of Goethe, 'The man who in changeable times is himself changeable increases the evil of the times, and spreads it further and further.'<sup>1</sup> In these circumstances, to be firm meant to use force, and Francis Joseph had abandoned the attempt to rule by force. Was he now forcibly to convert the Czechs, the Poles, and the Slovenes to the Liberal Constitutional State? It could not be. The Potocki Government handed in its resignation.

As on previous occasions in the life of Francis Joseph, such as the fall of Bach, the dismissal of Schmerling, the sudden departure of Rechberg, and the disappearance of Belcredi, a great change now took place, to all appearance without preparation and in deep secrecy. Vienna awake on February 7th, 1871, to read a list of new Ministers whose names were hitherto unknown. How had Count Hohenwart merited this appointment? Who was Jirecek; who was Habietinek; and who was

<sup>1</sup>Denn der Mann, der in schwankender Zeit selbst schwankend gesinnt ist, mehret das ubel und breitet es weiter und weiter.

Professor Schäffle? There was not much help in witticisms such as that of Daniel Spitzer, who christened this the Jirecek-Hahahabietinek Ministry, and declared that just as nowadays refuse could be turned to gold, and perfumes extracted from manure, so Ministers could be made out of the most insignificant individuals. So surprising and enigmatic was the change that even the Chancellor, Beust, knew nothing of it until he read the names of the new Ministers in a newspaper in the train from Budapest to Vienna. Yet it was not true that these new men had been summoned from obscurity in a single night. Francis Joseph's decision was not the fruit of a sudden change of mind, but had been prepared by long meditations born of disappointment, worry, and resentment. In his resentment against the Liberal Government, the Emperor was at one with the Court, with his mother and her counsellors, with the Archduke Albert and the nobility. But his disappointment was of a different order from the hatred of a social group whose interests and outlook were outraged by the domination of the Liberal bourgeoisie. Francis Joseph's first thought was for Hungary, and for the Dual System, which he considered the most important result of his efforts. In consideration for Hungary, he had long stuck to his intention of ruling the Austrian heart of the Empire by Centralist methods. When Potocki's attempts at a settlement proved unsuccessful, his thoughts turned to Schmerling. But Schmerling was disliked in Hungary, and was not the man to bring about better relations with the Czechs. For, just as four years earlier a settlement with Hungary had been the Emperor's chief concern, so now he yearned for settlement with the Czechs.

The history of his decision to throw over the Liberal Centralists goes back to the summer of 1870. It began far beyond the zone of publicity, where even the watchful eye of the Vienna Press could not penetrate. Hence, when he summoned to office the men who had secretly worked for the great change, to the public they seemed to have fallen from the skies. It would be a misunderstanding of this important episode in Francis Joseph's life to read in it a return to the ideas of the reactionary classes.

It is true that the Emperor's dissatisfaction with the Liberal régime was encouraged by persons of the most various types.

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Among them was the Lord Chamberlain, Prince Konstantin Hohenlohe, to whom the Liberal historians ascribe an important share in preparing the way for the new Cabinet.

Hohenlohe was no friend of the Constitutionalists, but neither was he a reactionary. It was Councillor Braun, Chief Secretary to the Cabinet, an intimate of the Archduchess Sophie, that Bismarck indicates to his Vienna Ambassador, General Schweinitz, as one of the principal authors of the Ministerial change. Braun was an enemy of Prussia and a pious Catholic, but it cannot really be maintained that he had the power or the capacity to influence the Emperor decisively. Bismarck went so far as to suspect that French and English influence was at play in the appointment of Hohenwart, a belief in which he was encouraged by the enemies of the new Government.

The fact is that the Emperor, in appointing his new Ministers, was following indications from Prague, and especially from Count Clam-Martinitz and Count Thun, the chiefs of the great Bohemian nobility. Baron Helfert, formerly Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Education, had come to Vienna on their behalf. Nothing of what happened was concealed from Taaffe, Francis Joseph's most intimate counsellor. Hohenwart, who had hitherto been Governor of Upper Austria, was indicated by Taaffe as the man who could carry out the new project. Other active supporters of the new policy were Hohenwart's friend, Count Dürckheim, a Conservative Deputy, formerly aide-de-camp to the Emperor, and the Director of the State Printing Office, von Beck, a singularly devoted servant of the Emperor, who placed at his disposal his remarkable knowledge of political currents at Prague. Count Dürckheim introduced Schäffle, to whose talents Count Eugen Kinsky had several times referred in conversation with the Emperor.

Albert Schäffle was a South German, who in his student days at Tübingen University had been known as a revolutionary and an agitator. Later he took to theology, and was for some time a lecturer on that subject, but passed over to journalism, and was for five years a member of the staff of the *Schwäbische Merkur*. Having made a name as a politician and economist, he obtained a Professorial Chair at Tübingen, and had already



twice been invited to transfer his residence to Austria—once in the days of Bach, and a second time during the régime of Schmerling—before he finally acquiesced in 1866 and became a Professor at the University of Vienna. He was already known for a voluminous historical work and a number of distinguished scientific works when he began to lecture on political economy at Vienna, side by side with Lorenz von Stein. He then attained the highest pinnacle in a professional career that was possible for a Swabian Protestant in Catholic Vienna. Yet seldom has so distinguished a man been so severely misjudged by public opinion. It was his misfortune to arrive as advocate of social reform and universal suffrage in Vienna at a time when Liberalism was the sole prevailing political and economic doctrine, at the service of which stood a Press ready to descend heavily, not only upon every opponent, but even upon anyone who ventured a criticism against the youthful excesses of the capitalist system. Schäffle notes in his *Memoirs*, ‘Among those Conservatives who were most savagely maligned I discovered distinguished men, while many of the Liberal idols of the Parliamentarians were besmirched with corruption. I discovered, moreover, that the so-called inferior races whom it was the fashion to deride could produce a far higher culture, and far more talented and interesting personalities, than I had supposed possible.’ Schäffle was at that time lecturing at the Vienna Society for Political Economy. ‘I glossed over nothing,’ he recalls. ‘I made no secret of my conviction that a purely Liberal and individualistic form of society, or, as I first christened it, a purely capitalist order, could not survive. My thoughts and feelings had been greatly influenced by the spectacle of misery in the industrial suburbs which I had seen with my own eyes, while the graves in the Schmelz<sup>1</sup> had made a fearful impression upon me.’

It was at this society’s meetings that Schäffle had met Count Eugen Kinsky, the most intelligent member of the nobility, who had interested himself in modern finance; and it was through Kinsky that Schäffle came to the Emperor’s attention. Schäffle owed also his acquaintanceship with Count Dürckheim

<sup>1</sup> A suburban area where there had been various conflicts between insurgents and troops.—*Translator’s note.*

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to the Society for Political Economy, which was at that time the meeting-place where men of science, politicians, and such business men as were interested in the problems of the time, exchanged opinions.

In the summer of 1870, Schäffle was staying at Rohrschach when he received a telegram from Durckheim asking him to come to Vienna, because there was an important movement afoot for bringing about a settlement with the Czechs. There was a meeting at the house of Habietinek, a university colleague of Schäffle, who lectured in civil law at Vienna. The meeting was attended by Count Hohenwart, Baron Helfert, von Beck, Schäffle, Dürckheim, and Habietinek. The basis of discussion was supplied by a memorial from the pen of Count Clam-Martinitz, which Helfert had obtained in the course of a visit to Bohemia to which the Emperor had given his approval. Helfert had let it be known in Prague that the Emperor was ready to fulfil certain wishes of the Czechs, that he would appoint a Cabinet which would recognize the equality of the races, and would include a Minister for Bohemia and Moravia who should be a native of those provinces. Further, the Emperor would consent to be crowned King of Bohemia at Prague. There had been a meeting at Pardubitz between Helfert and Habietinek on the one side, Count Clam-Martinitz and Dr. Rieger on the other, but for the time being no definite results were achieved, either at this meeting or at a later one held at Smetschna.

On October 24th, the Emperor summoned Schäffle, who records the occasion as follows: 'The Emperor received me in an intimate fashion, thanking me for my good offices, of which he had been informed by Dürckheim and Potocki. He then asked my views on the situation, and on the best means of remedying it.' Schäffle, in reply, delivered an address of almost two hours' duration. 'Without any disguise, I pointed out the deplorable and unnatural consequences of a concentration of power in the hands of a Parliamentary minority from which whole races and classes were excluded. I explained to him that the domination of this minority signified, in truth, domination of the big capitalists, with the support of the professors of Liberalism. It was the rule of money dressed up in intellectual garb by Liberal civil servants, lawyers, writers, and professors.'

Schäffle advised the Emperor to make a breach in the power of the Liberal bourgeoisie by introducing universal suffrage, reconciling the Czechs by concessions to the desire for national autonomy, and placing the principle of racial equality on a constitutional basis. Five days later, on October 29th, 1870, Schäffle was summoned from the university by one of the Emperor's aides-de-camp. Francis Joseph asked him whether in his view Hohenwart was a strong enough man to form a Government to carry out a policy such as he had outlined on October 24th. Schäffle answered affirmatively, and thereupon was commissioned to join Hohenwart in forming such a Government. As he left, the Emperor remarked to him, 'I cannot continue deceiving my Peoples.'

Never had an Austrian Government been so badly received by the public opinion of Vienna as was this one. If unkind words could kill, this Government would not have survived the day of its birth. On February 7th, 1871, one of the most fashionable balls of Vienna was held under the auspices of the 'Concordia' Journalists' Association. All Vienna celebrities, whether by birth, by intelligence, or by wealth, met there. High officials and politicians in the most casual manner addressed every unknown person they encountered as 'Your Excellency.' The explanation was given that nobody could possibly tell whether the unknown person were not one of the new Ministers. Even Potocki, who had not officially left his post, took part in these pranks, asking the journalists who surrounded him, 'Well, have you discovered Jiracek yet?' The newspapers asked their readers to excuse them if they could not yet print the names of the new Ministers properly, remarking that their presses did not contain sufficient characters with Slav accents. The drawing-rooms christened the new Ministry 'The Carnival Cabinet,' and the cabmen's shelters christened it 'The Prohaska Ministry.' The Press organs of the German Constitutional Party thundered against this 'crime against Germanism and liberty.' In exaggerated language they wrote that 'while Belcredi had used rods only against the Germans of Austria, they were now to be chastized with scorpions.'

It was not the fault of Hohenwart and Schäffle if the new Government was greeted favourably by the Ultramontanes, the

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autonomists, and the reactionaries of all colours. It was rather, at any rate in part, the fault of the German Liberals, whom class prejudice prevented from understanding the problem of the races. They should have made it their task to liberate the movement for racial autonomy and equality from the romantic disguise in which the nobility had enveloped it. Universal suffrage, as Schäffle had recommended it to the Emperor, could have brought these racial aspirations into harmony with contemporary democracy. The Peoples could not be satisfied by the offer of a greater measure of political liberty as advanced by the Liberals. The blindness of the Liberal régime to their national aspirations goaded them into enmity against it, and made of them, against their will, allies of the nobility and the Church.

It would be unjust at such a turning-point of history to expect Francis Joseph to be more progressive than men like Herbst, Kaiserfeld, Unger, Glaser, and Lasser. A direct appeal to the Peoples through the mechanism of universal suffrage must needs have seemed to him an alarmingly risky proceeding, all the more so since there were no popular parties in existence which had put forward such a demand in their programmes. Schäffle's programme appealed to his intelligence as offering a way out of the blind alley of Liberalism on to the open ground of national aspirations. But in practice it was soon shown to be impossible to rule against the will of the German Liberals so long as the most powerful political element in the Empire stood behind them—and that element was Hungary.

A programme of concessions to the Slavs could not please the Hungarians, for it entailed the risk that the Slavs of Hungary would make similar demands. Herbst proclaimed in thundering tones in the Reichsrat that the first period of reaction had concluded at Solferino, the second at Königgrätz, and that the third could not last long. But Andrassy, in quieter and much more effective style, began to combat the new Government. It was in vain that Hohenwart insisted that the hostility he aroused was due only to 'imaginary intentions ascribed to the Ministry, nebulous anxieties, and even sensational articles in the newspapers.' The 'Hohenwart Peril' aroused alarm even abroad, for General Schweinitz wrote to Bismarck that 'the Govern-

ment's Federalist programme could not be reconciled with the existing system in Hungary.'

In August 1871 there was a meeting between Francis Joseph and the German Emperor William I at Ischl. Francis Joseph remarked that the German Constitutional Party was causing him much inconvenience. The Emperor William replied that the German-Austrians would cease to look piningly at Germany as soon as their real needs were recognized. The Imperial decree dissolving all the Diets, first and foremost those of the German provinces which had proclaimed their adherence to the Constitution, was published during the meeting of the Emperors at Ischl. The Imperial proclamation which excluded Bohemia from the framework of the existing Constitution, and promised it a special constitutional régime, was published during the subsequent interview at Salzburg. Inevitably the anti-German supporters of the new policy described the meeting as 'a polite demonstration,' declaring that the Emperor's real intention not to countenance interference from Berlin was revealed by the circumstances which accompanied it. When Francis Joseph appended his signature to the dissolution of the Bohemian Diet on September 12th, 1871, the *Narodní Listy*, organ of the young Czechs, wrote that the creation of the Bohemian State on the border of Prussia was 'an answer to the restoration of the German Empire.' The most important sentence in Francis Joseph's proclamation ran, 'Remembering the unshakable faith with which the population of Bohemia has always supported our throne, We gladly recognize the rights of this kingdom, and are ready to renew this recognition by a coronation oath.' This sentence was a solemn endorsement of the national aspirations of the Czechs for a revival of their historic State. From that date it remained a moving force in Czech policy which did not cease to be effective until Austrian history had come to an end and peace had been signed at Versailles.

In its attempt to reach a settlement with the Czechs the Government had constantly the example of the Hungarian settlement before its eyes. The Government and the Czech leaders had jointly established, in a document known as the 'Fundamental Articles,' the limits of the political autonomy which was to be enjoyed by the Bohemian provinces. Bohemia

in these articles, recognized the Hungarian settlement, but demanded that the Bohemian Delegates should be nominated directly by the Bohemian Diets. As in the case of Hungary, Bohemia's contribution to the Imperial budget was to be fixed at a definite proportion. Direct taxation, education, civil and criminal law, the territorial army, roads, railways, police, and internal administration were all to come under the sole competence of the Bohemian Diet. Schaffle for many years defended the 'Fundamental Articles' with the argument that, if they had been carried out, Austria would have become 'an incomparably closer-knit unit than the German Empire or Switzerland, or the United States of America, ever were or now are.' Seen in their historical perspective, the 'Fundamental Articles' certainly do not appear so terrifying as they did in those days to all the Germans in Austria. Their defect lay in the excessive privileges they accorded to the nobility. The big landowners were the real masters both in German Austria and in Bohemia. This fact made it impossible to compound a juridical settlement which could maintain the national rights of the Germans within an autonomous Bohemia.

In this serious attempt to extract the problem of the races of the Austrian Empire from the slough in which it had fallen, the Emperor stood above considerations of class interest. Schaffle also, by reason of his foreign origin, was consciously actuated by the desire for a settlement in accordance with political morality and reason. But the Czech question, and the question of the other suppressed but no longer silent races, could not now be tackled as in 1848. They were now complicated by the internal struggle of the classes. As he had done in the case of Hungary, so in the case of Bohemia, Francis Joseph sought to establish the relation of his dynasty to the Nations by peaceful means and by concessions of political autonomy. But the Empire was no longer simply a domain of the Hapsburg family. Hungary and the German bourgeoisie had both become active forces, which interfered in the relations between the Crown and the Czechs. Nor was there any possibility of an understanding between the Czech people and the German people. The Bohemian nobility had other interests than the German bourgeoisie, but both were out to maintain their privileges against the broad

masses of the people. The Bohemian nobility diverted the Czech national movement along the path of a romantic aspiration for political independence. The German bourgeoisie used the Centralist Constitution to disguise and to protect their privileges. Hohenwart and Schäffle attempted the impossible task of pleading the cause of pure reason and pure political morality in this conflict. Young Prince Adolf Schwarzenberg reduced the problem to its simplest terms with the question : 'Why should the Hungarians have more than we have ? Why should we let ourselves be ruled by Viennese lawyers ?' The 'Viennese lawyers' would certainly have been defeated in this struggle with the Bohemian feudal nobility had not an alliance with the Hungarians made them the stronger party.

The dissolution of the Diets, and the publication of the 'Fundamental Articles,' provoked turbulent opposition among all the Germans in Austria, and led to angry demonstrations in the German towns. When the new rector of the University of Vienna, Baron Hye, was installed in his office, Jirecek, the Minister of Education, was chased out of the building. It was an added scandal that Beust, who took part in the ceremony, was received with loud cheers, and made no attempt to restrain the demonstrators. Baron Orczy describes, in a letter to his mother, the Emperor's resentment : 'The Emperor fell into a violent temper. All the morning nobody could come near his study, while he walked up and down, talking loudly to himself. The Emperor has never been seen in such a fury.' At this moment, Beust resolved to lay before the Emperor, in a long memorial, his view that a continuation of the policy of Hohenwart and Schäffle would lead to serious danger. It was no safe project upon which Beust was embarking, and he wished first to be sure of Andrassy's assistance. But Andrassy hesitated, for at his last conversation with the Emperor he had found him wholly disinclined to get rid of Hohenwart. Baron Orczy relates : 'Hardly had the first word been spoken about the dangers of the Hohenwart policy when the Emperor turned away and sharply broke off the conversation.' For the moment, Andrassy could not be persuaded to give his aid, and therefore Beust resolved to act alone, placing upon the Emperor's table

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the memorial in which he had summed up his objections to Hohenwart and Schaffle.

It is uncertain how Francis Joseph would have taken this memorial had not an event at this time occurred which made a deep impression upon him. On October 8th, 1871, an insurrection broke out on the military frontier aiming at severance of the South Slav provinces from the Hapsburg monarchy. The plan was to create a new 'Illyrian State' out of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Carinthia, with inclusion of Istria and the Slav portions of Styria, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. The General in command at Agram, General Mollinary, took immediate action, and was able on October 11th to announce to the Emperor that the agitation was entirely suppressed. But from that moment Francis Joseph did not feel safe. He himself summoned Andrassy. Before the audience, Andrassy called on Beust and reproached him for his share in the blame for the present dangerous situation. According to Andrassy, Beust had only declared that Hohenwart's policy was dangerous because he had desired himself to bring about a settlement with the Czechs, and disliked seeing the merit acquired by another.

The Emperor received Andrassy on October 17th, declaring that he thought a compromise should be possible. On October 19th they had a conversation of two hours' duration, in which Andrassy attempted to persuade the Emperor that compromise in this case was impossible. Rightly or wrongly, he blamed Schaffle for the unfortunate situation, declaring 'Schaffle will use any methods so long as they serve against Prussia; to this end he will make use of clerical, nationalist, or socialist forces.' Andrassy's arguments, it will be seen, were advanced in language worthy of a demagogue. But Francis Joseph did not yet accept them as decisive. He urged that Andrassy and Hohenwart should argue the matter out in his own presence, so that he himself might form an estimate of the respective value of their arguments. Andrassy left the Palace with the impression that Hohenwart was 'consummately pig-headed.' In the letter he wrote to his wife he complains, 'I am tired, and my head is aching.'

The next day there was a Crown Council, which lasted from midday till six in the evening. Andrassy arraigned Hohenwart



and Schäffle, declaring that it was frivolous and dangerous to overthrow a Constitution which had only just begun working.

Andrássy now, having subjected the 'Fundamental Articles' to a thorough and detailed examination, advised that there should be no reforms beyond what were absolutely necessary. Naturally Andrássy called attention to the reactions which the Czech Separatist aspirations would produce in Hungary. But the point of his criticism which most closely touched the Emperor was his argument that it was not permissible to bring the Emperor's person into the foreground and to put a political construction on his words. He declared that, in deference to monarchical and constitutional principles, the person of the monarch must be covered by his responsible Ministers. Hohenwart and Schäffle defended their projects, and proclaimed the purity of their intentions. Both of them reiterated the conviction that the Liberal and Centralist method could not work in the Empire of many Nations.

All participants were exhausted when the meeting drew to an end. The Emperor reached no decision. Beyond doubt it was extremely painful to him to have to drop the plan of reconciliation with Bohemia. The change came on October 21st, when the Emperor summoned Andrássy and Hohenwart once more to his presence, and asked to hear all arguments on either side over again. 'How,' Andrássy asked Count Hohenwart, 'do you propose realizing your Bohemian autonomy project?' Hereupon the Emperor suddenly interrupted the discussion, which both Ministers took as a hint that they should depart. Immediately afterwards Francis Joseph summoned Andrássy to his study. His manner was relaxed after the long nervous strain, and very serious. Andrássy had to repeat his complaints against Hohenwart. 'I have never understood Count Beust's arguments,' said the Emperor, 'but I can understand you, and it is for your sake that I have reached this decision.'

The policy of Hohenwart and Schäffle was now defeated. On October 22nd the Emperor conveyed this decision to Hohenwart, who, deeply incensed, went out and passed by Beust and Andrássy without saluting them. The Czech leaders, Clam-Martinitz, Rieger, and Pražak, were called to Vienna. They informed the Emperor that the Czechs would

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in no circumstances take their place in the Reichsrat before Czech autonomy was conceded, and warned him that if the settlement were abandoned there would be no hope of ever reviving it.

There was great embitterment in Prague ; but Vienna and German Austria rejoiced. At a representation of *Lohengrin* at the Vienna Opera, prolonged and enthusiastic applause greeted the words : 'The German sword for Germany to save the Empire's cause.' The Emperor was deeply annoyed.

On October 23rd, Schäffle handed in his resignation. Francis Joseph, in great excitement, protested : 'An isolated resignation is a breach of duty.' When Hohenwart offered his resignation on October 25th, the Emperor declared : 'This is a great blow for me.' The retiring Government refused to take responsibility for the new Imperial Proclamation to the Czechs. Francis Joseph insisted, for he did not wish that it should appear that he had frustrated the projected settlement with the Czech nation. In his Proclamation he did not refuse all the Czech demands straight out, but only contested isolated points, and, above all, rejected the demand that the existing Constitution should be suspended until the Czech demands were fulfilled. On Schäffle's advice, Hohenwart maintained his refusal, and when, on October 30th, the two Ministers were relieved of their offices, Hohenwart remarked to Schäffle : 'His Majesty would have liked to stick to us.' The Proclamation was now signed by Finance Minister Holzgethan and by the permanent Under-Secretary, and appeared in modified form. Thus ended one of the most remarkable chapters in Francis Joseph's reign.

## CHAPTER XIX

### ALLIANCE WITH GERMANY

THE year 1871 was one of the most significant in the life of Francis Joseph. In its course the last shadow of desire to avenge the defeat of 1866 disappeared, and the attempt to reach a settlement with the Czechs was finally abandoned. The formation of the new German Empire necessitated a change of thought and of sentiment. It was with bitterness in his heart that Francis Joseph had renounced the memory of his family's primacy in Germany. Now that belonged to the past, and did not Beust, perhaps, also belong there? Francis Joseph had a way of resolving crises by means of sudden decisions and of putting an end to unsuccessful ventures with the same speed. This has been explained as a consequence of his liking for official correctness, but the explanation is insufficient. Looking back to-day, one can see that the motive lay in his desire to rid himself of unhappy images and sentiments. Beust's nomination had been coupled with certain conscious and subconscious hopes and expectations, while his activities from 1866 to 1870 had been a trial with reference to the future. Now he and his works belonged to the past.

Partly in consequence of his own private feelings, and partly in obedience to circumstances, Francis Joseph was desirous of putting an end to this chapter. As the single fruit of the efforts of the last four years the Hungarian settlement stood firm and solid. All else had failed. Beust's vision of high politics had been proved false, the settlement at Prague had fallen through, and Beust himself, who had first encouraged and furthered the project, killed it with his memorial. The parting from Beust was painful to Francis Joseph, but the Imperial Chancellor needs must have lost his position even if the Bohemian nobility and Rieger, as well as Czech public opinion, smarting from the defeat, had not demanded the head of the Saxon as a sacrificial offering, seeing in him, somewhat unjustly, the author of their defeat. Beust himself noticed that after Hohenwart's retirement the Emperor, against his previous cus-

tom, no more summoned him. The two had grown apart. Beust still hoped and attempted to play the part of spontaneous counsellor to the monarch in the task of appointing a new Ministry. He had his eye on some such General as Mertens, Gablenz, Koller, or Edelsheim as a suitable head of the new Government. He also considered recommending the Emperor to choose Unger or Stremayr or Pretis. But Francis Joseph listened to him 'with an indifference' (it is recorded) 'which made Beust's blood run cold in his veins.' The Emperor's frigid manner constrained Beust to say that 'the Emperor evidently felt no more need of his services.' Francis Joseph remained silent, and the next day, on November 5th, 1871, Beust handed in his resignation. 'The Emperor,' he himself related, 'listened to me coldly.' He only asked Beust to wait a few days before handing in his resignation, for he had not yet spoken to the man whom he contemplated summoning to fill his place—Andrássy. On November 8th, Andrássy arrived in Vienna and accepted the Emperor's offer that he should take on the conduct of foreign affairs.

Andrássy was now more than the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was the Emperor's true counsellor and helper. The Emperor summoned him as the one man from whom he could hope for profitable suggestions. The choice cannot be wondered at, for, out of the whole circle of possible Ministers, Andrássy was the only one whose advice had so far been fortunate. At the decisive moment in 1867 he had shown the Emperor the way to a reconciliation with Hungary, and as Hungarian Prime Minister he had performed what he had promised. After Solferino and Königgrätz, Hungary had played the decisive part in making up Francis Joseph's mind for him, and now she was to do so once more. Hungary owed this political influence to the stubbornness and the superior political instinct of her leaders. It was this which made Hungary triumph over the Emperor's despotic instinct. The Emperor allowed himself to be converted and convinced, and now he had lost his fears. Andrássy, on his side, went to Vienna with so unclouded a mind that he could remark that he might as well leave his eleven-year-old son behind him as Prime Minister of Hungary.

There is no need to seek for any mysterious origins to explain the change which now came over the Emperor, and brought him to approve a totally new line of foreign policy, and to accept once again the principle of German Liberal rule in Austria. The change was due to Francis Joseph's confidence in Andrassy. Having finally given up the idea of vengeance against Prussia, Francis Joseph turned over a new and unwritten leaf in foreign policy which called for an idea and a programme to be inscribed upon it.

There were three unchanging factors to be remembered ; Austria's interest in the Balkans ; her relationship to Russia ; and her desire to retain the sympathy of England. But a fresh consideration, which provoked new thoughts and necessitated new decisions, was the change in Germany. Francis Joseph accepted in this matter the judgement and the policy of Andrassy, whose outlook and opinion now formed the basis of the foreign policy of the Empire ; nor of it only, for Andrassy also provoked changes in the interior policy of Austria. Great must have been the faith of Francis Joseph in his counsellor which could induce him to abandon two favourite ideas. So intensely had he desired a reconciliation with the Czechs that he had promised Bohemian autonomy and accepted the 'Fundamental Articles.' He disliked the idea of having to govern with the help of the German Constitutional Party, from whom he could expect no help in the solution of the racial problem, but much hindrance to his plans for the construction of the army. If Francis Joseph once more embraced the Liberal régime, this was in obedience to Andrassy's advice.

Andrassy's feeling for Hungary and for the Dual System made it impossible for him to advocate any federal experiment. He clung to his old conviction that it would be best for Hungary and the Empire if Hungarian domination in one half of the monarchy were balanced by German Centralist domination in Austria. Thus it was not to Francis Joseph's own instinct, but to Andrassy and to the power of the Hungarian arguments, that the Liberals owed their revival. Strange, indeed, in these circumstances is the failure of the Austrian Germans to understand Andrassy. It was natural that the Federalists, the Bohemian nobility, and the feudal and clerical circles in Vienna,

should let him feel their hostility, but the Vienna Liberal Press was not behind them in such efforts. This hostility cannot be explained simply by the sympathy felt for Beust by a Press which he had largely created. The fact was that the German Liberals could not understand that Hungary was their one support. They could not shake off opinions derived from the Centralist school of Bach, but saw the autonomy of the Hungarian State still as an impediment to their own power.

Criticism was not silenced when Andrassy, soon after taking over his new task, gave plain indications of the course he intended to pursue. He succeeded in persuading Prince Auersperg's brother, Adolf, to form a new Government, and, together with the Emperor and the new Prime Minister, drew up a programme on the basis of no tampering with the Constitution, no experiments in granting autonomy, and respect of the Reichsrat as Parliament of all the Crown Territories. On November 26th, 1871, the new Cabinet was formed, with the collaboration of Lasser, Glaser, Unger, and Stremayr. Andrassy could now tackle his proper task, which he began with a circular to the Foreign Offices of Europe, declaring for an open and peaceful policy, and containing the assurance that Austria-Hungary 'had no desire to increase her territory,' but only sought to strengthen the position of the monarchy at home. One of Andrassy's first acts was to recall Metternich from the Paris Embassy. This was designed to throw clear light upon the breach between Beust's policy, which had relied greatly upon Napoleon's friendship, and the policy of Andrassy. He reached an understanding with England that an alliance between Germany and Russia must be prevented, and as a means of prevention he pursued the way of an understanding with Germany.

As he had won over Francis Joseph, Andrassy equally quickly gained the confidence of Bismarck. He now proceeded to exploit the advantage which accrued to Austria from the defeat of France. Germany had to bear the burden of the enmity of France, and her tenure of Alsace-Lorraine compelled her to hold fast to Austria. Russia observed this intimacy with jealous eyes, for thereby one of the main elements of her predominance—namely, the antagonism between Prussia and Austria—was annulled.

As England's rival, Russia could find no other ally than Germany, for France's impotence rendered her useless. She therefore attempted to attain better relations with Austria in order that her friendship with Germany might not be disturbed. 'For my part,' remarked Gorchakov, the Russian Chancellor in 1871, 'I am in no way prejudiced against Count Andrassy. Let us wait and see him in action, and, if he stretches out the hand of friendship, we ask nothing better than to be able to grasp it.'

Such affirmations were soon backed up by proofs of their sincerity. In the beginning of July 1872, an Archduke visited Petersburg for the first time since the death of Nicholas I, in order to salute Alexander II for Francis Joseph. Before the Archduke departed for Russia, Francis Joseph had intended to visit William I in Berlin as a demonstration that he had now made up his mind to accept the latest chapter in German history. But on May 28th, 1872, the Emperor's mother died, and the visit was delayed by Court mourning. The intended meeting of the two Emperors later quite unexpectedly developed into a meeting of the three.

Francis Joseph was well contented with the results of the journeys, which had confirmed his peaceful relations on both sides—that is, towards Germany and towards Russia. Andrassy's reputation was thereby strengthened, not only in the Emperor's eyes, but also in those of the parties who now modified the tone of their opposition in the Joint Assembly of the 'delegations.' Giskra asked Count Andrassy somewhat ironically what was in truth 'the problem to be solved by our mastery of the art of politics.' Andrassy replied: 'The aims of Austro-Hungarian policy are first to be able to say to the peasant: Sow your seeds without anxiety; they are not going to be ravaged. Secondly, to be able to say to the town: Build your houses; they are not going to be destroyed. Thirdly, to be able to say to the whole population: Your sacrifices will serve the cause of peace.' In the Joint Assembly, Andrassy carried the project for three-year military service and for increase of the armed forces, against the opposition of the Liberals, including Herbst, Rechbauer, Giskra, and Brestl.

This was Francis Joseph's most sensitive point. From the first days of Austrian Parliamentary Government to the end of

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his life the Emperor felt resistance against military projects, criticism of the army, and the assertion of constitutional rights against the demands of a Minister of War, to be an affront to his person, his family, and the authority of the monarchy. The tragedy of the Austrian Liberal Party, which led to its final collapse, was that, faced by a choice between principle and tactics, it chose to remain true to principle, and rejected the tactics of indulging the Emperor's will. All subsequent critics of the German Liberals have accused them of being so far devoted to principle that they lost their eye for practical politics, and with it their capacity for government. Bismarck, who christened them 'fruitless flowers,' was among these critics. Yet it was not delight in opposition for its own sake which kept the Liberals so firmly to their principles. Whatever may be said about Herbst, Giskra, and Rechbauer, it must be acknowledged that they were true heirs of classical Liberalism when they objected to armaments, and defended the right of financial control, even over the military budget, as their most valued privilege. Their mistake was that they over-estimated the powers of the German bourgeoisie, and further diminished that power by the narrow attitude which they adopted towards the aspirations of other races and classes. Francis Joseph let the Liberals rule because, in his view, a Parliamentary Government was the necessary consequence of the Dual System, but he expected the Liberal Government to bow to his interpretation of the supreme needs of the State. He could not understand how the Germans could go into opposition at a moment when both home and foreign policy were following a pro-German line. Still less could he understand the objections of the Liberal Centre, voiced by Schmerling in his celebrated speech at the Concordia Journalists' Club. On that occasion this most eminent representative of the Austrian Old Liberals spoke against the reconciliation of Germany, against Austria's withdrawal from her pre-eminent position in Germany, and against the Dual System. Such a degree of misunderstanding could only be termed tragic blindness. This statesman from the days of the Emperor Francis could no longer understand the times.

The Liberals suffered under a second misfortune. They were advocates of strong Central Government and of intellectual



progress, but as representatives of the class which had made the greatest economic progress—that is, the German bourgeoisie—they had to bear the blame for, and the brunt of, all the misfortunes of the years in which capitalism was put to the test.

The Vienna World Exhibition had just demonstrated the remarkable degree of prosperity to which Austria had attained, and had directed attention to the charming beauty of the growing Imperial capital, when suddenly, at one blow, the deceptive façade of prosperity collapsed. 'The Börsenring was gay with the painted villages of Potemkin,' wrote Daniel Spitzer, in bitter scorn. 'Gaming masqueraded as work, sharp practice as progress, premium as wealth. "Come, come," cried the prophets of rejuvenated Austria, "visit our World Exhibition, observe our brilliance and our magnificence, see how we—work." The guests arrived full of curiosity, and were received in the desolate home of the ruined gamester.'

The 'great panic' of 1873 was the introduction to a general crisis which, beginning in Vienna, extended the same year to Italy, Russia, and North America, Germany, England, Holland, and Belgium, and even had reactions in South America and Australia—a veritable world economic crisis. It was not mere chance that it began in Vienna; this was the point of least resistance, where, moreover, the manoeuvres of the company promoters to utilize the power of Parliament for their own ends were countenanced, if not positively furthered, by the Government. Indeed, there were many points of contact between the promoters and the dominating parliamentary clique. Out of 167 members of the Vienna Parliament, the total number, after deduction of the mandates held by absentee Slav members, 46 held positions in business enterprises. In all 125 of such positions were held by members, so that there were 3 directorships held by every 4 Members of Parliament. The 18 members from lower Austria included 12 directors holding 38 directorships. In the House of Peers matters were no better, in consequence of repeated creations. No wonder if a Radical newspaper wrote: 'All the registered companies are linked together by a single aim in politics, which is to obtain for themselves political and economic pre-eminence. That is the only explanation of recent events.'

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The relation between speculation and politics was thrown into clear relief by the trial of the banker Ofenheim, who held the title Ritter von Pontouxin. In this trial Giskra was obliged to confess that he had accepted 100,000 gulden. He defended himself with the remark that it was customary in Austria not to scorn tips, a defence which became famous under the name of *die Trinkgeldtheorie*. The *Austrian Economist*, a review conducted by a Liberal Centralist, Sommersfeld, summed up the case as follows: 'The avalanche comes from three glaciers. First there are the bribes handed out to Parliament, next the unearned profits of the landlords, and thirdly the pillagings of buccaneers. Concessions were bought or begged in the House of Deputies. The Stock Exchange skimmed off the cream of the profit, and those supposed to be in charge of the public interests levied charges for their good offices.' Ofenheim was, however, as Schäffle bears witness, 'by no means the worst.' The Liberal Press of that time argued that he was chosen as scapegoat from a number of much worse goats than himself. This was more or less correct. What Ofenheim said of Schäffle reveals his own and his friends' mentality: 'Either the Minister of Commerce is an ass standing by the manger and not himself eating, or else such a deep rascal that even we can't see what he's up to.' Schäffle, to whom these pleasant remarks were recounted, did not revenge himself on Ofenheim on their account, but even took counsel with him in selecting those of the candidates who should receive concessions.

On May 1st, 1873, Francis Joseph had opened the World Exhibition without any idea that the foundation was not solid. The crisis was distressing for Vienna, but the programme of the receptions and visits which had been arranged in connection with the Exhibition could not be modified. Foremost among the guests whom Francis Joseph had invited to Vienna were the Emperor William and the Tsar Alexander II. It had been the Tsar's desire to be able to receive Francis Joseph at Petersburg before he visited Vienna, a desire which was shared by those persons in the Austrian Court who esteemed friendship with Russia more desirable than a good understanding with Germany. But Andrassy persuaded the Emperor not to fulfil the Tsar's wish, and an adequate excuse was found in the marriage

of Francis Joseph's eldest daughter, the Archduchess Gisela. The Tsar arrived together with Gorchakov, though this escort had not originally been envisaged. Bismarck had suggested to the Tsar that a direct conversation with the Vienna Government would be desirable, and, after the Archduke Albert had assured Alexander that Francis Joseph agreed to the proposal, the Tsar invited the Emperor to speak openly. General Schweinitz, German Ambassador to Vienna, learnt from Alexander himself that Francis Joseph had fully made up his mind to the turn of events, and desired to co-operate with Germany. Francis Joseph had declared that the heavy blows of fate and the pain they had caused him were still uppermost in his memory, but that they had no bearing upon his present policy. He had firmly decided to go forward on the path he had chosen.

The fruit of the Tsar's visit was a written agreement in which both monarchs declared that they would exchange views in the interests of peace, even supposing the interests of their respective countries should come into conflict. As a concession to the Tsar, and one which was not in accordance with the spirit of the new times, a sentence was added pledging the signatories to joint action against any attempted revolution. This document, initialled on June 6th, 1873, by Francis Joseph I and Alexander II, was brought to the notice of Berlin. It did not supplant the Treaty of Insurance of the previous May, but gave it a new significance.

Meanwhile, the visit of William I had to be put off in consequence of a slight heart-attack. It was therefore decided that the Empress Augusta should come to Vienna in place of the sick Emperor. She arrived on June 25th in the Imperial city. Her visit is remembered for a great garden-party which was given in her honour at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that time Kaunitz's baroque palace adjoined the so-called Lion Bastion, and was surrounded by a park in the middle of which stood the 'Metternich Lime-Tree' (the summer workroom of the Chancellor).

A few weeks later, on September 20th, 1873, the anniversary of the capture of Rome by the Italians, the Garrison of Vienna paraded before Victor Emmanuel II. Francis Joseph received his former enemy with all possible honours. Italy at that time

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had more than one reason to desire co-operation with the Empire. The spectre of a clerical monarchy in France, which might endanger Italy's position in the former ecclesiastical States, was not yet laid. Bismarck's struggle against the Vatican indicated him as a natural ally, and, finally, the young Italian monarchy wished to protect itself against republican movements. From Vienna, Victor Emmanuel passed on to Berlin, but the time was not yet ripe for the conclusion of an alliance.

On October 17th, the Emperor William arrived in Vienna accompanied by Bismarck, who had had no small difficulty in overcoming that shyness which he said altogether unmanned him.

The Emperor William's visit concluded harmoniously, although, as was apt to happen in that age of private diplomacy, currents of opinion in the Court, and personal likes or dislikes of the monarch, sometimes a single word, could produce an important effect on the political position. The emphatic toasts which were pronounced at the official dinner at the Hofburg were hardly ended when the atmosphere was disturbed. A journey of Francis Joseph to Petersburg had been planned as the final act which should seal the new friendship of the three Emperors. But at this very moment Andrassy let fall in front of Gorchakov words which caused Bismarck quite naturally to fear for the success of his whole plan for winning Austria's confidence. Whether it was that Andrassy had come round to voicing the views of the party of the Archduke Albert, or that he was revealing the innermost thoughts of Francis Joseph, the sense of his argument, anyway, was that Austria specially needed to maintain an understanding with Russia because of the danger that Germany might some day try to attract the Germans of Austria by holding up to them the ideal of national unity. Bismarck was surprised and disturbed, and actually thought it necessary to send a lengthy telegram explaining once more, clearly and in detail, his whole attitude towards Austria. Francis Joseph's sojourn in Petersburg in 1874 took place under the shadow of this incident, but personal considerations of another order this time produced an effect upon policy. Francis Joseph was well aware that Alexander II at heart intensely disliked him. The

Tsar had in 1860 actually boasted that he had not replied to an autograph letter of the Austrian Emperor. The reason of this dislike was said to be that Alexander II could not forget the injury inflicted upon his father in 1854. Francis Joseph, immediately upon arrival in Petersburg, drove to the tomb of Nicholas I, and left a wreath of flowers upon it. This act of piety produced a deep impression upon Alexander, whose attitude from that moment underwent a profound change. Alexander and Gorchakov were enthusiastic over the result of the Petersburg interview, and Francis Joseph, as well as Andr ssy, expressed equal satisfaction.

Thus all seemed to have changed for the better. Continual unrest and haphazard expedients had made way for a clear policy directed towards a single end. Secret rancours no longer dominated foreign policy, while at home the return to constitutional ways had discouraged new agitations, and produced an atmosphere of calm.

The credit for this turn of events was generally given to Andr ssy, but matters must have gone otherwise had not the Emperor kept a perfectly clear head. During this period he showed manifest and unbroken confidence in his counsellor, and the policy which he sanctioned was logical and simple ; yet never perhaps before had the Emperor had to overcome such resistances both in his own heart and in his environment. The situation was profoundly different from that of 1871. He was now friends with Germany, Russia, and Italy. The opponents of his policy were the Pope and the feudal and clerical nobility. The Emperor was now looked upon askance as a faithless son of the Church, a traitor to old traditions, who had allied himself to the worst enemies of the Vatican. The Vatican could not understand how it was that Bismarck, during the culminating period of his fight against the Catholics in Germany, could rely upon Austria's support. Nor could it understand the reception given to Victor Emmanuel in the Palace of Vienna. Still less could it understand the Emperor's behaviour towards its 'most faithful children,' the clerical nobility and their supporters in the countryside.

In vain the Pope declared the Liberal Constitution to be mistaken and reprehensible. Now, in his encyclical of March 7th,

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1874, he objected in still stronger language to the outrageous spirit inspiring the new religious legislation of Austria. 'These laws,' declared the Pope, 'subject the Church in deplorable manner to the tyranny of the State. They are subversive of Catholic discipline ; they encourage disloyalty to the Church ; they awaken the spirit of conspiracy and fanaticism against the true Christian faith.' With his own hand Pius IX wrote to the Emperor bidding him consider whether it was compatible with the conscience of a true Catholic 'to submit the Church to a dishonourable enslavement, and to occasion deep scandal to the Catholic subjects of the Empire.' The Pope even went so far as to threaten the Emperor with excommunication should he sanction the laws. The words were polite, but the meaning was quite unmistakable.

The Vatican was ill informed when it uttered this severe threat to Vienna. It had relied too much upon the reports of such nobles as Liechtenstein and Clam-Martinitz, and in the picture of the Emperor penned by Cardinal Rauscher, portraying him as a prisoner in the hands of the Liberal enemies of the Church. Francis Joseph was a Catholic, but not a clerical. In the first years of his reign, under the influence of his mother and his preceptor, Cardinal Rauscher, he had favoured the Church even to the point of surrendering sovereign rights of the State. But later he came to draw a clear distinction between the duties of a Catholic and the political demands of the Papal Church. Good Catholic though he was, yet as a true Hapsburg he esteemed his own kingship and throne no less highly than the majesty of the Holy See. This sentiment of equality between Emperor and Pope sprang from inherited dynastic pride. His cautious intelligence kept him from going too thoroughly into the concept of Divine Right. He appraised the political decisions of the Vatican with an eye both to utility and to piety. He did not forget that in 1859 the Pope had refused to bless the arms of Austria, nor did he fail to remember that the Vatican had punished the Jesuits of Vienna for imploring heaven to grant victory to the Austrian army in the war against France and Italy. The Vatican had a mistaken impression of the Emperor if it thought that it could induce him to make thorough-going changes of policy by assailing him with the haughty

language of a Papal Bull. He was not to be frightened in that way. But he would never have agreed to Bismarck's demand that he should chase the Jesuits out of Austria. That refusal was, at the moment of the great religious conflict in Germany, the chief point of dissension between Austria and Germany. Bismarck complained with some bitterness that Austria would not consider joint action against the Jesuits, though she would immediately have agreed to a joint hunt of Communists. Yet, he said, the greater danger for the authority of the State lay in the action of angry and fanatical priests on the uneducated classes. Francis Joseph judged this question very calmly, and in complete independence of his environment. 'It must be recognized,' he said, 'that the brothers of the Society of Jesus perform excellent work in educating the sons of the nobility in their college at Kalksburg. But I, personally, would not like a Jesuit for my confessor.' Once, when the name of a high official, well known as a pious Catholic, was proposed for a ministerial vacancy, Francis Joseph asked : 'Isn't he too much of a clerical ?' The question was put to some one who knew the Emperor intimately, and therefore gave the good answer. 'Before all else he is a good Austrian, and would, if necessary, imprison the whole bench of Bishops,' which pleased the Emperor so much that he accepted the proposal. Yet, if he was no clerical, Francis Joseph was a good enough Catholic to feel it to be his obvious duty not to set foot upon the 'stolen territory' of Rome when he paid his return visit to Italy early in 1875. The Emperor and Victor Emmanuel met in Venice, a meeting-place the choice of which clearly showed that Francis Joseph was capable of forgetting old scores and overcoming sentiments of wounded pride.

His confidence in Andr ssy carried him surprisingly far. Much which presented no difficulties to the Count, who was pursuing a policy born of his own ideas, cost the Emperor severe internal conflict before he could transfer his faith to alien opinions. Was Andr ssy's leadership tending in the right direction ? Doubt was rife in the Emperor's circle. In 1875 there appeared in Vienna a small volume entitled *Considerations on the Organization of the Austrian Artillery*, a pamphlet directed against the prevailing system from the standpoint that Russia

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was Austria's refuge and Germany her perilous enemy. The author of the pamphlet was the Archduke John Salvator, commander of a brigade. Of small importance in itself, the volume was remarked in Berlin, and caused displeasure. Bismarck was restless, watching the efforts of Gorchakov to bring Russia and France together. France, encouraged by Gorchakov's words to the Viscount de Gontaut-Biron, French Ambassador in Berlin, increased the number of her battalions. Gorchakov had said: 'He won't be able to make war on you again without exciting the public opinion of all Europe against himself.'

The tension was heightened by a letter from Vienna, published by the *Kölnische Zeitung*, and an article printed by the *Berlin Post* entitled 'Is War on the Horizon?' Both newspapers called attention to the designs harboured by a powerful party at the Court of Vienna and among the high aristocracy, who were waiting for a chance of joining with France in a war of revenge against Germany. The information from Vienna had been supplied by General Schweinitz, while it was the head of the Press Department in the Berlin Foreign Office, Counselor Ludwig Aegidi, who had penned both articles.

It was a journalist from Bohemia who precipitated the change which brought a sudden end to the alliance of the three Emperors, and thus made history. This was Adolf Opper, then already known by the name of von Blowitz, serving as Paris correspondent of *The Times*. In the pages of that newspaper he directed an appeal to Russia: 'It is necessary to persuade a certain Power to put an end, if not for ever at least for many years ahead, to disturbances which are perpetually troubling the peace of the world.'

Gorchakov now took advantage of the long-expected visit which he paid to Berlin in company with the Tsar to give the impression that he had restrained Germany from making war against France. Bismarck never forgave the Russian Chancellor for this humiliation. The league of the three Emperors fell to pieces. It was Austria who profited by the crisis, for now Bismarck, faced by the danger of isolation, had to cultivate Austria's friendship. This was the moment for which Andrassy had waited.

The peril of a great war was over, but now there arose the



peril of a small war. In 1875 the Christian population of Herzegovina raised the standard of revolt, and this was the first spark in a long series of struggles for racial autonomy, which, complicated by national fanaticism and religious dissensions as well as by intrigues of the Powers, continued henceforth to preoccupy and disturb the politicians of Europe, until at last they consummated in the conflagration of the World War.

It was in these months that the first links were forged in the fateful chain which held Germany firmly to Austria's side, and obliged her to bear her share in the tragedy of the south-eastern dominions of the Danubian Empire. There were already, by 1875, annexationists in Austria, notably Generals Roditsch and Mondel, the latter Francis Joseph's principal aide-de-camp, who desired immediately to conquer Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Emperor's sympathy was with them, for it would have allayed the grief which he felt at having lost part of the domain of his fathers, if he could balance the loss of Lombardy and Venetia, and of Austria's primacy in Germany, by acquiring new provinces. Andrassy pointed out how dangerous such plans were. The greater the agitation in the Balkans, the more animated the debates in the Belgrade Parliament, now dominated by the bellicose Omladina, and the more aggressive the attitude of Montenegro, the more anxiously Andrassy canvassed for the support of the German Emperor.

As the result of Andrassy's persuasions, the Archduke Albert, hitherto considered the central figure in the anti-Prussian movement, proceeded, in the autumn of 1875, to meet William I at Ems. At the same time, in view of the rebellion proceeding in the Turkish provinces, he suggested that there should be joint action to compel Turkey to carry out reforms which would ensure equality and liberty for all religions. Owing to the resistance of Russia, the project fell through. Gorchakov, however, urged that the question at issue should be referred to a conference of the three Imperial Powers at Berlin.

The aim of Austria's policy was to uphold Turkey, while that of Russia was directed towards the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Gorchakov desired to reach an immediate arrangement with Austria in Berlin for the partition of Turkey. And at the same moment England changed her mind along lines of

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significance for the history of the world, surrendering at last her long-cherished view that the integrity of the whole Turkish Empire must be preserved.

On May 6th, 1876, the German and French Consuls at Salonika were assassinated. Six days later the three Imperial Powers drew up a memorandum demanding measures for the pacification of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the disturbances had had their origin. Thanks to Gorchakov this memorial remained a mere scrap of paper. Gorchakov desired to withhold Austria from any isolated action in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to keep these two provinces, as well as Serbia and Montenegro, as war booty for Russia at a later date. Andrassy throughout this conflict acted as the instrument of the traditional Hapsburg policy of dynastic prestige; but he was also concerned to protect Hungary against the formation of large Slav States at the frontiers of the Empire. Russia, on the contrary, stood by the side of the nations which were shortly to awake.

On July 1st, 1876, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey. It was imperative now for Russia to know whether Austria would announce her resistance to any plans for the partition of Turkey, and the price she would charge for benevolent neutrality in case of a Russo-Turkish war. Eight days after the declaration of war—that is, on July 8th, 1876—the Tsar Alexander and the Emperor Francis Joseph, accompanied respectively by Gorchakov and Andrassy, met at Schloss Reichstadt, in Northern Bohemia, in order to clear up this question. Austria agreed to an arrangement by which, in return for her neutrality, she would have the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina at the conclusion of the war. This agreement, which was kept wholly secret, was in conflict with the policy of Andrassy, who had hitherto refused to intervene in Eastern complications otherwise than by promoting reforms. Andrassy blamed the necessity for this change of policy on England, and justified it with the observation that the meeting at Reichstadt had not, indeed, eliminated war between Russia and Turkey, but had obviated the still greater danger of a war between Russia and Austria. The judgement of history is, however, that the agreement only delayed this latter war.

Yet even at that time no certain guarantee was obtained against the danger of war with Russia. The struggle of the Serbs against Turkey had ended in failure, and the Tsar resolved himself to intervene. Gorchakov now found that the price he had promised at Reichstadt was too high to pay. At the end of September 1878, the Russian Military Secretary, Count Felix Sumarokov-Elston, arrived in Vienna to urge Francis Joseph in Alexander's name to participate in joint action, Austria marching into Bosnia, while Russia invaded Bulgaria in order to compel Turkey to grant political autonomy to both provinces. This placed Austria in a most difficult situation, for what was to come of Bosnia and Herzegovina when they had obtained their autonomy? Would not Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slovenia then be stirred to similar demands? Austria was caught in the network of her internal troubles and anxieties. In his answer to Francis Joseph, Alexander persisted in considering this autonomy as a means towards the end of liberating the Balkan countries from the pressure of Turkish dominion.

The differences between Russia and Austria were such as could not be reconciled. Both sides assailed Bismarck with the question of what Germany would do in the case of an Austro-Russian war. The Tsar, advised by his War Minister, Count Milyutin, inquired of Berlin whether he could reckon on Germany's neutrality if he were compelled to liberate himself from the shackles imposed by Austria on the policy of Russia. Andrassy also wished to know where he was. Bismarck, now at the height of his political talents, gave reassuring answers to both parties. At a parliamentary dinner on December 1st 1876, he expounded Germany's position in this conflict, and replied to a contemptuous observation of Salisbury regarding Austria's capacity for resistance. Bismarck declared that if Francis Joseph were to turn directly to each of his Peoples, addressing the Hungarians as a Hussar, hunting chamois in the Tyrol, talking Czech in Prague, and appealing to traditional Austrian patriotism in Vienna, then every section of the monarchy would stand firm at his side. As was often the case with Bismarck, he had drawn this not unduly extravagant picture on the spur of the moment, with the idea of performing a service

to Austria. It was from such casual remarks of Bismarck, however, that Germany formed her opinions, taking for dogmas words spoken only as metaphors.

Bismarck's intentions towards Austria were excellent, and his speech was not misjudged by Francis Joseph and Andr ssy, but the Austrian public took it extremely badly. Bismarck's attitude in 1876 obliged the other two partners in the League of the Three Emperors to pull the cart along another stretch of road in joint harness, though, indeed, they were an ill-tempered team.

On January 15th, 1877, an agreement was signed between Austria and Russia, whereby Austria promised to preserve benevolent neutrality towards Russia during the war in return for a recognition of the South Slav territories, as constituting in some measure Austrian spheres of interest, while Bosnia and Herzegovina in their entirety were to be made over to her as areas of occupation. The Russian troops could now march into Turkey, while Francis Joseph had acquired a claim on two new provinces. He wrote to the Tsar, declaring that not only they two, but their children also, could 'congratulate themselves upon an achievement so closely in harmony with their mutual friendship.'

At the end of the war these promises were construed in a somewhat different manner. The Russian victory over Turkey had not been easy, and, all the more for that reason, the Russians after the fall of Plevna and the conquest of Adrianople, advanced full of victorious pride in the direction of Constantinople, to impose their will upon the vanquished at San Stefano. All the agreements and treaties concluded by Alexander II and Francis Joseph were now no longer worth the paper they were written on. The Tsar and the Emperor exchanged angry letters in their own handwriting, and Bismarck thought this controversy was of such a personal nature, and stirred up such feelings, that it was altogether too dangerous to be allowed to continue. Alexander wished to re-open every question. Francis Joseph was 'exceedingly indignant at the faithless behaviour of Russia.' And, without a doubt, there is no example in modern history which parallels the way in which Alexander and Gorchakov now got round all their promises, undertakings, and treaties.

Russia wanted to manage the Balkans as though Austria did not exist, and Austria's laments, the Emperor's bitter reproaches, Andrásy's memorials, were of no avail. Alexander did not even need to invoke 'the right of the victorious sword.' He felt that he was the destined liberator of the Balkan Peoples, and the warlike policy of the Romanov dynasty was now consecrated to the service of an historic mission. Andrásy's demands were backed by nothing more than the naked ambition of the Hapsburg dynasty.

The problem of Austria had arisen once more in its familiar terms. Wherever she strove to assert her dominion she came in conflict with nations struggling for their freedom. It was thus that she had been forced to leave Italy and had been thrust out of Germany ; and it was thus that in the Balkan peninsula she stood without any natural right to the position of pre-eminence which she claimed. The House of Hapsburg had once been Europe's bulwark against the Turks, but now it was playing the part of protector of the Turks against the awakening peoples. It could not suffer the formation of Slav States at its boundaries, for fear lest these new formations should exercise such a power of attraction upon the Slavs within the Hapsburg boundaries that the old Empire would lose its balance. Serbs, Bulgars, Roumanians, and Montenegrins, was it supposed, should remain subject to the Turk for no other reason than that their striving for liberty and autonomy disturbed the repose of the Hapsburg dynasty ? The question had only to be asked for the danger of war with Russia to become threateningly evident. In this situation lay the germ of the future World War. Yet the events which followed were all connected rather with the second cause, which henceforth remained operative as an incitement to war, namely, the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine as the price of victory in 1871. It was this that made Bismarck side with Austria, and fettered Germany so tragically to the fate of the Hapsburg Empire. So deep was the enmity which henceforth divided France from Germany, and rendered any effort towards a true peace altogether vain, that Bismarck was forced into alliance with the Hapsburgs. His anxiety in face of the threat of Franco-Russian collaboration, a threat which twenty years later became a reality, involved Germany for half a century

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in a hopeless struggle to maintain the ambitions of the Hapsburg dynasty against the spirit of the age.

It was England who in 1878 set bounds to Russia's omnipotence ; and it was Bismarck whose proposal on April 9th that the British fleet should be recalled from the Sea of Marmora, and force the Russians to retire from the neighbourhood of Constantinople, secured the peace for the time being. Europe in 1878 was faced by a problem substantially identical with that of 1914. There was at least as great a danger of an European war arising out of the Russo-Turkish conflict as in 1914 out of the Austro-Serbian conflict. The difference lay in the statesmen who had to deal with the problem. In 1878 their names were Bismarck, Salisbury, Disraeli, Andrassy, and Shuvalov. Thirty-six years later their successors were Bethmann-Hollweg, Berchtold, Sazonov, Grey, and Millerand. In 1878 the Powers succeeded in preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Austria by bringing the Balkan dispute before a European conference. In 1914, Austria's resistance rendered such a method impossible.

But in 1878, even within the boundaries of the Hapsburg Empire, there were strong forces making for peace, and, even if Andrassy had intended going farther than threats, he would not have obtained Francis Joseph's approval. A whole chorus of voices were raised to warn the Emperor, and among them that of the chief of the Military Chancellery, General Beck. The General Staff officers of the following generation, disciples of Francis Ferdinand and Conrad, have portrayed this unselfish and retiring counsellor of Francis Joseph as a mere bureaucratic administrator of the army, with the underlying notion that the portrait of his successor would shine out in all the more brilliant colours by reason of the contrast. The events of 1878 showed, however, that if Beck at the critical moment was not heroic, he was not for that the less reasonable and clear-headed. It is totally untrue that his attitude was inspired by hatred of Prussia ; and when he warned the Emperor that he could not rely upon Germany's help in case of war with Russia, this solemn admonition was well grounded. Bismarck himself had at this time so clearly outlined his policy that to expect more of him than he could give was an idle dream. It is hard to believe

it, but in 1878 Francis Joseph was surrounded by counsellors who had the courage of their own opinions, and were not afraid of being derided as weaklings or cowards. Besides Beck, his deputy, General Krauss, and the Lord Chamberlain, Prince Hohenlohe, belonged to this category.

Thoughtless critics of Andrassy have marvelled at his policy at this moment. How came it that he was ready to risk war merely to avoid a diplomatic defeat? For British intervention and the attitude of Bismarck would have prevented him from carrying out this threat even if he had succeeded in winning the Emperor to his views. But Andrassy in this critical situation was the sole advocate of war. In all Austria nobody else desired war with Russia—neither the Court nor the parties, and still less the Peoples. The Slavs of Austria were obviously against the very notion of hostilities, while the Church and the Conservative nobility opposed Andrassy's policy because they loathed his system and all that it signified. But the attitude of the German Liberals, who took a firm stand on principle against the perils of a policy aimed at maintaining and enhancing dynastic prestige, was most remarkable, and we can measure against it the changes which took place in the next thirty years. The German Liberals had to choose between their principles and the needs of the moment. The choice drove a wedge into the Parliamentary block of the German bourgeoisie, for a section were ready to compromise, and these now seceded, yet the strength of the main body who stuck firm to principle was great enough to retain a hold of the German bourgeoisie and of public opinion for some time to come.

It was a select body of intellectuals who took a firm stand in 1878. Thirty years later the middle and lower bourgeoisie set the tone—and how different it was! The German Constitutional Party was certainly not successful in dealing with all the questions of the time. In face of the Dual System it was more Imperial than the Emperor. It wholly misunderstood Andrassy's valuable work after the resignation of Beust. But its struggle against the prestige policy of 1878 remains a heroic assertion of intellectual principles. The very defects of Herbst became meritorious in this struggle—his dogmatism, his notion of his own infallibility, and his obstinacy in sticking to his own

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ideas. The German Left may have been doomed to destruction, but the destruction was tragic and honourable, and shows the men of that time in a far better historical light than their successors of 1914, who had neither the power nor the will to resist the menace of disaster.

While Andrásy was devoting his whole powers to frustrating the peace conditions of San Stefano imposed by the victorious Russians, domestic discords fell into the background. The proposal not to leave the Near Eastern question to be settled by the two participants in the war alone, but to refer it to a European conference, was not altogether to Gorchakov's taste, but he did not protest against it except that he would not approve the choice of Vienna as the seat of the conference. It was his proposal, and a proper one, not to leave the negotiations in the hands of ambassadors, as Andrásy had planned, but to entrust them to leading statesmen. Yet hardly had the project come to birth when it was threatened with frustration. England announced that she would only participate on condition that the total results of the Treaty of San Stefano were laid before the new conference. This demand obliged Russia to secure the aid of Austria. In consequence, Alexander II resumed his correspondence with Francis Joseph and sent General Ignatiev to Vienna. It was not an easy matter to resume relations which had been so rudely disturbed. Andrásy named the price which Austria would demand for her neutrality in case of an Anglo-Russian conflict, namely, that Austria should occupy Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Novibazar, which she hoped to be able to do with approval of the conference. If the conference did not take place, Austria would act independently; and she desired the creation of an independent Macedonia.

After the Russian victory and Alexander's unsatisfactory behaviour, the Emperor had been extremely annoyed, yet he did not now refuse the Tsar's proffered hand. He did not believe that England would really go to war; and this time he was right, for, shortly afterwards, Salisbury and Shuvalov reached an agreement at the expense of Austria, whose claims were thus left in mid-air. Bismarck's policy during this conflict was different from the German policy of 1914. As Count Károlyi, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, expressed it, 'He only dropped



a quiet word here and there in favour of Austria, so as to shield himself from the reproach of taking sides too warmly.'

On June 3rd, Bismarck sent out his invitations, and ten days later the congress was opened at Berlin. Before Andrassy left, he wished to have everything settled in case of war, 'should the opportunity for military action arise.' He demanded a vote of 100 million crowns from the Delegates, which he later reduced to 60 millions. But, as he was developing his plans for the conference to the inner circle, the leaders of the Constitutional Party, Herbst, Giskra, and Kuranda, left the room. The Archduke Albert, on the other hand, produced a memorial, urging that war should be made against Russia.

Military action against Russia was not, however, necessary for the fulfilment of Francis Joseph's ends. On June 25th the congress, which, under Bismarck's presidency, had worked at high speed, concluded a settlement of the first question, namely, that of Bulgaria; and now Bosnia came up for discussion. Francis Joseph himself would have preferred the word 'annexation,' but Andrassy preferred to give to Austria's action the milder description of 'occupation and administration.'

It was no doubt in accordance with the desire of Prince Bismarck that the suggestion of giving Austria the right to occupy and administer the two provinces proceeded, not from himself, but from Salisbury. He had found a skilful excuse for not assuming this task in the name of Germany, suggesting that Austria must be spared from the appearance of receiving the two provinces as a gift from the hand of her powerful neighbour. The Powers agreed; only Turkey secured recognition by Austria that the occupation was of a provisional character, and that the Sultan maintained his rights of sovereignty. The argument which Austria advanced to justify her occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—that the creation of large Slav States at her boundaries could only be tolerated safely if the two provinces were in her possession—was at that time unconvincing, nor did it in the course of years become less so. On the contrary, as had been prophesied, the last war of the Hapsburg dynasty, and the final collapse of its fortunes, resulted from a conflict provoked by the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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In the beginning of July 1878, Francis Joseph issued an order for the mobilization of four divisions to carry out the occupation. Personally, he would have preferred to send at least twice that number of troops, but Andrassy strongly urged him to give the occupation a genuinely pacific character. Suitable instructions were given to the commander-in-chief of the occupying army, General Baron von Philippovič. 'It cannot be emphasized too much,' ran the order, 'that it is eminently desirable to demonstrate both to the monarchy and to Europe that the occupation of these territories is being carried out on the lines of a pacific advance and not of a warlike conquest.'

It was easier said than done. While the Austrian troops were crossing the boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prince Reuss, the new German Ambassador at Vienna, wrote: 'It is easy to read in the Emperor's face the satisfaction occasioned to him by the thought that the years of his reign will not be wholly lacking in triumphs. It seemed to me that the melancholy expression which so many have noted had fallen from his face when I last saw him.'

But Austria and Hungary were less enthusiastic. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Koloman von Tisza, inclined to hold to his view that the occupation was 'mistaken and dangerous.' With a few exceptions, the Austrians thought likewise. Philippovič, meanwhile, at the head of his 75,000 men, planned to march with his main body through the Bosnian valley to Sarajevo, and there to hoist the standard of the Hapsburgs. The peaceful character of the advance could no longer, however, be maintained after an attack made upon a squadron of Hussars at Maglai. It soon became evident, moreover, that a warlike advance was going to meet with far greater resistance than had been anticipated. After a few successes, the Austrian troops suffered more than one defeat. The 20th Division, under Count Szápáry, had to retreat, and thereby seriously exposed the 13th Corps to danger. At this time General Beck wrote, 'I have been greatly distressed and excited, and almost unable to sleep, considering the consequences of military disaster at Doboi.' Doboi, however, was not lost, and Lieutenant-General Ivanovič was able to advance, slowly but surely, forwards.

On August 14th, Philippovič resolved to advance on Sarajevo.

It has been remarked that the tragic episodes in Austrian history occur twice ; the same is true of the comic episodes. General Liborius Frank's conquest of Belgrade on December 2nd, 1914, was foreshadowed by Philippovič's conquest of Sarajevo. Disregarding military considerations Frank made up his mind to deliver his attack against the fortress on the anniversary of the Emperor's ascent to the throne. Similar motives led Philippovič in 1878. The attack on Sarajevo had been prepared by two forces. One of them, commanded by General Tegetthoff, had on August 17th approached the city so closely that it could have overcome any resistance the same day. Tegetthoff only awaited the order for the final attack. But Philippovič would not issue the order, not wishing to deprive himself of the glory of entering Sarajevo as a conqueror at the head of his own force. For this triumph he had selected August 18th, the Emperor's birthday. Unfortunately, he failed to capture the town on this day, and could not obtain its submission until August 19th. Francis Joseph, meanwhile, was far from satisfied with the way in which the occupation had been carried out. On the day of the capture of Sarajevo he ordered the mobilization of four more army corps, and by the middle of September these arrived to join in the advance. By the end of October all resistance had been quelled, and Austria could now make a beginning on the peaceful aspect of the task she had assumed.

Andrássy was now in a strange situation. Originally he had been favourable to a programme of reform in the borderline provinces, and had been unwilling to consider the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Subsequently he had become the interpreter and executor of the Emperor's project. But now it was with difficulty that he put bounds to the feverish bellicosity of the generals and the Court. The triumph in Bosnia over a gallant but largely disarmed opponent had greatly raised the self-esteem of the military leaders. Andrássy, and not he alone, realized that a movement was afoot in the circle of the Archduke Albert which was ready to forget the experiences of 1859 and 1866, and, having seen the reformed army pass through its baptism of fire, wished now to embark upon adventures in quest of victory. Andrássy kept his head, and refused to exceed the limits of the mandate which had been given to

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Austria. These limits, furthermore, had to be defended against sturdy resistance on the part of Turkey.

Andrássy, moreover, had to face an even more difficult opposition in Parliament and before the public. He was the Emperor's trusted counsellor, and had beyond doubt achieved successes ; yet at this moment, when he appeared before the representatives of Austria and Hungary as the man who had won new territories for the Hapsburg Empire, he was the most unpopular figure in the monarchy. There was no Royalist Party in Austria in 1878. Germans and Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, and South Slavs, were united in their opposition to an achievement which the Emperor viewed as his first triumph after a long series of disasters. It was the attitude of the German Constitutional Party which most distressed the Emperor. The party had in January compelled the Adolf Auersperg Cabinet to resign. The Emperor had accepted the resignation while holding fast to his principle of governing with a German Cabinet. At first he concurred in plans for entrusting Herbst or Kellersperg with the formation of a Government, but, as this proved impossible, the Auersperg Cabinet was reconstructed. But the Constitutional Party in no wise modified its attitude, while the occupation of the provinces widened the cleft between the Government and the Parliamentary majority. On July 13th, 1878, the very day of the signature of the Treaty of Berlin, Auersperg resigned for the second time. Yet the Emperor would not give up his desire to rule with the support of the Constitutional Party. Despite their opposition to his own foreign policy, and despite the bitterness of their attacks upon Andrássy, the Emperor yet considered the rule of the Germans to be an essential element in the Dual System, which he had learnt from Andrássy to regard as worth preserving at all costs.

The Finance Minister, von Pretis, now endeavoured to form a new Ministry with some German Liberal participants. The Emperor did not like such men as Dr. Herbst ; on the contrary, he disliked everything about this politician who could not be persuaded or moved. Yet he called him to audience, and discussed the situation with him for two hours. Nothing would persuade the obstinate man of principle to emerge from his fortress. At Herbst's side stood one of the best journalists

who had devoted his pen to combating the policy of prestige. This was Etienne, proprietor of the *Neue Freie Presse*. On October 22nd, 1878, the Constitutional Party submitted an address to the Emperor setting forth its view of the occupation. 'Irreparable sacrifices in blood and money have been expended before the representative assemblies have been permitted to discuss the Treaty of Berlin according to their constitutional right.' The address was voted by the Chamber of Deputies with a majority of 160 to 70.

Fearing lest the Delegation, which contained a certain majority for Andrassy, should pronounce a general approval upon his policy, and thereby deprive the Chamber of Deputies of a chance of criticizing the trend of foreign policy, Herbst demanded that the Treaty should be laid before the House.

There was one man who at that time honestly pitied Andrassy, threatened as he was on four or more fronts and almost unable to defend himself. This was Bismarck. He had had similar experiences, but had always been able to count upon the confidence of his monarch. Andrassy's position in this respect was less certain, and from time to time he was exposed to slight but painful humiliations. He could not persuade the Emperor to pension off Beust, who was now Ambassador in London, and thereby able to maintain a certain independence and to cause Andrassy more than occasional slight embarrassments. Francis Joseph was sentimental in his attitude towards the Saxons and the Alliance of 1866, therefore he would not dismiss Beust.

It was not likely to please Bismarck when this irreconcilable opponent was transferred from the London to the Paris Embassy, while Bismarck's special friend, Károlyi, was transferred from Berlin to take Beust's place in London. Bismarck, deeply regretting this change, wrote to Andrassy: 'If you are good enough to ask for my views regarding a successor, I can only indicate my general feeling that gentlemen of good Austrian or Hungarian stock are more likely to further the good relationships of our two Empires than even the most skilful adopted children of the monarchy.'

With genuine sympathy Bismarck watched Andrassy's struggles in Vienna and Budapest. Andrassy had no reason to fear the joint Parliament of the Delegations, but he had to demand

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a supplementary vote of credit for 60 million gulden from the Budget Commission, and in this Herbst reigned supreme. Herbst absolutely refused to consider the request so long as the Reichsrat had not ratified the Treaty of Berlin as required by the Constitution. He proposed passing over the request of the joint Ministry and proceeding to the Order of the Day, so as to prevent Andrassy from raising his voice in the Delegations. 'Andrassy's policy in the East,' wrote Etienne, 'is bankrupt. This Magyar politician who professes to combat Russian hegemony in the East is in practice sharp and domineering when he speaks to the Turks, but smooth and yielding to Russia. The result of his policy is not a weakening of Russia, but the collapse of our finances.' Andrassy's political existence was at stake, and in any other circumstances he would have been lost, but at this moment he was definitely fighting the Emperor's battle. Herbst's insistence that the Treaty of Berlin should be laid before Parliament was an act of public rebellion against the Emperor, who was thus, as he said, 'made to look foolish before all Europe.' He had ratified the Treaty; was it now, then, to transpire that his signature was not sufficient? The full measure of the Emperor's indignation appeared in a Cabinet meeting of November 27th; and it was now that the Emperor resolved never again to govern with the Germans. During the debate on the Treaty of Berlin, which occupied the Chamber of Deputies from December 10th, 1878, till January 27th, 1879, the seceding Liberals, known as the 'Bosnian Left,' raised their voices, led by Ernst von Plener and Eduard Suess. When it came to the vote, the Constitutional Party was abandoned by a section of its supporters, and the Berlin Treaty was ratified as required by the Constitution.

Since the days of Schwarzenberg, none of Francis Joseph's foreign Ministers had been able to boast such successes as Andrassy, and the split in the German Constitutional Party, as well as the decline of the opposition in Hungary, gave him the certainty that he would get the better also of his enemies at home. Great therefore was the surprise when, on December 19th, 1878, he resolved to quit office, and for the first time handed in his resignation to the Emperor. A complex of legends has grown up around this resignation and even

Andrássy's biographer, Eduard von Wertheimer, has not managed wholly to dispel them. Each of Andrássy's opponents claimed that the resignation had been on his account, but this was mere vanity and self-satisfaction. The Generals, who could not forgive Andrássy for having frustrated their plan of a victorious march on Salonika, now returned to power and influence ; yet they certainly had not been strong enough to compass his downfall. Nor can the resignation be interpreted as due solely to Andrássy's weariness and longing for rest in consequence of a severe strain upon his health. Such considerations no doubt played their part, but only side by side with an impulse of too rare a nature to have been understood by politicians and historians. Andrássy was an aristocrat in the noblest sense of the term. The highest office was no satisfaction to him if he felt no pleasure in its exercise and no security that his work would be properly appreciated. He was different from most of the other Ministers, whose ambition lay in never losing 'the Emperor's confidence.' To this proud man it was an intolerable thought that one day the Emperor might find him superfluous. His pride rendered him sensitive, and his instinct bade him take leave of office while there was yet time. There were real grounds, moreover, for his anxiety. After Auersperg's retirement he had endeavoured to assist Count Taaffe to form a new Ministry to carry on the line of policy without alteration. The failure of Taaffe's attempt showed him that the Emperor's mind had changed. And, in fact, the opposition of the Germans to the occupation of Bosnia, coupled with their unwillingness to vote funds for the army, had brought about a change in the Emperor's policy. His old desire to reconcile the Czechs revived when all the opponents of German hegemony united to persuade him to change his line of policy. It was Andrássy who stood in the way of the realization of such plans. He did not, indeed, take it upon himself to dissuade the Emperor as he had done in the days of Hohenwart, but his conscience would not allow him to give his own name to an alteration of the course of policy. But all the advocates of the new policy felt him to be a hindrance in their way. He was too strong, they felt, and too domineering in the exercise of his authority, not to impede the realization of the project which had now become mature. Even the Emperor

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felt that Andrassy was too strong and too powerful, as he confessed himself in 1881, after the death of Haymerle, saying : 'Andrassy is the man for stormy times, but Kálnoky is better when all is going calmly.'

Andrassy now recommended Baron von Haymerle, the Ambassador in Rome, as his successor, thinking that he would serve to keep his place warm in case he should later desire to return to it. Haymerle died shortly afterwards, and Andrassy would have liked to return to office ; but Francis Joseph did not invite him, preferring to his somewhat uncomfortable but highly talented character an honourable mediocrity. Andrassy's resignation took place by stages. He announced it in December 1878 to the Emperor, but it remained a secret until the summer of 1879, and, even at his meeting with William I at Gastein, Francis Joseph kept quiet about it. The final act of resignation and the choice of the successor were decided upon after the return of the Emperor from his retreat at Bruck.

An event now occurred, however, to delay Andrassy's departure once more. Bismarck wired from Kissingen on August 13th to his Embassy in Vienna that he would like a personal conversation with Andrassy, adding that on August 18th he was proceeding to Gastein, where Andrassy could find him if he wished. Andrassy agreed. On August 21st he was received by the Emperor, and on August 26th arrived at Gastein, little guessing that Bismarck was now preparing the most significant change of policy. The Chancellor had proceeded to Gastein with a fixed plan based upon an unshakable resolution to undo the knot which had tied Prussia to Russia for over a century. The roots of the plan lay in the previous year, but Bismarck's final decision was accelerated by two events—a conversation which had taken place between General Schweinitz, German Ambassador at Petersburg, and the Tsar ; and, secondly, Alexander's letter of August 15th to his uncle William, airing complaints against German policy in general and Bismarck in particular. Bismarck observed that if the German Emperor were to answer the letter in the same tone, it would mean war. In a copious memorial addressed to the Emperor he pointed out that the Tsar's letter contained 'unconcealed threats against Your Majesty should you continue to take Austria's and Eng-



land's feelings into account and not to subordinate your whole policy to that of Russia. We cannot,' he continued, 'carry gratitude to Russia to the extent of submitting our policy indefinitely to hers, and sacrificing our relations with Austria merely to please Russia.'

Germany had not opposed France's bid for hegemony ; she had not made war in 1870 in order simply to lapse into vassalship to Russia. It was not any immediate threat of war which induced Bismarck to ally himself to Austria, but Russia's demands that Germany should follow her lead. It was the thought that only thus could he protect Germany against Russian arrogance which put the idea of the alliance into Bismarck's mind ; Pan-German sentiment had nothing to do with the matter. Meanwhile he thought he had best seize Austria by the hand as quickly as he could, since Andrassy had openly confessed that he was ready to join with England and France in order to unite Austria's voice to theirs in opposing Russia in the Near East. It was the fruit of Russian threats that Bismarck now played the part of the suitor, while Andrassy, as object of the suit, could demand his own conditions.

Bismarck at first advanced his proposal in the form of a question : Did Andrassy think that it would be useful if the two Central European Powers were to form a League for Peace, and did he think he could win his monarch over to such an idea ? Andrassy answered that he was favourable to such an alliance, but that Austria's relations with England rendered it impossible that she should enter an alliance aimed against France. Only if Russia were to join the French in an attack on Germany would Austria be ready to render assistance against France and Russia. At the very beginning of the negotiations it became evident that the two parties held strongly divergent views. Bismarck wished to bring about a general offensive and defensive alliance, while Andrassy was for an alliance directed only against Russia. Nevertheless, Bismarck and Andrassy held to their common conviction that the projected alliance would serve to maintain the peace against the threats of Russia.

On August 31st, Bismarck dispatched a letter of sixty-two sheets to the Emperor William describing the conversation with Andrassy, and asking for leave to pursue negotiations with him in

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Vienna. The letter crossed a telegram from the Emperor William ordering his Chancellor not to proceed to Vienna, for, in the meanwhile, William, persuaded by the German Military Chargé d'Affaires at Petersburg, General Manteuffel, had replied to the Tsar's letter, addressing the answer to Warsaw, where the Tsar was shortly awaited. Francis Joseph was quite ready to agree to Andrassy's proposal. 'The projected alliance,' Andrassy had written to him, 'would give the monarchy its proper weight in Europe, and enable Your Majesty to act with a firm and free hand in the Near East.'

Now began a keen struggle between Bismarck and William, more arduous and passionate than any which the Chancellor had yet fought out with his King. William could not easily shake off memories of a youth passed in the wars of liberation. He could not forget his father's legacy, nor get free of his admiration for Russia, his sympathy for his contemporaries among the Russian nobility, men filled with the spirit of the *ancien régime*. He and his brother, Frederick William IV, had grown up in the atmosphere of the philosophy of the Divine Right. The picture of the Holy Alliance was ever before his eyes. Add to all these the affection he felt for his nephew, and the result was strong opposition to the new proposal that he should cut himself loose from Russia.

Bismarck's first efforts were not facilitated by the fact that the Tsar seemed to regret his previous sharp language. Unknown to the Chancellor, uncle and nephew arranged a meeting at the frontier station of Alexandrovo for September 3rd. Bismarck was furious. He could not prevent the meeting, but relied upon his report from Gastein to bring William round to his view. It turned out quite differently. At Alexandrovo the Tsar referred to his own letter as 'a silly mistake,' and William entirely succumbed to the charm of his nephew. Manteuffel sweetened the atmosphere by proposing an exchange of Orders, including the bestowal of a high Prussian Order upon the Pan-Slav Minister of War, Milyutin. Bismarck foamed at the mouth, muttering remarks about 'the beginnings of a new Olmütz.'

Francis Joseph, meanwhile, had no idea how stiffly William was resisting the project of an alliance with Austria. 'The

Emperor,' Andrassy wrote to Bismarck, 'is so persuaded of the necessity of such an agreement that to urge him any more would be superfluous.' Francis Joseph authorized his Minister to draw up the Treaty, and Andrassy awaited Bismarck in Vienna, writing to him : 'You may well believe that my sovereign would always be delighted, more particularly at this moment, to see you here.' It was a trial of nerve for Bismarck such as he had seldom had to face. He staked all upon winning over the German Emperor. On his side, he had the liberal-minded Empress Augusta, with her inclination towards England, the Crown Prince, Moltke, the Emperor's Military Secretary Count von Lehndorff, General von Albedyll head of the Emperor's Military Cabinet, and a young diplomat, Otto von Bülow.

Bismarck was the soul of the campaign of Gastein, yet all his efforts were vain. William declared he would sooner abandon the throne than act perfidiously against Russia. With astounding obstinacy the old King, now aged eighty-two, upheld his case against Bismarck and his friends. The vehemence of his feelings illustrates the power of aristocratic sentiment. All Bismarck's arguments were of no avail against the Prussian officer's sense of honour, which could not be reconciled with the idea of concluding an alliance against the Tsar, to whom he had just sworn friendship. 'Let Bismarck and Andrassy discuss certain future possibilities,' he said, 'but I can have nothing to do with an alliance.' Bismarck had need of all his talents. He recalled Nicholas I and Olmütz. He evoked the picture of an isolated Germany, and painted the perils of Slav propaganda—'the heritage of Napoleonic Caesarism'—in lurid colours. He insisted upon the need for a decision, declaring that the lesson of history was that lost opportunities never recurred. All his efforts were vain ; Bülow was in despair.

On September 8th, Bismarck was awaited in Vienna. William banged the table with his fist, swearing that he would not conclude an alliance a week after shaking Alexander's hand. 'I cannot commit such an act of perfidy.' Bismarck himself wished to go to Vienna, but the cure at Gastein, together with excitement and overwork, had seriously weakened him. Now he threatened resignation. He caused William to be shown the reports of the Ambassador in Paris, Prince Hohenlohe, indi-

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cating the way in which Russia was courting France. William replied that he put more faith in the word of the Tsar. At last he wrote to Bismarck that in order to save his face he would allow him to commence negotiations, but in no case would he grant him authority to sign an agreement or enter into an alliance.

Matters had reached such a pass on September 10th, after the Crown Prince had exhausted his efforts and Count Stolberg and Moltke had once again been called into play, that either the Emperor, it seemed, must abdicate, or Bismarck must resign. But, on September 14th, Otto von Bülow saved the situation with a happy idea, proposing that Bismarck's final project should be modified so that Russia need not be mentioned by name, only an aggressor being referred to in general terms. Once again Bismarck tried himself to explain to the Emperor what he desired. Of an alliance against Russia there was to be no question, but a defensive alliance was absolutely necessary. Even if it did not exist, Germany would have to stand by the side of Austria if she were threatened by Russia, for Germany could not risk remaining isolated between France and Russia side by side with a defeated Austria. On September 17th, Stolberg delivered a final exhortation to Emperor William. The Emperor now discovered that Bismarck's proposal contained no provision in the case of a war of aggression provoked by one of the two contracting parties. This could not but please him. Having clearly established the defensive character of the pact, William gave his consent.

Bismarck could now proceed on his journey to Vienna. He was loudly cheered at Salzburg and all the way through Upper Austria. At Linz he hid from the enthusiastic crowds behind the curtains, not wishing that any misunderstandings should arise in Vienna. Francis Joseph received him warmly, with every mark of honour, and had him placed next to him at the Court dinner. Andrassy now gave a dinner. Bismarck had no tail-coat with him, nor in the whole of Vienna could any such garment be found to fit the Chancellor's gigantic frame. On the day of his arrival, September 22nd, Bismarck made a declaration which revealed the contrast between the furthest point to which he could go and the views of Andrassy and

Francis Joseph. Bismarck recognized that the Emperor's objections to an alliance of a purely general nature could not be invalidated. The Emperor would not consider a treaty which might carry for Austria the risk of war with France. After long negotiations, Andrassy and Bismarck agreed to the project for an agreement, which they were to submit to their sovereigns.

The text of this project was similar to that of the later defensive treaty published in 1888. Both Powers promised reciprocal help in case of an attack by Russia, and benevolent neutrality in case of attacks by other Powers, meaning by France upon Germany or by Italy upon Austria. If such a case were to be aggravated by Russian intervention, then the threatened ally would be immediately entitled to the help of the other. The treaty was for the duration of five years, and if, after four years, neither of the two participants demanded a cessation or a revision of the alliance, the treaty would automatically remain in force three years longer—that is to say, till 1887. As Andrassy had demanded, Austria remained free of any undertaking against France. Bismarck had to agree to this in view of Germany's perilous position between a hostile France and a Russia gripped by Pan-Slav enthusiasms.

It had been hard enough to extract from King William permission to open negotiations in Vienna, but now followed a still harder task. How could William accept the treaty in the Austrian form? His objections were as strong as ever. The persuasiveness of Bismarck, the eloquence of Bülow, Stolberg, and Hohenlohe, could not overcome the old man's uncomfortable feeling that he was behaving badly towards Russia. Now even Moltke approved the draft, and thought it well to name Russia in the treaty as the probable enemy. William would not be persuaded, declaring to Bülow that, if he accepted such a treaty, Alexander could challenge him to a duel on grounds of disloyal behaviour. By the end of September, Bismarck had made up his mind to resign. In a letter to Andrassy he wrote: 'If my gracious master ever abandons untenable positions, it will probably be in consequence of a Cabinet decision. I do not yet altogether despair of seeing His Majesty acquiesce in face of a unanimous vote. But, should this expectation not be justified, then I must follow your example and retire from office.' Under

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the pressure of this threat, William made a further step towards agreeing with his Minister, but still insisted in subordinating acceptance of the treaty to the condition that the secret should be revealed to Petersburg in a letter to the Tsar Alexander. This proposal met with stout resistance in Vienna. Andrassy proposed a middle way : after the signature of the treaty the Tsar should be informed of its contents. Finally, Andrassy declared that he did not wish to anticipate the decision of his monarch, but that, as far as he was concerned, if his proposal were refused he must renounce any further part in the negotiations.

Bismarck feared that Russian policy would penetrate to Vienna before German policy. He was full of concern at the resistance put up by the 'Russischer Rütli,'<sup>1</sup> as he termed the Emperor, his brother, and Princess Alexandra. On October 3rd, Andrassy insisted upon a decision, declaring he could no longer carry on the business of the Foreign Office.

History surely knows no other example of so stout a struggle between a Minister and his King. The whole array of the highest State officials joined the Crown Prince Frederick in urging the King no longer to resist the treaty. Had even a thousandth part of the sense of responsibility here shown on both sides inspired the men of a later era, then surely Germany and Austria would never have blundered into the catastrophe of 1914. William once more thought of resigning his throne. On October 4th all the Prussian Ministers, headed by Bismarck, were ready to resign their offices. Finally, on October 5th, at 6.30 p.m., the Emperor gave his Ambassador in Vienna, Prince Reuss, authority to conclude the treaty. Yet even now he attached the condition that Bismarck must succeed in getting the treaty altered according to his views. Bismarck was in despair. Both he and the Emperor experienced nervous crises and were unable to sleep. On October 7th, Prince Reuss reported that he and Andrassy had put their signatures to a defensive treaty in the presence of Haymerle. But Bismarck's troubles were not yet finished. Emperor William insisted upon his condition, and Moltke had to be called to explain to him

<sup>1</sup> Rütli was the hill upon which William Tell and his confederates met and took the oath of mutual loyalty.—*Translator's note.*

that it would have been of doubtful value to extend the alliance to meet the case of a French attack. William, however, would not ratify the treaty until the draft of an informatory letter to Petersburg had been submitted to him. It was now October 13th, and on October 21st the period for signature of the treaty by the monarchs would elapse. Finally William's painfully sensitive conscience was soothed ; he realized that he could not further withstand signing the Treaty. On October 16th, Otto von Bülow, who had had the hardest task in this struggle, reported from Baden-Baden to Bismarck that William had signed the treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary at ten o'clock that morning.

## CHAPTER XX

### THE IMPERIAL MINISTER

IT is a somewhat facile view, adopted by certain historians, that the origin of the disaster of 1914 is to be found thirty-six years before that date. Yet not only pro-Tsarist Conservatives, but even Liberals like Prince Lichnovsky, the former German Ambassador in London, see in Germany's alliance with Austria a fatal error, only to be explained by the theory that in 1879 Bismarck was no longer in full possession of his faculties. The facts hardly justify this judgement. Bismarck himself on many occasions explained the reason of his estrangement from Russia, never, however, more plausibly than in his words to Prince Hohenlohe : 'If you are walking in the woods with a friend and suddenly notice in him signs of hysteria, it is not a bad plan to keep a revolver at hand in your pocket. This need not mean that your feelings of friendship towards him have changed.' The victim of hysteria, he meant, was Russia, and the revolver was the Dual Alliance.

There was, however, another possibility of guarding against the peril he envisaged. It is certain that Bismarck very earnestly attempted to reach a close understanding with England through the agency of the British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord Odo Russel ; but little has been done to throw light upon the history of this attempt. Lord Odo wrote in 1880 to Lord Granville, the British Foreign Secretary : 'Ever since I have been in Berlin, Prince Bismarck has constantly revealed an earnest anxiety to co-operate with Britain, but his attempts to render his relations to Her Majesty's Government cordial and intimate have never met with encouragement.' In September 1879 negotiations with Austria were near to completion. Bismarck then inquired in London what would be Britain's attitude if Germany were altogether to refuse to give that support to Russia's Near Eastern policy which was expected of her, and thereby came into conflict with Russia. Lord Beaconsfield promised that in this case Britain would 'hold France in check.' This was not enough for Bismarck, nor was it as much as he expected.



In the late autumn the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, attempted to make up for the omission in Beaconsfield's reply, proposing an alliance between Germany, Austria, and Britain, directed against Russia. But that proposal came too late. In the interval, the Dual Alliance had been sealed and had produced its effect in Russia. Now there was a possibility of a renewed understanding with Russia, and this put an end to suggestions of Anglo-German *rapprochement*.

Whether, however, the 'revolver' was to be of Austrian or of British make, Bismarck thought of it only as a safeguard. 'War between Germany and Russia,' he declared, 'must in any case be calamitous for us, even if France does not participate. Only as a last resort, if the very greatest interests were at stake and if our rear were thoroughly secured, could we venture upon such a struggle.'

Bismarck wished to make of this alliance a guarantee against the effects of Russia's overweening ambition. But, besides that, he wished to involve Austria, or, as he himself puts it, 'for the time being to hold her aloof from possibilities of entering into other coalitions by bringing her into the defensive alliance.' His aim was to obviate the danger of a 'coalition which would overwhelm the power of Germany.' He did not, however, overestimate the force of Austria; nor did he imagine that the Dual Alliance alone could bring about his ends. 'Prince Bismarck,' the German Ambassador in Vienna remarked to the Permanent Secretary in the Foreign Office in 1890, 'had no very high valuation of Austria as an ally, nor did he think that the alliance by any means balanced the dangers to which Germany was exposed. The Dual Alliance is but one among various means destined to protect Germany against the dangers to which she is exposed between an irreconcilable France and an incalculable Russia.'

When he concluded the alliance, Bismarck hoped that Austria would bring Britain into it. 'Once we have bound Austria to ourselves by such a treaty,' he wrote to the Emperor on September 22nd, 1879, 'Britain will always be on our side rather than against us.' This supposition seemed somewhat less certain in 1886. The Battenberg Prince had just resigned the throne of Bulgaria. Bismarck warned the Vienna Government to refrain

from excessive activity, declaring : 'Not only the interests of peace, but those of equity, demand that the Russians be compensated for their abstention from interference in Serbia by similar abstention on the part of Austria in Bulgaria.' On November 27th he spoke even more clearly : 'If it were true that Austria could rely upon British help if she were attacked by Russia on account of Bulgaria or of the Dardanelles, and if we could be sure of this, we should have no call to discourage Austria from resisting Russian claims. But so long as it appears that Austria would be left in the lurch by Britain, we are obliged not only to dissuade Austria from direct resistance to Russia, but even to discourage her by every means in our power. We should have no fear of the result of a war between Germany and Austria on the one side, and Russia and France on the other, if the Austrian army were proportionately as strong and as well drilled and supplied as ours. But that, unfortunately, is not the case, and the burden of such a dual war would fall mainly upon us.' Many more examples of this valuation of the alliance by Bismarck could be adduced, so that it is hardly to be explained why the reproach is constantly levelled against Bismarck that he sowed the seed of the world catastrophe in his alliance of 1879.

Gladstone's victory in the British elections of 1880 brought encouragement to the Pan-Slav Party, which aspired to bring Russia to friendly terms with Britain, and harboured the design of an anti-Austrian war. In face of this danger, Bismarck renewed the Alliance of the Three Emperors for three years as from June 18th, 1881. But both Russia and Austria insisted that the treaty should be kept secret, and this diminished its value. The former wished to avoid offending the Pan-Slavs ; the latter was anxious about the effect in Hungary. Acts of secret diplomacy which conflict with the political passion of the Peoples cannot escape the enfeeblement which results from such circumstances. However, the agreement lasted until 1884, in which year it was prolonged from March 27th until June 18th, 1887.

It would still be false to say that Germany was letting herself be towed by Austria. On the contrary, the Dual Alliance, combined with the League of the Three Emperors, gave Bismarck the means of restraining Austria. In 1884, desiring to elimin-

ate the possibility of conflicts arising out of the events in Bulgaria, Bismarck attempted to realize his own project of inducing the two rivals to limit their respective spheres of interest in the Balkans. Bismarck never wearied of advising Austria to reach a peaceful understanding with Russia. Emperor Francis Joseph later recounted that at that time the 'overbearing attitude, the tyranny of Berlin,' were 'intolerable.' The organ of the Vienna Foreign Office, the *Fremdenblatt*, complained in 1886 that the League of the Three Emperors had sucked the blood out of the Dual Alliance. Germany had two allies, Russia and Austria, but Austria had only half an ally.

In the autumn of 1886 the spectre of a war on two fronts for the first time caused real anxiety. The Emperor William was ninety years old, Moltke was eighty-six, and Bismarck was obsessed by the thought that the spectre might prove real. He introduced a Military Service Bill into the Reichstag, desiring to impress the French. In reality, however, he was resolved that, if war proved inevitable, he would offer France, after the first victory, a favourable peace, as he had done in 1866 to Austria. British support, moreover, promised to be forthcoming, for, as Salisbury remarked on April 5th, 1887, to the British Ambassador in Paris: 'It is hard to resist the desire for a second Franco-German War, since this would wash out all our difficulties in Morocco.' The British Press took the view that if the Germans marched through Belgium, Belgian neutrality would not be violated so long as Germany did not desire to annex Belgium permanently. Bismarck, however, refused to follow these British suggestions, and inspired the *Post* to write that Germany had no intention of conducting a preventive war, nor in any circumstances would she begin a war with violation of a European treaty. It would be an entirely false supposition to suppose that German policy could be pushed off the sure ground of this principle by pressure from the General Staff. For the matter of that, Moltke had no thought of opposing Bismarck. If war against France became necessary, he was determined to remain on the defensive. He planned to lean upon the fortresses in the newly conquered provinces, and to press the French forward into Lorraine and there to beat them. Certainly nothing was done to involve a later generation in

misfortune, nor can any parallel be drawn between the German policy of this time and that of 1914. The Dual Alliance prevented Austria from entering into an alliance hostile to Germany while the alliance with Russia placed bounds upon her activity in the Balkans. Germany under Bismarck, unlike Germany in 1914, was doubly and triply insured against the terror of being dragged into an Austrian conflict at the side of Austria. Those responsible for the policy of 1914 cannot excuse themselves by an appeal to Bismarck.

Detailed objections to the alliance of 1879 are, then, difficult to uphold, and critics have turned to the general objection that Austria's problems, her vital deficiencies, rendered her unsuitable as an ally. They declare that Bismarck should have foreseen in 1879 that the State of many Peoples would fall to the ground at the first serious test of its endurance. This reproach is doubly unfair. Those who make it under-estimate the defensive capacity which, in fact, Austria showed during the four years of the war, while over-estimating the internal dangers of 1879. In that year Austria's problems were no more alarming than they had been in 1848. The Austrian State was certainly more energetic, more powerful abroad, more secure at home, and therefore more suitable as an ally than in 1848, 1859, or 1866. Her economic condition was better, her finances were in a more ordered condition, the great malady which had afflicted her had been cured by the reconciliation with Hungary. After the battle of Königgrätz conscription had been introduced, and the army was better equipped than before; while the Constitution had guaranteed such political liberties as were enjoyed in other European countries.

Bismarck, however, did not consider these signs of progress excessively important, while Moltke's view was even more sceptical. Bismarck's judgement of the Austrian army shows that the German General Staff took a much more sober view in 1879 than in 1914. Austria was at heart the same as ever. It was as impossible in 1879 as in 1848 for the Hapsburg Empire to do justice to the aspirations of the awakening Peoples. The policy of the dynasty was in radical conflict with those aspirations when it sought to atone for the loss of prestige in Italy and Germany by successes in the Balkans.

Under an absolute system of government, the Emperor, by unrestrained exercise of his will, had succeeded in forcibly banishing all opposition from his ken, but the conflict of aims now once more found living expression in the dispute between Francis Joseph and Parliament. The Peoples of Austria, not excluding the Germans, really asked the same as Bismarck, namely, that the Empire should indulge in no ambitious Balkan policy. None the less, it was typical of the existing political and diplomatic system that Bismarck had to deny what he would have most liked to affirm. 'In my view,' he wrote to the German Ambassador in Vienna in 1886, 'it would be quite impossible to subject the foreign policy of a great country to the moods and the partisanship of Parliaments, whether German, Austrian, or Hungarian.' Bismarck thus claims despotic powers such as the great monarchs of the seventeenth century had not possessed. Charles II was dependent on the British Parliament for his foreign policy ; Louis XIV was in a position of even greater dependency, and had to bribe important members of his Parliament through the agency of his Ambassador, Barrillon. Francis Joseph was now obliged to fight for his hitherto unchallenged right to conduct the high policy of the Empire according to his own whim, before a stubborn opposition. He asserted this right, not by force, but by Parliamentary methods. Often the essential struggle seemed to lie between the power of the House of Hapsburg on the one side and the dainty pen of Michael Etienne on the other.

It was Etienne, the passionate rebel against Francis Joseph's prestige-promoting policy, who gave Dr. Herbst the intellectual weapons with which the leader of the opposition conducted his campaign in Parliament. Etienne realized, as Herbst never did, that this campaign could only be brought to a successful conclusion by the transformation of Austria along Swiss lines. In his last years, Etienne, along with Fischhof and Rieger, did all they could to bring about an understanding with the two most important racial groups. The earnestness of the endeavour is shown by his letter to a journalist named Scharf, in which he condemns Herbst's lack of understanding in emphatic language.

The strength of the opposition lay in the ice-cold philosophy of Liberalism, which threw scorn upon the romantic and costly

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traditions of the prestige policy ; and, further, in the national sentiment of all the Slavs, who felt themselves to be one with their brethren in the Balkans. The strength of Francis Joseph, on the contrary, lay in the melancholy recollection of bygone power and heroism, when his dynasty had functioned as the shield of Christendom against that assault of Islam which had brought Kara Mustapha up to the walls of Vienna. On the one side were the vital demands of the Peoples, on the other side a tapestry design.

Yet it was Francis Joseph who won the day. Nor could it be said that he had won it improperly. He had not violated the Constitution. He had not laid shackles upon the free expression of opinion of the Peoples. After all, the Reichsrat was a place where all the leading men of all the Nations could speak openly, without hindrance. True, the Czechs made difficulties about participating in this joint Parliament, where the uncompromising German Left triumphed over the claims of the other races, but the Emperor evidently desired to break down the obstinacy of the Germans, and seemed thereby to promise equality of rights to his Peoples in the future.

National resentments flamed up here and there, yet there was nothing to justify the opinion that Austria could not survive. Russia in 1879 was an Empire shaken by the fevers of political assassination and corroded by deep hatred against the reigning house ; yet who dared to prophesy that it was near to its end, and was unfitted to serve as an ally ? In later years we have seen how insurrectionary forces shook the mechanism of the State in other countries, and how, for instance, internal struggles racked even so secure an edifice as the British Empire. In the old Austria, matters did not reach the pass of sanguinary fights in the street ; a few stones thrown and a few fists clenched were the worst excesses of excited crowds. The Party struggle found its extremest expression in violent thumping of the desks by Members of Parliament. A street battle with ninety dead, such as was experienced by Republican Vienna on July 15th, 1927, would never have been possible under the government of Francis Joseph.

Two important events occurred simultaneously with the conclusion of the Dual Alliance. The first was Andr ssy's retire-

ment, and the second the formation of a Government under the leadership of Count Taaffe. On August 11th, 1879, the *Pester Lloyd* announced that the Foreign Minister was about to resign. On August 12th the Emperor put his signature to an announcement that Taaffe had formed a Ministry. Andrassy had but awaited the completion of his task before fulfilling the intention which he had long proclaimed. Taaffe had but awaited on his side the departure of the potent Andrassy before starting upon the task for which he was ready.

Andrassy's departure gave the Emperor an opportunity of once more conducting Austrian internal policy along the lines which he himself desired. Francis Joseph did not conceal from himself the services which Andrassy had rendered. He still believed as firmly as ever in the Dual System, and he regarded the conclusion of the alliance with Germany as a fortunate event which redounded to the strength of Austria's position in the Balkans. But Andrassy had completed his task, and his continuance in office would only have stood in the way of the Emperor's new design, which was in truth the revival of his oldest schemes. Francis Joseph had certainly been deeply annoyed by the behaviour of the German Constitutional Party, yet his political outlook and conduct were not so petty as to justify the view that personal feelings alone were responsible for the decisive change in policy which he now allowed Taaffe to introduce.

Ever since he had successfully concluded peace with Hungary, Francis Joseph had aspired to a similar arrangement with the Czechs. He cannot be too much blamed if he saw the problem of the races in these narrow terms ; for there were few men in Austria capable of a broader view. Who was there to realize and to proclaim that not only agreement between the Czechs and the Crown, but agreement between one people and another, was the issue ? Only Adolf Fischhof. Austria in 1880 could produce nothing like the lively interest and deep thought which in 1848 had been devoted to Austria's vital problem, the destiny of the races within her frontiers. There was nobody among Francis Joseph's counsellors who had envisaged the question in this simple form. He saw only two rival claimants for power : on the one side, the German Centralists, who rudely rebuffed

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any attempt at solving the problem by granting national self-government, and on the other side the group of the Bohemian nobility which clothed the problem of the present hour in the outward modes of ancient political tradition. It was the current opinion of the German Liberal school of history that (as Friedjung remarks) the German Constitutional Party, led by Schmerling, Herbst, and Plener, had performed an historical service in successfully withstanding the Czech demands, since 'Otherwise a state of affairs would have come about such as led to those disturbances which troubled the whole of Central Europe in the time of the Hussite heresy and the Thirty Years' War. Never in such a case would the Slav majority have followed the leadership of the industrious German stock in the three Sudeten provinces.' Such is the language of the historians ; from which dark valley there could be no path towards a solution of Austria's problem. How, then, could Francis Joseph find such a path ? He only knew that the Constitutional Party could not find it.

He felt all the more bound to seek the friendship of the Czechs on account of the alliance with Germany. Besides, the formation of the new German Empire could not come about without producing reactions in German Austria. The best specimens of the educated youth of the new generation were all the more enthusiastic to co-operate with the new policy because in the work of Bismarck, who had placed an Imperial crown on the Prussian King's head while simultaneously he granted universal suffrage to the King's subjects, they perceived a harmony realized between national and democratic aspirations. Such men as Georg von Schönerer, Viktor Adler, Heinrich Friedjung, and Pernerstorfer were the godfathers of this new national feeling. Schönerer, who had a large following among the students, did not long remain in sympathy with a programme which tried to unite civilized practice with national aspirations. He became the forerunner of the Anti-Semitic movement of the students, which originated in the great changes which came over the middle classes and the petty bourgeoisie. But he was also the spokesman of that Pan-German current which in the first years of Taaffe devoted its energies to combating the structure of the Austrian and Hapsburg State.



New figures now appeared in the framework of German Austria, where hitherto only two types had been perceptible : the traditional Alpine peasants and the German Liberal citizens. The new type of Austrian did not keep his eyes reverently directed towards Vienna, but boldly looked beyond the frontiers to Berlin.

Taaffe had from the beginning kept the German national movement under a certain degree of police supervision, but Francis Joseph did not attach too much importance to it, nor let it alarm him. His view of the Austrian Germans was that they were simply predestined to belong to Austria. The Hungarians could make an impression upon him, and, when the Czechs were recalcitrant, he dealt with them in a conciliatory manner. But an extreme national movement among the Germans he felt to be a breach of the rules. It was perhaps the result of this simple outlook, perhaps the consequence of a lack of suitable counsellors, which accounts for the failure to undertake any serious attempt to solve the problem of the races as the primary consideration of Austrian politics, after the Emperor's abandonment of the German Liberals.

Taaffe has been called the 'Imperial Minister,' Francis Joseph's own man, because he cared more for little expedients for handling men than for any broad programme, trusting more to routine methods for overcoming conflicts which arose than to arduous thought about the problems involved. No doubt he had much in common with Francis Joseph. Neither of them was capable of refined thought ; both of them considered that 'a healthy knowledge of human kind' was an adequate equipment for unravelling the complex riddles of the variegated Austrian States ; both of them deeply distrusted ideas ; both of them had a keen eye for human weakness ; and both of them over-estimated the value of governmental routine ; because both of them had so thoroughly mastered it. Again, they both preferred a good average specimen to an original and revolutionary personality.

This explains why Francis Joseph remained fourteen years true to Taaffe, while the insignificant Baron von Haymerle, who followed upon Andrassy, proved agreeable to him.

Scarcely had Taaffe taken over the Government when he

managed to persuade the Czechs to return to the Reichsrat, from which they had for sixteen years absented themselves. They did so with a declared reservation that their reappearance in Vienna in no way signified that they had renounced loyalty to the rightful Constitution of Bohemia. In his speech from the throne the Emperor saluted the Czech Deputies who had returned to the Assembly 'without renouncing any of their constitutional contentions': words which amounted to a formal recognition of the autonomy programme. Formal recognition, however, of a programme which seemed far from realization was not what the young Czechs, led by Eduard Gregr, wanted, so much as successes in the realm of practical politics. It was Gregr who spoke the oft-quoted words that the rights of Bohemian autonomy were not worth a pipeful of tobacco. The Czechs now entered a demand for equality of the Czech language in official business transactions as well as in public instruction. This demand, in return for which they offered to approve the military estimates, was the first step along the path of practical politics which the Czechs now followed for many years. Taaffe to some extent approved, introducing in April 1880 special language ordinances for Bohemia and Moravia. These ordinances, which laid down that all petitions should be dealt with and recorded in the language of the petitioner, were a beginning of that historic battle of languages which did not cease from now until the end of the Austrian Empire.

At a great meeting of the German Liberal Party in Vienna discontent came to a head. The scene had suddenly changed. In April 1879 all Vienna had united to celebrate Francis Joseph's silver wedding in a procession which Hans Makart, the representative painter of this time, arranged according to the taste of the German bourgeoisie, and with the lavish expenditure of their money. A year later there were celebrations of the hundredth anniversary of the accession of Joseph II, somewhat obviously directed against Francis Joseph. That, however, was a domestic quarrel. Matters looked worse in Bohemia. Since the war the world has become accustomed to measuring disturbances by another standard. The breaches of the peace at Prague and Königshof in 1881 were idylls compared with those witnessed in Berlin, Vienna, Paris, and Dublin after the war. They

sufficed, however, to induce Francis Joseph to send the President of the Supreme Military Court, General Kraus, of Venetian fame, to Prague as administrator of the province, with orders to suppress all violent manifestations. It was not any pining for passed days which caused the Emperor to resort thus once more to pre-Revolution methods, but rather a hopeless desire to deal with great questions by petty methods. The Provost of 1850, who had in vain sought to terrorize Italy with the menace of the Fortress of Belfiore, was certainly not the man to deal with Bohemia in 1881 from the Hradschin, the citadel of Prague. He attempted to show impartiality in the strife of the Nations by arresting an equal number on either side, but this only inflamed their mutual hostility. Yet the Government might have learned from one incident of this time that the wall which divided the two Nations was 'no thicker than paper.' In the middle of the fiercest political struggle the Czech theatre of Prague, which had only just been completed, at great sacrifice, out of the resources of the Czech nation, was destroyed by fire. Czechs and Germans in rare harmony combined to repair the damage of this disaster in the realm of culture.

Taaffe rightly hoped, by extension of the suffrage, to create better conditions for mutual understanding between the Nations. But he lacked the strength to carry out his plan. A strong and powerful Parliament might at that time have constituted a binding element. Bismarck gave Germany a real National Assembly, and thereby got the better of local particularisms. The most that a powerful Austrian Parliament could do was to weaken the position of the Diets, with their historical traditions and national peculiarities. Even so, the attempt might well have been made. But Taaffe's way was the way of Austria as defined by her greatest poet :

Auf halben Wegen und zu halber Tat  
Mit halben Mitteln zauderhaft zu streben.

To pause half way when half the deed is done  
And half to struggle for a cause half won.

He encouraged the Emperor to believe that he could safely act with half-measures and without any general scheme ; General Kraus and the police would help him through.

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Saint Simon says that kings are more dependent upon their servants than they suppose, and that servants are more to blame for what happens than the kings. This is certainly true of Taaffe. Under Andr ssy's influence, Francis Joseph could be won for great schemes, but under Taaffe his own nature had a free run, and he adopted the methods of pedantic preoccupation with detail. Unexposed to any intellectual stimulus, he ceased to comprehend what was happening, and did not guess that behind the eruptions of his Peoples, where he saw only personal vexatiousness, there were impersonal powers at play. Receiving a deputation from the Chamber of Commerce of Trieste, he referred with irritation to the 'factious opposition' of the German Left.

At that time a social revolutionary ferment was working throughout the world and giving rise to Socialist manifestations in one place, petty bourgeois reaction in another, according to the character and development of those affected. A dark cloud fell upon Hungary which had hitherto been in the vanguard of Liberalism. The blackest superstition gained credence, and the system of Justice was disgraced in the ritual murder trial of Tiszaes lar, followed by anti-Semitic outbreaks in Budapest. The Emperor himself telegraphed to the Prime Minister, Koloman von Tisza : 'I trust that repetition of the outbreaks of the last three evenings will be strenuously impeded. Kindly arrange with the commander-in-chief to use the troops in larger numbers and with more energy.' In such a command Francis Joseph clearly appears as the supreme civil servant. In the best style of the benevolent despot, he interfered countless times in the administration, but, thanks to his lively sense of justice, this attention to detail actually became a guarantee for correct application of the law. After the Vienna Ring Theatre was burnt down, the Chief of the Vienna Police boldly announced 'all saved,' although 230 persons had lost their lives. Francis Joseph immediately ordered that this official should be dismissed, while he refused to rescue the theatre manager, Jauner, from a severe sentence. Albert of Saxony, the one friend for whom the Emperor generally fulfilled every request, put in a plea for Jauner, whose brother was director of the Royal Opera at Dresden. The Emperor refused the request, writing to his

restraint. Bosnia and Herzegovina had to be paid for, and not all the modesty of Kálnoky could save Austria from having to accept the consequences of her active policy in those provinces. When Prince Alexander of Bulgaria was arrested by Russian emissaries and compelled to resign, and when the Tsar sent General Kaulbars to Sofia to reduce Bulgaria to acquiescence in his wishes, the boundary between the zones of influence became once more the object of strife. Either Austria had to resign her claims or she had to face up to a conflict. She disputed Russia's right to treat Bulgaria as a zone of influence. Bismarck put an end to the conflict, declaring that, according to his interpretation of the Treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria fell under the protection of Russia. In his great speech before the Reichstag of January 11th, 1887, he applauded the German-Austrian Alliance in ringing tones, but at the same time applied Hamlet's sentence : 'What's Hecuba to him ?' to the case of Bulgaria.

It was the first time that Austria had been so clearly informed that Germany would not support her in any active policy in the Balkans. 'To us,' Bismarck declared, 'it is a matter of total indifference who governs Bulgaria, or what becomes of that country. Not for Bulgaria's sake shall we suffer any one to cast a lasso round our necks and drag us into a quarrel with Russia.'

There was then no possibility of defending Austria's prestige. Even a defence along Kálnoky's mild lines might provoke war. Russia had behind her not only the treaty of Berlin and Bismarck's words, but the voice of the Nations.

In consequence of the war peril which loomed in 1887, and of Bismarck's unfeeling decision to dissociate the German people from the Balkan policy of the Hapsburg dynasty, Francis Joseph inclined now towards England and Italy. Since 1882, Italy had been linked by a five-years alliance to Germany and Austria, without deriving any real advantage from this treaty. Italy now demanded German support in case France should attempt to obtain Tripoli or Morocco. She also asked Austria for a treaty to cover the eventuality of a partition of Albania. In return for this, Italy was prepared to place 200,000 men on the Rhine, or to send them against the Russians in case of war. Austria at first refused the Italian proposals, demanding, as a condition of her support for Italian colonial ambitions, an

Italian guarantee of the *status quo* not only in the Turkish coastlands but also 'in the Balkan regions,' and, further, a promise of help in case of war with Russia. The expression 'in the Balkan regions,' which was an Austrian invention, was one of the points of the treaty which roused so much discussion in 1915.

In 1887, Austria and Italy could not reach an agreement until Bismarck invented a solution whereby Germany, in a separate treaty with Italy, supported her colonial ambitions, while Austria and Italy signed a second treaty to clear up the Balkan question. This treaty obliged Austria and Italy to consult together, and to agree, before engaging upon hostilities, regarding any territorial expansion to follow upon an occupation on the Turkish coast or in the Balkans. Bismarck's assistant, von Holstein, called this proviso the *Trinkgeldparagraph*. The Chancellor himself, however, saw it as a new means of restraining Austria from over-ambitious plans. Italy appealed to this clause in 1914, complaining that she had not been informed of the action against Serbia, and that the treaty therefore had ceased to be applicable.

The truth is that Bismarck, at this period of Francis Joseph's reign, saved Austria from war with Russia by bringing her into an apparently inconsequent, and in any case highly complicated system of alliances. Was this a mistaken policy? Ought he to have reached an immediate understanding with Russia over the corpse of the Hapsburg Empire? The idea of annexing German Austria for the new German Empire would necessarily imply dethronement of the Hapsburgs. Moreover, it would mean strengthening the Catholic religion within the Empire, a prospect which must have frightened the spokesman of the Protestant Empire, besides shifting the balance of authority towards the south, and thus endangering the Prussian hegemony. Without radical changes in the Constitution of the German Empire the revolutionary scheme was not practicable.

Francis Joseph did not altogether understand the value of his alliance with Germany. This is shown by his laments over Bismarck's 'tyranny.' His thoughts did not carry him to the point of realizing the internal contradiction in his own policy. Austria could not maintain a show of being on equal terms with

her Russian rival in the Balkans. It was not so much that her military or physical power was inferior, but that she was morally in a less good position. In general and in detail, the designs and desires of the Hapsburg dynasty contrasted with the hopes of the Balkan peoples, while Russia was their protector. Kálnoky had an inkling of this insoluble contradiction, but he was on the wrong track when he expounded to the Emperor in a long memorial the harmfulness of Taaffe's system. His thoughts were simply those of the old Austrian Centralists, familiar through endless repetition; Austria, they said, could only be powerful abroad if she was strong at home, and she could only be strong at home if she relied altogether upon the two Peoples who were the pillars of the Empire; therefore it would be dangerous to make concessions to any other people. In truth exactly the opposite advice would have been more advantageous: namely, that Austria could not conduct any prestige policy which in the long run contrasted with the desires of the Peoples of the Empire, which really meant that he had best not attempt any such policy. The internal tasks of the Empire were so great that it would have been worth while devoting every effort to accomplishing them. The Emperor had already twice tried following such advice as Kálnoky now gave him.

Meanwhile, a new candidate for government had arisen. This was Ernst von Plener, son of Ignaz von Plener, the former Finance Minister. The younger Plener had now become the effective leader of the German Left opposition, and Taaffe's chief opponent. Unlike Herbst and the older Liberals, he was not a doctrinaire thinker, nor had he opposed the Bosnian policy of the Emperor on principle. None the less, among all the political leaders of this period there was none whom Francis Joseph viewed with such unconcealed dislike. Plener himself has placed it thus on record: 'The Emperor had never particularly liked me, and Taaffe encouraged him to regard me with more and more hostility, representing me as the chief disturber of the peace, and thereby strengthening the monarch's prejudice against me. My acquaintance with the Crown Prince gave rise to rumours of all kinds of intrigues which had no basis in fact.'

Ernst von Plener was, however, no more than a Liberal with

Conservative ideas. In the course of a long sojourn in England his mind had been opened to some extent to social problems, but in comprehension of Austrian circumstances he lagged even behind Taaffe. He blamed the Emperor for his ill-defined outlook on the Bohemian question. While it may be true that no clear programme was outlined in Francis Joseph's declaration that the Czechs must be afforded 'certain concessions,' yet the Emperor was certainly at this time ahead of the Liberals in two important matters. Firstly, he desired to solve the national problem ; secondly, he advocated progressive reform of the suffrage. Unfortunately, he sought both ends by the altogether inadequate methods of Taaffe. Precious years went by without bringing any advance towards a real Czech settlement. Discussion between the Nations was reduced to a quarrel about the language of the law courts, and this quarrel became fiercer as it extended from the educated classes on both sides—the lawyers, industrialists, and their friends in the Press—to the great awakening masses.

The petty bourgeoisie was stirring ; new parties were being formed, and a more vivid tone was being heard in the public life of Austria. Francis Joseph faced unknown and unwelcome developments. At that moment a shot was fired which changed the course of his life ; on January 30th, 1889, his son Rudolph committed suicide.



## CHAPTER XXI

### THE SON

ON Wednesday, January 30th, at nine o'clock in the morning, a gentleman in shooting clothes drove from Helenental to the Southern Railway station of Baden, near Vienna. Arriving at the station, the gentleman rushed into the stationmaster's office. Hurriedly he gave his name—Count Hoyos—and demanded authoritatively a special train to Vienna for an urgent affair of State. The Austrian railway official, with all due respect to the Count, could not fall in with his wishes. He inquired whether this affair of State was of a military nature. Count Hoyos insisted. Every moment was of value to him, he said; he absolutely must have the train. The official said nothing could be done. Even the express train that was due to pass in half an hour was not available, as it did not stop at Baden. Hoyos urged him to stop the express. The official was greatly perplexed what to do. He could not act against instructions without knowing the reason. Finally Hoyos was forced to explain himself: Crown Prince Rudolph had had a shooting accident.

Special signals brought the express to a standstill. Count Hoyos arrived in Vienna, but not before his news, which had secretly spread like wild-fire. Many people had seen and heard Hoyos tearing down the station steps, hurling himself into a cab, and shouting to the coachman: 'The Palace.' Here Count Bombelles, the Crown Prince's Lord High Steward, was the first to receive the news, and then Count Paar, the Emperor's Military Secretary. Paar thought it best first to break the news to the Empress. Baron Nopcsa, Elizabeth's Lord High Steward, was asked to undertake the hard task, but did not feel himself capable of it. The Court ladies attempted to prepare the Empress. Then Hoyos entered. This was the bitterest hour of Elizabeth's life. All unsuspecting, the Emperor sat in his study, the little dark-red room looking on to the courtyard. Who was to be the bearer of the news? An hour passed by before Eliza-

beth arrived at a decision. She sent for Katharina Schratt, the Court actress, the only woman who was intimate with Francis Joseph. One woman's strength was not sufficient to break the news to the Emperor. The two women entered the Emperor's study together to reveal the terrible truth.

The scene in the study was prolonged. A decision had to be made whether the whole world must know the awful truth. Even horror was bound up with formality in the Emperor's house, but tradition and statutes could not help now. For such a tragedy no precedent could be found. It needs must be masked. And from that hour the mask has never been completely removed. Inventive and sensational imaginations have made the mask still more impenetrable by covering it with a veil of myths. Historical investigation has lifted the veil, but not altogether removed the mask. Deep in Francis Joseph's soul there lay a premonition of the end of his House. The Hapsburg Terror, a spectre that always walked the Palace in times of great catastrophe, and to which the domestic staff attributed physical existence, appeared anew after Rudolph's death. Francis Joseph had visions of a day when his sixfold sealed and locked cupboards and cast-iron safes, that housed the Court archives, would be in the power of men who no longer respected them as secrets of the confessional. He did not convey the documents relating to the Crown Prince's death to the secret archives, but handed them to his Minister, Count Taaffe, with instructions that never and under no provocation was he to reveal their contents. Count Eduard Taaffe, like all those who had close contact with the Emperor, kept the truth utterly secret. The mystery remained until Francis Joseph's death and the end of the Hapsburgs. Taaffe's son also guarded it jealously. All that was found amongst his father's papers was the police report of the burial of Mary Vetsera, and a note explaining that with regard to the other documents: 'Count Taaffe has expressly ordered that these are never to be made public.' Many were the rumours that arose. When a fire broke out in Count Taaffe's Bohemian castle, Ellischau, where the Emperor's Minister kept his papers, it was said that the fire had been kindled expressly in order to destroy the Rudolph documents and other political papers that might serve to compromise certain people

who were still alive. Certain though it be that Taaffe left such papers behind him, the supposition that the fire had been purposely kindled was fantastic. The political incendiaries of Ellischau are as shadowy as many other ghosts which haunt the graves in the Capucin vault.

The mystery of the Crown Prince's death is a veritable Hapsburg sleight of hand. The magic of the Court ritual converted Ministers and marshals, friends of the dead and those in the know, nobles and servants, high dignitaries and coachmen, into the silent priests of the Royal Faith. The power exercised by Francis Joseph's impersonal monarchy was greater than the might of tyrannic princes; the truth was buried without the necessity of getting rid of uncomfortable people who knew too much.

The first attempt to mask the terrible news of January 30th, 1889, broke down. At two o'clock in the afternoon the Emperor, leaving his intimate circle, gave his orders. The Crown Princess must be informed; the Empire must be given some news; the question was, how much? The Archduchess Stephanie was having a music-lesson with Frau Kempner when the message was brought to her. At three o'clock the members of the Imperial House met together in the Palace. Afterwards the Emperor summoned his Ministers. At half-past six in the evening, Vienna, already buzzing with a hundred rumours, was told of Rudolph's death in a special edition of the official *Wiener Zeitung*: 'His Highness the Crown Prince, accompanied by some guests, including Prince Philip of Coburg and Count Hoyos, went, the day before yesterday, to shoot at Mayerling. Yesterday His Imperial and Royal Highness felt somewhat unwell, and had to excuse himself from appearing at the family dinner as arranged. When his guests assembled this morning and found that His Highness did not appear, they made the shocking discovery that, following on a stroke, His Highness had breathed his last.'

At the same time telegrams were sent to all the European sovereigns. They all announced that Rudolph had suddenly died while on a shooting expedition: 'probably owing to a stroke.' Only in the message to the Pope was no mention made of the cause of death. The telegram, in French, ran: 'It is

with the greatest sorrow that I announce to Your Holiness the sudden death of my son Rudolph. I am sure of your deep sympathy in my cruel loss ; I must make the sacrifice to God, giving back to Him without complaint what I received from Him. I beg the apostolic benediction for myself and my family.' Private telegrams containing the news were forbidden in the afternoon, and it was only possible to send them in the evening. All information about the Crown Prince's death was subject to a rigid censorship.

The result of the official communication was that nobody believed it. Many people had seen the Crown Prince in the Court Theatre a week before, on January 23rd. Punctual to the minute, the Emperor had appeared in the Imperial box opposite the stage. Rudolph came a little later than the Emperor. Etiquette at the Imperial Opera did not permit of gazing at the Imperial box through glasses. But even the naked eye could discern that day that father and son were on the best of terms. The Crown Prince kissed his father's hand and took his place beside him. They were observed in friendly conversation. Four days later—Sunday evening, January 27th—Rudolph and the Crown Princess accompanied the Emperor to a *soirée* given by Prince Reuss in the German Embassy in the Metternichgasse. The party was in celebration of the German Emperor's birthday, and almost all the members of the Court were present, besides Francis Joseph and Rudolph, the Archdukes Albert, William, Charles Ludwig, and Rainer. Eye-witnesses noticed that 'the Emperor bade adieu to the Crown Prince, cordially extending his hand, while the Prince responded with a deep bow.' Who could have guessed that this goodbye would be for ever ? Even those closest to the Crown Prince, even the sharpest ears, had heard nothing about the Prince feeling unwell or being in any way indisposed. Rudolph's sudden death was a riddle. The whole of Vienna awaited an explanation. The newspaper offices were besieged with questions from all over the world. Immediately on receiving the tidings, they had sent their best men to the not very accessible district of Mayerling. It was evening when, after hours of travelling, the reporters pushed their way through the ice-bound forest paths to the neighbourhood of the Monastery of the Holy Cross, only to find all roads

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and paths blocked by gendarmes. Nobody might penetrate farther. Nothing could be gleaned at the Holy Cross or its two guest-houses. The wood-cutters and road-menders only knew what they had gathered from the lodge's domestic staff : that the Crown Prince had arrived in Mayerling at midday on Monday, January 28th, and on Wednesday had been found dead in his bed by his faithful valet, Loschek. The silence which surrounded the death in Mayerling seemed impenetrable. By the evening of the fatal day the whole of Vienna was convinced that the Crown Prince had died no ordinary death. This opinion was strengthened by the confiscation of the *Neue Freie Presse*, which had reported that the Crown Prince had lost his life through a stray shot. The effect of this muffling of the truth was that within twelve hours the wildest conjectures were current : as, that he had been shot by a discontented forester ; that he had fallen as victim of a bad shot among the party ; and that an aristocrat had killed him in the course of a quarrel. The drawing-rooms of the nobility, the Jockey Club and Sacher's Hotel, claimed to know more.

Meanwhile, on Wednesday night, the Crown Prince's remains were brought from Mayerling to the Palace. In order to hush up any scandal, the body was transferred as quickly as possible after the notification of death. The only witnesses of the special train that brought the body to Vienna were a few journalists, who intrepidly stood in the snow behind the thick ranks of gendarmes, and some peasants, gamekeepers, and beaters. The conveyance of the Baden '*Entreprise de Pompes Funèbres*' descended the steep and frozen mountain road to the Southern Railway line. Its brakes creaked loudly. Behind it were three closed cabs. Gendarmes were posted all the way to Baden. Gendarmes, police, and firemen made a cordon round the station square. Firemen carrying lanterns helped to lift the coffin out of the black lacquered hearse and into the station waiting-room. The train reached Vienna the same night. The town was still awake ; the streets were filled with whispering busybodies. The hearse, flanked by officers of the Life Guards, quickly reached the Palace.

On Thursday, January 31st, at six o'clock in the morning, Francis Joseph lifted the lid of the coffin. A tight bandage held

together the Crown Prince's shattered head. After seeing his son's remains, Francis Joseph stayed alone for two hours. Then he sent for Taaffe, and later for the Military Secretary, Count Paar. On the same day, January 31st, the post-mortem took place. Dr. Hans Kundrat, Director of the Institute of Pathological Anatomy in Vienna University, presided. He was assisted by the Professor of Forensic Medicine, Eduard von Hofmann, Dr. Widerhofer, the Court physician, and a Court Commission to receive the report. A suggestion was made to the two professors, Kundrat and Hofmann, by Count Bombelles, the Lord Chamberlain, that the official reason of death given out the previous day by the desire of the Court (a 'stroke') should be corroborated. The two doctors asked for a little time for reflection. They conferred with their colleagues, Drs. Stricker, Ludwig, and Eduard Albert. Then they returned and told the Lord Chamberlain that, in spite of their devotion to the Emperor and understanding of the motives that led to this desire to obscure the truth, it was not compatible with their consciences that they should put their names to a false report; therefore, hard though it was, they must confess that they would rather resign their positions than be answerable for this falsification of the truth. The Emperor received this information at a late hour on the evening of Thursday, January 31st. On Friday, February 1st, the official *Wiener Zeitung* published an explanation: 'Yesterday's notification of the probable cause of the Crown Prince's death was based on the first observations of the immediate entourage of the deceased, who held the view that the Crown Prince met his death by means of a stroke. Subsequently Professor Widerhofer was sent to Mayerling. He states that he found a considerable wound in the deceased's head, with accompanying displacement of skin and bone, that must have been the immediate cause of death. On the side of the bed, close to his right hand, lay a discharged revolver. The position of the weapon left no room for doubt that the deceased had discharged it with his own hand. As the Crown Prince's attendants were distributed among neighbouring houses, and the servant in most immediate attendance had left the house on an errand, the shots were heard by no one. It is the task of those sent to Mayerling and of the duly appointed Commission to

place the fact on record in an official form. We cannot conceal that many members of the Crown Prince's entourage had noticed during the last few weeks many signs of a morbid, nervous condition, so that it must be supposed that the terrible event took place at a moment of sudden aberration.'

So the Crown Prince Rudolph committed suicide? Suicide while of unsound mind? The result of the second communication was that even fewer people believed it than had believed the first. There were hundreds of Viennese who had known the Crown Prince—officers, diplomats, journalists, waiters, café proprietors, actors; none of them had noticed this condition of morbid neurasthenia or seen signs of mental disturbance. How could the man in the street believe that the only son of the Emperor of Austria, the heir to one of the mightiest of thrones, had taken his life without good reason? Only at Sacher's Hotel, at the Jockey Club, at Demel's, in the houses of the aristocracy, and now also in the newspaper offices, was more known.

Now the doctors' report was also made public. It ran: 'Crown Prince Rudolph died of shattering of the skull and of the forepart of the brain. The shattering was the result of a shot fired at short range at the right temple. A shot from a revolver of medium calibre would be capable of producing the injury described. The projectile was not discovered, as it had emerged through the wound of exit found above the left ear. It is beyond a doubt that the Crown Prince fired the shot himself, and that death was instantaneous.' The medical report closed with the sentence: 'The premature closure of the sagittal and coronal sutures, the remarkable depth of the vault and of the so-called finger-like impressions on the inner surface of the skull, the definite flattening of the convolutions and the dilation of the ventricles, are pathological findings, known to be associated frequently with abnormal mental conditions, and hence justify the assumption that the deed was done in a state of mental aberration.' The closing sentence was the concession made by Hofmann and Kundrat. They could do this with easy consciences, as Karl, Baron von Rokitansky, the renowned anatomist, to whom the Vienna School owed its prestige, had made a practice of detecting pathological changes in the brains of Catholic suicides and recording these in death certificates. In

this way the Church authorities were given an opportunity to evade the strict canonical regulations, and to grant a Christian burial. Except for the closing sentence, which implied more than was strictly admissible, the medical report was a true one. Nevertheless, this opinion, wrenched from the two doctors after much searching of conscience, was received with distrust. Belief in official communications had been too much shaken by the first untruthful account. The man in the street wished to know the reason of this voluntary death, and the excitable fancy of the great city took fire all the more at the gloomy pomp with which the mystery was soon surrounded.

From morn till night the Palace was besieged by thousands of people ; one after another, Princes, Ambassadors, Ministers, and Deputies came to pay their last act of homage to the dead. On Sunday night, February 3rd, the body was taken from the Crown Prince's dwelling and laid in the Court Church, in the middle of the south aisle. On Monday the door of the Church was opened, and all who wished could enter. The coffin, reposing on the high catafalque, remained open until the evening. Rudolph's corpse, attired in his general's full dress, was visible from foot to hair. The bandaged head was decked with leaves. On Tuesday afternoon an icy wind blew through the streets while the Crown Prince was laid to rest in the Hapsburg vault in the crypt of the Capucins. The ceremony was short. Francis Joseph had expressed a wish that the foreign Courts should not be represented. Rudolph was the one hundred and thirtieth Hapsburg in the Capucin mausoleum.

During the day, people pushed their way through marketers, flower-sellers, and cab-ranks to the Capucin crypt. Rumours, reports, and scraps of news came from here and there. Everyone had some acquaintance at Court, amongst the servants, lackeys, gendarmes, and caterers. Every now and then the secret police made an arrest. Newspapers were confiscated. A foreign paper which had printed the apparently harmless news of the sudden death of the youthful Baroness Mary Vetsera, was sequestrated. An amended report was passed by the censor : the Baroness had died in Venice ; her remains had been brought to the family vault in Pardubitz. On February 1st the Emperor placed in the care of Prime Minister Taaffe the following



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report, received from the Imperial and Royal Police Commissioner Habrda.

'I have the honour to submit the following report, which refers to the instructions received on January 31st at 12 noon, regarding the procuring of permission from the prelates of the Holy Cross Monastery for the burial of the Baroness Mary Vetsera, who died by her own hand at Mayerling Castle ; and, further, regarding the secret transport of the body from Mayerling to the Holy Cross, and the provision of a coffin. Immediately on receiving the instructions I went, accompanied by Commissioner Baron Gorup, to the Vienna Southern Railway station. In spite of our haste, we did not succeed in catching the train that leaves Vienna at 12.35. The express that leaves at 1.30 does not stop at Mödling. The route via Baden was not feasible, because of the journalists keeping watch upon it. So Commissioner Baron Gorup and I decided to travel in a hired vehicle to Mödling, and there to hire another vehicle to take us to the Holy Cross. Notwithstanding the bad condition of the roads, we reached the Holy Cross at 3.30 p.m. We went straight to the prelacy, and I delivered His Excellency the Lord Chamberlain Count Bombelles' dispatch to the Abbot Grünböck. Commissioner Baron Gorup and I were soon able to overcome the slight hesitation of the Abbot, without giving him any further information as to the real facts of the case. We said that the body of a lady who had committed suicide close to Mayerling, in the castle grounds, was not to be buried in the cemetery of the parish church of Alland, but, in conformity with legal requirements, was to be interred that same night or early next morning as quietly as possible in the Holy Cross cemetery, with full observance of legal formalities. We declared to the Abbot that the fact of suicide had been established by the medical examination of Dr. Auchenthaler, and verified by the Court Secretary, Herr Slatin ; that the next of kin of the deceased Baroness Vetsera, Count Stockau, had asked for a provisional burial in the Holy Cross cemetery, that this request had been granted by the Prefect of Baden, Herr Oser ; and finally, that all the said gentlemen, as well as Chief of Police Wyslouzil, would appear that day at the Holy Cross, in fulfilment of legal requirements. We requested the Abbot to handle the matter discreetly, and obtained

his promise in the most loyal terms. In order to avoid any scandal, the Abbot promised to house all the members of the Commission, permitted us to have the coffin made in the monastery workshop, and finally gave instructions to the grave-digger to begin preparing the grave that very evening. While I sent off the cypher telegram referring to the first part of our mission, Baron Gorup, under cover of darkness, proceeded inconspicuously to Mayerling, left a note for Count Stockau, asking him to advise us when the body had started its journey, and finally transferred three detectives from Mayerling to here. Meanwhile, Chief of Police Wyslouzil, Herr Oser, and the medical clerk, Dr. Managetta, had arrived. At 10.30 p.m. we received a discreet intimation from the Count that the body had just left for the Holy Cross via Sattelbach. Baron Gorup went to meet the carriage in order to bring it to the Holy Cross in as inconspicuous a way as possible, while I awaited its arrival, with the policemen and the grave-digger, in the road leading to the cemetery. Dr. Auchenthaler and Herr Slatin drove straight to the monastery in their carriage, but the carriage containing Count Stockau, Alexander Baltazzi, and the body of Baroness Vetsera drove to the cemetery of the Holy Cross. Owing to the abnormal weather—storm and rain—the journey progressed very slowly. The icy condition of the mountain roads made it necessary for Count Stockau's coachman to fix new calks on the horses' shoes ; and so, dragging through snow and mud, we reached the cemetery gate on the stroke of 12 midnight. Count Stockau, Herr von Baltazzi, Baron Gorup, and I lifted the body out of the carriage and carried it to the mortuary, where we placed it in the newly made coffin. After some time we left the cemetery and returned to the monastery. Chief of Police Wyslouzil, Baron Gorup, and I ordered our detectives to keep a night watch by the mortuary. The continuous bad weather prevented the grave being ready at the appointed hour. It was only owing to the energy of Baron Gorup, who remained in the cemetery from 7 a.m. encouraging the digger, that the grave was ready by nine o'clock. I had meanwhile sent off the second cypher telegram, and, half an hour before the completion of the grave, I went with Count Stockau and Herr Baltazzi, who had requested the Church's blessing, along with the Prior who was to

pronounce the blessing, in the most inconspicuous way possible to the cemetery. The coffin was now closed. The storm and rain made the burial so difficult that the two forenamed gentlemen, as well as Baron Gorup and I, had to lend some assistance. The sad ceremony ended at 9.30 a.m.'

The police document which records this nocturnal funeral in all its grimness tells more of the Crown Prince's tragedy by its reticence than any other item of Mayerling literature. To understand the Austria of Francis Joseph it is necessary to distinguish two special features in this picture—the Spanish Court ritual and Viennese officialdom. The Court pushed the Crown Prince's lover out of the picture, in a way which recalls the example of the Spanish ancestors of the Hapsburgs. When Philip II had his only son, Don Carlos, arrested, the most horrible rumours were circulated. Philip also, in a circular letter to the *Grandeas* and the municipalities of the kingdom, as well as in notes to the Courts of Europe, concealed the truth. Only to the Pope, Pius V, did Philip not dare to speak an untruth. When the King's Ambassador in Rome, Zuñiga, transmitted His Holiness's request for a true explanation why Don Carlos had been imprisoned, Philip wrote with his own hand a full report for the Pope. This statement, written in code language, has never been seen by curious eyes; it lies to this day in the secret archives of the Vatican. The documents of indictment in the file of Don Carlos have also disappeared. In 1568, in order to find a precedent, the archives of Barcelona were ransacked and documents brought to light relating to the remarkable trial put into motion by Philip's forefather, John II of Aragon, against his lovable and unfortunate son John, who also went by the name of Carlos. These documents, translated from the Catalan into Castilian, side by side with the records of the trial of Don Carlos, have never been revealed to the curious eyes of the world. The historian Cabrera recounts that, in 1592, Philip had the documents placed in a heavily locked green box in the archives of Simancas. In 1828, along with other documents, they were removed by Ferdinand VII, and it is not known where they now are. Philip had concealed for all time the true story of the death of his only son. He did nothing to prevent Antonio Perez and the historian De Thou openly ex-

pressing their belief, in his lifetime, that Don Carlos was 'condemned to death by casuists and inquisitors, and dispatched, with the King's consent, by the addition of slow-working poisons to his food.' Philip's almost magnificent cruelty and severe suppression of the truth were the fruit of his religious faith and his political code. The secret of Don Carlos's death was guarded by Cardinal Espinosa, Prince of Eboli, and the Royal Councillor, Bribiesca de Muñatones.

The secret of Rudolph of Hapsburg was kept by the police officials Wyslouzil and Habrda. Though three centuries divided them, much was similar in the Court ritual which enshrined the two dramas, one of which belonged to the world of El Greco, and the other to that of the Viennese bureaucracy of 1890. It is, however, a misreading of historical comparisons to see more in the death of Rudolph of Hapsburg than is there.

It is pure fancy on the part of Heinrich Friedjung when he voices the suspicion that there were other reasons for Rudolph's death besides the drama at Mayerling. Rudolph's biographer, Oskar Mitis, also indulges in this senseless talk : the frustrated ambitions of the heir apparent ; the disagreements with many members of the Imperial House ; the impossibility of influencing according to his ideas either internal or foreign policy ; his complete scepticism about the future ; his fear of a war with Russia and inevitable defeat in it ; his apprehension that the casually thrown out plan of a military action against Hungary would become public ; his friendly relations with Pista Károlyi —according to Mitis, all these had perhaps combined to rouse in Rudolph's 'already unstable mind' the delusion that he was not fitted for his position.

This picture of Rudolph does not ring true, for it tries to surround the human kernel of the tragedy with a political shell. Francis Joseph was no Philip, frightened by the opposition of his son ; Rudolph was no Don Carlos, his mind running on conspiracies. Great as was the difference in their natures, neither of them stepped outside the boundaries of their House and their essentially Austrian temperaments. Francis Joseph allowed no encroachment on his power. He permitted his son and heir a freedom in everything relating to his way of life such as has seldom been granted in so full a measure by any father,

but he held him at arm's length from the business of government, not even allowing him a passive participation in the labours of sovereignty. Moreover, we have no proof or clue in Rudolph's more or less open life that the Crown Prince really had any desire to alter this state of affairs. He took the Emperor's method of government for granted ; between him and Francis Joseph—so much we know from the accounts of intimates—there were no political conversations. Rudolph's intellectual world was rather the office of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* than his father's study ; he could talk and discuss more easily with Moriz Szepe, the editor, than with the Emperor. The guardians of Hapsburg tradition looked with disfavour on this scion of the Imperial House who consorted with Liberal journalists like Szepe and Frischauer. It is generally rash to predict that a Liberal Crown Prince will prove himself a Liberal monarch, but this heir to the throne did not pretend to be anything which he was not, and there is no difficulty about tracing his portrait. It is a true appreciation of his personality to say of him that, unlike his father, who never disowned his origin in the *ancien régime*, he was a man of his own period.

He had the luck to grow up in an age when even his father could not entirely close his eyes to the importance of Liberalism. Among his tutors were distinguished men, such as Karl Menger, Ferdinand Hochstätter, Wilhelm Ambros, Adolf Exner, Gindely, and Zeisberg. Since the days of the Emperor Francis, thinking had been against the rules of the House of Hapsburg. Since those of Joseph II there had been no one so liberal in thought and so free from religious shackles as Rudolph early showed himself to be. In this he was his mother's son, and her influence in the decisive years of his youth is evident in the fact that Rudolph remained impervious to the atmosphere of the Catholic Imperial Court. His thoughts were anchored in natural science ; his conception of the duties of a sovereign, of State, and politics bore the rationalistic imprint of Liberalism. At the age of twenty he wrote an essay against the Austrian nobility. He sympathized with France. 'We must,' he wrote in 1882 to his friend Moriz Szepe, 'be deeply grateful to France as being the fountain of Liberal ideas and institutions on the Continent, and in all moments when great thoughts break forth

she will remain always as our pattern. Compared with France, what is Germany? Nothing but an enlarged rabble of Prussian soldiers, a purely military State. Of what profit has the year 1870 been to Germany? An Emperor has been added to the little kings and princes, she must support a much larger army, and bayonet points sustain an Empire united only by the soldiers, police, and zealous bureaucrats who serve it.' Rudolph, four and twenty years old, did not speak here as a Hapsburg, embittered by memories of 1866. These were the thoughts of a bourgeois Liberal; with the reservation certainly that, excepting the radical democrat Franz Mehring, no bourgeois journalist would have formulated this reasoning so audaciously. Rudolph went beyond the Liberals of his day when he said: 'The nationalist idea is based on purely animal principles. It imperils all the spiritual and cultural advantages which the ideas of the equality of Nations, cosmopolitanism, and humanity bring in their train.' He was free from the one-sidedness of Austrian Liberalism, which it showed when dealing with the question of the Slav Peoples. When the Emperor appointed him colonel, he himself chose a Bohemian regiment, with middle-class officers—the Jungbunzlauer Regiment, No. 36, which at that time was stationed in Prague. He took his service very seriously, and there is scarcely a word of truth in the Prague gossip that would make him out a Don Juan. Prague was, in 1882, a second-rate town, and its citadel was a narrow official and military quarter where the Emperor's son, the centre of observation, could not take a step without being followed by a thousand curious eyes. The only passion of the twenty-four-year-old colonel was journalism. He had his daily duties, which claimed much of his time; he had his Royal obligations; he was newly married; but he found the leisure to compose light articles and letters for the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*. He reported all the political and local news to the editor; he told him of things that were not yet ready for publication. 'I beg you,' he wrote repeatedly, 'to arrange things in such a way that not the slightest suspicion could fall on me.' He had to go—it was in June 1882—to Berlin for a Royal baptism. 'One baptism is very like another,' he remarked in a letter to Szeps, 'one a little more festive, another a little duller than usual; but

this one on June 11th in Berlin has a very serious background. The present unexampled tenderness between the Courts of Vienna and Berlin has been conjured into being by the alliance of the Western Powers and the spectacle of the fortunate, wealthy, and mighty French Republic, which, scarcely twelve years after Sedan, shows very plainly that republics can exist among the Great Powers of Europe, while Russia, in a state of delirium tremens, lies in painful internal convulsions, and is, as the mainstay of conservative principles, lost to the Holy Alliance.' Would this shrewd young man have dared talk in such a way to his father? Francis Joseph would have been horrified. To Moriz Szepe he could talk naturally. He could be ironic and malicious. In 1882 he wrote of the Foreign Minister, Count Kálnoky: 'Count K. is a great diplomat; his statement that the bombardment of Alexandria was a weighty decision was wonderful—what a pity that the whole of Europe wastes so much money on his diplomacy!' Could anyone with such sentiments become Emperor of Austria?

Rudolph had enemies; he was blamed for his friends. 'I am watched and distrusted on all sides, and I see more clearly day by day in what a narrow circle of espionage, denunciation, and supervision I am enclosed. . . . I had already grounds for believing,' he wrote to Szepe, 'that our friendship is known of in high circles; but now I have collected tangible evidence. Futtaky told me that Wodianer had asked him a few days ago whether it was true that you came often to the castle. You know Wodianer is the Archduke Albert's banker. Unfortunately, I know only too well the war methods of my enemies; first they sound, feel their way, lay traps by cross-questioning, and, when they are thoroughly prepared, they make a sudden attack. I have already had experience of it in a bad and shameful way.' Another time he wrote: 'I have had anonymous letters denouncing gentlemen with whom I am friends; warnings and lamentations from the well-meaning and pious; and quite open accusations, agitations, and denunciations about and against me addressed to "very high quarters"—all this I have already suffered.' We must always bear in mind that these were the words of a twenty-four-year-old, a Prince who, surrounded by enemies as well as flatterers, nevertheless formed his

own judgement. How extremely remote from the Court he must have felt when he talked, in the manner of the bourgeois journalists, of 'high quarters' in inverted commas. The 'very high quarters' is his father, the Emperor. He was imbued with Viennese journalistic scepticism. 'I get my ideas of what is happening in Vienna,' he wrote from Prague in 1883, 'from newspapers and private letters—financial swindles, thieving, caddishness in high places, brutal lawlessness, exceptional measures, corruption and breakdown of the State. As a simple onlooker, I am curious to know how such an old and tough organism as that of the Austrian Empire can last so long without cracking at the joints and breaking into pieces. . . . One cannot deny that Count Taaffe has a certain tapeworm-like tenacity.' The Crown Prince's anger was not a pose. One single incident shows how genuine his indignation was. In Prague some tipsy aristocrats had committed excesses in the Jewish quarter; their names were withheld, and the police pardoned the young gentlemen. The Crown Prince was furious. He knew his Empire too well, however, to attempt to do anything directly. He knew how hopeless such an attempt would be. Moreover, he did not wish to become mixed up in administrative measures. He sat down and wrote an article for the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* entitled 'Noble Window-breakers,' which appeared on March 18th, 1883. It was one of Rudolph's best articles. It mentioned the names of the hooligans. In an accompanying letter to the editor he said: 'In all haste I send you these lines, which in my opinion, merit publication. A few days ago, during the night, various blue-blooded young gentleman of the so-called highest, but God knows not the best, society broke the windows in the Jewish quarter in order to show their political sentiments in an aristocratic manner. At the head of this band stood the son of the pious Count Richard C., the heir to the childless Count Heinrich. . . . When a poor country lout breaks a window there is a great fuss made about it, yet these aristocratic ragamuffins can go scot free, their action unnoticed!' A number of Rudolph's contributions to the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* never appeared; the paper had not the courage to publish them; the father's Public Prosecutor would have confiscated the outpourings of the son.



In his own circle Rudolph was a stranger—not, certainly, to his mother, who was as much a stranger as he himself, but to his father, grandfather, and great-uncle ; beside the representatives of the two last generations of the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine he seemed to have the attributes of another race. He was a deviation from his family, but not different from thousands of young men of his age. Must one look for pathological reasons to explain why he sided with the opposition rather than with the Court? The type of Vienna youth of his day that later found literary expression in the works of Arthur Schnitzler did not differ from Rudolph. They enjoyed life, and suffered deeply at heart ; they played with life and death ; they were rationalistic in thought and sentimental in feeling, always entangled in love-affairs, and always ready to take leave of life in thrilling ecstasies. Each one of these young men, as Karl Menger said of the Crown Prince, was an excellent writer of *feuilletons*, and each one had his romance. Is not Schnitzler's popular work, *Liebelein*, with its tragic end, essentially the story of Rudolph? Hundreds of sharp, prying eyes have searched through Rudolph's biography without being able to discover the reason of his death. 'The Crown Prince,' writes the otherwise very accurate Viennese recorder, Mitis, 'nervous from youth, had already shown for some two years before his death striking alterations in his whole nature. Solitude, formerly a necessity for his literary work, became a torment to him. He hurled himself into wild amusements, took alcohol in large quantities, suffered from headaches, and cured himself with morphia. He showed a preference for stories of suicide, his mind ran on the thought of self-destruction, and he had numerous premonitions of death. Some explained this as the result of heredity ; some spoke of the effects of a fall from a horse.'

The facts stand in contradiction to such theories. Until the end of 1888 his correspondence with his intimates retained its old quality. Neither his mind nor his body had suffered. One thing certainly was true—he was not happy. On his thirtieth birthday, August 21st, 1888, five months before his death, he wrote to his friend : 'Many thanks for your letter and good wishes. They come from a true friend, and speak straight to the heart. The age of thirty marks an epoch in a lifetime, and not

altogether a happy one. Much time has passed, more or less usefully employed ; nevertheless, empty of real deeds and results. We live in a wearisome and corrupt age. Who knows how long it will continue ? And now every year I shall become older, staler, and less active ; for daily work, however necessary and useful, is wearing, and, together with perpetual self-education and the expectation of great reforming times, it must in the long run take its toll of one's creative powers ! A human life, when it is passed in restless movement, much of which, as I can say, is exhausting and harrowing because it consists of so many different kinds of occupation, is short—short in its epoch of true mental agility and productive power. However it be, we must believe in the future. I hope and rely on the next ten years.' Is this the speech of a man of 'wild amusements,' a drink-lover tormented by pathological disturbances, whose world has fallen about his ears ? He was embittered, sick of military pedantry from which he could not escape ; he felt that his best talents were wasted. All this, however, was the natural reaction of an intelligent man to a dictated scheme of life. His power of judgement was in no way diminished ; he was still clear-sighted in his observation of men and things. In August 1888 he wrote : 'William II progresses ; soon he will be ready to stir up a first-class muddle in old Europe ; he is just the man to do it . . . energetic and obstinate, considering himself a great genius—what more can one want ? In a few years he will be able to bring Hohenzollern Germany to the position which she deserves. . . . Please tell good Frischauer that during these last few days it has been impossible for me to see him.' Who else in 1888 judged the young German Emperor so clearly ? Rudolph with his thoughts, his way of speaking, his judgement, and his sentiments, had to go to Szeps and Frischauer. It was just his intellectual capacities that Francis Joseph did not take seriously. The Crown Prince was a general ; he had two brigades to look after ; everything else was withheld from him as much as formerly. He had given up literary work—perhaps out of a mature discernment that amateur journalism could not satisfy him for long. He avoided his study ; he shunned his home ; he was no longer a faithful husband. In this, too, he did not differ from the other young men of the Court and high society. His

freedom was restricted, his world within the capital very small. Unlike the Prince of Wales, he was not privileged to move *incognito* in a large city. In the confines of Vienna all walls have eyes and ears. The little romance was to prove his doom.

He first met the seventeen-year-old baroness, Mary Vetsera, at the carnival in 1887 at the Viennese Polish Ball. The young lady, a southern beauty with dark hair and blue eyes, who was very generally admired, lived, since the death of her father, a noble official of Bohemian descent, with her mother and sister in Vienna. Her mother, who came from a rich Greek merchant family, had many aristocratic connections in Vienna through her brothers and brothers-in-law. The four brothers Baltazzi owed their inclusion in aristocratic circles to their love of racing. In 1876 a horse bred by Alexander and Aristides won the English Derby. Hektor, the husband of Countess Ugarte, was famous as a gentleman jockey. Mary had seen the Crown Prince at race-meetings, in drives through the park, at balls, and at the opera; like many girls of her age, in the nobility and the bourgeoisie, she was in love with Rudolph. The Empress's niece, Countess Marie Larisch, arranged that the two should meet. Elizabeth's eldest brother, Duke Ludwig of Bavaria, had marriedmorganatically Henrietta Mendel, who later became Baroness von Wallersee. Their daughter came as a young baroness to the Vienna Court. The Empress was fond of her beautiful niece, who was also a splendid horsewoman. But, on noticing Marie's quickly awakened attachment to Rudolph, she married her off in 1878 to the cavalry officer Count Georg Larisch. 'When, in 1881, the Crown Prince married the Belgian Princess Stephanie'—so recounts Rudolph's tutor, Lieutenant-General Latour von Thurmburg—'the disappointed Countess set herself to disturb the marriage, whose weak points she soon discovered.' This gifted, restless woman, after being divorced by her husband, married first the opera singer Bruck, and later a Florida farmer, M. H. Meyers, whom she also left, and is now earning her living as a teacher in New York. She has been the object of much misplaced denunciation. She is given the devil's rôle in most Crown Prince Rudolph literature. Her part in the Mayerling tragedy was no small one, but there is no proof that she was led by such motives as Latour suggests.

She took a woman's pleasure in the service which she rendered to the two lovers, but she could not have guessed that the flirtation would end so tragically.

It was a typical Viennese romance that Rudolph found himself immersed in—a romance with secret drives in the park and hidden meetings, with speechless encounters at the opera and in the Freudenau, the Rotten Row of Vienna. Few towns make such a lovely background for little affairs of the heart as does Vienna; Rodaun and the 'Rote Stadl,' deeply embedded in forests, are the lovers' gardens of an ancient and aristocratic culture; besides the little summer resorts served by the Southern Railway, and the hotels nestling between vineyards and woodlands. In his love-affair the Crown Prince came very close to the heart of the city and its inhabitants. Thirty years old when the romance began, Rudolph was in many ways older and more experienced than other men of his age; nevertheless, this was the first time that he had felt the flame of a great love. The summer after his first meeting with Mary Vetsera he had to go to England for Queen Victoria's Jubilee. Shortly before his departure, the Baroness left Vienna to visit a sister residing in England. Her journey was known in Vienna, and was the occasion of a crisis in the Crown Prince's home. The Archduchess Stephanie refused to accompany her husband to England. Rudolph went alone, which fact did not pass unnoticed in Vienna, and was much commented on in London.

In a memorial which the Baroness's mother composed after her daughter's death, in self-vindication, she minimizes the duration of the affair, and speaks of a few 'fleeting weeks.' The known facts tell a different story. The Baroness was Rudolph's lover for more than a year. The relationship was no secret to the Emperor and Empress. The mother, tender-hearted and lovingly understanding, did not guess the danger that threatened her son through the burning heart of a young girl. It was not in her nature, even in matters that closely concerned her, to drag that which was hidden into the daylight. She herself was helpless against the conflicts and riddles of existence. She took the advice of the Munich Countess who brought her messages from the spirit world. Also she had no wish to meddle in her son's affairs, or to become a mediator between wife and son. Francis

Joseph, however, accustomed through years of exercise to be severe against himself, demanded from his son as a self-evident request that he should learn to renounce his human nature. The historians have omitted to mention the real problems of the Mayerling tragedy ; they were afraid to give the impression of an inhuman trait in the Emperor's character by admitting that his request had been the cause of his son's death. Nevertheless, this demand corresponded to Francis Joseph's nature, his consciousness of royalty, his self-mastery, his inner coldness. His character had been formed by his youthful subjection to restraint and the responsibilities which he had had to shoulder so early. He enhanced his mediocre talents by a perfection of self-discipline, by a sense of duty and propriety. The longer he reigned, the less did human relationships count for him. He lost the capacity for human joy and suffering. Perhaps Francis Joseph never knew that the art of gaining complete control of one's feelings is one which leads to impoverishment of the personality. He had had to renounce all natural emotions and inclinations so early. He who can permit himself no instinctive action, no free flight or delightful spiritual adventure, becomes the eternal guardian of the castle which he has built round himself. He becomes severe and irritable towards the undisciplined, who give way to every inclination and every emotion, even when there is a danger that it may lead them to a precipice and prove their downfall. In Francis Joseph it was no Goethean distaste for disorder and self-destruction that caused this hatred of want of discipline, but rather an aristocratic feeling for manners and good taste, which was noticeable in him, coupled with the petty-bourgeois and bureaucratic sense that had been peculiar to his House since the days of Francis. The Emperor had granted entire freedom to his son so long as he did not flout the conventions. When the Crown Prince offended against this highest law, and threatened the House with scandal, the Emperor became a stern critic. The family dinner summoned for Tuesday, January 29th, 1889, was intended to re-establish peace in the Crown Prince's house ; and to signify his return to the conventions, when he was to make good his word already pledged to the Emperor. On Wednesday, January 30th, Rudolph was dead.

The following details are beyond all question. Before the decisive conversation with the Emperor, the Crown Prince had made certain arrangements which give no indication of any intention of killing himself. Some four days before the catastrophe, in a letter addressed to Weilen, Rudolph had promised a contribution to the work *The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy* that was appearing under his patronage and with his collaboration. He hoped to find the time to do it in his shooting-lodge at Mayerling. Sunday, January 27th, was the evening of the famous *soirée* given by the German Ambassador, Prince Reuss, at which the Emperor, the Crown Prince, and Princess Stephanie were present. The following day, Monday afternoon, Rudolph left for Mayerling. The Crown Prince did not take part in the shoot arranged for January 29th with Prince Philip of Coburg and Count Josef Hoyos. Prince Coburg left in the evening for Vienna, intending to return the next day. Rudolph took the evening meal in the company of Count Hoyos. Another shoot had been arranged for Wednesday, January 30th, in time for which the Crown Prince was to be called. When he did not reply to the morning knock, Count Hoyos, Prince Coburg, who had returned from Vienna, and the Crown Prince's valet Loschek broke in the door of the bedroom. Here they discovered the bodies of the Crown Prince and the Baroness Mary Vetsera lying in bed. In the darkened room, filled with smoke from burnt-out candles, the method of death was not immediately obvious. Only on closer inspection were Rudolph's severe head-wounds and the Baroness's injuries visible. Prince Coburg guarded the bedroom and locked up the lodge, while Count Hoyos hurried to Baden in order to reach Vienna as quickly as possible by the Southern Railway. Among the letters which the Prince left behind him, only that addressed to Szögyényi, a high official in the Foreign Office, can be seen in its authentic text. 'Dear Szögyényi,' it ran, 'I am sending you a codicil, which please add to the will signed by me two years ago with the consent of my wife. In my workroom there is a little table standing next the sofa ; open the drawer with the enclosed key and you will find my writings. I entrust you to sift these, and sort out what you think fit for publication. I must leave this life. May you live happily. Yours, RUDOLPH.' Baroness

Vetsera had written three letters : to her mother, sister, and brother. If any doubt yet remained, it disappeared with the publication of these last lines of Mary Vetsera, which showed so clearly that the suicide was an act of free will on both sides.

Next to the Imperial couple, the mother of the Baroness was the person the most to be pitied in this tragedy ; not only had she lost her child, but she became the victim of angry reproaches and cruel suspicions. Her memorial, only circulated secretly in the lifetime of the monarchy, and published for the first time in 1921, is the cry of an injured mother whose child has been denied even a Christian burial. The transport of the half-dressed body, wedged between Count Stockau and Alexander Baltazzi, in the narrow conveyance, the interment almost before the hastily carpentered coffin had been closed, the prohibition, which kept her away from her own daughter's grave—all this gave the poor woman good grounds for her bitter lamentations and hard accusations against the Court, whose pitilessness was all the more terrible because it was uninspired by deep insight and undistinguished by magnanimity.

Philip had martyred his son, but he had real grounds for fearing him. It was the King's remedy against the madness of his own blood. The behaviour of the Vienna Court in the tragedy at Mayerling was dictated by the need to uphold etiquette. It is not true—what so many writers have taken pains to point out—that the Crown Prince was ill ; that he had become paralytic, incurably diseased, as the result of debauchery. Such facts would in the long run have been acknowledged. The historians of Crown Prince Rudolph were so anxious to see the Court's point of view that, even to-day, every conceivable reason is thought of, even to the length of talk of conspiracy, in order to avoid saying the simple truth—that Crown Prince Rudolph found it impossible to keep his pledged word, and therefore went to death with the woman he loved, who was not his wedded wife. This inexorable severity was not the mark of Court etiquette before the time of Francis Joseph. It would have been unthinkable under Maria Theresa, who, with all her standards of Royal dignity, knew how to smooth out human conflicts with a mother's touch. Joseph II did not know it, nor Leopold, nor Emperor Francis, who, as monarch, was content

with the knowledge of his own power. Under Francis Joseph, that personally unpretentious, unobtrusive being, for the first time Hapsburg etiquette aped the Vatican.

After the first untrue account of the Crown Prince's death, the Emperor himself agreed that the true reason should be made public. The former Lord Chamberlain, Prince Konstantin Hohenlohe, recounts that the Emperor listened silently to Taaffe with 'sunken head, his eyes covered with his hand.' Then he lifted up his head and said in a low voice : 'I owe my people the truth.' Etiquette forbade him to say more. On the day before the catastrophe, Baroness Vetsera had gone to the Chief of the Vienna Police and to Count Taaffe to ask for help in tracking down her missing daughter. Etiquette had risen like a blank wall to frustrate the anxious mother. Nobody would have dared to put his finger in matters which it was officially forbidden to mention. The Emperor, however, had his son's promise ; it was unthinkable that human frailty should get the better of this obligation. The Crown Prince's lover, who caused him to break the promise, was struck out of the record of history.

The Memoirs of Count Taaffe recall that on February 1st, 1889, he visited Baroness Vetsera to ask her for the moment to keep away from her daughter's grave. Her request to the Emperor to be allowed to justify herself remained unanswered. The grave at the Holy Cross was watched by the police, and on April 23rd, 1889, the Chief of the Vienna Police, Kraus, informed Taaffe, 'Baroness Vetsera came once a week to the Holy Cross, and each time laid camellias on the grave. She was last on Holy Saturday at the grave, which is still without a stone. To-day the camellias were still on the sunken grave.' A stone and a cross were later erected with an inscription : 'Mary, Baroness von Vetsera. Born March 19th, 1871. Died January 30th, 1889. "Man springs up like a flower and perishes."—Job xiv. 2.' Mary Vetsera was doubly dead in Austria until 1918 ; her name could not be mentioned publicly. The end of the Hapsburgs brought the removal of the ban.



## CHAPTER XXII

### FRANCIS JOSEPH AND HIS PEOPLES

**A**FTER the death of Don Carlos, Philip of Spain withdrew to the cloister of St. Jerome. His conduct earned him the approval of the Papal Nuncio, who wrote: 'He takes his loss as a father, but bears it with the patience of a Christian.' Francis Joseph also retired from the world, but to a more mundane and commonplace cloister—his study. He gave no sign of his grief, and only in one recorded sentence do we get some idea of what it was. 'What a burden Rudolph has placed on me,' he said to Johann Salvator, Rudolph's friend. Julius Andrassy declared himself utterly amazed when the Emperor, after receiving his condolences, immediately proceeded to talk about politics, giving no indication, in words or facial expression, of his sufferings.

For some time after the catastrophe the Empress remained by his side, driven to him by her own dread of solitude. On February 11th, six days after the burial of Rudolph in the Capucin crypt, the Imperial couple left Vienna. The Empress proposed a visit to the castle of Ofen, in Budapest. But the Hungarian capital was still agitated over the new military law, and the streets and the squares were filled with tumultuous demonstrations. The Empress's health did not improve; soon she was seriously ill. She left Budapest and proceeded to Wiesbaden to see Dr. Metzger, and later visited Ischl, Meran, and Corfu. Thence she wandered restlessly from place to place as if pursued by a ghost, and it was only in December of that terrible year that she returned to Vienna.

The Emperor's daily life now consisted of twelve to fourteen hours of detailed work dispatched with monastic accuracy. He woke at four in the morning. His bedroom was small, uncomfortable, and primitive; his bed was that of a common soldier. His valet slept beyond the curtained doorway, and all stories of servants watching him through peep-holes are inventions. The Emperor's servants had to be as inconspicuous as possible. The

man who personally attended to him for more than thirty years records that in all physical matters the Emperor was as shy as a young girl, it seeming almost to distress him that he had to sleep and eat. Shyness in face of his immediate attendants prevented him from giving orders or from ever changing any details of the daily routine. It would have distressed him to have to speak of his own needs. He never woke his valet, who kept watch, according to routine, with a shaded lamp beside him, listening for any noise. Francis Joseph never suggested that the old-fashioned wash-hand stand with its small basin should be replaced by a more modern apparatus. As soon as he got up in the morning, one of the valets, specially charged with this sole daily task, appeared with the rubber bath, a sponge, and towels, and proceeded to massage the Emperor, who underwent this process in a standing position. This bath attendant had a special daily routine. He kept watch the whole night, had everything ready for his job before four in the morning, and as soon as it was finished went to bed. It was not to be wondered at that during the long night he should beguile the time with liquor, but, according to Frau Katharina Schratt, the Emperor only once complained of his bath attendant, on an occasion when the servant was so unsteady at the job that he had to support himself on the Emperor to avoid falling. Francis Joseph had the keenest eye for any breach of etiquette, but he said nothing of this little misfortune, obviously because he knew that the experience itself was enough to warn the servant to keep off excessive drinking. Probably he did not even rebuke the man, and certainly he had no wish to enlist the services of another masseur.

Francis Joseph was now sixty years old. Within its framework of magnificence his life resembled that of the head of a Ministerial department. Two rooms sufficed him, a bedroom and a study, where he took his simple breakfast, consisting of coffee and a roll, though in the last years of his life the coffee was replaced by tea. He remained alone from 5 to 7 a.m. reading official papers. His grandfather, the Emperor Francis, had varied the intensity of his labour with long hours in which he had sat idly conning reports from the Court officials, like a schoolmaster looking through his pupils' note-books. Francis Joseph, on

the contrary, gave himself heart and soul to the daily task. His horn spectacles perched upon his nose, he devoured the papers placed in front of him by his principal secretary and his military staff, always bearing in mind that he was the head of a vast organization, and it was he who must speak the final word. His marginal annotations were brief, but, despite their impersonal character, they revealed more of him than the records of occasional short conversations. After half-past seven he received verbal reports from the departments. The Court officials and Ministers had to rise early. They had to begin their day well before six, and the Emperor judged them according to their ability to conform to his standards in this respect. It was chiefly because of his early habits that Koerber, although not in the same category as Taaffe, Gautsch, and Stürgkh, was popular with the Emperor. Wladimir Beck, a late riser, was permitted to give his daily report at eleven o'clock, but the Emperor always felt that this permission disturbed the clock-work regularity of the daily scheme. The other Court officials and servants who filled those posts for many years on end—men like Count Friedrich Beck-Rzikowsky, Chief of General Staff, Count Eduard Paar, Military Secretary, General von Bolfras, Chief of the Military Chancellery, and Dr. Kerzl, the household physician, loyally fell in with the Emperor's daily régime; nor was this enough; they must needs imitate such a personal matter as his method of trimming his beard. On the Emperor's desk was pinned a large sheet of paper, and the programme for every day was carefully written down, every single minute being accounted for, while birthdays, bereavements, receptions, audiences, and visits of members of the Royal family were noted down to jog the Emperor's memory. Large sheets of paper bearing the crest of the Private Chancellery were supplied for the monarch's correspondence, but Francis Joseph, with typical meticulousness, would always cut off the unused half of a sheet with a paper-knife. On this paper he wrote his orders and wishes, which were then telegraphed to their appointed destinations.

During his long reign his curriculum was never changed. In the course of time the typewriter supplanted the pen, the telephone the telegraph, the motor-car the carriage, but Francis

Joseph would have none of these changes. He never read a book, and the notion of progress was alien to him. His whole manner of thought was unhistorical, and he remained conservative in all his habits. No telephone was ever installed in his study ; he never set eyes upon a typewriter ; and only once did he use a car—when King Edward visited him at Ischl. His taste in clothing and in food remained unchanged through the years. At a quarter past twelve every day his lunch was served on a small table in his study. It consisted of soup, meat, and a glass of beer. His tastes, like his morals, were middle-class. With a regiment of magnificent cooks at his service, his midday meal never consisted of anything more elaborate than roast beef, a couple of sausages, or a faintly flavoured hash. The meal was washed down by 'Seidel' or 'Virginia' beer, the symbol of Viennese lower-middle-class contentment. Dinner at five o'clock, served with ceremony, was somewhat less simple, consisting of soup, entrée, beef or game, and a sweet. The Emperor would never sample the treasures of the Hapsburg cellar, and drank only Austrian wine, supplied by the monastery of the Scottish monks. After his dinner he generally had some business to finish off, retiring to bed at half-past eight. It has been alleged that Francis Joseph forced himself to this Spartan mode of life, but this was not so. It was the natural expression of his simple character and desires.

The Emperor was apt to get into grooves. In the first half of his reign circumstances certainly forced him to recognize that life does not stand still. Andrassy and Beust, Hohenwart and Schöffle, were not bureaucrats, but exponents of ideas. But with Taaffe's ministry the Emperor's mind became moored in a quiet backwater. It was certainly Taaffe's desire to free Austria from the lethargy of the Liberal régime, but he lacked the necessary historical vision which alone could show him in what direction he should steer. He was a danger despite his good intentions, because he always gave in to the Emperor's whims. Both wished to transcend the Liberal phase, but their intellects could not grasp the problems of the Empire.

In 1889 the elections in Bohemia went in favour of the Young Czechs. This was an important development. It meant that the Extremists had triumphed over the compromisers. The

victory was inevitable, for under the leadership of the radical intellectuals the middle-classes and peasants had emancipated themselves from the dominion of the Old Czechs and the nobility and had begun to think for themselves. Similar causes had produced different effects in the German ranks, giving birth to the Christian Social Party and to the Nationalist Anti-Semitic Movement, while the Czechs advanced under the very different standards of democracy and social progress.

How the Emperor viewed these changes is shown by his remark to the Moravian Deputy, Fandrlík, after the Parliamentary dinner which inaugurated the new session. 'We have a lot of queer customers who've come to the surface,' he said. 'We must take energetic measures against them.' In the case of Hungary he had come to realize that 'energetic measures' led nowhere : Deák and Andrassy had taught him that lesson. But now he had no one to hold his hand or show him the way, and he stumbled helplessly. General Kraus, whose help he had called in for a display of 'energy,' had not managed to impede the progress of the Young Czechs. Now he was removed from his governor's post in Bohemia and replaced by Count Thun.

Franz Thun, a wealthy and not unaccomplished gentleman, with plenty of self-confidence and an imposing exterior, was amicably inclined to the Czechs. His ideas, moreover, corresponded altogether to those of the Bohemian nobility. It looked as though he were intended to perform a very special function, for the Emperor, after the manœuvres at Leitomischl, in Bohemia, administered the oath to him in circumstances of great solemnity. The Czechs called him 'the Viceroy.' Taaffe had no particular intentions of the kind hinted at, but to avoid friction with the Czechs he uttered no disclaimer. The Germans continued to absent themselves from the Bohemian Diet. Finally, in the Reichsrat, Taaffe made a pronouncement which did not exclude the possibility of a revision of the Constitution, but declared that the present moment was unsuitable for the project of crowning the Emperor King of Bohemia. Later it was known that a governmental proclamation announcing that such a coronation ceremony would take place had been drawn up by the Finance Minister, a Pole named Dunajewsky, but repudiated by a Cabinet Council under the Emperor's presi-

dency, owing to the remonstrances of the Foreign Minister Kálnoky.

Both Germans and Czechs were now out of humour, but a new possibility of negotiation arose. Taaffe's man-of-all-work, Blumenstock, who later changed his name to Halban on being nominated a Court Councillor, had been deputed to inquire of the Germans whether they would make a new attempt to reach an understanding. At the beginning of the new year, on January 4th, 1890, Germans and Czechs found themselves seated in conference at the Palais Modena, the Prime Minister's headquarters in the Herrengasse. The Germans were represented by Eduard Plener and Hallwich, Scharschmid, Schlesinger, and Schmeykal, the finest examples of the German-Bohemian Liberal type. Hallwich, no less cultivated than Plener, later obtained celebrity as an historian with his great biography of Wallenstein. Schmeykal was the political mouth-piece of the wealthy German bourgeoisie of Bohemia, a man with all the merits and all the limitations of his class. Opposite these sat the Czech representatives, Rieger, Mattusch, and Zeithammer, as well as the grandees of the Bohemian nobility—Prince Georg Lobkowitz; Richard Clam-Martinitz, a friend of Rieger, who defended the historic rights of the Bohemian State, without, however, any of the fire or skill of his more celebrated brother; Count Friedrich Karl Kinsky, and Prince Schönburg. Pražak, Gautsch, and Schönborn, Taaffe's Ministers, took a lively share in the meeting, especially the two latter, who were thoroughly well versed in the difficult matters under debate, and frequently helped negotiators by advancing well-thought-out projects for legislation. Yet all the efforts of this assembly of distinguished men to bring about a reconciliation of the two Peoples by solving the language dispute were of no effect in the realm of politics. The advocates of the two parties were German Liberals on the one side, Old Czechs on the other. It was the last time that they were to function as representatives of their respective Peoples, and all of them, Rieger and Mattusch equally with Plener and Schmeykal, appeared to be under the shadow of a common doom.

Nations know no gratitude; every generation, every class, as it arises, rages against the gods and heroes of the past in youthful

enthusiasm for its own new idols. The victory of the Young Czechs had altogether changed the outlook. A mistake had been made which could no longer be remedied. Francis Joseph's words and Taaffe's lack of historical sense had kept the 'queer customers,' the Young Czechs, away from the conference, a mistake which Plener himself describes as 'Taaffe's supreme error, which cost so dreadful a price.' It was of little use that the negotiators envisaged the possibility of fixing the respective rights of the two languages in the law courts, the schools, and the municipalities. The persons who reached this realization no longer were backed by the confidence of the Nations they were supposed to represent, and their work was therefore vain. Taaffe's endeavours were two years too late.

Scenes both in the Prague Diet and in the Vienna Chamber of Deputies were soon to reveal the measure in which the situation had moved against Taaffe and his policy of conciliation. Had this policy been pursued with ten times more skill and vigour, it would yet have come up against the resistance of the Young Czechs, whose victorious strength thrust aside all would-be mediators. The movement of the young Radicals gathered force in Bohemia like a swollen mountain stream which sweeps away the products of careful husbandry. The stream was fed from many sources : from the peasants' cottage, from the workmen's dwellings, and from the meeting-places of the awakening proletariat. The Czech peasants bitterly resented two elements in the economic structure of the country—the landowners and the industries. The great landowners enjoyed surpassing advantages, the laws of entailment protecting them for all time, while the credit facilities of the great banks were at their command. The middle and small farmers could not compete against the colossal estates of the nobility. It was from the small farms that the best elements of the Czech people had arisen—law-abiding and industrious individuals, who were content with a minimum and averse from upheavals. But with the industrialization of the great estates corn cultivation began to make way for sugar-beet crops. The revenue increased, but more and more independent peasants degenerated into hired labourers. The surplus farming population was driven away to the industrial centres, where they had to embark upon a new

and altogether strange mode of existence. The Emperor, in his blind ignorance, spoke of 'queer customers.' In truth, a veritable migration of Peoples was taking place, with great social and political effects. There was pathos in this uprooting of the Czech farmers. Away from their native fields, they still remembered the songs, a medley of melancholy and gaiety, which had resounded in the evenings round the village pond. Their language, and the memories of the colours of the familiar landscape and of the red and white costume of the peasantry, remained with them ; but that was all. In the north Bohemian industrial towns they became proletarians. They no longer lived on the broad spaces of the Bohemian plains, under the open sky. Miserable hovels and industrial barracks were now their homes. During those merciless years, when all the world was following in Manchester's wake, the north Bohemian textile industry and the west Bohemian coal-mining industry had been founded upon the unrestricted exploitation of millions of local Germans. Now that the German population had been decimated, or drawn away elsewhere by the attraction of higher wages, the Czech peasantry began to fill up the places left vacant by the exhausted or departed Germans. Short-sighted and dull-witted, if not actually malevolent, persons invented a catch-phrase about an organized campaign of conquest directed against the German industrial centres. But it was not national propaganda, it was sheer need, which dislodged the farmer from his field, and many were the consequences of the migration, both for Czech agriculture and for German industry. The extreme national parties owed their success to a romantic interpretation of these great movements. The Czech peasant, terrified by what was happening, found relief in promises of a restoration of the old happy country tradition. The Czech State of the future, promised by the Young Czechs, was to bring social justice. The Young Czechs appealed to the strength, the independent spirit, and the home-sickness of the peasantry. The uprooted proletariat, in bitter despair at the gloom of its new existence, swelled the ranks of the Socialist Party, which won a vast extension in north Bohemia and in the mines. The Young Czech intellectuals also followed extreme currents. They, too, had no room for self-expression. There was no developed Czech industry,



wholesale trading was in German hands, and there was hardly any career opened to them save the service of the State. Hence the fight for use of the Czech language was for them a fight for their career, and coincided with the greatest intellectual revival which the Czech youth had yet experienced. It was as though all the currents flowing through Europe had converged, and were suddenly pouring their abundance into the bosom of the Czech people, to whom their young intellectuals simultaneously introduced German Socialist theory and Scandinavian literature, Karl Marx and Ibsen, Spencer and German popular philosophy, Dostoevski and Nietzsche, the French naturalists and Strindberg. The Young Czechs devoted themselves with astonishing energy to translating and commenting on these works ; but still more amazing was the capacity of the Czech people, the possessors of only one great city, to absorb what was given them.

The change took place at feverish speed. Only lately the Old Czechs had exercised unchallenged dominion in Czech politics ; in 1888 the whole nation had applauded Rieger on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. Three years later this distinguished and meritorious leader, friend of the great man of the nation, Palacky, was abandoned. The Young Czechs, headed by Julius Greg, took up the inheritance. But the creed of their fathers, though but lately formulated, could not suffice the young men. A programme based on arguments of national history and natural law left them unmoved ; they turned to philosophy, and became political extremists.

The whole of Bohemia—peasants, petty bourgeoisie, workers and students—were implicated in the change, and the effects of it were felt even in Vienna. Compared with the uprooted son of the soil, who went to seek work in the industry of northern Bohemia, happy was the young Czech who set out to finish his training in Vienna. Long before the disconsolate procession of peasants to the industrial centres began, the Imperial capital had received numberless sons of Bohemia and of Moravia within her walls. First came hundreds of thousands of handicraft men, seeking employment in the great and wealthy city, soon followed by thousands of workmen who swelled the numbers in the growing industrial suburbs of Vienna. Certainly, in Vienna,

German expansion progressed peacefully enough. In the course of years millions of Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia were modelled to the Viennese type without force or pressure ; the quiet charm of Vienna was sufficient. Pacific and splendidly human, Vienna lifted every new citizen to a higher level of humanity, even while the struggle of the nationalities raged around. In this process there was no loser ; neither the German nation—for, thanks to it, the dialect of Vienna became the most musical of all German manners of speech—nor yet the immigrants, who plunged willingly and pleasurably into this *milieu*, and thereby enriched and broadened their outlook. Only Paris could rival Hapsburg Vienna in performing the miracle of attracting the foreigner and moulding him anew. This was Vienna's contribution to German culture.

Francis Joseph understood nothing of all these changes. He lacked the historical understanding which would have enabled him to distinguish any unity among the various new appearances which met his eye. The German counterpart to Czech extremism was the anti-Semitic movement in Vienna and the provinces. The Czech bourgeoisie had a national history and national aspirations to keep it from the temptation of abusing the confidence of the people. The Austrian Germans were less fortunate ; before their eyes there floated no vision of a national community which symbolized their membership in the world of German culture. Moreover, social distinctions were more marked among them than among the Czechs, and kept them divided one from the other. German Liberalism was a precious flower which had sprung from the uppermost soil, and had no roots in the depths of the people. The men of culture thought and spoke only for one another. Intellect and wealth, banded in alliance, forgot that the day might come when those without learning and without possessions might rise to question their leadership.

It was among the university students of modest origin in the German provinces that the anti-Liberal agitation began. Arriving to study at the University of Vienna, these sons of small families, without means, were too shy and awkward to take their part in the life of the great city ; they remained banded together in provincial societies and conventicles. Indeed, the more shy

and awkward they were, the more eagerly did they imbibe romantic theories which placed their own social and national distress in an ancient historical setting. These young students detested everything outside their narrow horizon ; they hated the great city, with its teeming life ; they hated the industries and the great trading-houses, which threatened the idyllic existence of the craftsman and the little shop-owner. They only felt at home in their students' federations, where the heroic standard of the picture-books prevailed. They saw themselves as ancient Germans among the enemy hosts. As Arminius the Cheruscan, had gone out to fight the Romans, so his descendants armed themselves against the Jews. Later, as lawyers and employees in the little towns of German Bohemia, these ex-students displayed their hatred of Liberalism, and impregnated the middle and lower-middle classes with those doctrines which led to the growth of new parties.

The origin of Viennese anti-Semitism was similar but not identical. Impressed by the spectacle of industrial development and of Liberal trade legislation a host of small tradesmen had arisen who cared nothing for Liberalism or for Socialism. For years they had been faithful adherents of democracy, but the spate of company promotions, the extravagant movements of the Stock Exchange, and the great financial panic, combined with the experience of the competition of the great industries against their own means of existence, inclined them towards a new doctrine which diverted their depression and resentment into hatred of the Jews.

Austria was fundamentally changing. Hitherto the nobles and the wealthiest citizens had made their voices heard above all others, but now from all the people came indications that a third class was preparing to mount the political stage. Meanwhile the fourth class, the workers of Austria, had already found their spokesman. At the first International Socialist Congress in Paris there was an address on the condition of Austria. The speaker was Dr. Viktor Adler, a Viennese physician aged thirty-seven. The matter and manner of his speech marked him out as an Austrian thinker of the first rank. 'Austrian liberty,' he declared, 'is a hybrid creature, mid-way between Russian liberty and German liberty. In shape it is German, in execu-

tion Russian. Apart from France and England, Austria has perhaps the most Liberal legislation in all Europe, and seems almost to be a republic, with a crowned head instead of a president at the summit. Unfortunately, in practice it is not the provision of the law, but the whim of the police officer in question which counts. The police officer is empowered to suspend all legal liberties, and, as you may imagine, he uses and misuses this right abundantly. The Austrian Government is equally incapable of performing an act of justice or an act of oppression with thoroughness. It sways hither and thither. It is a system of despotism tempered by mismanagement.' From 1890 till the end of Austria, never was so apt a judgement delivered. His criticism was severe, yet it enshrined the fairest memorial to the departed Empire.

Adler's words applied with special aptitude to Taaffe's Government, which was typically Austrian in the best sense, for it did not make life a misery to its subjects. Taaffe's Government exerted authority dispassionately, refusing to be hypnotized by the advocates of Liberal doctrine, who pointed a stern finger towards the traditions of Emperor Joseph ; nor would it embark upon experiments in local autonomy. Both the good and the bad in this Government, both its humanity and its lack of initiative, sprang from the aristocratic Austrian sense that a man is something more important than a State. Taaffe thought he could reconcile Peoples and parties by talking to them kindly and urging them to make it up. He thought that it only needed a few small accommodations such as he could bring about to make Austria a happy home for ten Nations. Viewed from the opposite angle, from the standpoint of the awakening Nations and classes, this soft-speeched conciliatory Government bore the mark of an intellectual fraud. The petty bourgeoisie of both the German and the Czech Nations departed from Austrian type when they found the need for swollen sentiments and big language to support their programme. Among the Germans the anti-Semitic movement took on a Pan-German and Palæo-Prussian colour, while the Czechs decked out their opposition with memories of Huss. Yet beneath the scurrilous exterior of the first and the antiquarian appearance of the second there was something genuine—a painful yearning for national emancipa-

tion. Austria, meanwhile, like a misunderstood mother, angled for the affections of her children, hesitating between the efficacy of caresses or chastisement, as the Nations on their side fluctuated between tenderness and hatred towards her.

The rise of the new parties made a certain impression upon Taaffe. The Old Czechs had been an essential part of his majority. He was obliged now to look for new allies, and, in consequence of the attempted conciliation with the Czechs, he now felt himself drawn close to the German Liberals. Kálnoky advised the Emperor to propitiate the Germans. Taaffe had made up his mind to this, and expected that when the new elections took place his real adversaries, the Germans of the Left, would suffer losses. In pursuing this thought, however, he came up against the spokesman of the old majority, Finance Minister Dunajewski, who was an enemy of the Germans, and even at heart of the German-Hungarian settlement. The Emperor decided in favour of conciliation, and Dunajewski was dropped.

In his place, Taaffe called up the departmental head of the Finance Ministry, Dr. Emil Steinbach. Steinbach, who was recommended by Count Schonborn, Minister of Justice, was in more than one respect a remarkable person. He was a living example of the high estimate in which men of talent were held in Austria under Francis Joseph. Ernst von Plener, having been offended by Steinbach, referred to him in his Memoirs as 'the Jew from Budapest, who, after a timely conversion, later became an ostentatious Catholic.' The Emperor, however, showed himself more liberal than the Liberal leader, and took no offence at Steinbach's origin; nor, for all his own exalted birth, did Count Schönborn. It was perfectly true that Steinbach originated in the Königsgasse in Budapest, a street of little Jewish shops; it did not prevent him from being one of the most original and universally talented persons in a bureaucracy which was not poor in such talents. Alexander Spitzmüller, later Finance Minister, said of him that there was no case in the history of the Austrian State in which a civil servant had been active along such a variety of lines, or exerted so potent an influence as Steinbach in the Ministry of Justice.

It was Steinbach who breathed into the Austrian legal code

the spirit of social reform, and it was he who introduced legislation for insurance against accidents and sickness. Another proposal fathered by him was the project advanced in 1891 for creating conciliatory organizations to bridge the gulf between employers and workpeople. The plan also comprised compulsory workmen's councils in the factory. Two other great reforms are linked with his name, the currency reform and the reorganization of direct taxation. Yet his greatest service no doubt was that he won over Taaffe to the cause of universal suffrage in October 1893.

Taaffe dissolved the Chamber of Deputies in 1891, and, narrow though the electorate was, yet when the House met again it had undergone great changes. The German Left had, indeed, not succumbed to the great assault, yet there appeared the first representative of the petty bourgeois extremist parties, German Nationalists and Christian Socialists, who included Dr. Karl Lueger, the most gifted popular orator in Vienna—a demagogue, but a lovable one. The Old Czechs had been wiped out by the Young Czechs. Rieger was no longer a member.

In the summer of this year the Great Industrial Exhibition was opened at Prague, to commemorate the coronation of Leopold II as King of Bohemia a hundred years before. The Emperor wished to take part in this commemoration, and hoped that a visit to Prague might help towards making a settlement with the Czechs. The history of this journey gives us a glimpse into the life of bygone Austria. The Exhibition was organized by the provincial authorities of Bohemia, and was intended to illustrate the economic strength and the progressiveness of this most highly industrialized province of Austria. The Czechs were a majority in the province, and naturally this fact left its mark on the Exhibition, yet the Germans at that time were in possession of far the greater part of the industry, and, equally naturally, this was bound to come to light in the Exhibition. The German group in the Diet, however, had made its participation in the Exhibition conditional on the attitude of the Czechs towards the negotiations for a national settlement. After the Young Czechs' victory, however, there was no prospect whatever for one of the principal demands of the Germans, namely, that the Bohemian administration should be divided

into two parts. Consequently the German group decided not to patronize the Exhibition, a decision condemned by the Governor, Count Thun, in a cypher telegram to Taaffe, as 'petty.' The telegram is marked behind, 'Seen by His Majesty, May 15th, 1891.'

The Czechs now enjoyed a free hand, and proceeded totally to ignore the Germans. The Hapsburg crown figured, indeed, prominently in the Exhibition, but, as this was in honour of the coronation of Leopold II, there was an implicit snub to Vienna, for the commemoration carried with it a declaration of loyalty to the claim of Bohemian autonomy. The note of the Exhibition was thus a spirit of opposition combined with loyalty to the Crown. Above all, however, it was intended to be a demonstration of Czech nationalism, and as such to engage the sympathies of all Slavs. This annoyed the Court as well as the German party, but it was typical both of Austria and of Czech feeling at that time that the Exhibition authorities should desire to receive the Emperor as the guest of honour. They counted upon the Imperial visit. In June the first report of the Emperor's intention to come to Bohemia reached Prague. Prince Lobkowitz, Marshal of the Province, wrote to Taaffe that if the Emperor came there would be a great demonstration of loyalty, in which all the prefects and mayors would take part. 'Everything depends whether you think,' he wrote, 'that His Majesty would permit such a demonstration.' The Emperor agreed to the plan, but Taaffe laid it down as a condition that both Nations should be represented at the reception. Meanwhile the Governor, Count Thun, was sick with typhus. Taaffe wrote to Lobkowitz that in view of the Governor's ill-health His Majesty wished to spare him all trouble, and would therefore provisionally put off his journey to Prague from July 8th to September 18th. But this humane consideration had lamentable consequences. The German Nationalists proclaimed with delight that the Emperor was not coming to Prague, while the Czechs were deeply annoyed. The Czechs, however, were spurred on by the absence of the Germans and by the postponement of the Emperor's visit to make the Exhibition a grandiose success, despite these circumstances, and, moreover, to give it a specifically national character.

They appealed to the Czechs abroad and to their brother Slavs, nor was the appeal in vain. Trains with visitors from all countries, even America, arrived daily. Inevitably, among all these rejoicings and receptions a political note was struck. Taaffe became nervous. A Polish deputation sang the National Polish Hymn, '*Boże, coś Polskie*,' and Pan-Slav speeches were pronounced in the Teinkirche at Prague. Finally the police were called in, a Government order being dispatched on June 26th, 1891, from Vienna to the Governor's office in Prague declaring that this was a case of 'carefully planned demonstrations.'

Any one not blind to the circumstances of Austria could see that each race within the Empire really faced two ways, turning its eyes on the one side to Vienna and on the other to its fellows beyond the frontiers. Any large demonstration of Germans in Bohemia must needs have a Pan-German character, while any Czech demonstration must similarly use the language of Pan-Slavism. Those very peoples who but recently were awaiting the Emperor's visit with eagerness, immediately afterwards became suspect in the eyes of the police. It must be confessed that Count Thun, even if on occasion he could play the part of an Alba, was very reasonable in this case, and urged the Prime Minister not to take police measures. 'There has never been a great festival,' he wrote, 'in which nationalist tones were not heard. I remember how it was at various receptions in connection with song festivals and shooting expeditions, at the Exhibition in Pest and other such occasions. Inevitably, in the addresses of welcome, that which links the host and the guest rather than that which divides must find expression. If they are Slavs, then historic memories and racial ties common to the Slavs must be introduced to leaven the speeches. Political Pan-Slavism, as regards Bohemia, is out of the question. . . . There is no city in the world where thousands of people do not congregate at certain points if they think there will be something particular to see. . . . Only one attempt has been made to start singing in the streets, and this was stopped by the patrol outside the Blue Star Hotel. Rumours of shouting and groaning outside the German Casino, reported by the *Bohemia*, are not confirmed by the police. . . . The one point I dislike is the visit of



the French, who let themselves be misled by political passion into seeking among the Czechs the same hatred for the Germans which they themselves feel. . . . I trust that the athletic festival will pass off without incident. The foolish words which will be spoken, the appeals to the Bohemians to show themselves "*Frisch, Frei, Fröhlich, Fromm*" ("Bold, free, gay, and pious"), will disappear into thin air, like the similar idiocies which we hear at any German athletic festival.' This report of Thun to Taaffe is typical of Austria. It shows the ruling aristocrat taking pains to view the national problem from a human standpoint. From this standpoint national enthusiasm becomes dangerous when it leads to shouts and groans underneath somebody else's window. Typically Austrian, too, is the picture of the Imperial Royal Police of Prague protecting the German Casino, while in the narrow streets of the old city a young people has its fling. Taaffe had the Hapsburg outlook: for him any Nationalism not dressed up in black and yellow was suspect. Thun's outlook was human: all Nationalism appeared to him to be a form of idiocy. But great history was in the making in these little scenes in the streets of Prague.

Francis Joseph's Government cannot be taxed with harshness so far as concerns the way in which the Emperor himself, first in Vienna and then in his summer residence at Ischl, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Governor, and a host of employees dealt with the matters which held them in such suspense. The Austrian régime in the early 'nineties was a police régime to this extent—that it endeavoured to subject natural forces, such as national consciousness, to supervision by the police. But this example shows that the attempt was vain. Force is rightly employed when all other methods of government have failed. No State, not even Great Britain or France, hesitates to send its police to break up undesirable assemblies. But Francis Joseph could not easily bring himself to such a decision. This can be seen from the telegram which he addressed to Taaffe from Ischl on July 31st, 1891: 'I hear that even the Russians are coming to Prague now. A repetition of those scandalous scenes must be avoided. Surely an official reception with speeches could be forbidden, couldn't it? Every

day it seems to me more doubtful whether I can decently go to Prague.'

It is hardly the language of a despot, this 'couldn't it?' Francis Joseph asked no more than a minimum. Even the weakest post-war State in Europe, the Republic of Austria under Dr. Seipel has addressed its citizens in much more dictatorial tones than did the great Empire of Francis Joseph.

The Emperor, Taaffe, and Thun were kept for some time longer in suspense by the excitement in Prague, but finally Francis Joseph departed for the Bohemian capital, and received there salutations no less warm and hearty than had recently been accorded to the Slavs from across the frontier. It was part of the difficult governmental practice of bygone Austria that when the Emperor visited bilingual territories he had to use both languages. It was strictly laid down in the protocol that he should open his reply in the language of the majority of the province, and then switch over to the other language; he always read these speeches straight off the paper in his hand. It was carefully laid down how many sentences, of what length, and what importance, should be in each language. In Prague the Emperor began in Czech, continued in German, and concluded in Czech, and the newspaper reports recorded the points at which he switched over from one language to another. The same etiquette was observed at Reichenberg, the principal German State in Bohemia. Here, too, the Emperor opened his speech in Czech and continued in German.

Journeys like this, which cost him no little exertion, were regarded by the Emperor as a necessary part of the work of government. Sceptic though he was, he was persuaded that he had promoted peace in Bohemia. Taaffe was still more of a sceptic, and he took the shouts and the groans less seriously. He could not think that the gestures of the Nationalists had any great significance, looking at them from his own point of view—that of an aristocrat devoid of national feeling, and with all the indifference of the cultivated Viennese to such appeals. He could not believe that it was impossible to resolve a conflict between two Peoples who had lived for two centuries alongside of each other. He could not understand what nationality meant, and it passed his comprehension that Germans and Czechs

should feel a loyalty as citizens to the supernational State even while their language and their ideas linked them to a national unit outside the Hapsburg domain. Nationality, in his view, was a matter of language, and surely it should suffice to permit the Slav subjects of the Empire to use their own mother tongue alongside of German where that might be necessary for mutual understanding in their dealings with the authorities ? In such forms did Taaffe envisage the problem of Austria. It would be wrong, however, to depict him on that account as a backward-minded individual. Who else was there at this time who had diagnosed the troubles of Austria more surely ? The Germans were occupied in quarrelling over their hereditary privileges, which lay heavily upon them, trammelling their liberty of outlook, even though they honestly believed that in defending their possessions they were strengthening the foundations of the State.

In truth, it was impossible to satisfy the aspiration of the Czechs and the South Slavs for a national existence within the Empire otherwise than by radical reforms. In the beginning of January 1893, Taaffe published a new governmental programme. The author of the document was Baron Gautsch, who promised a settlement of the language question and urged the greater parties to form a coalition. The appeal was left unanswered. The Young Czechs replied through the mouth-piece of Dr. Pacak : 'No settlement without autonomy,' while the Germans remained unmoved. The Nationalists meanwhile had become so extreme as to seize upon any opportunity of making their voice heard in opposition. Even the Currency Reform, which, under the leadership of Steinbach, placed Austria's currency on a gold basis, was greeted with howls from the new extreme parties. Austria had for decades suffered under the depreciation of her currency, an unfortunate heritage of the wars of 1859 and 1866. Since State notes had been issued in 1866 there were two types of unredeemable currency in circulation. In 1891 there were bank-notes for 455 millions, and State notes for 378 millions circulating. The notes fluctuated in value below par to such an extent that stabilization was absolutely necessary. Three years earlier, Parliament had unanimously voted for this reform. Yet now it required a great

effort to bring Steinbach's reform on to the statute book, and success was finally due in no small measure to Moriz Benedikt, who led the journalistic campaign in favour of the reform in the *Neue Freie Presse* with tireless zeal. It was two parties representing the progressive bourgeois class—the German Liberals and the Czechs—who finally brought the measure into port. But the chorus of the opponents of the reform bore witness to the new extremism which had arisen in Austria. Allied with the agrarian and petty bourgeois anti-Semites, and with the old-fashioned clericals, stood the Viennese Christian Socialists, and their leader, Dr. Lueger, poured forth his rousing eloquence against the new 'Jew money.' Yet if money had united the bourgeois parties for once, on national questions they remained altogether divided. It fell to T. G. Masaryk, Professor at the University of Prague, to demonstrate the breadth of the gulf, and to define it as impassable. The Left, he declared, desired a uniform Austria under German leadership, while the Czechs fought for the political independence of Bohemia, a claim supported by the historical traditions which inspired the whole people. The Germans, he said, were prepared to give them autonomy only in isolated details of administration. The Czechs could be satisfied with nothing short of political autonomy, with the Governor answerable to the Diet. But national development could not be held in check; it led naturally, Masaryk declared, to an ever wider measure of self-determination of Peoples and countries. The endeavour to hold fast to an immobile centralist system must result in political slavery; therefore the German Left, once the champion of political freedom, was now reactionary, showing hesitation and distress even in face of the proposed extension of the suffrage. The Germans were politically and nationally saturated, and now desired only to consolidate their possessions. Therefore they had become the advocates of general torpor.

With the best will in the world, Taaffe had little prospect of succeeding with his settlement policy in the face of such irreconcilable differences between those whom he sought to bring together. In April 1893 he had four Bills introduced in the Bohemian Diet which showed a serious endeavour to deal with the language question. This only landed the whole settle-

ment policy in confusion. There was one Bill in particular which provided for creation of a permanent district court at Trautenau, and eight German assize districts, and so enraged the Czechs that they impeded the introduction of the Bill with violent outbreaks. In later times there were still more tempestuous sessions, but in May 1893 the replacement of wordy warfare by the warfare of fists and rowdy singing was a novelty. The Bohemian Diet was closed, and the settlement was seen to be a forlorn hope.

Those, however, who deduced from the turbulent manner of the Czechs that they were lacking in political understanding and education, were attaching too much importance to the surface form and overlooking the deeper realities. The Bohemian question could not be understood by anyone who sought to pass moral judgement on the laws of national development, nor could it be dealt with by any one who relied upon the sabres of the police. The scenes in the Bohemian Diet only confirmed the sad certainty that the petty methods employed by Austrian Governments simply could not avail to settle this question, fundamental to the Empire, which since Kremsier had been constantly suppressed and misunderstood, but ever recurred and never came to rest. The year 1893 was one of the most critical for the Empire. Austria was still strong enough to carry through a great work of reformation. She did not do so. Instead, an extraordinary development occurred. Spurred on by the Emperor's annoyance, Taaffe showed energy, Thun became fierce, and Prague was placed under a special régime. Trial by jury was suspended, societies were dissolved, the right of association was withdrawn, and the Press was subjected to restriction. Moreover, the seeds of new hatred were sown by persecutions against the youth of the Czech nation. True enough, the younger generation was extremist. This was its '*Sturm und Drang*' period. Yet any one with an eye for history must have realized that the chaotic 'Omladina' movement was more than a mere agitation against the State.

In a few years the youth of Bohemia had lived through the experiences which for most are spread out over several decades—the struggle between Nationalism and Socialism, individualism and reverence for racial catchwords, romanticism and

critical scepticism. These were the birth-pangs of a young intellectual world. But this process, which was far from crude Nationalism and might have brought valuable fruits even to Austria, the police were called in to suppress with the power of the fist. History, however, has its own strange logic. Those very young men whom Thun arrested and brought before the exceptional courts enjoyed later a resurrection as Ministers and revolutionary Deputies of the Czecho-Slovak Republic of 1918.

A peculiarity of bygone Austria was that, if disturbed from her slumbers, she easily became wild and brutal, and hit about blindly in all directions. The general measure of liberties was very large, but the police were extremely sensitive to two things—Socialist propaganda and anti-monarchical utterances. The Prague Youth Movement was suspected of both. The Austrian Socialists also were to pass through a period of repression, even though it had successfully got over the infantile malady of anarchism, and had, after the party meeting at Hainfeld, acquired the shape of a party based on well-reasoned theories under the leadership of Viktor Adler. Taaffe, of course, was without any understanding for the meaning of Socialist aspirations. It was not, indeed, his fault alone if he found himself shaking off his Austrian languor, and cutting the figure of a persecutor of the Socialists. It was a much greater man than he who, as enemy of the disciples of Marx, cast his shadow over Austria—Bismarck. There was a tradition in Austria that Bismarck was infallible, hence Bismarck's anti-Socialist legislation produced a profound impression in Austria. A considerable time was necessary before Taaffe could attain to the notion that a State which was threatened by Nationalist agitations had nothing really to fear from a movement which condemned Nationalism as a bourgeois extravagance.

Taaffe no doubt more frequently heard this point of view after Emil Steinbach entered the Cabinet. Steinbach was what was known in Germany as a pulpit Socialist. That is, he was a monarchist convinced that it was the mission of the Hapsburg dynasty to give an ethical and Christian significance to the Empire by the administration of social justice in a State torn by the internal conflicts of the bourgeoisie, and in particular by taking the working class under its protective wing. It is doubt-

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ful whether Taaffe altogether understood Steinbach's ideas, but, at a moment when there was obviously no more progress to be made by means of a Parliament representing the feudal and privileged classes, it was extremely fortunate for him to be able to have recourse to the practical point of Steinbach's programme—the introduction of universal suffrage.

The Emperor was quite amenable to Steinbach's ideas, but was frightened at the prospect of making a free gift of democratic suffrage by Imperial decree. Hitherto the Chamber of Deputies consisted of members of the four Estates, the big land-owners, the Chambers of Commerce, the towns, and the rural districts, each of which constituted a separate class of electors. Steinbach now proposed that the first two Estates should be left as they were, but that within the other Estates there should be simultaneous, universal, and direct suffrage.

The proposal was outlined in Cabinet meetings on August 21st and September 13th. On October 10th, 1893, the first day of the new Parliamentary session, Taaffe announced his intentions, and aroused in the House surprise and resentment. The popular parties were delighted, but the German Left and the Conservatives were in consternation. 'By chance,' wrote Ernst Plener, 'I came upon Hohenwart at the end of the session, and told him how shocked I was at Taaffe's unspeakable conduct. . . . Hohenwart was distressed and excited.' This was the hour in which the German Liberals incurred great blame, and their leader, Plener, showed the full measure of his narrowness when he declared that he and his friends 'saw in the proposal a manœuvre of the political adventurer Steinbach, aimed at annihilation of the Left, while on Taaffe's part it represented a breach of his solemn promise to maintain the political and national *status quo*.'

With such opinions the German Liberals showed themselves to be the mere servants of a class. Plener began a noisy agitation against the project. At his instance Chlumecky, the Speaker, travelled to Budapest to impress upon the Emperor the dangers of the proposed reform. Chlumecky was received by the Emperor on October 19th, but had to hear from him a defence of the proposals. The Emperor declared that he himself had already, some years before, advised Taaffe to extend the

suffrage, in view of the development of the working-class movement, and that he was now more than ever persuaded that there could be no salvation in little expedients. 'The alarm of the Germans is excessive,' he said. As often before, the Emperor saw further than the German Liberals. Against his innermost instincts he had accepted the Liberals as a governing party, under the persuasion of Andrassy and Beust. He enabled the constitutional party to carry its legislation, and successfully to thrust back the Church into her own limits. He would have been ready to stick to the Liberals had they not shown themselves incapable of emerging from the theoretical paradise of Schmerling, and doing constructive work for Austria in the real world. The Liberal Party was a State party so long as the State shielded their party. But, so soon as their own interests were threatened by developments necessary to the whole community, the Liberals became the party of one class.

Liberal historians reproach Francis Joseph with having performed his daily work without reference to any wide programme or general principle. It is a reproach which comes ill from that party which was partly responsible for all the negligences of bygone Austria. Those 'erratic reversals of decisions' marked the moments when Liberal doctrine was obviously unable, or its exponents unwilling, to give the Empire what it needed at the moment. The blame for Francis Joseph's recourse to Hohenwart and Schäffle must be laid on the German Liberals as much as upon the indispensable Taaffe. Now, when the Emperor showed a better understanding of history than the Liberals, wishing to extend the suffrage and to have done with 'petty expedients,' Plener opposed him.

That the Emperor was almighty in bygone Austria is one of many legends. At a decisive historical moment Plener managed to frustrate a much-needed decision of the Emperor. The three great parties, the Left, the Poles, and the Conservatives, joined at Plener's behest to withstand the reform, which therefore for the moment was done with. And so was Taaffe. On October 29th, 1893, after fourteen years in office, he handed in his resignation, and the Emperor with a heavy heart accepted it.




## CHAPTER XXIII

### MIDDLE-CLASS RESENTMENT

IN the decisive moment, then, the German Liberals allied themselves with the Poles and the Conservatives to defend the interests of a class, and to keep the door of Parliament closed against the knocking masses. Yet they have been blamed in a manner which is not wholly just. Ernst von Plener, the man who carried the victory over Taaffe and the Emperor, attempted to interpret this coalition in a more elevated sense as the natural alliance of the parties upholding the State against the assault of Nationalist and Socialist extremism. History hardly justifies this defence. The German Liberals owed their successes to the defeats suffered in Italy and in Hungary by Francis Joseph's neo-despotic system. It was military impotence and the inflexible resolution of the Hungarians which necessitated the modification of that system. Hungary had not only obtained recognition of her historic rights, but had helped the Austrian crown territories to the achievement of a constitutional political life of their own. In Austria the crown was reconciled to the Liberals on the basis of newly contracted agreements, and not, as in Hungary, by way of the restoration of old rights. Austria remained a uniform State founded upon the power of the Crown, of the army and of the civil service. The only class which approved this balance of power, and identified itself therewith, was the German bourgeoisie, which saw in it a continuance of the tradition of Maria Theresa and Joseph, along the supposed lines of Austrian historical development. Thus Francis Joseph and the German Liberals became allies, the Liberals in the enthusiasm of a great conviction, but Francis Joseph against his true will. Since, however, whether he liked it or not, the Emperor had to accompany the German Liberals along this path and to participate in the good work of this time, history made the Liberals responsible also for his abuse of force.

It was not without the use of force that Austria, before the time of Maria Theresa, attained the stature of a great State. Yet this State had been based upon solemn treaties whereby



The Emperor and Burgomaster Luegear



the Emperor was recognized as 'supreme lord in virtue of established right.' With the victory of the Counter-Revolution, Francis Joseph exhausted the credit opened to him in those treaties. The Empire assumed a new shape. New classes and groups associated themselves with the inheritors of ancient privileges. Treaties, concluded and respected by Francis Joseph's forebears, rose again to memory, stimulating the aspirations of the living Peoples. But this resurrection would have been in vain if the historical claims had been revived only in favour of the traditional claimants. Power and significance came rather from the union of old claims and new aspirations. The Bohemian nobility claimed autonomy for the State and, with it, pre-eminence for themselves. But behind them stood a people which claimed, not only historical rights, but the right to future history. Had not the living force of the Nations been in play, then the recollection of historical treaties would have been a mere piece of antiquarianism. But, with the power of the nation behind them, these treaties became an offensive weapon which finally annihilated the unified State. The living Austria was smothered to death beneath old documents. The true mistake of the German Liberals was their failure to understand the logic of events in their own country. They were the prey of an illusion, just as the Emperor had been in 1866, but, unlike him, they never escaped from it. In the year 1893, however, the Liberals fell short, not only of the truth, but even of their own illusion. Their claim to domination had hitherto been based upon the assumption that they represented a progressive principle. Now, even in the realm of politics, they had become the advocates of stagnation. The Emperor had a better understanding of the signs of the times when he demanded extension of the suffrage; only he was bound by the duty of a constitutional monarch to respect the opinion of a Parliamentary majority. Receiving on October 30th, 1893, Chlumetzky, the Speaker of the House, and the three representatives of the majority, he most unwillingly accepted their demand that the Government should be entrusted to the Coalition. He had expected that Count Hohenwart would take over the reins of office, and, when this Conservative leader indicated his age<sup>as</sup> an excuse for refusing, he answered sharply: 'You weren't too

old to upset the last Government ; you're only too old to create a new one in its place.'

Plener recommended that the Government should be formed by Prince Alfred Windischgrätz, grandson of the General of 1848. Thus the heirs of the bourgeois revolution were not afraid to take their place beneath names associated with the Counter-Revolution. Francis Joseph had thought of another candidate, the Governor of Galicia, Count Kasimir Badeni, who had struck him as a particularly gifted man. Badeni, however, remained for the time being at his provincial post, and Plener's candidate, Windischgrätz, became Prime Minister. The constitution of the Cabinet was no easy matter. When the list was almost ready, Plener, as he himself records, committed the imprudence of forwarding to the Emperor, who was already impatient, a piece of paper on which were the names of the new Cabinet Ministers. The Emperor was extremely annoyed, seeing in 'Plener's chit' an interference with his own right to nominate the Ministers.

When finally the Cabinet which was to defend privilege against the assault of the masses was formed, the Emperor wished that it too should proceed with a proposal for electoral reform. The very first time he received Plener he returned to this point, and declared that the reform could not possibly be further delayed. The Emperor was assured that his other particular desires—more funds for the army, a new Military Service Act, and currency reform—could be well looked after by the new majority. But what a price the German bourgeoisie exacted in return for its votes on behalf of these 'measures of national conservation' ! The unnatural Coalition could not but unite against it all progressive elements in a counter-coalition of intellect and labour such as Austria never saw either before or after. The Young Czechs, then at the height of their power, advocated universal suffrage not only in the name of their own people. Men in their party like Eduard and Julius Gregor, Dr. Kramář, Pacak, Herold, Eym, Kaizl, and other men of fine intelligence and eloquence, raised the level of the attack on the Coalition Cabinet to that of a conflict of universal ideas. In one of the first sessions Eduard Gregor called out to Plener : 'How tragic it is to see the proud leader of the Liberals serving

in the ranks of the clericals and feudalists. He has doffed the plumed helmet of the champions of Liberty and made his humble submission to a party which all his life he has valiantly attacked.'

The Social Democrats, led by Viktor Adler, conducted a no less passionate opposition. In their new daily paper, the *Arbeiterzeitung*, they had forged an abiding weapon of opposition. A number of talented young men, headed by Friedrich Austerlitz, daily renewed their assaults till the protest against this anti-popular Government swelled to a great chorus. Thanks in no small degree to this effort, the educated sections of the German bourgeoisie fell away from the Liberals, who, already deserted by the petty bourgeoisie, were now abandoned by the better part of their own class. Talent thrived in the atmosphere of opposition, and for the first time since 1848 Viennese journalism reached once again a very high level. In *Die Zeit*, a weekly paper conducted by Heinrich Kanner, Hermann Bahr, and Professor J. Singer, could be found evidence of the serious attention paid by educated circles to the questions of the day.

Vienna and Prague had become centres of excitement. On October 17th, 1894, the Imperial capital witnessed a mass procession of workmen, demanding universal suffrage, of such dimensions as had never been seen before. In Prague there was something like a revolutionary spirit, so bitter was the resentment against the merciless character of the trials of the young men of the 'Omladina' before the exceptional tribunal which condemned 179 accused persons to sentences totalling 278 years of imprisonment. The Prague police did more than this to ensure that feelings might not calm down, not hesitating to foment the movement by means of *agents provocateurs*. Upon the police fell much of the guilt for the murder of an agent named Mrva, who, under the name of 'Rigoletto of Tuscany,' had put forward proposals for anti-dynastic conspiracies of a romantic type in order to betray participants to the police.

The ranks of the Opposition were not recruited solely from the Czechs and the Socialists. The Vienna Christian Socialists, representatives of the exasperated small tradesmen, were also there. At the new elections for the Vienna Municipal Council in April 1895 they had obtained results which gave

them a voice, under the indirect electoral system then in vogue, in the election of members to the Chamber of Deputies. With ten more votes they would be masters of Vienna—so terribly quick had been the loss of the Liberal grip upon the capital. In June a Vice-Mayor of Vienna had to be elected. The Liberal candidate, Dr. Richter, retired from the contest, declaring that he did not wish to be dependent on the mercy of his opponents. At the second voting Dr. Karl Lueger obtained a majority of votes, whereupon the Liberal Mayor resigned from his post. Now somebody had to be chosen for the office of Mayor of the Imperial and Royal city of Vienna, and without doubt Dr. Lueger had the best prospects. It was as though the devil were about to penetrate into heaven.

Dr. Lueger was the son of a Viennese concierge family. Both in his virtues and his failings he was a typical child of Vienna. He had begun his career as a democrat, but with remarkable vision had realized the change that was coming over the small trading class. No other politician could rival him in his ability to translate the sentimental agitation of this discontented class against the domination of the capitalists, the bourse, and the other powers of industrialized society, into the picturesque dialect of the Viennese. He fell below the standard of his own knowledge and education when he adopted the catchword of anti-Semitism as the central note of his doctrine, which was termed by the democratic parliamentarian, Dr. Kronawetter, 'Socialism for fools.' To his followers, however, Lueger was the Bebel and Marx of the movement. Imagine, then, the consternation aroused by the prospect of this disturber of civic peace, this master whipper-up of the passions, becoming Mayor of the capital. The Emperor presided over the Cabinet Council before which the proposal came. Later on Lueger became reconciled to the world and performed meritorious services; but Francis Joseph was always pained by the popularity of this darling of Vienna and by the tremendous ovations which greeted him. But now, at the moment when a decision had to be made, he was afraid of being dragged into the turmoil of the parties if he should attempt to deal with the situation in a dictatorial manner. He inclined then to accept Lueger as Mayor, all the more because, as he said, there was no legal ground for

refusing to nominate him. Plener advocated quashing the autonomous rights of the Imperial capital when it came to nomination of the Mayor, pointing out that in France the Prefect of the Seine was chosen by the Government. For the moment, however, Lueger himself put an end to the discussions, refusing to accept an office to which he had been elected by so small a majority. This conduct was not only the consequence of his own sense of the dramatic, but also had been urged upon him by friends in Court circles.

The Emperor, however, was less concerned with this Viennese question than with the project of electoral reform, but the Coalition Cabinet was completely at a loss to know how to deal with this matter. Plener himself confesses that the sub-committee appointed for its discussion 'made no progress ; the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, and the members of the Government, sat in silence listening to fruitless debates.' The Emperor, however, was constantly pressing for some decision. In the Cabinet Council of March 7th, 1895, he desired to hear from the Ministers themselves how discussions were proceeding, but the answer he received was full of contradiction and confusion.

The Minister of the Interior, Marquis Bacquehem, now advanced the following plan : alongside of the existing electoral colleges of the municipalities and rural districts there should be created a sub-college to represent the humblest taxpayers, while twelve seats should be reserved for the representatives of the insured workmen. Even the Emperor thought that this plan was too far behind the times. He asked whether the Government was itself unanimous in its intentions, and how much time would be needed to put the reform through. But the Ministers' debate showed that a genuine reform was far from their minds. The Emperor closed this unprofitable session, declaring that the Government must not leave the reform to the parties, but must 'itself take it in hand to prevent it from being marooned.' Plener remarked that the Emperor's language did not fail of effect, yet it was not till June that the committee produced anything like an organic plan ; and this was described by the *Neue Freie Presse* 'as a monstrous concoction as far removed from reason as from social vision.'



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This was not the first trumpet-call sounded by the great Liberal paper against the Government; and it was only by the exercise of restraint that it did not open a frank campaign against it. The Liberal Party, meanwhile, refrained from expressing discontent with a Government which was unable to deal with the great question of the moment, nor did it show any great resentment at its relapse into the methods of the old police state, such as interference with the Press, maintenance of an exceptional régime, and a display of force against miners on strike at Falkenau and Ostrau, which cost three lives in Bohemia and fourteen in Silesia. All this could have been forgiven, but the Cabinet met disaster over a typical, petty Austrian dispute.

In the Styrian township of Cilli there was a German secondary school. For years the Slovenes of this town and district had been agitating to obtain a secondary school for themselves. Knowing that this claim would have been defeated by the Germans, Taaffe had promised them the use of the German school for classes in the Slovene language. Windischgrätz, in his desire to preserve the Coalition, had taken on this engagement, which was supported by the Conservatives and the Poles. In the daily squabbles of embittered Nationalists it was the custom to indicate any satisfaction of the cultural requirements of the other nation as a diminution of German prestige. The petty squabble of Cilli became the occasion of serious contention between the German parties. The Government had voted 1,500 gulden to institute the first Slovene classes in the school of Cilli. Plener, as Finance Minister, had to defend the expenditure. The Budget Committee sanctioned it, but on the same day, June 18th, 1895, immediately after the session, the German Left announced that it would leave the Coalition. On June 19th, at crack of dawn, Windischgrätz submitted the Cabinet's resignation to the Emperor, and Francis Joseph did not hesitate for one moment to accept it.

After the fall of the Coalition Ministry the Emperor remarked to Baron Chlumecky that it was difficult to govern with the German Left, because they brought down their own Ministries. It had always been so from the days of Schmerling to those of Plener. They themselves proved that Parliamentary government was really impossible.

The Emperor's thoughts now turned to Badeni, a man who seemed to him to combine discretion with energy. In May 1895 Count Kálnoky had left the Foreign Office, and in his place the Minister in Bucharest, Count Agenor Goluchowski, had been nominated. Francis Joseph had intended to put Goluchowski in the place hitherto occupied by Badeni as Governor of Lemberg, but on the advice of Kálnoky he changed his mind and entrusted him with the conduct of foreign policy. Badeni, therefore, was still in Galicia. Francis Joseph had regretted the departure of Count Kálnoky, in whom he had seen a cautious mind, well adapted for quieter times, after the period of the brilliant Count Andrassy. Andrassy had been the advocate of prominent action, and it was Kálnoky's idea, no less than Francis Joseph's, that a programme of caution should now be followed. Andrassy had visualized the occupation of Bosnia at the first step in an extensive eastern policy; nor was he afraid of coming up against Russia. Kálnoky was out for defence, and in his view the internal structure of Austria rendered any other foreign policy impossible. When there was serious danger of a conflict with Russia over Bulgaria, Kálnoky reached an understanding with Lobanov, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna. He has been blamed for neglectfulness in letting the moment slip by which might have given an opportunity for an expansion of Austrian influence southwards. Yet he could console himself with the thought that he had avoided war with Russia without showing weakness. It was a dispute with Hungary, and not a question of foreign policy, which occasioned his fall.

Francis Joseph must by now have been accustomed to having at least one domestic crisis to deal with at any given time. For some years, however, the machinery of Government had always been breaking down in more than one place. It was not patience or pertinacity which the Emperor lacked at these critical moments, but vision, which might have shown him that national forces, the expression of an historical process, which should have been treated as such, were behind the appearances of a tiresome and destructive party dispute. He had always been sceptical of theory, and he had learned resignation from his experience with the Liberals and with the decentralizing experi-

menters Hohenwart and Schöffle. This confirmed his conviction that it was not intellectual vision, or political theory, which mattered, but the personality of the men who ruled, and their practical ability to deal with the conflicts of the Empire as they arose. Napoleon in 1797 proudly declared to Miot and Melzi : 'What the nation needs is not political theories, but a master.' Scepticism had brought Francis Joseph to the same point of view. Once, in conversation with Dr. von Koerber, who was able to lead the Emperor along normally forbidden paths of argument, Francis Joseph compared Austria with an old dwelling-house inhabited by a number of parties between whom there was constant dissension and quarrelling. Francis Joseph declared that the best method was to eliminate the causes of dissension by cautious repairs, because a thoroughgoing reconstruction would be dangerous. The comparison may be primitive, but it gives an idea of the Emperor's outlook. Unfortunately, he did not always find the best architect for these repairs.

After the resignation of the Coalition Cabinet, a Cabinet of civil servants under Count Kielmannsegg figured as an interlude pending nomination of Count Kasimir Badeni, who was already the man of the Emperor's choice. The Emperor's inclination towards this Polish count was not simply the result of his desire for a 'master,' nor was it, as Plener alleges, the consequence of his 'ignorance of human nature.' Amongst all the Ministers, Counsellors, Governors, and Aides-de-camp who approached the Emperor, Badeni was the first who for many years had revealed an optimistic outlook. Amid that circle of sceptics who, out of weariness and self-knowledge, could see nothing but doubts in the future, Badeni showed self-confidence and hopefulness.

Austrian history shows that these traditional sceptics in truth played their part better than the exceptional optimists who wished to make up by a display of ill-directed energy for their failure to understand the structure of Austria. But now, after the lamentable fiasco of the Coalition, the Emperor had a good reason for seeking out an apparently strong man who could put through that electoral reform which seemed to him a necessity, and bring about some tolerably satisfactory settlement in Bohemia.

The most important member of the Cabinet after Badeni was the Finance Minister Bilinski. The Ministry of Justice was taken over by Count Gleispach, that of Trade by Glanz von Eicha, and that of Agriculture by Count Ledebur. The humorists of Vienna invariably exercised their wit on the names of new Ministers, and the punning sentence was now produced : '*Bade nie den Bilinski im Gleisbach, sonst verliert der Ledebur den Glanz*' ('Don't give Bilinski a bath in the Torrent or Ledebur might lose his polish').

Badeni's Government opened well. He revoked the exceptional régime in Prague, and removed Count Thun from the governorship of Bohemia. In Parliament he declared that the essence of his programme was that he intended to lead and not to be led.

In October 1895, Dr. Karl Lueger was for the second time elected Mayor of Vienna. It showed nothing but his headstrong character that Badeni advised the Emperor not to confirm the hero of the Viennese petty bourgeoisie in the office to which they had elected him. In November, Lueger was elected for the third time, and the Municipal Council was dissolved—but in vain, for the Christian-Socialist movement had become far too powerful to be restrained by force. In March 1896 their majority in the Council had increased, and for the fourth time that body insisted that it would have Lueger, and no one else, at the head of the city.

The Emperor's fears were now confirmed. The most loyal part of the population—those humble classes who by tradition had never been anything else but subjects of Hapsburg Austria, citizens of the Imperial city, with no national home save the Imperial capital—even these indispensable adjuncts to the Imperial system had defied the wishes of their monarch. When, in April 1896, the Emperor drove in an open carriage from Schönbrunn to Vienna, he heard shouts of 'Long live Lueger !'

Finally he made peace with the Christian Socialists. First of all he himself persuaded Dr. Lueger, though four times elected Mayor, to content himself with the position of Vice-Mayor. But a year later, when a fifth election had followed, he withdrew his ban. From then on Lueger was the representative man of the new Vienna. The city had twice been transformed during

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Francis Joseph's reign. The first transformation was at the beginning of the constitutional period, the classical age of Liberalism, when Vienna, as Emperor Francis, Grillparzer, and Schubert had known it, developed into the great metropolis of the wealthy bourgeoisie. The typical figure of this period, for all its outward changes, was still Schmerling. But now the Liberal bourgeoisie was thrust out of its dominating position. A new type challenged its supremacy, the type of the small tradesmen with advanced views, and the darling of this class was Dr. Lueger, alongside of whose portrait, with his fair hair and prominent beard, the portrait of the Emperor looked uninteresting.

Vienna, however, was not the Empire, nor were her politics Imperial politics. More important than the question of who should be Mayor of the Royal city was the problem of electoral reform, of which a solution could not much longer be postponed. Badeni was not so slow as his predecessor, and by February 1896 he had already submitted a project by which a fifth electoral college, in which the whole body of citizens should vote with equal rights, should come into existence alongside of the four distinct privileged colleges. It was open, of course, to the Chamber of Deputies to refuse this compromise altogether, and to take up in its stead a project of unrestricted universal suffrage. The dynasty, however, indicated its disapproval of such a proposal, and decided for Badeni's project, which came into force so that the new elections of March 1897 were held in accordance with this system.

Despite the reform, the composition of the new Parliament was not substantially different. There was an increase in the representation of the Extreme Nationalists, while the Social Democrats won fourteen seats. Now the Government was faced with what was the principal preoccupation of every Government—renewal of the agreement with Hungary before it elapsed. A majority in Parliament was needed to approve the Austrian contribution to the joint expenditure of the Empire, and also to ratify the treaties. To form such a majority must now be Badeni's aim.

Partly with this end in view, and partly to please the Emperor, who wished to promote a Bohemian settlement by the exercise of his own personal powers and on the basis of his own opinions,

Badeni issued decrees regulating the usage of the German and the Czech languages in Bohemia. Looking back to-day on these measures, it is hard to see in them anything which could not properly enter into a just settlement of racial differences. The two languages were placed on an equal footing in the sense that all offices and tribunals were required to conduct business in the language of the person they were dealing with. Similar rules were to apply to the language of registration and archives. A natural complement to this was the order that all civil servants in Bohemia and Moravia should be capable of speaking and writing both languages.

During their period of Parliamentary domination the Germans had neglected to establish their language as the language of State, but it had in practice remained the language of official business. Badeni's decrees required of the German employees a knowledge of the Czech language. This was the novelty which roused a storm of protest on the German side, only to be explained by the power of old illusions. The German politicians were perfectly prepared to allow the use of the Czech language in the Czech-speaking areas, and proposed for this purpose a definition of those areas. But it seemed to them a violent breach of tradition that both languages should henceforth have equal rights throughout the country. The German Nationalists thought that the fate of the Germans was at stake, and, indeed, if Badeni's decrees entered into force, those sons of the petty bourgeoisie, who for the most part were candidates for Government employment, would see the door to such employment closed upon them. For, while the Czech student learnt the German language comparatively easily, the German students felt a great repugnance against mastering the second language of the country. Such was the material basis of the language conflict, but, in the course of the campaign against Badeni's decree, each side adorned its case with idealistic arguments, and on the German side many factors contributed to give this protest against a practical administrative measure the character of a national movement.

The German Nationalist extremists profited by the fact that the German petty bourgeoisie had now freed itself from the domination of Liberal ideas and Liberal leadership. This Lib-

eralism had been at bottom a Viennese product. In the frontier districts of German Bohemia, from the Riesengebirge to Lausitz, the sense of community with the German Empire had always been stronger than the attraction of Vienna, and now the mass of those who felt their national and social position threatened naturally accepted the Nationalist doctrine with the greatest willingness. It was in the programme of Georg von Schönerer that they found a formulation of both their social and their national grievances. Schönerer had gifts which marked him out to be a tribune of the people. Independent and courageous in his attitude towards superiors, he was able to see beyond the limits of his class, although he himself was a landed nobleman. Further, he was a good speaker. All he lacked was culture and the will to enter more than superficially into the questions of the time. He was too proud to suffer instruction, and had cast off his connection with the more intelligent members of the Nationalist movement in order to follow his own path. The Christian-Socialist movement had been born in Vienna as a reaction against the triumphs of the company promoters and of the industrial development of the city. Schönerer discovered the possibilities of a reaction in the little German provincial towns. The citizens of these towns found themselves powerless in the face of the impersonal forces of capitalism, and yet unable to submit to the laws of this system. They were crushed between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and menaced by the progress of their national opponents. They therefore took refuge in the most distant past, masquerading as representatives of primitive Germanism. It was not simply a fad of Schönerer's that he cancelled from his calendar the reckoning of years from the birth of Christ, and substituted a new era in which the year One commemorated the Battle of the Teutonic Forest. Nor was it merely a joke when he and his friends, dressed in antique costumes, revived the Festival of the Solstice, lighting bonfires and calling the people to assemble in front of burning piles and other symbols of ancient Germanism. The historical inaccuracies of these celebrations, which were performed with the utmost seriousness, furthered rather than hindered the movement, which extended from its original source among the students and spread over the whole

of German Bohemia. It was most unfortunate that the German middle and lower-middle classes followed this path in their awakening to national consciousness, which might have been accomplished to much better advantage with a programme rejecting the Liberal structure and aiming at national autonomy. Neither the Germans in Austria nor the Empire itself would really have suffered by such a movement for self-preservation, even at the expense of the ideal of a single centralized State. But in the emotionally charged atmosphere of German Nationalism there was no room for any political idea to flourish—no room for anything but sentimentality about the primitive forests of the Germans, and for the Hohenzollern dynasty, Hermann, Bismarck, Luther, Stöcker, and Ahlwardt. The only positive aims which emerged from the confusion were anti-Semitism, anti-Romanism, and anti-Hapsburgism. This was the first time in Francis Joseph's life that large numbers even of his German subjects became his enemies. Schönerer carried this enmity to fantastic lengths. In 1888 a Vienna newspaper announced the death of Emperor William I prematurely, but immediately published a special edition to rectify the mistake. Schönerer, however, felt his pro-Prussian loyalty outraged, and broke into the newspaper offices with several friends in order to beat up the editorial staff. He was arrested, imprisoned, and deprived of his hereditary title. The judges, it is well known, had it in their mind to punish not only a violent fanatic, but above all an enemy of His Majesty.

It was Schönerer's party which in 1897 took up the struggle against Badeni's decrees. Schönerer's most talented disciple, an ex-student and journalist named Karl Hermann Wolf, now a Member of Parliament, toured German Bohemia in the guise of 'Young Siegfried,' and whipped up the lethargic and good-natured citizens to rebellion. To complete his campaign with an act of personal symbolism, he insulted the Prime Minister, and, on being challenged to a pistol duel, wounded his opponent. While the Radicals were agitating in this fashion, the other German parties could not look on with folded arms. In Parliament Schönerer demanded that Badeni's decrees should be submitted to the House. The Liberals demanded their revocation, the German Peoples' Party called for their speedy cancellation as a



first step to a new discussion. Seventy German university professors put their names to the project.

In May the German parties began systematically to hold up the work of Parliament. The Opposition carried its campaign into the streets, and, at a national demonstration at Eger on June 13th, the Deputies of all the German parties swore an oath to persist in their opposition to the decrees. An attempt by Badeni to bring about conciliation was dismissed. When the House reassembled in October 1897, the opposition continued to put every interference in the way of work, so that even the settlement with Hungary was in peril. It was useless to hold evening and nocturnal sessions. The opposition members achieved new records as loud and long speakers. Dr. Ernst Lecher spoke for thirteen hours without stopping. Dr. Alois Funke, representing the constituency of Leitmeritz, spoke for six hours, and others followed his example. On November 23rd the provisional treaty with Hungary was submitted for a second reading, to the accompaniment of wild scenes. Badeni succeeded in getting the better of the House, for during the tumult he secured a change in the order of business which excluded members guilty of misbehaviour from the proceedings, and provided for their removal, if necessary, by force. But this attack on the liberties of Parliament only resulted in the Social Democrats joining the Opposition. On November 26th, Social Democratic Deputies stormed the chair of the President of the House. The new President, a Pole named Abrahamowicz, called in the police, of whom sixty advanced into the assembly. There was a hand-to-hand fight. Ten Deputies, including Schönerer, Wolf, and the Polish Socialist Daszynski, were conducted by policemen out of the assembly. Wolf was arrested, and a charge preferred against him of breach of the peace. On November 27th there was trouble in the streets of Vienna. Thousands of people, citizens, workmen, and students, thronged the Franzens-Ring, in front of the Parliament, the Schmerlingplatz, and the Volksgarten. The police lost their nerve, and charging into the crowd, arrested any one they heard shouting. The outer gate of the palace quarter was closed, the guard was strengthened, and the garrison ordered to stand by.

The Emperor had left Vienna and was staying with his daughter at Wallsee. On the next day—Sunday, November 28th—Vienna was in a feverish condition. In the morning, thousands of people marched from the outlying districts to the inner city. In the Rathausplatz, and everywhere between Parliament and the Palace, a vast throng stood waiting for an outlet for its excitement. In front of the Palace gates there were shouts: the crowd was trying to get into the inner court. From crack of dawn the police had been busy making arrests. It required only a word or an example to raise a storm. Dr. Lueger comprehended the situation. Only yesterday he had been at Badeni's side, but now he mounted the balcony of the Rathaus and addressed the crowd: 'Badeni must go!' The tension was now relieved by the shouts of newspaper boys with special editions of the official *Wiener Zeitung*, headed by the symbolic double eagle. The news was that Badeni had resigned. The previous evening Emperor Francis Joseph had suddenly returned to Vienna and had received Badeni, Goluchowski, Bilinski, and Dr. Lueger. Badeni's advice was to see things through and not to be terrorized by street demonstrations. The Emperor hesitated. He had yielded in Hungary, but he longed to feel himself master in Vienna. Meanwhile, telephone messages from police headquarters to the Chief of the Imperial Staff declared that matters had reached too far for it to be possible to maintain order without a display of force. As Baron Gautsch later declared, the monarch's pride was wounded, but he had abjured violent methods, and it would have seemed to him impossible to have shots fired in the streets of Vienna. He preferred to yield.

So Badeni's luck was out, but the excitements in Vienna had an aftermath in Prague. The enmity between the two Nations caused anything which seemed to satisfy the one to be taken as an outrage by the other. The Young Czechs considered that Badeni's defeat was a triumph of German extremism, and that his resignation had endangered the language decrees.

The man-in-the-street in Vienna had indeed effected the removal of Badeni, but in Prague the German students committed the error of celebrating the fact with a victorious procession through the city the following day, carrying their colours

through the thronged streets to celebrate the triumph in the most obtrusive fashion. This performance was taken by the Czechs to be a direct insult, and Prague was in an uproar. On November 29th the Czech students held a demonstration, and in the evening all the wildest passions in Prague were let loose. Broken window-glass was scattered over the pavements of the inner city, where the enraged crowds had vented their feelings upon German shops and cafés. But the demonstrations did not remain within the limit of national protest. Students and young people of the working classes were alike disturbed and infuriated by the persecutions of the police and the harsh judgements of the Exceptional Tribunals, so that the extreme Socialists and the theoretical anarchists were well placed for preaching open rebellion. In the suburbs the excitement took on a nihilistic appearance, with general plundering of stores. The police reacted mercilessly. The whole garrison of Prague was called out to restore order, but two brigades at peace strength did not suffice for this purpose. The Emperor had given the order to the commander of the 8th Corps, within whose zone fell the military district of Prague, to depart from standing orders in that the troops were not immediately to resort to firearms if they were attacked. Another brigade of infantry and a regiment of cavalry were sent to Prague, and, on December 2nd, martial law was proclaimed to the roll of drums. The army had not used its weapons either in Vienna or in Prague. There had been no death recorded, and the wounded owed their injuries solely to the attentions of the police.

It was instinct rather than any well-pondered theory which persuaded Francis Joseph always to call a civil servant to the head of the Government after periods of stress and fruitless experiment. The Emperor's own favourite, Taaffe, had closed a chapter of Parliamentary Government. When a return to the Parliamentary rule of the Coalition had ended ingloriously, the Emperor followed his personal inclination, and his desire to play an active part, in appointing Badeni. This had been a disastrous mistake, and now he desired Gautsch to pour oil on the stormy waters.

Gautsch was not a politician, but a loyal servant of the Emperor. Under Stremayr he had been Minister of Education.

Subsequently he had been in charge of the Academy for Young Nobles, the Theresianum. He had another spell as Minister of Education under Taaffe, and yet a third after the collapse of the Coalition. Taaffe was his ideal, although he had nothing of his easy manner nor of his fundamental scepticism. He was like him only in his devotion to the Emperor. The programmes of Taaffe and Gautsch, for all their identical appearance, were radically different by reason of the change of circumstances. Taaffe had held office fourteen years simply by attending to detailed business and remedying defects with petty expedients. Gautsch could not possibly adopt the same plan in face of a Parliament fermenting with Nationalist passion.

Gautsch tried to induce a calmer atmosphere, releasing those who had been imprisoned during the excitements of November, revoking martial law, and modifying Badeni's language decrees so as to make them less objectionable to the Germans. But it was not by such means as these that the unrest of Germans or Czechs could be calmed. Petty incidents, such as affrays between German gowned students and Czech citizens near the fortifications of Prague, were magnified into matters of Imperial importance. The Prague students were forbidden for some time to wear their traditional gowns. This provoked a strike in all the German higher educational institutions in Austria.

A resumption of negotiations between the representatives of the two infuriated Nations was not to be thought of. A Finance Bill and a prolongation of the Customs and Trade Treaty with Hungary had to be put into operation by an exceptional decree without Parliamentary sanction. Gautsch resigned. He had done what the Emperor had asked him, and was ready to return if summoned.

The sad experiences of the last years plunged the Emperor into meditation on the origins of the crisis. He thought that the root of these troubles lay in the appointment of the Coalition Ministry, which had interrupted the work of conciliation. Since then the nobility of Bohemia had been sulking, the Czech people were estranged, and the Germans were singing: '*Die Wacht am Rhein*.' Once more Francis Joseph determined himself to take the initiative and to place a strong man in charge of the State.

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Count Franz Thun had justified himself in Prague, and the Emperor now asked him to form a Government. Thun's policy was indicated by the invitations which he now addressed to Dr. Baernreither and Dr. Kaizl. The first of these was a man of intelligence and education, owner of a property in Western Bohemia and a member of the constitutional landowners' party. He had little influence, however, even with the moderate Germans, since the Liberals had fallen under the fascination of the Extremists. Dr. Josef Kaizl, professor at the University of Prague, and a friend of Dr. Kramář, was a genuine representative of the Young Czechs. The plan was that Baernreither should be Minister of Trade and Kaizl Minister of Finance, and that these appointments should herald the coming settlement between Czechs and Germany. But the Germans were hopelessly under the domination of the Extremists, and persisted in obstruction. They were completely alienated when the commander-in-chief at Graz degraded thirty-six German reserve officers, from the best families of the city, for participating in the funeral of one of the victims who had fallen in the agitations against Badeni.

In June, General Komarov, of the Russian army, was in Prague, and toasted the growing unity of all Slav nations in the face of their common enemy, the Germans. Now from the darkest corners of Galicia, where the Polish nobility, in pursuit of their own selfish ends, maintained a condition of popular ignorance, came news of threatened pogroms. Martial law had to be declared. The peasants plundered the Jewish stores to the cry that the Emperor had ordered death to the Jews, egged on by a fanatical priest named Stoyalowski. Meanwhile the Hungarian Minister of Trade was threatening an abrogation of the Customs Union. Thun attempted to win over both parties with promises, but failed. In the beginning of September, in Schönbrunn, Dr. Baernreither reported to the Emperor that the attitude of the German parties would oblige him to resign from the Cabinet. The Emperor was worn out and disappointed. 'I don't know what to do,' he said. On September 10th, Count Paar tremblingly announced to the Emperor that the Empress had been assassinated.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### ELIZABETH'S DEATH

ELIZABETH as a young woman had avoided a life of mere resignation by running away. Since the day which had robbed her of her son, existence had become a burden to her. She was then fifty-one years old. During the worst period she remained by the Emperor's side, and how she helped him is testified by his own words to Paar shortly after Rudolph's death: 'If I had not had my wife I would have entirely gone under.' She seemed stronger than she was because she was able to bear grief in silence. Her suffering did not force her from her sanctuary of inward loneliness. She still depended on her youngest daughter, who, on Christmas Eve of the unhappy year, had married the Archduke Francis Salvator of Tuscany, and travelled with her to Wiesbaden and Heidelberg. Near Frankfort the train was derailed, and there were a certain number of dead and wounded. The Empress's saloon car was among the three carriages which were saved from wreckage. Scarcely had she arrived in Vienna when she was summoned to Munich. Her elder sister Helen, Princess of Thurn-Taxis, had died unexpectedly in Regensburg. Elizabeth stayed for a short while with her mother. After that she only went as an occasional guest to Vienna.

It seemed as though she had found a home when she planned to build a palace on the island of Corfu, five miles south of the town, on the peak of Gasturi. During her sea-travels she had been drawn again and again to this ancient land of primitive peoples, the Scheria of Homer. By now she had roamed through the whole of the old world—Switzerland, France, Italy, and Greece; had crossed the Mediterranean to Africa and the Azores; but this small, crescent-shaped island, with its classical associations, alone soothed the suffering woman's nerves and calmed her brain like some fine opiate.

Here the chain of memories was broken, here the Empress imagined she could forget. And, because she believed this with certainty, this fugitive from existence built as though she were

going to live for ever. Vienna blamed her for this building. They did not understand the plan of the old Hellenic Palace, with its 128 rooms, its terraces and colonnades, halls, loggias, and stable room for fifty horses. Elizabeth's castle by the sea devoured untold sums, and, although Francis Joseph took upon himself the estimated cost, Elizabeth sacrificed part of her jewels, worth more than 2,000,000 marks to-day, in order that this edifice might arise according to her taste. In the 'Achilleion' this unhappiest of Empresses built a monument that tells us more of her than all the pages of the diary of her faithful companion, Dr. Chrystomanos. In this flight from a tormented present into a retreat of her own making she resembled her cousin, the architect of Linderhof, Neuschwanstein and Herrenchiemsee, Ludwig II of Bavaria, whom she visited, when he was already unhinged in mind, in his 'Rose Island' near Feldafing. Her building phantasy was less eccentric than that of the Bavarian King, but she had the same end in view—that of self-isolation. This palace, with its view of the sea, the strange town, and far line of mountains, was to be her own world, far removed from the familiar. And in her architectural choice she showed the same eclecticism as the Wittelsbach monarch, whose south-German Hellenism laid its imprint on Munich. Hence came its strange mingled style, made up of shimmering marble and gilded railings, where between Ionic pillars shone variegated panoramas—a creation that showed the marks of her period, the artistic sterility of the 'eighties.

It was the less enduring side of Heine that she loved, his sentimental lyrics. She had 'Lonely Tears' engraved on Hasselriis's statue, which she had put up in memory of the poet. In her bedroom hung two poems that she had found somewhere and had had simply framed in wood. One of them—'Renunciation,' by Friedrich Beck—began with the words: 'To be equipped ever as for the last journey, without heavy thoughts, that is perhaps the only right way to draw the blessing of the gods on one's head.' The other, by Albert Roderich, is in the same tone. What so few realized was that this Empress, mother, and now also grandmother, remained until the end of her days a girl. In Corfu she kept a diary just as she had done at sixteen, writing in it eulogies of the sea and recounting her

sufferings : 'The sea will always hold me ; I know that I belong to it. When we are on the high seas I have myself bound to a chair ; so I am like Odysseus, the waves call me. . . . What would come after if I were to drown ?'

In January 1892 her mother died. From now on she became even more reserved. Even Corfu could not hold her long. While there, she loved to climb the steep mountain paths—without her lady-in-waiting, Countess Sztaray, and without Dr. Chrystomanos. When she returned from her walks she studied Greek with Chrystomanos. In the evening she bathed in the marble bath from the Villa Borghese. Everything was quiet by 9 p.m. in the Castle by the Sea. Only sometimes it happened that the Empress, plagued by insomnia, got up in the middle of the night. Then the gardener would see her stepping cautiously, in order not to wake anybody, over the terrace into the sombre park. The old watchman never ventured a greeting when the dark woman glided by him like a shadow.

Her dream world was violated once again when in 1896, after much protesting, she fell in with the Emperor's wish and returned to Austria. Hungary was celebrating her thousand-year jubilee. It was not in mere deference to the Court that Hungary's Nobility, Parliament, and Press demanded the presence of the Empress. Here she was sincerely honoured. Although sick at heart, and suffering from the old arthritic pains, she came. At fifty-nine years old she was the most dignified figure at these festivities. 'She sat next to the Emperor on the throne, dressed in black silk, a long black veil covering her hair. Her face was white and unspeakably sad. Motionless as a statue she sat on the throne. When the Speaker called her name, there was such a mighty storm of applause that the windows rattled. "*Eljen Erzsébet !*" It was some time before their enthusiasm was satisfied. A flush came over the snow-white face of the Empress ; she could control her emotion no longer ; she hid her tears behind her lace handkerchief.'

It was the last time that Elizabeth was seen in public. On May 5th, 1897, she received the news that her youngest sister, the Duchess Sophie of Alençon, had been killed in the most horrible way. For some days previously the women of the French aristocracy had been arranging a charitable bazaar. Some



strips of celluloid belonging to a new invention, the cinematograph, had exploded, the curtains caught fire, and the whole hall burst into flames. A hundred and thirteen people lost their lives in the fire. The Duchess of Alençon, a member of the committee, was amongst their number. First her rings were found, and later the remains of her charred body. Elizabeth and Sophie had been very intimate. The elder had consoled the younger when Ludwig II of Bavaria, on October 11th, 1865, shortly before the marriage was to be celebrated, broke off his engagement with Sophie. It was alleged that Sophie was the victim of an intrigue that had been spun round the suspicious, morbid young man, who later drowned himself in Lake Starnberg. Elizabeth shut herself up when she learnt of her sister's death; in the evening she spoke of how the name 'Six Bavarian Sisters of Misfortune' had been given to her mother and her five sisters. 'The misfortune,' she said, 'always continues, and gets ever worse.'

Of her sisters, the Countess Trani and the dethroned Queen of Naples were still alive. Matilda, the Countess, resembled Elizabeth. Like the Empress, she lived a vagabond life, being known by the humble name of 'Nellie Smith.' At Christmas 1897 they were both in Paris. Elizabeth was ill, once more afflicted with sciatica. In the New Year they travelled to Marseilles, where Elizabeth's yacht *Miramare* waited to take the two women to San Remo. On March 1st, 1898, the sisters travelled via Turin to Territet, in Switzerland, and from there Matilda went on to Munich. Elizabeth remained in Territet. Her companions were Countess Sztaray and Friedrich Barker, the young reader. Her health was getting worse. Besides her arthritic trouble she had neuralgia. She left Switzerland and went to Kissingen. In May, Francis Joseph paid her a short visit. She remained until the middle of June. The cure brought her no relief. Still ill, Elizabeth went to Lainz. 'She hid her small sunken face; she could no longer endure to have people near her. Even the company of her husband and children fatigued her.' The cold evenings and early mists in the Lainz deer park drove her away; and on July 2nd she travelled to Ischl, not even waiting for Francis Joseph's birthday. In July the official communication gave out that the Empress had been

ordered to take the baths at Nauheim; anaemia, acute neuritis, insomnia over a long period, and a new additional dilation of the heart, made it urgently desirable that the Empress should undergo regular treatment. On her way to the German resort, Elizabeth stopped at Munich, but did not visit her relations. She stayed in Nauheim till August 29th, and then returned to Switzerland. This time she chose Mont de Caux as residence. It was better here; she could walk in the surrounding woods. She intended to remain here five weeks, and wrote that she would be in Vienna by December 2nd, the fiftieth anniversary of Francis Joseph's accession to the throne.

On September 9th, 1898, she visited Baroness Mathilde Rothschild, the owner of Castle Pregny, that formerly belonged to Joseph Bonaparte. 'The evening before,' recounts young Barker, 'we sat on a large piece of rock near Territet landing-stage. The Empress skinned a peach, and handed me half of the fruit. A raven, one of the flock that lives here, flew up and hit the fruit out of the Empress's hand with its wing. It had come so near to her. It was the Hapsburg bird of misfortune. I did not venture to say so. The Empress, as though she had guessed, looked at me and said: "Dear friend, I am not afraid. I am a fatalist; what must happen will happen".' After the visit to the Rothschilds in Pregny she went to Geneva. As in former years, she stayed at the Hotel Beau Rivage, on the Quai du Mont Blanc. The proprietress of the hotel recognized her guest; incognito was preserved, but the Canton Government had been warned from Vienna. Even before her arrival the secret police had taken up their duties. Next day, Saturday, September 10th, at fifteen minutes past one, Elizabeth, accompanied by Countess Sztaray and Barker, left the hotel. She wished to return to Caux. The boat had already given the signal for departure, and it was doubtful whether they would reach it in time. Countess Sztaray hurried on ahead. The Empress reached the right side of the landing-stage; Barker was on her left, a step behind, close to the quay. At this moment a man who had been leaning against the barrier of the quay crossed her path. With two steps he reached the right side of the Empress, turned sharply round to the right, and gave her a push. The Empress hesitated a moment, was held up by Barker, and

he and Countess Sztaray, who quickly came to her side, supported her. To the question whether the push had hurt her, she replied : 'I don't know.' With their assistance she walked the twenty-five yards to the gangway, sank to the ground, and was carried on to the boat. Here she fainted. Meanwhile the boat had started. Countess Sztaray believed that the faint was the result of the push or of fright. She and some women who were on board assisted the unconscious Empress. The passengers were asked if there was a doctor amongst their number. There was no doctor. Countess Sztaray opened the Empress's blouse and unloosed her corsets. Elizabeth regained consciousness, and said : 'What has happened ?' The lady-in-waiting noticed a thin cut, that might have been done by a razor-blade, just beneath the left breast, from which oozed two drops of blood. Stricken with horror, she called the captain and told him who the sick lady really was. The captain turned the ship : a stretcher was improvized out of poles and bolsters. Meanwhile many people had collected on the quay. Two cab-drivers had seen the man who had pushed the Empress throw away a dagger and begin to run. He ran first along the Quai du Mont Blanc and then turned up the Rue des Alpes. He was seized near the monument of Charles of Brunswick, and overwhelmed. By this time the stretcher-bearers were on the landing-stage, and the alarm had been given. Her room in the hotel was being prepared. Dr. Golay, the medical man who was first on the spot, used every art to restore her breathing, even resorting to friction with brushes. He made a small incision in her right hand, and only then, when no blood appeared, was he persuaded that death had already taken place. The murderer's two-edged dagger had pierced between the ribs, causing an internal hæmorrhage.

The assassin, Luigi Lucheni, an Italian, aged twenty-five, born in Paris, last heard of in Lausanne, confessed he was an anarchist. He had come to Geneva with the intention of killing the Duke of Orleans. Not finding him there, he sought him, also in vain, at Evion, and then returned to Geneva. He then made up his mind to murder the first crowned head that passed his way. He learnt from a newspaper that the Empress of Austria was in Geneva. He had seen her four years ago in

Budapest, and was certain he would know her again. So the senseless dagger struck a noble, suffering woman, whose crown was indeed a crown of thorns. On September 11th a special train conveyed Elizabeth's remains to Vienna. She had, as Chrystomanos testified, wished her last resting-place to be in Corfu. This desire is also mentioned in her will. She was buried in the Capucin vault in Vienna, the fifteenth in the row of sleeping Empresses.

Elizabeth, so lonely in life, received in death the greetings of the whole world. Flowers for her grave were sent from all parts of the earth—from France, Greece, Italy, from Switzerland, Ireland, and Egypt. Women in Cairo sent Jericho-roses and lotus-flowers, with a branch of the old fig-tree under which, according to tradition, Mary sat after the flight from Herod. Under the black bow of this sheaf lay the inscription : '*Flores etiam miseri desertorum te salutant !*' ('Even the poor blooms of the desert salute you !')

## CHAPTER XXV

### KOERBER

ON December 2nd, 1898, Francis Joseph celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of his reign. In these days Austria spoke in the accents that had been drilled into her for half a century—in the accents of the Imperial Anthem. The melody which rang out in Vienna and Budapest, in Prague and Trieste, in Lemberg, Czernowitz, Innsbruck, and Hermannstadt, was everywhere echoed at the same pitch of official loyalty. It expressed, nevertheless, an historical fact : in the Empire whose internal dissensions and conflicting aspirations had been laid bare by the Revolution, Francis Joseph was at the same time the personal pivot and the symbol of the State. 'The Austro-Hungarian monarchy,' Francis Joseph said in 1904 (according to General Margutti) to Ernest von Koerber, 'is no fanciful work of art, but an absolute necessity for the present existence and for the future of her peoples. It is a refuge for all those fragmentary nations of Central Europe which without a common home would have a deplorable existence, and be tossed about by all their powerful neighbours ; whereas so long as they are joined together they themselves constitute an imposing power.' It speaks for Francis Joseph's sense of reality that he refrained from attributing any mystic mission to Austria, and judged it to be her unobtrusive task to be a refuge for her peoples and races. The Emperor never completed his well-chosen image. If Austria was to have such a character, then the component Nations should have been able to express their approval and their conviction that things really were as the Emperor said they were, such a home for its Peoples as, since Lord Durham's Report on Canada, the British Empire had really been. Austria did not succeed in persuading the Peoples to view her as the refuge that Francis Joseph dreamed of ; the 'absolute necessity' of which he spoke was the furtherance of the power of the dynasty, and not the development of Empire and State. Fate had decreed that the generation which grew up with Francis Joseph should see in him the only sovereign, deeming that in

the continuity of the ruling line lay the safety of the whole, but it remained to be proved whether this single clamp was strong enough to hold the whole Empire together for long.

The year of the Jubilee was a sad one. The Press devoted more space to the personal troubles of the lonely Emperor than to cares of Empire. The Austrian problem had been shown to the world in its full significance in 1848 for the first time ; it stepped on to the stage of world history with Francis Joseph. Fifty years later it was even further from a solution. The verdict of history will surely not lay the whole blame on the Emperor's shoulders. He had given a free hand to the two principal Peoples—the Germans and the Magyars—to build up their own internal development. It was not his fault that these two peoples treated the problem of the Empire as a problem of self-assertion. He did not lack initiative in attempting to help the remaining Peoples, and it is certain that after 1848 neither the German bourgeoisie nor the ruling classes of Hungary did anything worthy of mention towards the understanding and solving of the Empire's problem. There was no intellectual attempt to solve this great question such as there had been in the Vienna of 1848, and in Kremsier, in Frankfort, and Budapest ; the earnestness and political accomplishments which showed in the writings of Palacky and Baron von Eötvös were never again seen. Only in the Social-Democratic camp was there still one man who sought, with intellectual training and political instinct, to create an Austrian Empire of free Peoples—Dr. Karl Renner. The journalistic fronde of Left Liberal reviews and weekly papers was witty, provocative, ironic, proud of its display of wisdom and talent, but caring only for literary effect ; the fate of the Empire was a matter of no importance. They did right to make a trial of their strength against the Coalition Ministry when an appeal to a free electorate was not permitted ; with a good conscience they assisted in the overthrow of Badeni ; they could exercise their wit and criticism against Count Thun—but as regards the Empire they remained unfruitful ; and the Empire was bleeding from a dozen wounds and crying for a doctor.

In May 1899 the German parties concluded an alliance, with a programme that did not even attempt to solve the German-

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Czech language question. The need for a renewal of the Customs and Trade Treaty rendered the situation of Thun's Government more difficult. There was no prospect of obtaining the assent of Parliament for an agreement with Hungary, so Thun proceeded by way of decree. Thereupon the Hungarian Government resisted, and Bánffy's Ministry fell. An autocratic imposition of fresh indirect taxation caused much agitation in German Bohemia ; in the storm-centres of Eger and Asch there was open rebellion ; in Graslitz the police fired on the crowd. In October 1899 the episode of Thun came to an end. 'The monarchy,' says Friedjung of this period of Government, 'was deserted by its good genius when the Emperor renounced the age-long co-operation with the central race of the Empire, so that its radical elements were in opposition, not simply to the Government, but even to the State.' But history is not so simple as that. Co-operation with the Germans, as had been shown, was only possible on one condition—that the aspirations of the other Peoples should be rejected by sheer force ; in practice an impossible proposition. Nevertheless, Francis Joseph leaned towards the Germans. He thought first of entrusting the Government to the German-clerical, Prince Alfred Liechtenstein ; but finally called on the Governor of Styria, Count Clary-Aldringen, to take on the task of Government ; and he immediately repealed the language ordinances of Baron Gautsch, which were those of Badeni in a mitigated form.

The reason of this change lay in proceedings that rubbed Francis Joseph on a sensitive spot. In the army the order was in force that when the reserve-men were mustered they should have their names called out, according to army custom, and answer with the German word '*Hier*.' The Czech Radicals now urged that their people should be allowed to answer with the Czech word '*Zde*.' This project was not pointed against the army ; the Czech reservists fell in with military discipline ; but they felt that the word of response, which was spoken while they were still in civilian clothes, should be said in their mother-tongue. In this the Emperor saw a danger to the army ; those who answered '*Zde*' were condemned to the punishment of detention. Amongst them, one of the first, was the editor, Klofač, who was destined to become Minister for War in the

Republic of Czecho-Slovakia. The suppression of the language order and the strife over the little word drove the Czechs into radical opposition. It availed nothing that the Emperor, contrary to previous custom, was now himself taking the wheel of internal politics, and, in personal conversations with the leaders of the parties, striving to restore a conciliatory atmosphere. Count Clary was only a stop-gap ; he went as soon as he realized that there was no means of governing except by decree.

Since the days of Schmerling the Emperor had governed with the help of his nobles, though it was not as though he credited them with an exclusive capacity. Amongst his Prime Ministers, it was only Schwarzenberg, Belcredi, the brothers Auersperg, Windischgrätz, and Thun who were political aristocrats ; the others, Potocki, Taaffe, Kielmannsegg, Badeni, Gautsch, and Clary, were ennobled officials. Schmerling was the only case of an untitled bourgeois standing at the head of the Government. Now once more Francis Joseph had resort to the services of gifted officials. In Austria's civil service there were quite a number of distinguished minds and strong individual personalities with whom, as in the case of Steinbach, the Emperor came into immediate contact. Badeni had already appraised Ernest von Koerber, his Departmental Chief in the Ministry of the Interior, as one of the most capable. Gautsch had entrusted him with the Ministry of Trade. Now, under Clary, he became Minister of the Interior. A few days after the beginning of the new century, on January 18th, 1900, the rescript appeared which nominated Koerber as Prime Minister and head of the Home Office.

This was one of Francis Joseph's happiest inspirations ; in Koerber Austrian talents were seen at their best. He was a true Austrian by birth, the son of Lieut. Josef von Koerber, grandson of a Lieutenant-General. His mother represented the intellectual and liberal element in the marriage, being the daughter of one of those cultured families with a civil service tradition which, since the days of the Emperor Francis, had given the Empire its best men. He himself was educated at the Theresianum, where he showed himself a model pupil, with a real bent for the classical languages, for history and philosophy. After completing his studies in law, the young Koerber, following



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family tradition, became a civil servant. He began as a magistrate in the courts of Vienna, entered the Ministry of Commerce, where he attracted the attention of Witteck, and, under Marquis Bacquehem, was appointed Chief Secretary for Commerce. His career was precipitate. Still only thirty-five years old, for this rapid rise he had to thank his talents, his industry, and his typically Austrian versatility. Bacquehem, himself a talented man, valued the young Chief Secretary for other reasons besides the excellent speeches he prepared for him. Badeni took him into the Ministry of the Interior, where he was but one step removed from Ministerial office.

He was fifty years old when the Emperor entrusted him with the Government. A portraitist of prominent Austrians of this time describes him as follows : 'He has the sharpest features in Austria, somewhat Asiatic but not quite up to the level of a Japanese male beauty—a sincere lover of the Great City—never goes away for a summer holiday—has a truly overwhelming assiduity—in his private life an enthusiastic bachelor—in his publications and orders he carries modernity almost to the point of defiance of the authorities.'

Austria was now given into the hands of this cultured, clever, free-thinking modernist—might he not prove her saviour ? He seized the bull by the horns and began with the racial question. He would have no more decrees ; he proposed to settle the language question by law on the basis of agreement between the Germans and Czechs. He invited the representatives of both Nations to a conference, and himself made proposals for rearranging the assize districts of Bohemia so as to bring them into correspondence with racial boundaries. According to the population, he decided whether each district was purely German, purely Czech, or a mixture of both. Koerber's proposals were the first attempt to decide the language question as a whole. Both sides refused them ; the Germans because neither the Moderates nor the Radicals wished to appear less nationalistic than the other, the Czechs because they scented a threat to the indivisibility of Bohemia. In Parliament also Koerber had the two Nations against him. He dissolved the House of Deputies and appealed to the good sense of the electorate. The tendency to extremism, however, had so far

advanced that the humbler bourgeoisie remained deaf to Koerber's arguments. The new Parliament was even more refractory than the old. In order to keep government going even, Koerber had to resort to exceptional measures. His mind now turned to electoral reform ; if the privileged classes spurned the State, then let the people as a whole speak out. For some time the Emperor had approved of this reform, but Hungary and Count Goluchowski, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, hindered the scheme. Koerber, determined to down his opponents, tried another method. The parties would not agree to national peace ; perhaps the lure of economic advantages would persuade them. He conceived a vast scheme for building railways and canals. Single portions of the scheme, such as the Tauern Line, a second line connecting the interior of the Empire with Trieste, and the enlarging of Trieste harbour, were immediately tackled. He helped the Czech capital to clean up the old parts of the town with government funds. The State coffers were emptied, but the stream of money that Koerber caused to flow operated usefully ; for the first time for years Parliament passed the Budget.

One section of the community stood by Koerber in his efforts ; he had known how to make the Press his friend. He granted complete freedom, and stopped the system of State confiscation. He was always accessible to newspaper men. He won over the better types by his charming personality, and by giving them news and stories ; for the venal he had orders, titles, and hard cash. He granted Austria the completest freedom of speech, and would make no exception even when the Archduke Ferdinand demanded measures against the Anti-Rome movement.

No European country, with the exception of France, possessed greater freedom than Austria during Koerber's Government. We now know that, as in the days of Andrassy and Beust, or of Hohenwart and Schäffle, the Emperor did nothing to prevent these reforms. He saw no danger in the removal of limits to political discussion. Now, seventy years of age, he had such a deep scepticism of men and minds that he attached no particular significance to the formal liberties which had once been the subject of such bitter strife. He was more tolerant

than the average educated citizen. Koerber had checked the bureaucracy; he let the journalists prattle to their hearts' content; he never prevented meetings, and accustomed the police to the idea that Socialists might be left to heap curses on capitalism and that the enemies of Rome could worship Wotan if they chose; he discouraged official mumbo-jumbo, for he himself eschewed ceremony and was never on his dignity. He was at the end of a telephone to all who had grievances or requests. As his own Minister of the Interior he declared war on the formality and literary verbosity of officials; as his own Minister of Justice he initiated the revision of the Book of Common Law. During the big strikes among the miners of Moravia, Silesia, and Bohemia he sent Ministers and departmental chiefs as mediators. Under his Government the working-hours of miners were reduced from twelve to nine hours. He had more in view; he intended that the workers of Austria should benefit by a system of old age insurance.

Koerber was the friend of any progressive scheme, but he was surrounded by parties to whom the spectacle of a rejuvenated and reanimated Austria meant nothing. It seemed that the extreme Nationalists would accept any tyranny of Nationalist origin rather than a paradisaical existence under the Hapsburgs. Every educational problem changed into a problem of national prestige. The age-long hesitation of Governments and of the two dominating Peoples in face of the possibility of creating a Federation of the Peoples, with the dynasty to hold the balance and to symbolize the union—these hesitations had resulted in magnifying every little national matter into an affair of great importance. For many years the Italians had wanted a university in Trieste. The wish was now fulfilled, but the university was created in the Tyrol. Koerber meant well when he transferred the Italian Faculty of Law to the little town of Wilden, near Innsbruck; but he was powerless to prevent the German Nationalist students from chasing away the Italians with violence. The affair ended in street affrays, which had to be put an end to by the military.

The controversy with Hungary appeared more deplorable to the Emperor than these little domestic Austrian dramas. Since 1867 both of the allied States had to pay a contribution to the

common funds, and the Customs and Commerce Treaty was renewed every decade. In 1878 and 1887 this treaty had been renewed, but since Badeni's Government in 1897 it had not received Parliamentary sanction, the lapsed treaty being merely renewed from year to year, in Hungary by consent of Parliament, in Austria by method of decree. In the summer of 1902, Bánffy's successor, the new Prime Minister of Hungary, Koloman von Széll, threatened a complete severance from Austria. Koerber worked far into the winter trying to find another form of union, but until the morning of December 31st it seemed as though his efforts were doomed to failure. Twice during the last hours of the year the two Ministers were summoned before Francis Joseph, but he too was unable to effect an agreement. Not until New Year's Day, precisely on the stroke of midnight, was the settlement reached. It was Koerber's greatest success. But the good work did not last for long. No sooner was the settlement ratified than fresh difficulties appeared.

It was long since the number of recruits for the Austrian-Hungarian army had been increased; no War Minister had dared bring such a proposition before Parliament. The influx of recruits into the regiments did not suffice to make up the complement of the new battalions. The Government now proposed raising the number by 23,000 men a year. Austria approved the suggested raising of the number; even the Czechs fell in with the Emperor's wishes. In Hungary, however, Kossuth's party would not let the occasion slip by without attempting to fulfil a long-cherished wish. Their demand was that Hungarian words of command should be used in the Hungarian regiments of the common army. This demand had little prospect of fulfilment, for there were seventeen Croatian regiments in the Hungarian Corps who would resist, if necessary with force, the introduction of Hungarian words of command. Nevertheless, the Emperor saw in the dispute over the words of command an attack upon the common defensive forces of the Empire.

Széll, unable to pacify Nationalist opposition, retired. His successor, however, Count Khuen-Héderváry, who, as Banus of Croatia, had proved himself a strong man, was more concerned over the matter than Széll. No sooner had he taken office than

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he hurried to the Emperor at the camp at Bruck and begged him to renounce the recruit proposal. He portrayed the atmosphere in Hungary in such lurid colours that Francis Joseph, with a heavy heart, gave way to the pressure of his Minister.

Koerber was now in a fatal situation. He had advocated the increase of the forces as an urgent necessity; the Emperor, however, was taking in sail before Hungarian opposition. Koerber could no longer face the Austrian Parliament, and asked leave to resign. The Emperor refused, but Koerber was now made to feel the enmity of Hungary and the hatred of Goluchowski. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who for long had disliked the free-minded modern Prime Minister, chose this moment to play the part of anxious upholder of the Emperor's cause.

In the hot summer of 1903, Francis Joseph, now seventy-three years old, for the first time began to show his age. He suffered from unconquerable somnolence, and would doze during consultations. So as not to waken him, the Ministers had to tiptoe out of the room, and decisions had to be postponed. Goluchowski blamed Koerber for having been, in the recruiting question, 'more Imperial than the Emperor.' Francis Joseph saw his mistake, and sought, in September 1903, to rectify his weakness. The Army Orders, issued during the manœuvres, at Chlopy, conveyed a new assertion of faith in the common army: 'Uniform and undivided as it is now, so shall my army remain.' Khuen-Héderváry went, and Count Stefan Tisza became Prime Minister of Hungary.

Tisza did not succeed any the better in stemming the movement against the indivisibility of the army. He let loose his anger against Koerber, who had declared in the Austrian House of Deputies that any change in the Imperial army must receive the consent of the Vienna Government. Tisza described Koerber's speech as the 'dilettante utterance of a *distinguished foreigner*' (the last two words in English). Now not only were the Peoples at loggerheads, but the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary were conducting an open quarrel before the eyes of the whole world. It was the worst crisis since 1848. The resistance of the Hungarian Opposition was infectious: there was fighting in Prague, tumults between Ruthenians and Poles, new quarrels in Innsbruck, and even discord in Vienna. Lueger,

encouraged by Francis Ferdinand, attempted an attack on the secular schools; Schönerer raged against Rome; the Poles had to be placated by the concession of educational facilities in Troppau and Teschen.

For four years Koerber, with admirable energy, had held out against all storms; now his nerves were beginning to fail. He became so ill that he could neither eat nor sleep. It was the moment for his enemies, Goluchowski, Gautsch, Dr. Kramář, and Herr Kestranek to rally together. His old opponent, Goluchowski, had formed an alliance with Dr. Kramář, and promised the Emperor that Czech opposition would end if Koerber were sacrificed. Gautsch, the custodian of bureaucratic tradition, was only waiting to show the Emperor how Koerber's methods had failed. Herr Kestranek, the Chairman of the Prague Iron Company, announced a huge rise in iron shares if Koerber fell. To this group was added Herr Derschatta, one of those commercial pushers who behind a veil of political interest conceal one single aim—their own profit.

Koerber, ill and hemmed in by his enemies, begged the Emperor to be relieved. Francis Joseph hesitated, and advised his Minister to take a rest. Goluchowski and Gautsch took advantage of this breathing-space to prophesy peaceful days to the worried Emperor. The cynical Goluchowski advanced an argument that he had tried out the previous day at the Jockey Club, to the effect that so-called talent was of no use to Austria, and only led to confusion and unrest. The Emperor did not answer this feeble reasoning, but he was tired. On December 1st, 1904, Koerber received the dismissal for which he had pleaded.

## CHAPTER XXVI

### KATHARINA SCHRATT

**A**MONG the many public squares of Vienna which recall various centuries of Hapsburg rule there are few that can rival in intimate charm the Maximilian Square in Hietzing. Bounded on one side by the many-tiered buildings of Schönbrunn Castle, and on the other by the terraces of the hotels, with the baroque church in the background, its atmosphere is that of the days of the Emperor Francis. During Francis Joseph's reign it became the home of the Court officials, the high bureaucracy, and many artists. The houses of the quiet streets, each standing in its own old garden, date from the days of honest humdrum Emperor Francis.

In No. 9 Gloriettegasse, Hietzing, lived Katharina Schratt, the woman who, for over thirty years, was Francis Joseph's friend and confidante. Kathi Schratt, the daughter of a postmaster in Baden, near Vienna, started her career on the stage as a young girl, being first discovered by Heinrich Laube for the Burgtheater. Her naturalness and charm pleased her audiences; her Austrian temperament, amiability, and sense of humour were at once the strength and the limit of her art. During a performance she attracted the notice of Francis Joseph, but Elizabeth, who had seen her in Ischl and taken a fancy to her, cemented her friendship with the Court. Whether the ever-restless Empress, who now herself so seldom visited Vienna, took this trouble to make the life of her lonely husband the richer by a human relationship, or whether her action sprang from a secret self-reproach, certain it is that her kind heart and knowledge of human nature hit upon an excellent choice.

From that day until his death, Katharina Schratt played a vital part in Francis Joseph's life. Her rôle was typical of Imperial Vienna. Although Francis Joseph had become the personal pivot round which his Empire centred, the capital heard nothing of such rumours as generally float round great Courts, where listening ears are ever ready to supply the populace with

tittle-tattle. The mystery of this Court lay in its apparent uneventfulness; often for long periods it seemed as though Francis Joseph as a person had disappeared; there remained only the function of an invisible Emperor. The personal kernel inside the mystic shell was more than discreet, and, if Frau von Schratt had written her memoirs, as so many friends urged her to do, she would have found herself in much perplexity how to describe the intimate life of the great Court.

Curious eyes might have seen the correct old gentleman, early in the morning when the big park of Schönbrunn was just beginning to wake up, leave his castle by a small, inconspicuous door which led to a small alley, cross the road, and enter the garden in a house of the Gloriettegasse which bore the number of nine. There he was awaited by a lady who was always good-tempered and smiling, and in the small room, furnished in the old-fashioned Vienna way, a white-clothed table, gay with flowers, was laid for breakfast. Francis Joseph had, by his own habits of life, compelled the ladies of the Court to rise early in the morning. In summer, before the move to Ischl, for weeks on end Frau Schratt's household had to begin the day at four o'clock in the morning. They had to do the same at Ischl, where the Emperor's little summer palace was connected by a 'private way' with the Villa Felicitas, on the banks of the Trenkel, that Frau von Schratt had taken on lease from the hotel-keeper Seeauer. The path was guarded by hidden police, so that no prying eyes or itching palms might disturb the Emperor. An exception was made only on August 18th, the Emperor's birthday. On this day a group of children lined the wooded path and handed flowers to the Emperor. This was not only the naïve homage of the Ischl peasants; ambition and thirst for patronage were active even here.

Frau von Schratt understood that she must never allow the power that she possessed to become noticeable; she avoided availing herself of this power, except in order to help on the little wishes of other artists and colleagues, thus occasionally indulging her vanity in a good cause. Her talent for handling people, and her natural cleverness, enabled her to become easily the best informed woman in Vienna. Her circle of acquaintances embraced, directly and indirectly, all the personalities of



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Imperial Vienna who had become important in virtue of their positions and efficiency—highly placed officials, bankers, politicians, society people, members of the theatrical profession, and journalists. From them she heard of all that went on in the capital. She knew better, and in more detail, what was happening than the best-informed newspaper. All the gossip of the town reached her ears, and amongst this chaff she was able to find much grain. One of her best informers was the vice-president of the Exchequer, Dr. Paul Schulz, a man as clever as he was knowledgeable, and in touch with the best connections of the Imperial city. Frau von Schratt did not listen and collect her information merely from a natural inclination ; it was important to her to hear much, and to understand the significance of what she heard. She was the link between the Emperor and the outer world ; she was his newspaper ; from her he learnt more, and matter of greater interest, than from all his Ministers put together. Francis Joseph had a most receptive ear for any information coming through this channel, for Frau Schratt's news was quite different from that of his advisers, and it was often only from her that he heard the truth.

There were many who came to the powerful woman with the intention of acquainting the Emperor with matters that he would not otherwise hear of. Baernreither tells how, in the winter of 1913, the Emperor was made aware of the loud clamouring of the war party through Marchet, the former Minister, a friend of Katharina Schratt. Frau von Schratt was ready to lend her aid for such good actions, although it did not come easily to her to handle such ticklish matters. Although the Emperor listened willingly to all that came to him so refreshingly through this channel, he was firmly determined that, as regards matters of State, the authority of his Ministers must not be undermined. Frau von Schratt had to be very circumspect, for she had one great enemy, who eagerly awaited the moment when he could prejudice the Emperor against her, and who criticized her over the smallest matters. This enemy was Prince Montenuovo, the pitiless and severe guardian of the etiquette and dignity of the Court. He was always ready, when from time to time there were little differences between the Emperor and Frau Schratt, to widen the gulf between them rather than help span it with a

bridge. It says much for the character of the woman who for over thirty years stood at the side of one of the richest of monarchs that she neither amassed wealth nor attached any considerable value to it. She would, however, not have been a woman had she not occasionally entertained some desire that could not be satisfied without money. Francis Joseph was never petty, but he had no sense of money. Out of this many little misunderstandings arose, which it required diplomatic skill to smooth out. On such occasions Frau von Schratt was made to feel the might of the powerful Lord Chamberlain.

Among her records of the days when she was the uncrowned Empress are the letters and telegrams Francis Joseph sent to her. They are short documents. The Emperor was no letter-writer; he made use of the most economical German.

Here is one :

‘Frau Katharina von Kiss-Schratt, Heitzing Bei Wien, Gloriettegasse, No. 9.

‘Please keep to yourself the information I sent you yesterday. Best wishes.

‘FRANCIS JOSEPH.’

It is certainly not a long letter. He telegraphed to her at Villa Felicitas, Ischl, at six o'clock in the morning : ‘Did you arrive safely in Ischl, and how are you ? Francis Joseph.’ Another time : ‘Warmest thanks for your letter of yesterday. How are you to-day ? I am anxious about you. Best wishes.’ The few words of these telegrams are the sole sentimental records of Francis Joseph.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### THE SHADOW GOVERNMENT

WHILE the whole world was listening to the distressing discords of Austrian politics, the Imperial Opera boasted the music of the most magnificent orchestra ever heard by human ears—the Vienna Philharmonic, conducted by Gustav Mahler. At the same time the voice of Josef Kainz was ringing from the stage of the Burgtheater. These two Hapsburg theatres were still the supreme temples of German art. The great times of the Burgtheater were indeed over. They had begun on the victory of the Counter-Revolution, after which Heinrich Laube, a former revolutionary, managed to keep this stage for twenty years in the van of German dramatic art. Franz Dingelstedt and Adolf Wilbrandt were the actors of the transition period between the classical era and that of the new bourgeois society, which impressed the mark of its taste and style upon the forms of the theatre. An Austrian, Marx Burckhard, in 1890, and a Berliner, Paul Schlenther, in 1897, attempted to restore the old excellence.

Even in the quietest times, Francis Joseph seldom visited his theatres, but he was always a most generous patron, and a more liberal one than his ancestor in that he did not interfere with the independence of art. He never built up a programme on the basis of his own taste, nor even claimed that this should be treated with any special regard. If, during the vogue of the German Naturalists, the director of the Burgtheater could not always follow his inclination to spread their fame, it was not the Emperor who impeded him, but the views of the ladies of the Court, who had no sympathy for the new times.

Francis Joseph delegated the government of his artistic Empire to his Chamberlains, being certain that he could rely upon the taste and tact of Prince Liechtenstein and his successor Montenuovo. If there were any appreciation left for the virtues of the nobility, Alfred Liechtenstein, the most perfect gentleman of his time, would certainly have had a monument erected to his memory in Vienna. These two theatres were

dispensing the last fading glory of the doomed Empire. Theirs was a swan-song of melancholy beauty for which there were hardly any ears attuned. Liechtenstein and Montenuovo, who preserved a noble tradition in the capital city which had lost so much of its nobility, treated the artist with respect. Vienna of the middle and lower-middle classes had become petty, spiteful, and ill-mannered, against her intellectual leaders. The Court was generous and unprejudiced, but the greatest musician of the time was driven out of the Opera by the hatred, envy, and dislike of the middle classes. This was the first foretaste of that intolerance which, in the Republic of Austria, has driven Richard Strauss from the conduct of the Opera, and has refused a place to Bruno Walter because he is unbaptized. Prince Montenuovo, successor to Liechtenstein, was Francis Joseph's last Chamberlain, the last director of Hapsburg ceremonial. He was the grandson of Maria Louisa, Napoleon's wife, and as a relative of the Royal family he took it to be a sacred duty to maintain that ceremonial in its integrity.

As might have been expected, the new heir to the throne fell into disagreement with the director of ceremonial. After the Crown Prince's death, the heir was Francis Joseph's second brother, Charles Ludwig. But, as he was only three years younger than the Emperor, more attention naturally went to his eldest son, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. This young man, who was so closely associated with the Emperor as his nephew and heir, was as far from him in nature and opinion as Vienna was from Graz. It was in this latter town that he had been born on December 18th, 1863, the first son of Charles Ludwig by his second wife, Princess Maria Annunziata of the Bourbons of Sicily.

He was heir to the last Duke of Modena, Francis V (Ferdinand Geminian), and inherited both his property and his title of 'Austria-Este,' which linked him up with the somewhat unedifying history of a number of obscure heroes. For, while the Este dynasty was one of the oldest princely houses in Italy, the Austrian branch of the family went no farther back than the wars of the Revolution. It was not only, then, by Montenuovo that the family of Francis Ferdinand was reminded of Napoleon. When young General Bonaparte, with his ragged

heroes of the Revolution, conducted the campaign of 1796, the first and most brilliant of all, he utilised his victory over the Austrian army to make a clean sweep of the petty princes of Italy. Among others dispossessed by Napoleon was the last descendant of the Italian house of Este, who ruled at Modena under the pompous name of Duke Hercules III Rinaldo. After the negotiations at Leoben and the Peace of Campo Formio, Austria renounced the Netherlands, Mantua, and Milan, but kept Istria, Dalmatia, and Venice. As a final concession, she agreed to the incorporation of Modena in the new Cis-Alpine Republic. Hercules of Este would naturally, then, have remained a duke without a dukedom had he not been closely related to the Imperial House of Austria by the marriage of his daughter and heir, Maria Beatrix d'Este, to the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand Charles Antony, third son of Maria Theresa and brother to Joseph II and Marie Antoinette. As uncle of the reigning Emperor Francis, the founder of the House of Austria-Este might reasonably hope that his father-in-law, Hercules Rinaldo, would not be left altogether uncompensated for the loss of his dukedom of Modena. After the blow she had suffered, Austria had not much to offer, but Emperor Francis managed to secure a clause in the Peace of Lunéville attributing Breisgau to his uncle's father-in-law in compensation for the loss of Modena. Thus, while Napoleon was driving petty princes out of Italy, and so taking the first steps towards uniting the Italian nations, slices of German territory, with their inhabitants, were being transferred like pieces in a game of chess. This Italian, Hercules of Este, was transformed into the lord and monarch of one of the most charming districts in Germany. When he died, in 1803, his son-in-law, the Archduke Ferdinand, was first of all provisional administrator of the territory, and then became reigning duke. But it was not for long, for, after the defeat of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz, the Hapsburgs lost Breisgau, which was first of all divided between Württemberg and Baden, and in 1810 attributed as a unit to the Grandduke of Baden.

Duke Ferdinand died in 1806 without the consolation of seeing the Austrian House of Este restored to any throne, however petty. The Congress of Vienna, however, re-established

the old order of things. Ferdinand's son entered Modena with the title of Francis IV, while his mother not only inherited the Duchy of Massa and Carrara, but also the Imperial domain of Lunigiana, which after her death was united to Modena. The history of the last two Dukes of Modena, Francis IV and Francis V, is one of the most miserable chapters in the inglorious tale of the petty Italian States. It is a record of flights and restorations, promises and persecutions. Francis IV fled in 1831, to return to his domain with the support of Austrian bayonets. In 1848 his son followed his example, and was restored by the soldiers of Radetzky. The cruel comedy came to an end at the battle of Solferino, but Francis Ferdinand inherited from Francis V, who died childless in 1875, though married to a daughter of King Ludwig I of Bavaria, his property, his Italian estates, and his title.

The gloomy side in Francis Ferdinand's character was inherited from his mother, the daughter of Ferdinand II, King of the Two Sicilies, celebrated in Italian history as 'Re Bomba,' the Bomb King. Among the petty princes of the House of Bourbon-Parma, who exercised a foolish despotism in Naples, Messina, Parma, and Florence, Ferdinand was one of the most repellent figures. Cowardly, and ready to make any concession when faced by the indignation of his people, he was ferocious to madness as soon as he felt power in his hands once more. He acquired the name of the Bomb King when he shot down the rebels in Messina in September 1848, and also from the reign of terror which he exercised after the rebellion had been quashed. Twenty-two thousand persons were condemned by him to death, to long terms of imprisonment, and to confinement in forts. It was his particular pleasure to see his own Ministers, who had proved unfaithful to him, chained to the galleys. When the wrath of his people compelled him to leave Naples, he retreated to Caserta and there ruled the country with siege methods.

Francis Ferdinand inherited something of the spirit of this foreign despot who was constantly fearing attempts on his life, and surrounded himself with a network of spies. Hence came his distrust of every one, his conviction that he was disliked and hated ; hence, too, came the fierce resolution to defend his pos-

sessions as the foreign usurpers had done. Once he remarked to General Conrad : 'You generally expect that every man will prove an angel. This is likely to lead you into great difficulties. For my part, I always assume that any one I see for the first time is a scoundrel, and later on, if possible, I revise my opinion.' It was not a philosopher's contempt for human kind that made him speak thus, but an evil conscience, as of a despot uncertain of his power. The weak lungs he had inherited from his mother increased his tendency to suspicion. The doctors almost lost hope for him when he was twenty-five years old, and his younger brother Otto was thought to be the real heir. But a long and meticulous observance of medical instructions in the South, at Meran, Lussin, Ajaccio, and in Egypt, combined with a strong determination to live, got the better of his illness. The experience, however, of that period in which all eyes were admiringly turned upon his brother as the likely heir hardened and sharpened his character. The experience of life which Francis Joseph had acquired, the understanding and resignation which his long years had brought him, made no impression upon the nephew, whose character was so different. Unlike Rudolph, moreover, Francis Ferdinand had no store of culture which could help him to understand indirectly what his native intelligence could not grasp directly.

His tutors were Dr. Marschall, Court Chaplain and later Suffragan Bishop of Vienna, Dr. Kapp, Inspector of Schools, and Dr. Knauer, Professor of Natural History. He had the greatest difficulty in learning foreign languages, a gift which came without effort to the other Hapsburgs. Ottokar Czernin records that as a grown man he spoke French indifferently, and otherwise only snippets of Italian, Czech, and Hungarian. His real passion was hunting. He was not, like Francis Joseph, content to hunt the rare game of the Salzburg district and to find his pleasures in the chase rather than in the kill. Like William II, Francis Ferdinand enjoyed wholesale massacres. At his Bohemian estate at Konopischt, where he resided after his marriage, thousands of pheasants were primed to such fatness and heaviness that they could hardly lift themselves above the ground ; and it was the delight of the Archduke to shoot these unnatural creatures in vast numbers. It must be added that

Francis Ferdinand's education went even more strictly along military lines than that of the other Archdukes.

In 1899 his life suffered a great change. At the castle of Pressburg he made the acquaintance of Countess Sophie Chotek von Chotkowa und Wognin. Francis Ferdinand's visits to the Archduke Frederick at Pressburg were originally devoted to one of the many daughters of the Archduchess Isabella, but Countess Chotek, who was then thirty-two years old, outshone the young Archduchess. She came from a noble but impoverished Bohemian family, and was in the service of the Archduchess Isabella as lady-in-waiting. Her sister, a gentler and more handsome woman, resided in the citadel of Prague in an institution for daughters of the nobility.

Members of the Bohemian nobility who knew Sophie Chotek and her family declared that she had captivating qualities, above all a talent for mimicry such as is often possessed by clever and ambitious persons destined by nature to serve rather than to command. This is their method of exerting charm and attraction over those from whom there is much to expect—essentially a feminine and artistic talent, compounded of the gifts of the actor, the diplomat, and the hypnotist. In the performance of her services as lady-in-waiting, Sophie Chotek had constantly had to swallow her own family pride ; naturally this had nourished in her an intense desire to rise in the world. Long years in a more or less tolerable state of dependence had taught her to excel along the whole scale of that seductive and deceptive art which is so much more potent than innocent blushes. Her eyes had that cunning depth which reveals that the servant has accepted the weaknesses and vanities of the master and magnified them in reception. She had great feminine attraction. Like many women of the Bohemian nobility, she was slender yet strong, combining a rustic naturalness with the distinction of inherited tradition.

Soon the heir to the throne was visiting the young Archduchesses solely because of the opportunity which that gave of seeing the lady-in-waiting. But the Archduchess Isabella discovered a secret correspondence between the two, and dismissed Sophie Chotek from her service. Those who knew Francis Ferdinand testified that at that moment Sophie



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Chotek attained her designs. Francis Ferdinand was no match for her female energy and cunning. She took possession of him.

Ten years after the tragedy of his son, Francis Joseph entered into the struggle with the new heir. Sophie Chotek had been obliged to leave the castle at Pressburg overnight. The next day Francis Joseph was informed of everything. The Empress Eugénie declares that he took the news as a most severe blow to his House and to the unity of the Empire. The thought that Francis Ferdinand wished to marry the Countess raised the most alarming prospect of constitutional disorders which would bring Austria-Hungary to an end. Francis Joseph gave the heir his choice : he must give up the woman or give up the throne. But Francis Ferdinand was wholly in the power of the Countess. It was her will and her energy alone which dictated the course of events. The Archduke would undertake neither to give up the woman nor to give up the throne.

The Emperor took every conceivable means to persuade the Archduke that this marriage was impossible. Goluchowski and Koerber endeavoured to use their good offices. The Archduke's former tutor, Bishop Marschall, a wise and kind adviser, spent days arguing with his pupil. Prince Montenuovo said this was dynastic suicide. The Ministers and courtiers urged that the old Emperor's health must not be endangered. But all in vain.

Bishop Marschall later declared that it was a most serious error on the part of Francis Joseph that he consented to a morganatic marriage for the heir. It was not, however, pliancy, weakness, or resignation which finally led the Emperor to this decision. It was the dreadful thought of what would happen if Francis Ferdinand resigned his claim to the throne. The next heir would be the Archduke Otto, known as the handsomest prince of the dynasty. Otto was at the mercy of a most violent temperament, and had been involved in many scandals. Years had passed since Deputy Pernerstorfer had recounted the adventures of a 'very young and very exalted personage.' There was now no more talk about the wild behaviour of the Archduke. But Francis Joseph could not conceive of Otto as heir to the throne. Otto's eldest son, Charles, was only four years old.

The Empress Eugénie records a saying of Francis Joseph which is probably genuine : 'God grants me this long life in order that the end of this ancient Empire may be delayed a while. After my death it is bound to come.' Dynastic events confirmed these fears of the Emperor. Half in despair, and certainly with no hope that any good should come from it, Francis Joseph consented to 'the Chotek woman,' as he continued to call the Countess until her marriage, becoming the wife of the heir.

On June 28th, 1900, exactly fourteen years before his tragic end, Francis Ferdinand, in the Palace of Vienna and in presence of the Emperor, the whole Court and all holders of office, renounced all rights of succession and of Royal status for the children of his marriage. Ernst von Plener, who was present as a Privy Councillor, records that the whole ceremony made a most painful impression upon those who saw it. The Emperor, who looked resentful and greatly aged, read out in an almost threatening tone to the Archduke an address calling upon him to take the oath. Francis Ferdinand complied in choking tones. But Francis Joseph's fears were justified, for scarcely was the ceremony ended when the Hungarian Opposition began to question the legality of the renunciation. Franz Kossuth declared that, according to Hungarian law, when the Archduke ascended the throne his wife would be Queen of Hungary, and the children would enjoy the rights of accession. Kossuth had no particular affection for Francis Ferdinand or for his wife. His words were an attack upon the Court in general, and upon those dynastic regulations of which the public still had no knowledge.

Kossuth's attack was of no immediate importance, but showed what was in store for the Hapsburgs once Francis Joseph should depart. What Francis Ferdinand minded much more than the theoretical implications of his marriage was the open hostility with which part of the Court encountered his wife, 'the interloper in the Belvedere.' The Emperor, however, showed more delicacy than his Court. It was his habit to become reconciled with what could no more be changed, and he sought to accommodate the iron rigidity of ceremonial to the rules of politeness. He elevated the Archduke's wife, whose domineering temperament alarmed him, to the rank of Princess,

and gave her the name 'Hohenberg,' derived from a noble family allied to the Hapsburgs. Yet even the Emperor could not get the better of the ceremonial so jealously guarded by Montenuovo. On intimate Court occasions the heir could only appear unaccompanied by his wife. The upstart was excluded from Imperial family receptions and banquets, from private parties in honour of foreign royalty, and from Court balls of the most exclusive type. At the other type of Court ball, held during the carnival season, the Archduke had to head the procession with an Archduchess on his arm, while his wife followed as last behind the youngest Princesses. She was not allowed to enter a Court carriage, though these, despite their golden wheels, were extremely uncomfortable.

It does not often happen that an ancient traditional ceremonial, designed for the exaltation of majesty, should be converted into a source of pain, humiliation, and constant discomfort to the heir of majesty. Yet, though human feelings revolt against the rigidity of etiquette, it is not a mere empty form, but the expression of an existence raised above the normal level. Francis Ferdinand carried on the bitter struggle against the guardian of Hapsburg ceremonial, Prince Montenuovo, but logic was on the side of the Chamberlain, who, himself an illegitimate offspring of the dynasty, defended the dynastic principle against the heresy of the legitimate heir. The emotion roused by this conflict did not, however, attain to tragic depths. The claim advanced in the name of nature against the privileges of birth was rooted merely in a personal desire to attain these privileges.

All the energy of the heir and his bride could not prevail against the principles of dynastic tradition. But, if this tradition proved victorious, the victory sowed seeds of envenomed bitterness. The Countess had fulfilled the ambition of a thousand dreams. Was she, at the very peak of attainment, to suffer a most painful humiliation? Was she to taste at the bottom of the cup of delight harsh and repellent flavours mingled with the sweet and luscious? During these years of humiliation the Countess learnt to hate with a hatred that could never forget or forgive, but pursued its victim until it annihilated it. She refused to go near the Court, and the heir created a Court

for himself. Henceforth the Belvedere was in perpetual opposition to Schönbrunn.

Was there anything more than a spirit of contradiction, in this perpetual opposition now shown by the heir, to Francis Joseph's conservative inclinations? Certainly Francis Ferdinand had an outlook of his own upon the world, quite different from that of Francis Joseph's. His view of history was almost original, as shown in a conversation with the aide-de-camp, General Margutti, in which he denied that either Emperor Francis or Metternich were first-class statesmen. He declared that Francis's horizon was a restricted one, 'bounded on all sides with wooden constructions,' while 'Metternich was not truly great, because he failed to understand the importance of the French Revolution as the critical point in the recent developments of humanity.' Again, Francis Ferdinand showed independence in declaring that the war of 1813 against Napoleon was Austria's greatest mistake, because the important matter was to maintain a primacy of the Hapsburgs in Germany. From quite different premises Francis Ferdinand reached the same views as the South German democrats when he declared that the House of Hapsburg, in combination with Napoleon, might have impeded the rise of Prussia and given a different shape to Germany. Yet the Germany which he imagined was altogether unlike the ideal of the South German patriots. His ideal was that of a Germany ruled by the old princely families under the presidency of the Hapsburgs, this system being guaranteed by an alliance with Napoleon. He could not forgive his great-grandfather for laying down the crown of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, and thereby renouncing the possibility of a later revival of the claim. He regarded Metternich and the Emperor Francis as the destroyers of German unity, without whose errors Bismarck could never have created his little Germany. Francis Ferdinand considered that the decision of 1866 had been 'disastrous.' This is a reasonable judgement, which accords with that of some critical historians of to-day. He defended, on the other hand, Francis Joseph's youthful policy of sacrificing Lombardy rather than abandoning the leadership of Germany to Prussia without a struggle. 'Prussia's egoism,' said Francis Ferdinand in August 1913,

'sawed off the branch on which we were sitting, but the Hohenzollerns will come to no good by this. Prussia inherited among her conquests from us the hatred of France, and has let that hatred develop into a peril for the stability of the whole world. Germany, with her purposeful and methodical mind, and her wonderful untiring energy, ought to have a magnificent destiny. But the ambitions of Imperial Prussia direct those energies into dangerous channels, before the Germans have had time to attain their maturity. That Prussia should have won that victory,' continued Francis Ferdinand, 'was regrettable for the further reason that the natural course of federal development was interrupted. Under the primacy of the House of Hapsburg the federal principle would have become the essence of the German system, and would have found further application in Austria itself through the great advantage of Austria's strength and vitality.'

There is much to be said against these views, yet they undoubtedly show an individual mind at work. These glances at the past are directed from the standpoint that Austria-Hungary's national problem was at that moment insoluble. Francis Ferdinand, unlike many of the Emperor's advisers and his own contemporaries, realized that the existing situation was untenable, and took pains to investigate the problem of national autonomy and federalism. In his view, however, that the problem could be solved even now by the sheer exertion of the powers at the disposal of the state, army, and bureaucracy, he showed himself to be still misled by outworn conceptions.

And on this point divergences between the Emperor and the heir became clear. Francis Joseph had long ceased to believe in the virtues of force. Yet he lacked the creative imagination necessary for comprehension of the problems of the Empire. Francis Ferdinand perceived that federalization was the one process by which the Empire could be given strength to survive in the new times, but he mistakenly supposed that the change he imagined could be brought about by force. The Emperor had needed twenty years to learn the hopelessness of attempting to reform the Empire by the exercise of absolute power. His nephew returned to those Utopian notions. Francis Joseph had adapted himself to modern means of

government, but had no modern programme. His heir had a modern programme, but sought to realize it through antiquated means. Both strove to consolidate the Empire, but the law of evolution cannot be imposed from outside ; it imposes itself.

Evolution follows the strongest force at play, and the strongest force now was Hungary. Hungary, stubbornly fighting for her old privileges, had broken the back of the absolute system, and had brought Austria also into the constitutional system. Hungary had imposed the dual form upon the Empire, and it was Hungary which again determined the turn of events.

The unity of the army was of all things closest to the Emperor's heart. Whether a reformation of the army along national lines would have diminished its value is doubtful. Concessions might well have been made with advantage in the course of a rational decentralizing policy. Yet the Emperor and the heir were in this single matter at one. They both refused to consider changes in the army. Count Tisza himself could not get the better of the Hungarian Party of Independence, and therefore, in the summer of 1905, Francis Joseph handed over the government of Hungary to one of his old generals, the Hungarian Minister of Defence, Baron Géza von Fejérváry de Komlós-Keresztes.

In the Emperor's view the latest elections in Hungary had rendered Parliamentary Government, as he conceived it, impossible. The Liberal majority in the House of Deputies had faded away, and it was the extreme Independence Party which now dominated. There was no hope of getting the Budget or the Army Recruiting Bill passed through this Parliament. The only hope lay in an appeal to the Peoples. It was an idea which Francis Joseph had embraced during Taaffe's last years of government—an idea partly inspired by Steinbach—that the strength of national extremism lay in the parties which came into Parliament through the indirect suffrage system, so that nothing short of the adoption of universal suffrage could get the better of the difficulties of the Empire. A Coalition of German Liberals, Conservatives, and Poles, however, frustrated this intention. The suffrage was somewhat extended, but not even Koerber had the courage to extend it in a thoroughly democratic manner. Now it had become evident in Hungary

that national extremism owed its force to a suffrage system which excluded the broad masses from any participation in government, and, among these masses, the minority peoples of the Hungarian State, Serbs and Slovenes, Rumanians, Croats, and Germans.

Francis Ferdinand cherished the ambition of breaking down the primacy of the Hungarians by calling in the other Nations. He would have liked to begin with an extension of universal suffrage, and thence to go on to a complete reconstitution of the Empire. Such plans could only be realized by unconstitutional procedure and a display of force. Francis Joseph would hear nothing of such plans, although he believed in the beneficial effects to be expected from universal suffrage.

In July 1905 the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, von Kristoffy, announced that the Government intended to introduce universal equal suffrage. But what had happened in the days of Taaffe happened once again. The Emperor had all his counsellors against him. The Hungarian nobility and their Austrian cousins, the Upper Houses of both Parliaments, did their utmost to frustrate the plan. At the Crown Council of September 10th the majority of Ministers, including not only Goluchowski, whose opposition was loudest, but even Gautsch, urged that universal suffrage should not be given to Hungary. Fejérváry handed in his resignation, and there was no other course but to come to an arrangement with the Hungarian Opposition. This proved totally impossible: the conversation between Francis Joseph and the Magyar Extremists lasted only five minutes. Francis Joseph was obliged to call Fejérváry once again, and to entrust Kristoffy with the task of weaning Parliament from its fanatical preoccupation with narrow interests. The attempt failed, but the Hungarian Opposition, consisting of the Independence Party, the Catholic Popular Party led by Count Zichy, and the Dissident Liberals led by the younger Count Julius Andrássy, were obliged to take over the Government.

The reaction of Kristoffy's plan in Austria was much more marked. After Koerber's dismissal, Baron von Gautsch, Francis Joseph's loyal servant, a kind of second Taaffe, was entrusted for the second time with the formation of a Govern-

ment. A notable jurist, Dr. Franz Klein, was included in the Government and gave it a superior tone. Gautsch had the good sense to do nothing to disturb the routine of Liberal government inherited from Koerber, while he enjoyed an advantage which his predecessor had not had, the silent approbation of the Czechs. The only opposition he had to face was that of the Social Democrats who reproached him with his attitude towards suffrage reform. Gautsch was not an opponent on principle of universal suffrage, of which the Emperor had long been a declared advocate. He only considered that this reform would be useless unless preceded by a reconstitution of national conditions. It was a mistaken idea, for such a reconstitution could not be effected by the existing restricted Parliament. It was an idea moreover in conflict with the exigencies of the moment. The Government was by now too weak to set itself against the great mass movement for general suffrage.

The Social Democratic Party, under the inspiring leadership of Viktor Adler, had, since September 1905, conducted an agitation on a grand scale. The majority of the Chamber of Deputies now advocated the reform, in favour of which seven demands, including one from the German Clericals, had been registered. In belated opposition were only the German Liberals and German Nationalists; and the Liberals went so far as to disavow one of their most gifted Parliamentarians, Dr. Lecher, for his boldness in raising his voice on behalf of the unprivileged section of the German people. In their blindness, the advocates of outworn class privilege directed cheap witticisms against the leaders of the great popular movement, talking and writing of 'the Imperial and Royal social democrats,' while, out of earshot, they laughed at 'Comrade Francis Joseph,' who had been clever and courageous enough to identify himself with the reforming movement. Once more the Emperor was showing himself more long-sighted and more aware of the trend of the times than the leaders of the German middle classes. By the end of October the Russian revolutionaries had won the day, and the Tsar had been obliged to convoke a Parliament. The Austrian Emperor was only doing his duty in calling the wide masses to participate in the Government, in face of the impotence of the Extreme Nationalists and the arrogance of the privileged classes.



There was a popular demonstration in favour of the suffrage throughout Austria on November 28th, 1905, and on the same day Baron Gautsch declared that 'the Government would do its utmost to lay its reformed proposals before the House at latest during February.' It was in vain that the House of Peers resisted, and that men like Count Thun, the Emperor's former Minister, assailed the Government for 'hauling down sail in terror of the shrieking mob.' Once again the advocates of feudal privilege banded themselves together with those who dreamed that maintenance of the unequal suffrage system could preserve the interests of the German people. Dr. von Grabmayr and Count Stürgkh were the most eloquent spokesmen of this dangerously mistaken notion that the Germans of Austria could maintain their power and position behind a wall of privilege.

For other reasons than the efforts of the Opposition, in which even Count Goluchowski took an active part, Gautsch's good intentions ended in failure. It was not so much on a matter of principle as on the details of application—namely, how many seats should be assigned to each region—that the plan was wrecked. The Polish party, stoutly defending the strong position which it had attained under the old system, refused to allow the work of reformation to proceed. In April 1906 Baron von Gautsch, the champion of universal suffrage, had to resign. The Poles had held up reform, though they could not at this stage finally frustrate it.

Retrospective historians, who seek in the last years of the Hapsburg Empire a significant development in accordance with supposed historical laws, profess to see in the social and national conflicts of the last decade before the war anticipatory signs of Austrian decadence. The fact is, however, that Austria-Hungary was menaced by no serious dangers. Count Goluchowski was not a genius, but he would have nothing to do with the policy of prestige, and he was entirely in the right in avoiding, as the Emperor directed, any occasion of conflict, for all that he was bitterly criticized by the Forward Party, with its keen sensitiveness to appearances. The agreement with Russia at Münzsteg was a guarantee against unilateral arrangements in the Balkans. Discontented elements reproached Austria with

weakness, but the policy pursued up to 1908 was along the lines of Bismarck's advice to maintain a good understanding with Russia and to avoid perils in the Balkans. Austria did well not to take advantage of the assassination of the Serbian monarchs in Belgrade in 1903, although at that moment Russia would not have stood in the way of armed intervention by Austria. It was bad enough that negotiations for a new Treaty of Commerce with Serbia only served to provoke a tariff war which barred the Austro-Hungarian market against Serbian cattle. Yet though in this Goluchowski was promoting the interests of Hungary, it was by the Hungarians that his position was undermined in 1906. He left behind him no dangerous complications. His critics declared that his leadership in foreign policy had been feeble. It was, in truth, only prudent.

Austria's economic situation had also long been normal. Four decades of peace had brought about such general prosperity in the bourgeoisie that they had repurchased from abroad securities of whose stability they had previously been in doubt, and now kept them as permanent investments. In 1907 there was a budget surplus of 146,000,000 kronen, and the Minister of Finance, Korytowski, might well say: 'Our position is favourable.' Throughout the Empire, and especially in Vienna, this could be detected by the native eye. The sons of fathers whose lives had been passed in mere Stock Exchange speculation had become industrialists, tradesmen, sound bankers, civil servants, officers, and men of learning. Once upon a time the Kreditanstalt (Credit Institute) had been the only first-class bank. At its side now stood the Bodenkreditanstalt (Agricultural Credit Institute), which was not, as its name implied, merely an agricultural mortgage institute, but a first-class general bank. It was managed by Herr von Taussig, a man much admired for his talents and much criticized for his lack of scruple. In any case, he was Austria's leading financier, and was, further, Chairman of the Austro-French State Railway and of the North-Western Railway. In 1905, Vienna was thrilled by the question whether Francis Joseph would agree to von Taussig's nomination as Governor of the Bodenkreditanstalt. The Emperor, who was better instructed and less prejudiced than Francis Ferdinand, did not withhold his consent.

These two great banks constituted the Rothschild group. They financed Serbia and disposed of the orders for supplying King Peter's army with rifles and ammunition. A dispute arose, however, over the question whether the Serbian guns should once more be ordered from the Skoda Works, and the cartridges from the Hirtenberger Fabrik, both of which belonged to the Kreditanstalt; or whether both should be delivered by the Steyrer Waffenfabrik. The influence of Albert von Rothschild, principal shareholder in the Kreditanstalt, predominated, his importance being all the greater since the deaths of Weiss and Gustav von Mauthner.

The third great bank was the Länderbank (Provincial Bank), which devoted its attention to creating trading trusts, for which it then acted as banker. The Länderbank was managed by Palmer, who was constantly at Frau Schratt's house, and enjoyed the favour of the Emperor. It was reported in Vienna that Palmer played *tarot* every day with Francis Joseph, but this was inexact, if only for the reason that the Emperor never played cards. But Palmer heard all the gossip of the capital, and this was much appreciated by the lonely monarch. Another institute which had reached the dimensions of a great bank was the Wiener Bankverein (Vienna Banking Union), directed by Moritz Bauer. The Union Bank was an institute connected with Mendelssohns' of Berlin, and was very skilfully directed by Minkus, while the Anglo-Austrian Bank was founded by the firm of Erlanger, and had a branch in London. The Niederösterreichische Escomptegesellschaft (Lower Austrian Discount Company) succeeded the Böhmisches Escomptebank (Bohemian Discount Bank) as the banking institute of the Iron Trust, thus transforming itself from a deposit bank into an industrial credit institute.

Along invisible channels the proceeds of the industrial development of the Empire flowed into Vienna. All the great companies had their head offices in Vienna, first and foremost the Iron Syndicate, which owed its enormous profits to tariffs which would have been unthinkable in other countries. The iron works were located in Moravia, Bohemia, and Styria. They were chiefly owned by the Kreditanstalt and the Länderbank. Feilchenfeld, owner of the great nickel works at Berndorf, was the

him still zealously working ten and more hours a day on the documents supplied by his Ministers.

The Emperor had maintained the sphere of appointments as his own most special preserve, but he had allowed the heir to take the initiative in army appointments. With regard to these Francis Joseph thought there could be no differences of opinion. Politics had nothing to do with the army; a soldier remained a soldier, and Francis Ferdinand, being a younger man, was in a better position to appreciate the progress of military technique than he himself, at seventy-six years of age, could possibly be.

Yet in 1905 Francis Ferdinand was found complaining that the Emperor neither gave him any information nor listened to what he said. 'I learn less than the humblest lackey at Schönbrunn,' he lamented. He now chose a new aide-de-camp, Major Alexander Brosch von Aarenau, and set up a Military Chancellery of his own. Such a term hardly expresses the organization which he created. This office entered into all kinds of connections. It had its own network of sources of information; it received visitors and granted audiences, and was approached by many discontented, hopeful, and persistent persons. It had, indeed, the character of a small Ministry, in which all important departments, including those devoted to administrative and political matters, were manned by carefully selected officers. Francis Ferdinand's Military Chancellery soon became a shadow Government. When Brosch, at the expiry of his service as aide-de-camp, was received by Francis Joseph on his appointment to an active command, the Emperor said to him: 'Well, you've been fighting against me for six years.' Nor did he mean it as a joke.

Francis Ferdinand broke down the ring of the Emperor's venerable advisers at the point of least resistance. Francis Joseph no longer trusted his own judgement in military matters, fearing that his ideas must be out of date. He therefore allowed Francis Ferdinand to get rid of the Chief of General Staff, Baron von Beck, who was retired in 1906 after many years of service. In his place followed a nominee of the heir, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf.

Conrad was twenty-two years younger than Beck. Born in 1852 in Vienna, he was the son of a colonel of Hussars. After

frequenting the Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt, he passed through the War College and followed the normal course of an Austrian officer of the General Staff. In 1886 he became Lecturer in Tactics at the War College. There he wrote manuals on tactics and on training infantry—works which were thought much of in the Austrian army, but were blamed by foreign critics for their one-sided concentration upon the offensive. In 1896, Conrad returned to service in the field. Three years later he commanded a brigade at Trieste, and in 1903 a division at Innsbruck. Francis Ferdinand's attention was drawn to him by his conduct as commander of the Southern army in the Imperial manœuvres in South Tyrol in 1905. A year later he called him to the Belvedere and marked him out for the post of Chief of the General Staff.

At his audience with the Emperor, Conrad asked if he might 'always express his views and opinions without reticence, and openly speak the truth.' Francis Joseph accorded this permission, of which Conrad wrote, 'I subsequently took fullest advantage. The Emperor,' he added, 'accepted my practice of absolute openness and truthfulness, though often visibly annoyed and sometimes thoroughly exasperated. But, being a gentleman, he kept his promise. I remember one particularly distressing occasion, when, after I had submitted a memorial to him, he banged his fist on his desk and shouted: "I always lose my temper when I read your memorials." He gazed straight in front of him, and for some time said nothing. His heightened colour and swelling veins showed the extent of his agitation. I sat in silence by the table, fearing that the aged monarch might be on the verge of some serious disturbance. About ten minutes passed like this, but it seemed to me an age. Then the Emperor continued the interview, and I was dismissed with the brief words: "Thank you".'

Baron von Conrad intended, in placing this conversation on record, to illustrate the difficulties which he came up against in his duties. He did not realize that incidentally he was throwing a decisive light upon the history of six years of unrelenting pressure to which the Emperor finally yielded. 'I always lose my temper when I read your memorials.' For six years Francis Joseph suffered these memorials to be showered upon him.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

### AEHRENTHAL'S VICTORY

**F**RANCIS JOSEPH was seventy-six years old, and had been on the throne fifty-eight years, when he first came up against Francis Ferdinand's aspiration to power. Till then he had never had the experience of being opposed in his personal decisions by some one who thought differently and was able to say so. Throughout his long reign such difficulties as he had met had always been of an external nature. To himself he appeared to be a kind of impersonal force, inheritor of the ripest experience from both good and bad times. His conscience was clear, thanks to this treasury of living wisdom about the nature of his Empire. He derived from it belief in his own authority and indispensability. Who could know Austria better than he, who was himself a portion of Austrian history? Who could have the audacity to conceive that mere thinking power could be superior to the wisdom of experience? Nor did Francis Joseph give any justification for complaints against him on the ground of his age. He performed all his duties with the punctuality of a clock. There was no party in the wide Empire, no voice even in the Opposition, which had so far called the person of the monarch in question. When the Bohemian Count, Adalbert Sternberg, spoke in Parliament about the 'Council of Greybeards at Schönbrunn,' he spoke as a bright young man anxious to gain a reputation for recklessness and aggressiveness, and not as a representative of current opinion. The Opposition was at one with the patriots in refusing to seek the explanation of Austria's weakness in the person of the Emperor. For the same tradition, born of experience and scepticism, which framed the policy of Francis Joseph had been inherited from previous generations by all thinking men in the Empire as much as by himself. It was not without painful effort that knowledge of Austria and familiarity with her true nature had been acquired. This knowledge was alive in the best minds of the country. In some it took the form of an acute understanding of the country's weaknesses; in others, it appeared as criticism softened by

amiable irony. All shared in common a strong aversion from an energetic policy aimed, in defiance of experience, at curing Austria's maladies by violent methods.

The conviction prevailed, both among thinkers and among those whose policy was guided by sentiment, that Austria should fulfil her duty by bringing about a condition of peace at home ; this modest task seemed great enough to satisfy the ambitions of the best men. Only, it seemed, in this way could a new meaning be given to the history of the old Empire. Great movements had come, like irresistible natural forces, to sweep aside Austria's dreams of domination, and to point out a new task for her within more modest boundaries—movements such as the great struggle of the races for emancipation, beginning with the French Revolution, continuing with Napoleon, with the rise of the bourgeoisie, and its advance to self-consciousness, and, finally, culminating under Napoleon III and Bismarck.

Julius Andrassy must bear the blame for having devoted his talents to winning Bosnia and Herzegovina in compensation for the loss of the Italian provinces. Neither he nor Francis Joseph dreamed that this last temptation to proceed along the now aimless path of territorial expansion bore in it the seed of destruction.

Clausewitz laid it down that defensive action was the strongest form of warfare. But this opinion scarcely holds good for war in modern times, and certainly does not apply to a war of opinions. Francis Joseph stood quite alone when Francis Ferdinand and Conrad began to lay siege to his Cabinet. This isolation was the result of that pedantic formalism which made him take care to listen to nobody but his responsible advisers ; for he would have thought it unpardonable to take advice from men who did not carry responsibility. Vienna housed many wise and skilful members of society. But it was against Francis Joseph's principles to call the experience of old advisers once more to his help when they had left their official position. A breach of this principle he permitted himself only in time of great need ; and such an exception was made in the case of the indispensable Gautsch.

The Emperor and Francis Ferdinand were divided by a natural antipathy, the Emperor regarding with the deepest mis-

trust the temperamental energy of his heir, yet not closing his mind to Francis Ferdinand's judgements. The heir advocated army reform, but not simply to have a better instrument for prosecuting a vigorous foreign policy. His political ideas were not clarified, but he held fast to one tenet; he wanted an understanding with Russia. It seemed to him the one goal worth striving for—that of forming an alliance with Russia and, if possible, reviving the Alliance of the Three Emperors in the old sense. Even during the time of the Balkan crisis, when Conrad's mobilization in Bosnia rendered the danger of a conflict imminent, Francis Ferdinand made the following reproach to the Austrian Military Attaché who had hurried to Vienna from Petersburg: 'Of what use are your pretty reports to us when you do not bring us an alliance with Russia?'

It was an eternal thorn in Conrad's side that the heir appreciated him only as a soldier, that he maintained him and upheld him, but would not take his political memorials, proclaiming the necessity of preventive wars, with the seriousness he considered they deserved. Francis Ferdinand was not thinking of a war; he wished first of all to bend Austria and Hungary to his will. We know from his programme, which he had prepared as the body of a Proclamation upon his Ascent to the Throne, what was his idea of the future Empire. Originally he had played with the idea of a Constitutional Trinity, in which the German and Bohemian Crown lands formed the first, Hungary proper the second, and the South-Slav territories of the Empire the third autonomous member of the Union. After the first Balkan crisis in the years 1908–1909 he reached the view that such a South-Slav State would be far more inviting to the greed of Serbia than isolated provinces, and gave up the plan. In his programme, which he composed with the help of the Professor of Constitutional Law, Lammasch, and with the advice of men like Turba, Jager, Zolger, Steinacker, Czernin, and Kristoffy, there was no more mention of this division of the monarchy into three. As 'Emperor Francis II,' which was how he thought of himself, he wished to stand by the Dual Constitutional System, but strengthened by a centralizing power in the person of an Imperial Chancellor, as it had been in the days of Bach and Schwarzenberg.



Francis Joseph had no programme for the future, and it must be considered the most unfortunate feature of his reign that no statesman had arisen to stake everything upon a federal programme before the lower-middle classes had devoted their allegiance to a barren romanticism. Finally, Francis Joseph was shrewd enough to obtain a written outline of Francis Ferdinand's intentions. If he had only been out to discover a theoretical solution of the Austrian racial problem he would have found in Dr. Renner's programme, published in book form, something more apt and modern than the hotchpotch of Francis Ferdinand and his assistants. The method, however, was more controversial than the goal. And here the views of Francis Joseph and Francis Ferdinand differed profoundly, and experience and sheer will-power came face to face.

Francis Ferdinand's biographer, the faithful custodian of the Vienna war archives, Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, says of him that he 'considered the maintenance of order as one of the most important duties of government : annihilation, shooting, and such threats were often to be heard in the mouth of Francis Ferdinand.' The fundamentally feeble Archduke, pliant to the stronger will of his wife, was like many similar men of his times in that he worshipped the external appearance of power and effectiveness. There is an instinct for domination and self-assertion peculiar to haughty individuals ; but the instincts of Francis Ferdinand were unlike those of well-bred ancient stock seeking to display its talent and its courage. His instinct was for great gestures, and for a puffed-out chest when he spoke of the might and eminence of Austria. The nobility and the bourgeoisie, classes which had made history in their time, sought for the reality of power, and loved it. The new proletarian class followed the doctrine of Karl Marx, who taught that the capitalist system culminates in a seizure of power. The age of 'prestige' bore the mark neither of those old classes nor of the proletariat. This fever to appear more than one really was had nothing in it of nobility or of bourgeois virtue either. It was not the fruit of soldiers' minds nor of the much-blamed 'spirit of Prussia,' but of the lower middle class, lately risen to power ; and to it belongs the blame for the World War.

Millions of humble individuals had been uprooted from their

traditional homes and transplanted into the great cities, there to serve as professional men, tradesmen, and clerks. The rapid economic development of the twenty years before the war had transformed the life of the great cities, and overwhelmed with a tide of industrialization what had previously been their mode of thought and life. Between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat rose a vast army of human beings of uncertain instincts. At heart they were ashamed of themselves, but to the outward eye they were domineering, and indulged in heroic attitudes. Democratic suffrage had made of these people a real political factor. Now they had their own party organizations, and exercised an influence over the legislature. As consumers they had their say in the style of the Press, the fashions, and the amenities of life. The age of William II cannot be understood, with its hunger for appearances and prestige, nor can the new style in taste and language be appreciated apart from the antics of the mimic-heroes of the middle class. Prussian militarism, Bismarckian administration—these were of aristocratic origin, and were realistic in the pursuit of their aims. They cannot be held responsible for the prestige mania of a later age whose spirit was obedient, not to any soldierly or aristocratic figure, not to the outlook of Clausewitz mingled with that of Kant, but to the plebeian upstart. This tragedy was born of the spirit of tailors' assistants fancying themselves as heroes.

This spirit Francis Ferdinand assimilated gladly. In his outward manner he differed from his uncle by his loud voice and uncontrolled reactions, while the Emperor discreetly veiled even his deepest distress and confusion. Francis Ferdinand saw his uncle's experienced scepticism, his dislike of gestures and pathos and emotion, as weariness and slackness. He thought of himself as the powerful man of action contrasted with the opposite pole of an inactive nature. His was the vulgar error of the noisy fanatic, the blindness of the coarse nature to the many-sided.

The danger which faced Francis Joseph needs no more description. His enemy was not old age; but exhaustion from the assault of those who besieged him and were waiting to destroy his self-confidence. The new Chief of General Staff was Francis Ferdinand's best ally. Not that they agreed upon their

practical programme ; Francis Ferdinand would not go so far as to shoulder the risk of a preventive war. The object of their alliance was destruction of the Emperor's self-confidence. Spurring him on to doubts, they became participants in his decisions.

The battle was not all on one side. Francis Joseph defended himself, his instinct, his mature judgement, his sober outlook. In October 1906 he appointed Baron Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, the Ambassador at Petersburg, to preside over the Foreign Office in succession to Goluchowski. Baron Lexa, commonly known by his second name of Aehrenthal, came of a noble Bohemian family. He had studied at Prague and Bonn, and had begun his diplomatic career under Kálnoky, who appointed him Chief Secretary in the Foreign Office. In 1898 he was appointed Ambassador at one of the most important stations—Petersburg.

When, eight years later, the Emperor called him to be his Minister, this was done on Francis Ferdinand's recommendation, to which the Emperor gladly gave ear. But later the heir bitterly regretted having supported Aehrenthal, from whom he severed himself altogether as soon as he showed a determination to follow his own way. He came finally to hate him, just as he came to hate his former tutor and intimate, Baron Max Vladimir Beck.

After Gautsch's resignation from the Government on April 30th, 1906, Francis Joseph called upon Prince Konrad Hohenlohe, Governor of Trieste, to take over the task, begun by Gautsch, of promoting electoral reform. The Prince had made a good name for himself as Lord Lieutenant in Teplitz, the Bohemian lignite region. He had acted humanely, had adjusted strikes, and shown an understanding of the social needs of the miners. From this time he was nicknamed the 'Red Prince.' In Trieste, too, he had proved clever and tactful. Hohenlohe seemed to the Emperor to be the right man to carry out the project of universal suffrage. But, being a stranger to Parliamentary practice, he was baffled by the conflict of the parties over the apportionment of seats. His position was ruined by an attack delivered by the Hungarian Coalition Ministry, headed by Weckerle, against the common customs tariff.

Hohenlohe, after less than four weeks in office, chose to resign rather than to compromise, and returned to Trieste.

Amid general surprise, on May 30th, 1906, Baron von Beck, Permanent Head of the Ministry of Agriculture, was nominated Prime Minister. This man, of outwardly imposing appearance, jocularly termed, on account of his tall figure, the 'highest' of the high bureaucracy, was a stranger to the great public. His intimates knew him to possess great mental ability. Baron von Beck had been brought up in the tradition of his father, the valued director of the State Printing Works, Privy Councillor von Beck, who, with Baron Helfert and Counts Clam-Martinitz, Thun, and Dürckheim, had brought into existence the Hohenwart-Schäffle Ministry. The son, like the father, Austrian in the best sense, had from childhood upwards gained that knowledge of the Empire which it was so difficult to acquire later. He enjoyed the advantage of seeing beyond Vienna, knew Bohemia, and was familiar and well grounded in Austria's secrets. In the long series of Francis Joseph's Prime Ministers, Baron von Beck certainly deserves the seat of honour. Although not so popular as Koerber, he was equally skilful in handling men; as well as all the specific Austrian talents, he possessed a virtue not often found in that country, that of earnestness.

He took up the work in his best years, but it was a supremely difficult moment. Petty-bourgeois extremism had infected all parties. It needed much skill to persuade this Parliament, which had long languished in feverish heats, that now its time was over and it must leave the future to its heirs. Baron von Beck succeeded in his attempt. With untiring exertion he won over the parties. After a long period, Austria had once again a Parliamentary Government. Professor Marchet, the German Liberal, and Derschatta and Prade, the German Nationalists, sat next to the Czechs Pacak and Fořt on the Ministerial bench. Korytowski, a Pole, became Finance Minister; Count Dzieduszycki, Minister for the Polish Department of Agriculture. Even the Christian Socialists entered the Cabinet, represented first by Ebenhoch and later by Gessmann. It was high time to begin the electoral reform; the masses were knocking at the doors of Parliament. Nevertheless, even in those last hours the

House fought against its predestined doom. The accumulated egoism and vice of years broke out again in this last struggle. Sixty-three sittings were needed to bring the new electoral law to birth. The Emperor helped with the work ; Kúbeck's pupil had to convert recalcitrant Parliamentarians to the cause of democracy. There was an angry fronde in the House of Peers, led by Count Franz Thun, but the Bohemian arch-Tory, who was even taller than Beck, could not stand up to the victorious arguments of the winning side. On December 1st, 1906, the House of Deputies passed the new electoral law ; at the end of the month it was sanctioned by the House of Peers. On January 26th, 1907, the Emperor gave his consent.

New hopes were raised in Austria by this granting of universal suffrage. It was expected that attention would be diverted from national contrasts to the more fundamental political aspirations. In the Emperor's Speech from the Throne, delivered before the new Parliament, he said : 'By the grace of Providence it has been granted to me to lead two generations of my Peoples. The exertions attendant upon my Royal position have been rewarded by the proven love and fidelity of my Peoples throughout all the changes of destiny, and by their continued advance in welfare and education. To further these, and to administer faithfully this glorious inheritance received from our fathers, that is the task to which I have sacrificed my whole life.' Austria now showed her true face, heavily marked with racial perplexities. Nevertheless, Baron von Beck succeeded in carrying out a Constitutional Union of Austria and Hungary that lasted for ten years—that is, till 1917—and placed the Empire on a firm basis. However one might estimate the prospects of this Austria in her new democratic shape, for the moment she was free of internal danger.

On April 6th, 1907, the new Chief of General Staff, Baron von Conrad, handed the Emperor a memorial in which he complained of 'stagnation and regression in the army,' and suggested general proposals for securing its unity and efficiency, proceeding then to give a detailed account of the army's defects.

In this document he addressed the Emperor in the following words : 'We come then to this : Either we must immediately put the army into shape and break down all resistances, if neces-

sary by force, or we must strike immediately against Italy, the sooner the better. . . . A decision may be hard to make, but it must be made.' The Chief of General Staff was a diplomat as well as a soldier. In the old controversy between the General Staffs and the diplomats he had his own standpoint. Now, without knowledge of the policy it is intended to follow, a General Staff cannot take the necessary measures ; but unless, like Napoleon, one man unites the political and military functions, it is the general opinion that the General Staff should follow the lines laid down by the principal Minister responsible for conduct of the foreign affairs of the State. Conrad was not prepared to do this.

He was a politician first, a soldier second. His *exposés* were based on definite political suppositions which did not agree with the views of the Minister. He was convinced that the existence of Austria-Hungary was in peril, and that there was no prospect of the Empire winning new allies in the near future. 'Lest all our predestined foes, having perfected their armaments, should deliver a blow against Austria-Hungary,' he wrote, 'we must take the first opportunity of reckoning with our most vulnerable enemy.' This, he considered, was the 'kernel of the situation.' Aehrenthal simply shelved all suggestions for conducting one or more anticipatory wars in defence of Austria's position. It did not occur to him to take the General's political fancies seriously. He, too, desired a renovation of Austria, and felt himself called to the great post of active statesmanship. His rejuvenation programme, however, was very different from the slapdash proposals of Conrad.

Up to 1907, Aehrenthal followed the line of thought of his master Kálmoky. He had before him, moreover, the impressive example of Bismarck, whose remarks on Eastern policy he had himself been privileged to hear when he accompanied his Ministerial chief to Friedrichsruh. Bismarck had said that every step taken by Austria in the Balkans should be preceded by an agreement with Russia. The two Empires should divide the Balkans into two zones of interest in the spirit of their traditional friendship. Bismarck advised Austria not to prevent the Russians from marching on Constantinople, since only an agreement could bring them a share in the heritage of Turkey.

Without going so far as this, Aehrenthal held fast to the principle that Austria could not pursue an active policy in the Balkans without an understanding with Russia. It was on such grounds that in 1906 he defended the agreements of Murzsteg before the Joint Assembly as a useful foundation on which to construct his Balkan policy. He had in mind some such idea as that of assuring for Austria predominance in the Western Balkans from Salonica to Montenegro, thanks to a series of alliances, trade treaties, and military agreements. It was an admirable plan, but its execution could not be guaranteed by a mere aspiration to power. If Austria really wished to play a great part in the Western Balkans, she must not overlook the civilizing and educative mission which belonged to it. Unless the attempt were made to reach an intimate relation with the South Slavs, there was nothing more to the plan than mere ambition.

Aehrenthal's thoughts moved within the closed circle of diplomacy. There was no room in his mind for political realities, which might have formed the substance of the scheme. For all this, it must be acknowledged that his ideal was that of a peaceful primacy. Austria was not to stand by idly while others were active. She must follow the great example of Germany, whose creative power was stirring the Orient. Austria was called, by her history and her geography, to be the natural mediator between West and East. Such notions were in Aehrenthal's mind when he brought forward anew the old plan of Goluchowski of building a railway from the terminus of the Bosnian Eastern Railway, through the Sanjak of Novibazar, to Mitrowitz and Salonica.

In preparing this project, Aehrenthal for the first time abandoned the traditional line of Austrian policy in the Balkans. He negotiated with Turkey, and obtained from her a concession for building the Sanjak Railway, but did not approach Russia. In the Joint Assembly of Delegates from the Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments, Dr. Kramář asked Aehrenthal whether this unilateral procedure would not endanger relations with Russia. Aehrenthal answered that the building of the Sanjak Railway was not a political, but merely a transport question. This view was not accepted, however, by the new Chief of the Russian Foreign Office, Izvolski. At Murzsteg the two Empires had

agreed to mutual consultation, and, on the strength of this agreement, they were about to put through a programme of judicial reform in Macedonia. Izvolsky now declared that, in consequence of Aehrenthal's independent action, the plan must be dropped.

Soon after the railway project was dropped, but at the same time the Treaty of Münzsteg was abandoned as a whole. The rights of supervision in Macedonia, which had belonged to Austria and Russia, were extended to all the Powers, and the joint action of Austria and Russia ceased. The Young Turk Rising put an end to the reforms in Macedonia. Revolutionary Turkey herself took charge of all reforms, and thrust the Powers aside.

On July 9th, 1908, the Tsar and the King of England met at Reval. This was a most important step in the direction of an Anglo-Russian Alliance. Edward VII had already three times been the guest of Francis Joseph. Sir Sydney Lee says : 'The King was warmly attached to the old Emperor. Francis Joseph, on his side, had a high opinion of the King's capacities. Both desired the peace of Europe ; King Edward because he loved peace, Francis Joseph because he was afraid of war. They were both convinced that there was no durable advantage to be gained from a war. Both were zealous advocates of the *status quo*. It would be difficult, however, to conceive a greater contrast in character than that between the jovial, affable King, who won all hearts with his natural bonhomie, and the reserved Emperor, who cultivated the cold, dispassionate politeness of the *grand seigneur*. A close and systematic inspection of the State documents referring to the meeting at Ischl,' concludes Sir Sydney Lee, 'lends no support to the idea that the King, during his visit, tried to shake the Emperor's loyalty to his German ally. Margutti's account is apocryphal.'

Baron von Margutti, the aide-de-camp, has it that King Edward made the first attempt to weaken the German-Austrian Alliance in 1904, alleging that at the time of the meeting of the two monarchs at Marienbad the British King offered to help Austria in the Balkans. In August 1905, during Edward's visit to Ischl, he had plenty of opportunity to develop his political plans, 'particularly during the memorable drive to Hallstatt via



Lauffen and Goisern, which the two monarchs took unattended. The old Emperor could hardly stand up to the cleverness of the highly gifted King. . . . On the return journey the Emperor was observed to be undergoing a sharp conflict of conscience.' But as Francis Joseph and Edward had no witnesses on this journey to Hallstatt, and as it was not the Emperor's habit to repeat such conversations, Margutti's version of the content of the monarchs' conversation is quite conjectural.

In 1906, Edward was again in Marienbad, but this time he did not come to Ischl. Not till the following year did he again visit the Emperor's summer seat. 'This time'—so notes Margutti—'King Edward went straight to the point. The situation had altered inasmuch as Russia was recovering surprisingly quickly from her defeats in the East. Once more the Emperor was passing through difficult days. . . . The King returned home having accomplished nothing; he left the Emperor, however, quite overcome by the great responsibility which his suggestions had placed upon him.' Margutti was describing what he had not personally heard or seen, but in attributing to Edward VII a desire to win over the Emperor to England's schemes he is corroborated by two witnesses. Baron von Conrad records the words that the Emperor spoke during an audience in Ischl: 'When King Edward was here he wished to detach me from my alliance with Germany—but I put him off.' The second witness is Frau Katharina Schratt, who recounts that the Emperor had great difficulty in resisting in a friendly way the very pressing and subtle offers made by Edward VII.

King Edward came once more to Ischl, in August, 1908, on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of Francis Joseph's accession to the throne. In the following year he had intended to visit the Emperor after his trip to Marienbad, but he had to content himself with sending his Master of the Ceremonies, Mr. Arthur Walsh, to Ischl in order to take a present to the Emperor on his birthday. In May 1910 Edward VII died.

It was impossible to break the Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Germany, useless also to attempt to exert an influence on William II through the medium of Francis Joseph. During his four meetings with King Edward, Francis Joseph presumably declined everything that would have been in con-

tradition to his feelings as an ally. What he considered the duties of an ally to be he showed to the King of Saxony in 1866—all political considerations must give way to a point of honour. Certainly it is another question whether it would not have been possible for a far-sighted diplomat to respond to Edward's advances without being unfaithful to the Alliance. Kiderlen said to Fürstenberg that there are no sentimental friendships in politics. Here there was surely one which was destined to give rise to grievous mistakes.

Aehrenthal was present at the most important meeting between Francis Joseph and King Edward. 'He showed himself,' remarks Edward's biographer, 'not over-anxious to collaborate with England in the question of the Balkans, although he desired peace in Macedonia.' These were the days when for the first time the outline of the new grouping of the Powers was visible, and the disarmament question began to preoccupy the Cabinets of Europe. Germany's proposals for rebuilding her fleet were the chief concern of England. King Edward's visits to Ischl passed without result. No single idea or plan or proposal resulted from the few moments that Aehrenthal was alone with King Edward. Aehrenthal went his own way, and dragged Germany into the danger-zone of an active Balkan policy.

In May 1908, Emperor William and the Princes of all the German Federal States came to Schönbrunn. The magnificent pageantry was not only an act of homage to commemorate Francis Joseph's sixtieth jubilee; it was intended to demonstrate to the world the friendship between the two Central European Powers. At the same time, on June 13th, Francis Joseph witnessed the gaily-coloured multiform 'Procession of the Past' which Vienna had arranged as a jubilee-gift. The whole Military Museum had come to life, and the history of the Hapsburgs was presented before the Emperor, the entire Austrian nobility marching in historical costumes. The procession ended with Radetzky. In this there was an unintentional significance. The figure of the last commander-in-chief of the old Austria marked the closing-point of the 'Procession of the Past.'

It was Francis Joseph's tragedy that, in the autumn of his life, when his simple mind had reached its maturity, he found himself

surrounded by the apostles of change, and, for lack of sympathetic support, he had not the strength to pit his own instinct and experience against them. He defended himself against Francis Ferdinand's violence, upheld his experience and sober understanding against Conrad's aggressive un-Austrian excitability, but eventually he himself helped on the tragedy when he approved Aehrenthal's plan.

Bosnia and Herzegovina were the consolation and, at the same time, the sore point in the Emperor's life. From 1866 till 1878 he never lost sight of the idea that he had diminished the prestige of his House by losing the Italian provinces. The acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina was his piece of luck. He took it hardly that the Congress of Berlin upheld the sovereignty of the Sultan, thus giving the tenure of those provinces the provisional character of an occupation. He had never quite forgiven Andrassy's flexibility in this matter, considering it to have been mere weakness.

In 1896 the idea arose of converting the provisional occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a permanency. It was Badeni who advised the Emperor to take this step; by this he gained Francis Joseph's sympathy, but the cautious Kállay, although in agreement with the principle, did not see his way to realize the monarch's heart's desire. In 1907 the Minister for the Occupied Territories, Baron Burián, took the initiative of sending a memorial to the Emperor in which he declared the annexation of the provinces to be a necessity. Aehrenthal still wavered; he considered it too risky to alter the Berlin arrangement without the consent of the Powers. It was not till the Young Turk Revolution that he plucked up courage. The momentous decision matured after a conference between Aehrenthal and Burián; it was completed in the Südbahn Hotel, on the Semmering, on August 6th, 1908. Before he took the bold step he sketched an outline for his Balkan policy, the basis of which was to be Serbian-Bulgarian antagonism. 'If we uphold Bulgaria in this dispute,' he wrote, 'and favour the creation of a greater Bulgaria at the expense of Serbia, that supplies the necessary preliminary for us to seize a propitious moment in European affairs to lay hands on the remainder of Serbia. An independent Albania under our protection, a Mon-

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tenegro with whom we have friendly relations, and a Greater Bulgaria who is bound to us by gratitude'—this was Aehrenthal's scheme, his plan for the security and renovation of Austria. These few sentences contain the germ of all that was to come; they were the egg from which the chicken was to be hatched.

A fair-minded critic of Aehrenthal, the intelligent and well-informed Joseph M. Baernreither, describes this decision of Aehrenthal's as the turning-point leading to misfortune. Aehrenthal misjudged the respective strength of the Peoples. He thought that Austria, by virtue of her authority, was strong enough, though herself unbuoyed by national sentiment, to divide and humiliate a people which, like the Serbians, had been cradled in liberty. Thus he made Austria Serbia's hated enemy and oppressor. The great plan that Aehrenthal laid before the Emperor was but the latest inspiration of the Foreign Office, which was accustomed to play off the Balkan Peoples the one against the other and to delude them by the assumption of various disguises. Aehrenthal wanted to renew Austria by proclaiming a death-sentence on Serbia, but in the end it was Austria who went to her doom. The campaign of annihilation against Serbia as leading thread in a complex Balkan policy matured the hatred of those whom it threatened, and led up to the assassination of Sarajevo.

Austria had the chance and the duty to predominate in the Balkans as a civilizing influence. Her ambition and craving for prestige could have been satisfied by taking such a path—a hard one, but one that would have earned herself gratitude. Foreign Office diplomacy viewed such a proposition with contempt. Baernreither, who untiringly strove to win the South Slavs for Austria by means of educational work and goodwill, describes his fruitless attempts to explain his ideas to Aehrenthal: 'His heart remained cold. Sometimes, when I expressed myself with some enthusiasm, an ironic contraction played about his mouth, for he could not tolerate an independent opinion. His invariable companion was his departmental chief, Count Paul Esterházy, a Hungarian aristocrat through and through, to whom the South Slavs were an inferior people.'

Conrad wanted to revivify Austria by the sword, Aehrenthal

by means of dexterous moves on the diplomatic chessboard. The annexation of the Occupied Territories and the subjection of Serbia were the goal.

What had Austria to show for herself as the result of her thirty years' rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina ? By 1908 both Territories had the outward appearance of civilized countries. Austria had built roads and railway-lines, erected offices and barracks and filled them with officials. She had made the necessary provisions for traffic ; the administration was good. She had not touched on the real problems of the districts. Of the 100,000 peasants who had to give a third of their harvest to their landlords—the so-called Kmetes—only a fifth part purchased their freedom during the thirty years of Austrian sovereignty. While for many years in Serbia there had been a free peasantry, in Bosnia and Herzegovina there were 80,000 agricultural labourers in deepest slavery. The Austrian Government did nothing towards freeing these wards. In 1906 only 14 per cent. of the juvenile population attended schools. The bards who told tales of Serbia's past remained the only source of learning to this people craving for education. Austria economized on schools. The promise of local autonomies was never more than a promise. Those who knew the provinces felt that it was senseless to bring about a constitutional annexation until Austria had gained the confidence of the people by educational work.

Aehrenthal thought otherwise. On August 19th, 1908, the day after the Emperor's birthday, during his sixtieth jubilee year, he announced before a combined Cabinet Council the decision to annex the provinces. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Weckerle, was at first sceptical, 'We are unarmed and we have no money,' he said. When he realized, however, that Aehrenthal's plan was immutable, he agreed to it, and formulated Hungary's conditions. The Prime Minister of Austria, Baron von Beck, found it difficult to calm his intellectual conscience. He had enough foresight to know that Austria's Mandate, based on a European Treaty, could only be altered by a single party at great risk. He compared the annexation to a reckless flight. He asked Conrad whether Austria was prepared from a military point of view. The Chief of General Staff was very confident : he was sure of Germany : Russia was

not in a position at that moment to make war ; Serbia lacked military education ; Turkey was fully occupied with Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania ; there remained only Italy, and against this enemy he was in a good position. Beck wanted to lay the question before the Austrian Ministers. He did not guess that with his honest hesitations and doubts he was incurring the deadly hate of Aehrenthal. He was already hated by Francis Ferdinand ; now Aehrenthal also demanded his head.

That many of the more experienced Austrians shared Beck's opinion is proved by the testimony of Ernst von Plener, who, since he had given up popular politics in favour of statesmanship and membership of the House of Peers, was far from being a rebel. On the Emperor's birthday, Aehrenthal unfolded his plan to Plener and asked his opinion. Plener knew that the Emperor had been won over to the plan, but he had the courage and imagination to point out to Aehrenthal the difficulties in his road. 'We received the Occupation Mandate by the consent of the Great Powers,' he said ; 'if we want to change the Occupation into an Annexation we must have the agreement of the Powers—otherwise we shall be courting exclusion from the Concert of Europe. . . . We have managed for thirty years with this provisional arrangement ; this is not the time to disturb it.' Plener went on to counsel Aehrenthal in all seriousness, not to pursue further the idea of a unilateral annexation. His objections were spoken to the air ; Aehrenthal was not going to alter his resolve.

Plener's refusal to recognize a calculated breach of treaty as an act of genius showed not only intelligence but also a memory of the great tradition of the Liberals, whose best act had been to fight tenaciously against a policy of expansion in the Balkans. True, this tradition had been laid aside like old lumber in Liberal public utterances and by the Vienna Press. It was Karl Hermann Wolf, this time clearer sighted than many of the intellectuals, who, in the Joint Assembly, denounced Aehrenthal's plan, and spoke the significant words that Austria would end by being driven out of Bosnia as she had been driven out of Venetia and Lombardy.

All thinking Austrians privately held the same view as Wolf and Plener ; nevertheless, in public the atmosphere was now being prepared for the Forward Policy. Aehrenthal had won

over the historian Heinrich Friedjung to be an enthusiastic advocate of his plan, an error which was soon to bitterly avenge itself on that otherwise estimable man. By virtue of his authority Friedjung wrote in the *Neue Freie Presse* and influenced that leading newspaper, whose astute editor, Moriz Benedikt, had up to then remained more than doubtful about the Forward Policy. The petty journalists, enthusiastic supporters of Aehrenthal, strained themselves to give loud expression to his views. Material motives and clique passions also played their part in furthering Aehrenthal's proposals. The partisans of Francis Ferdinand, the young Bohemian noblemen, the officers, part of the Vienna money market, army contractors, textile manufacturers, the powerful group of the Iron King, Kestranek, all played the fiddle to the tune of Prince Eugène. The Austria of Francis Joseph was indulging in heroics.

A particularly advantageous circumstance led up to the execution of Aehrenthal's plan. Izvolski had shown himself not unwilling to make common cause with Aehrenthal. The revelations in *The Times* of July 1909 leave no doubt of this. This clever and much slandered Russian statesman was influenced by his determination to satisfy a frustrated desire that had rankled in Russian minds ever since the Manchurian War—the desire to open the Dardenelles to Russian battleships. It had been maddening for Russia to have her ironclads imprisoned in the Black Sea while her Baltic Fleet was wrestling uncertainly with the Japanese. Soon after the Treaty with England, when the zones of influence of the two Powers in Asia were defined, Izvolski tried to make headway towards solving the ticklish question in London. For this he required support, and was obliged to inquire into Austria's views, she being that Power who, next to Russia, was most interested in the Balkans.

The affair prospered so far that Izvolski, writing to Aehrenthal on July 19th, 1908, could show his hand. 'If through your aid I succeed in opening the Dardanelles to Russia's Fleet, the sovereignty of the Occupied Territories will be yours.' It says nothing against Izvolski that in the pursuit of his scheme he changed the direction of his politics, showing a grim face to Austria one day and smiling affably the next. Greater people

than he have adopted these realistic methods. It would be unjust to condemn Aehrenthal for making the most of favourable opportunities if everything else had been propitious. On September 16th, 1908, Aehrenthal and Izvolski met in the Moravian Castle of Buchlau belonging to Count Berchtold, then Austrian Ambassador in Petersburg. This meeting was the most important moment in the preliminaries to the annexation. On September 17th, Aehrenthal and Izvolski were alone for several hours. The results of their confabulation were never written down. Count Berchtold, the host, was certainly not present at the actual conversation, but he was with the Ministers both before and after. He declares that 'complete agreement was reached' during the meeting. Izvolski accentuated the European character of both questions—the annexation and the Dardanelles—and advocated the view that they should be brought before a conference of the Berlin signatories. Aehrenthal did not agree with this opinion, fearing that such a proceeding would disturb the existing harmony; it would be better, he thought, to reach a mutual resolution and then make the agreement known to the Powers: the altering of the text of the treaty could be left to the conference. Berchtold relates that agreement was reached on this basis. Apart from the fact that his testimony occurs in a kind of apologia composed after the war, it does not make clear the decisive point whether Izvolski knew that the annexation was already prepared and was to be announced in a few days. Izvolski certainly denied that he knew. He felt that he had been outwitted, and called Aehrenthal's act a 'diplomatic trickster's fraud.' Aehrenthal himself, writing to Chancellor von Bülow on September 26th, said that Izvolski 'has declared his general agreement with my manner of proceeding, and has assured me that Russia will take a friendly attitude.'

One more piece of evidence is to be found in the letter the German Secretary of State, von Schoen, wrote to Bülow to report what Izvolski had told him about the conference at Buchlau. After leaving Buchlau, Izvolski had travelled to his country house at Tegernsee, and had visited Schoen in Berchtesgaden. 'M. Izvolski,' wrote Schoen, 'has the impression that Baron Aehrenthal, moved by internal politics rather than by



external considerations, wants to find a solution to the problem soon. Without having obtained any decisive declaration on the subject from Baron Aehrenthal, he inclined to the hypothesis that the Austro-Hungarian Minister had already decided to lay the Annexation Scheme before the next meeting of the Joint Assembly.' We can accept this evidence without hesitation. The German Secretary of State had every reason to report carefully what he had heard from Izvolski, for Aehrenthal was also keeping Germany in the dark as to the true state of affairs. True, he wrote to Bülow that he was contemplating 'announcing the annexation of the two provinces as a *fait accompli*,' but he did not tell his German friend that he had decided to do it within a few days. There are no grounds for doubting the truth of Izvolski's statement to Schoen; in this matter the Russian Minister had nothing to hide and nothing to disguise from Germany. It may also be true, as he said, that Aehrenthal had made no definite assertion about the time fixed for the annexation, but had only spoken of laying the scheme before the Joint Assembly. To deduce from this that the actual deed was to happen almost at once was a long step.

Izvolski travelled peacefully to Tegernsee. He had asked Aehrenthal to send any further news to him in Paris, where he expected to be on October 1st. On the way there he met Tittoni at Desio, and informed him of the intentions of Austria and Russia in order to discover Italy's opinion. Tittoni considered the matter, but felt that there was nothing to fear from Izvolski's plan, as the decisive word in the Dardanelles question must come from England. Wishing to further his cause, Izvolski left Desio for Paris, intending to go on to London. In Paris, however, he had a surprise. He learnt, on October 4th, that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Paris, Count Khevenhüller, had, the preceding afternoon, handed a personal note from the Emperor of Austria to President Fallières, in which he announced the annexation as a fixed intention, and mentioned October 7th as the day arranged for the proclamation. Khevenhüller had added a declaration to the note to the effect that Russia had agreed to the annexation.

It was only some hours after Izvolski had heard the news that he received Aehrenthal's letter. The affair was less com-

plicated than has been constantly asserted in Vienna by Aehrenthal's advocates, who include Friedjung. After Buchlau, Aehrenthal decided to act very quickly. One single reason suffices to explain this : Aehrenthal doubted whether Izvolski would win his point in the Dardanelles question (and in this he was right) ; and he feared thus to lose his chickens before they were hatched. He comforted his conscience with the thought that he was sure of Izvolski's general agreement, and had told him more or less how soon he intended to put through his scheme by mentioning to him the next meeting of the Joint Assembly. We may be certain that Aehrenthal realized in what a state of uncertainty he had left Izvolski. A proof of this is found in the refrain hummed by the Foreign Office journalists, who talked of 'persuasive cunning,' a phrase they had often heard in Aehrenthal's environment.

Aehrenthal risked the deed which was to be his great accomplishment. The atmosphere among the Powers was generally favourable : Russia really not prepared for war ; France peacefully inclined ; England perhaps somewhat irritable, but in no mood to prove a menace. What could happen ? Tittoni was still in office ; there remained only Serbia's vengeance ; and to annoy Serbia was part of Aehrenthal's plan. Germany's friendship and help were a foregone conclusion. The detail whether Khevenhüller really visited Izvolski on October 3rd in order to acquaint him with the news before it became public, which appears very important to some historians, is, after all, quite a secondary matter, and, anyway, Izvolski was not in. More important than accuracy in such details is a truthful representation of the general scheme and internal coherence of events.

On October 5th, Francis Joseph signed the Proclamation to the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Peoples ; on October 7th it was publicly posted up. On that day the Emperor, 'visibly stirred,' read from the throne a declaration to the Joint Assembly at Budapest announcing the event.

The incorporation of the two provinces was now achieved ; the Emperor had the satisfaction of being able to exercise his sovereignty in Bosnia and Herzegovina ; but the true value of the annexation remained to be shown. Certainly he had

already possessed full sovereignty : justice was administered in his name ; recruits were taken on and sworn in in his name. It was one of the weaknesses of Francis Joseph, explained by his uneasy conscience and his inclination to formalism, that he overvalued the distinction between an occupation and an annexation. However, Aehrenthal and his supporters were now to realize how deeply this seemingly elegant *coup* could shake the peace of Europe.

In making the announcement to the Signatory Powers, Aehrenthal had chosen the very questionable form of personal letters from the Emperor to the heads of States. At the same time, circular notes were sent to the Cabinets, but the personal letters, which were not countersigned, were intended to ask the consent of the Powers. Aehrenthal obliged the Emperor to bear the brunt of the disapproval of the Powers.

The Emperor William answered agreeably, leaving no doubt of his friendship ; though he might well have shown some annoyance, since Berlin had not been told of the Buchlau agreement till ten days later, while the decision to proclaim the annexation on October 7th had been entirely withheld from her. On October 5th, the day that the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szögyényi, handed in Francis Joseph's letter at Berlin—two days later than the French President had received a similar letter—Emperor William was in Rominten. He received the explanation only on October 6th, three days later than Fallières. In Bülow's personal report, which was laid before the German Emperor along with Francis Joseph's letter, William II wrote the following words in the margin : 'Obviously we will do nothing to prevent the annexation. Personally I am deeply hurt that, as Austria's ally, I have not been taken into His Majesty's confidence before now—as it is, I am the last in Europe to be informed !' Soon after, however, Emperor William allowed himself to be pacified by Prince Fürstenberg, a good friend but a bad prophet, who hailed Aehrenthal's act as a work of genius. Bülow and his collaborators were less charmed. Bülow says in his Memoirs that both in addressing the Reichstag and in his directions to the German diplomats he 'left no doubt that Germany was determined to remain true to the Austrian Alliance under all circumstances. The German sword had been thrown

into the scales on behalf of her ally and in defence of German prestige.' This statement seemed necessary to Bulow after the annexation was already an accomplished fact. In the personal report to the Emperor, however, the naked truth appears. 'Our position would really be alarming,' it ran, 'if Austria ceased to trust us and turned aside from us. . . . We must greet Austria's announcement without sham enthusiasm but with a calm, clear assent, the expression of our unqualified fidelity.' Germany was already isolated and thrown into dependence on the Austrian Alliance. She took over the hardest part of the work in Austria's clever *coup*—the pacification of the resentful.

The replies to Francis Joseph's letters gave a foretaste of the attitude of the Powers. Only Fallières was really polite and accommodating. The King of Italy took his time, and only answered in the middle of December that he was laying the matter before his Government. King Edward, who so lately before had been expressing his friendship in Ischl, was short and sharp; he regretted the decision of Francis Joseph, and declared that he still attached great weight to the terms of the London Protocol, which laid down that the Berlin treaty could only be altered by consent of all the Powers. With the Tsar, too, Francis Joseph had a regular polemic, lasting until January 1909. The biggest protests came from Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia called up her reserves and mobilized her forces. Further, the Press raised an angry voice from Petersburg, London, Rome, and Belgrade.

The most painful of all was a bombshell from Turkey, who declared a boycott on Austrian goods and ships. Industrial enthusiasts for Aehrenthal's scheme and those writers who had heralded his action as a preface to new greatness and prosperity were somewhat shaken by this first fruit of the new heroism. It was a severe blow to Austrian trade and industry, a blow from which they never recovered. Aehrenthal had to buy off the boycott with the very considerable sum of fifty-four million kronen, which greatly dimmed the glamour of the annexation.

Besides all these difficulties there were internal disturbances. At the end of November there were demonstrations of so violent an order in Prague that Beck's successor, Baron von Bienenrath, had to call the executioner to his aid. On December

2nd, the day of Francis Joseph's jubilee, martial law was proclaimed in Prague.

Nevertheless, Austria had luck. It was as if the House of Hapsburg were basking once more in a late summer of its proverbial luck ; the peaceful atmosphere that had penetrated all Europe, partly owing to Russia's weakness, partly to France's attitude, helped Germany in her efforts to allay the conflict. There was one moment, however, when war was perilously near.

On the very day of the annexation, Baron von Conrad, the Chief of General Staff, demanded the closing of the frontiers and a strengthening of the forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a preparation for mobilization against Serbia. He asked Francis Ferdinand, who was then at St. Moritz, whether he would take over the command of the forces. He caused the Emperor to be asked to move his residence from Schönbrunn to Vienna, but the Emperor declined. Conrad had decided that 1908 was the favourable moment to declare war on Italy and Serbia, hoping thus to render them harmless for the future. He was also now convinced that it would be advantageous not to fight shy of the war that must 'inevitably' come. The Emperor and Aehrenthal set themselves against this view. On March 1st the Emperor decided against giving the command to Francis Ferdinand in case of war. Meanwhile, Conrad invited the heir to return from St. Moritz to Vienna. Francis Ferdinand returned to Vienna on March 3rd, and the same evening received the Chief of General Staff. He was very much mortified that the Emperor would not give him the command, scenting an 'intrigue on the part of Aehrenthal and Schönaich.' The Archduke came alone to Vienna, the Duchess Hohenberg following on after. 'This is important,' remarked Conrad, 'because during our discussions he favoured a solution by arms, but his point of view changed after the arrival of his wife.' Conrad went to the Emperor and tried to convince him that Serbia was temporizing with Austria in order to enjoy more favourable conditions for a war. He laid the plan of campaign before him and begged him to allow the preparations for mobilization to continue.

On the 12th of March Francis Joseph put off the decision with the remark : 'We must take Germany into consideration,

and not expect too much from her.' On March 2nd the Ambassadors of Russia, England, France and Italy had tried to soothe Belgrade. Aehrenthal demanded a clear answer. The atmosphere suggested the imminence of an ultimatum. On March 15th, Francis Joseph gave the order for transport of the required reinforcements to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Francis Ferdinand occupied himself with the question of organizing headquarters. 'He arranged,' reports Conrad, 'even the meals, which he wished to have fixed for certain hours. Further, every participant was to consider himself the Archduke's guest.' Conrad replied that it would be difficult for the General Staff in time of war to have definite meal-hours.

Meanwhile Bülow advanced a proposal that since Austria had reached an understanding with Turkey there was no more reason for refusing to recognize the annexation, and the conference demanded by the Powers could be called off. The German Ambassador in Petersburg, Count Pourtalès, urged the seriousness of the situation should the Powers refuse to give their agreement to the annexation. His words to Izvolski : '*Alors c'est la guerre !*' brought the situation to a head. On March 29th the Vienna Cabinet decided on the so-called 'yellow mobilization' preparatory to a war against Serbia and Montenegro. But the warnings of Pourtalès, which Emperor William later described as 'his heavy labour in Petersburg,' had done its work. Russia gave her agreement to the altering of the Berlin Treaty, and by this means peace was preserved.

All that was necessary now was to find a way of retreat for Serbia. With the collaboration of Cartwright, the British Ambassador in Vienna, the text of a declaration whereby Serbia submitted to the ruling of the Powers, undertook to modify her policy, and promised to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria, was drawn up. The declaration was handed to the Austrian Government by the Serbian Minister in Vienna on March 31st.

The danger now being over, the Austrian reserves were disbanded and Francis Joseph conferred the title of Count upon Aehrenthal.

## CHAPTER XXIX

### FOREIGN OFFICE AND GENERAL STAFF

WITH Germany's help Aehrenthal had won a diplomatic victory, which bore in it the seed of great peril. The prize won was not important—nothing more than the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—yet to obtain this a display of military preparedness, and finally the threat of the whole might of Germany, had been needed. This alteration of the settlement of Berlin, attained with so great an effort, could not have been effected but for Russia's fear of war. The Berlin treaty of 1878 had been constructed on the basis of a pacific agreement, and, thanks to the acquiescence of all the signatories, it had become a generally recognized portion of the law of nations. Recognition of the new situation had, on the contrary, been extracted from the weaker side by the readiness of the stronger side to make war if necessary.

Sazonov describes this victory of Aehrenthal and Bülow as 'the first nail in the coffin of Austria-Hungary.' Not only is this judgement obvious and banal ; it does not even tell the whole truth, for Sazonov forgets to add that the events after 1909 occasioned the collapse of the House of Romanov as well as of the two Central European dynasties. In any case, neither side had any advantage out of Russia's humiliation before the will of Austria.

Aehrenthal himself had no desire to continue in the direction of an anti-Balkan policy. In the spring and summer of 1909 Conrad von Hötzendorf was plying the Emperor with memorials, in which he deplored the pacific solution of the dispute and sought once more to demonstrate that nothing short of the 'incorporation of Serbia in the monarchy' could make for peace. Aehrenthal replied with a 'Secret Memorandum' which gives exhaustive information about his intentions. He declared that the aim of his policy had been obtained with recognition of the annexation, and that in view of the European situation there could be no thought of 'permanent annexation of Serbia and Montenegro.' 'Had we chosen to provoke war, the result

would have been no better than an incursion into Serbia and Montenegro, at a heavy cost of money and human lives, to be followed by a speedy excursion.' Aehrenthal granted that some day it might become necessary 'to consider annexation of a portion of Serbia if this petty State were to continue to serve as a magnet, drawing away the loyalty of subjects of the Empire.' But for the moment 'Serbia could be left to play the game of conspiracy either against Turkey or against ourselves.' The only danger Aehrenthal saw ahead was that Turkey might not be able to maintain her European possessions. In this case his plan was 'to increase the territory of Bulgaria to the maximum possibility, so that rivalry between this State and Serbia could not subside.' At all events, he was convinced that 'a rearrangement in the Balkans without Austrian participation in the settlement was unthinkable.' He desired 'sincere and friendly relations' with Russia. 'Russia,' he declared, 'cannot possibly undertake any active line of policy in the years immediately ahead, and it is doubtful whether, even later, she will be in a better position than now. Her weakness is such that she will do everything to keep in with Turkey.' Nor had Aehrenthal any fear of Italy. He recognized that Conrad's fortifications in South Tyrol served a good purpose, but thought that Italy's present military preparations were no more than a reply to Conrad. He quoted Wallenstein's saying: 'Let me have a strong army to keep my enemy from strangling me, but let me, if possible, not have to lead it to war.' Aehrenthal's reply to Conrad's bellicose insistences, submitted to the Emperor, was in accordance with the monarch's own views. Both considered that the annexation of Bosnia represented a sufficient achievement, and that now was the time to return to a policy of observation.

It is not difficult to see where Aehrenthal was in error. His outlook was that of an adept of the old secret diplomacy, and for him the South Slav movement ranked quite simply as a 'conspiracy.' The Vienna Foreign Office adopted the designation 'the Piedmont of the Balkans' for Serbia, exactly as though fifty years had not passed since 1859. In that year the Italian movement was also a 'conspiracy' which Austria had felt called upon to suppress. But it seemed that history could teach no



lesson to these people. Had they drawn no deductions whatever from the wars of 1859 and 1866? Only once in Aehrenthal's memorandum do we find any suggestion that the South Slav question was a matter of Austrian internal policy, and that Austrian policy might determine along what lines it would be solved, namely, when he suggests that if Austria-Hungary succeeded in attaching the South Slavs to herself, Serbia would cease to act as a magnet, diverting the loyalty of Austria's South Slav subjects. But there was no statesman ready to embody this recognition in his line of policy.

Scarcely had the conflict with Serbia been smoothed down when the trial of the historian Heinrich Friedjung showed up the methods of the Vienna Foreign Office in the worst light. Friedjung had taken full responsibility for a passionate accusation which appeared under his authoritative name in the *Neue Freie Presse*, addressed to the King, the Government, and the political parties of Serbia, all of whom he convicted of attempting to seduce the Serbs of Austria from their loyalty, and of making secret preparations for a violent upheaval. Friedjung's article roused the greatest excitement, while the author loudly proclaimed that he could back every one of his assertions with the indisputable evidence of documents.

A short time before, a celebrated trial at Agram had attracted general attention, and had roused protests from numerous intellectuals throughout Europe. The case for the prosecution in this great trial had been shown to repose solely upon the evidence of a single witness, 'the most notorious individual engaged in playing the informer in the Serbian territories.' None the less, the accused, including many leaders and members of the Serb-Croat Coalition, were condemned to heavy sentences of imprisonment. The trial took place on Hungarian territory, and the Budapest Government was not unsmirched by the suspicion that it was terrifying its non-Hungarian subjects out of an attitude of opposition by measures of extreme severity. The conduct of the trial had, indeed, been such as to rouse indignation far beyond the frontiers of the Empire.

When, therefore, in December 1909, some fifty members of the Serb-Croat Coalition, whose honour had been impugned in Friedjung's articles, took action against him, and the trial

opened before a Viennese jury, the eyes of all Europe were fastened upon the scene. It soon transpired that the documents in question had been provided by the Austrian Legation at Belgrade, and were forgeries. The trial was extremely distressing for the accused. Professor Markovich, who held the Chair of Criminal Law at Belgrade, was one of those whose names appeared in the documents as a participant in secret meetings. He had no difficulty in proving that his signature, shown on these documents, had been forged, being able to demonstrate that, on the day and hour in question, he had been engaged on research work in Berlin, in which statement he was fully backed by the Berlin police reports. It was much the same with the other documents. In many cases it was shown that the informers had not even troubled to put their forgeries into decent Serbian.

In shameful wise the Foreign Office retreated and left Friedjung, who had risked his whole reputation on his confidence in Aehrenthal, to save himself as best he might. Finally Baernreither and Masaryk, by dint of great persistence, managed to bring about a compromise which saved the situation. Friedjung declared that he recognized Markovich's alibi, and renounced his contention that the other documents were valid. The plaintiffs on their side recognized Friedjung's good faith. Thus the historian and those who had utilized him were spared the uttermost consequences. But the trial left behind it an indelible resentment among the Serbs, and diminished Austria's prestige throughout Europe, since hereafter it was impossible to place confidence in any documents produced by the Vienna Foreign Office.

The Emperor was greatly disturbed at the result of this trial. He recalled that, when the archives of Milan and Verona had been opened, they had given the Italians access to many documents used by the Austrian police, which were demonstrably forgeries and inventions. Aehrenthal had believed in these documents provided by Forgách, as was only natural since his view of history compelled him to regard any movement among the South Slavs as a conspiracy against the Empire. He could not conceive that the movement for national autonomy was rooted in human nature. He remained blind to the nature of

the development which had first of all transformed Italy, and was now at work in the Balkans. He failed to appreciate the support given by Russia to the Balkan Peoples in their efforts towards emancipation. For him the great aim of policy was 'restoration of sincere and friendly relations between the sovereigns of Austria, Germany, and Russia.' In the tradition of Metternich, he viewed the interests of the monarchs as fundamental in a Conservative peace policy, while Russian policy was being directed by a man who recognized the aspiration of the Peoples as the fundamental force.

Aehrenthal assumed that the Emperors could co-operate, while the Peoples were in conflict. He was always trying to bring the monarchs together, while he sought 'to play the Balkan Peoples against one another so as to be able to keep them under control.' The Balkan situation was, in truth, much better understood in Berlin than in Vienna, and more than once Germany advised Austria to improve her relations with Serbia. But Aehrenthal's mind moved differently. He encouraged Bulgaria in the hopes of holding Serbia in check.

When Bulgaria declared her independence, Turkey replied with a claim of eighty-two million francs as indemnity for the loss of Eastern Rumelia. This debt Russia undertook to pay, the first of Izvolski's acts of revenge against Austria. And now, in the autumn of 1909, Nicola Hartwig arrived in Belgrade as Russian Minister. German blood flowed in his veins, but his mission was to promote Slav policy. Ambitious, adventurous, restless, a gambler and a fighter by nature, he differed from other Russian diplomats by his clear knowledge of what he wanted. He had a sense of history ; he understood the Serbian desire for power and national unity. In Serbia he saw a second Prussia, and was convinced that this State was destined to a position of pre-eminence and leadership among the Balkan people. He knew that this could only come about through bloodshed.

The notion of a Balkan alliance was no novelty ; it was older than the ambition of the Germans to attain national unity. But what hitherto had been no more than a fancy in the minds of diplomats, Hartwig animated with the breath of national passion. Aehrenthal's calculations were proved mistaken.

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Personal relations between Vienna and Petersburg were extinct. In October the Tsar travelled to Racconigi to visit the King of Italy, but he gave Austria a wide berth. Izvolski's scheme of reciprocal insurance, which he had imagined at Buchlau, was to be attempted with a new partner. Russia's aspirations in the Dardanelles were to be set off against Italy's plans for Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

However, at the end of October 1910 it looked as though Aehrenthal's desire to revive an Entente of the Three Emperors had some prospect of success. Nicholas II was at that time staying at Wolfsgarten, near Darmstadt, the country house of his German cousins, of which Sazonov remarks: 'Its modest size and furnishing suggested a gentleman farmer's residence, and it was so full of guests that the Tsar had to receive visitors in a small bedroom with hardly room for a bed and two chairs.' Sazonov, destined successor of Izvolski, who was proceeding to Paris, was to accompany the Tsar to Potsdam. 'The ceremonial atmosphere of Potsdam was ill adapted for serious political discussions,' wrote Sazonov, who, however, found an opportunity to discuss matters at stake very thoroughly with Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and with the Secretary of State, Kiderlen-Wächter. 'Despite his enormous stature,' wrote Sazonov, 'Bethmann did not impress me as a strong man, but his easy manner and his pleasant appearance gave the illusion of absolute sincerity, in which it was impossible not to have confidence. Kiderlen was wholly unlike his superior, but he was unquestionably a clever fellow, who knew the international situation in all its details and was not afraid of saying what he thought.' Sazonov had a particular weakness for Kiderlen, noting with gratification 'that he was by no means attached to Austria-Hungary, and considered the German alliance with the Dual Monarchy, to be, as Bismarck intended, not the end of German policy, but a means to other ends.'

The main topic of conversation was the need for an understanding about the Persian trade, but Sazonov declared that the most precious result of the meeting was the assurance which had been given him that henceforth Berlin would not unreservedly support all the projects of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. This is confirmed in a note written by Kiderlen on October

30th, 1910, recalling that Germany had been ready to pay a high price if thereby she could blunt the edge of a dangerous conflict of interests. 'We believe that it can be stated without hesitation that Austria is pursuing no further ambitious project in the East, but will, on the contrary, be ready to throw in her weight squarely on the side of maintaining the *status quo*. . . . We can therefore with a good conscience assure Monsieur Sazonov that we have not pledged ourselves, and do not intend to support any ambitious plans of Austria in the East.'

Since it was impossible to detach Russia from France, Germany did not intend to renounce her close alliance with Austria, but she was ready to take steps in Vienna for settling differences between Russia and Austria. No treaty resulted from the Russo-German conversations, although Germany was anxious to have the results recorded in writing. Sazonov pleaded the need of respecting his allies' feelings as justification for delay. This annoyed Kiderlen, who wrote: 'So we are to make open profession of friendship for Russia, while Russia will only secretly whisper into our ear that she will not go so far as to make war with England against us.' It is distressing to recall this promising beginning which never came to anything. The Balkan peril was clearly envisaged at Berlin in 1910. Kiderlen was the last German diplomat who, in the tradition of Bismarck, saw the peril which threatened Germany with a vision unobscured by sentiment.

Aehrenthal's mistakes were obvious. He favoured a modest policy, aiming only at the conservation of Austria, but his methods were those of an obsolete secret diplomacy. He had no positive programme. Since Austria could not forcibly withstand the rise of the Serbs, she ought to have done her best to play the part of a benevolent, powerful neighbour, for which nature and geography, history and economic forces, destined her.

Vienna was still the centre of culture most easily accessible to the South Slavs. Large numbers of Serbian students frequented the Austrian capital, whence Serbia derived all that reached her of art and the pleasures of the intellect. Austria, moreover, was the market where the Serbian peasant sold his corn and cattle, and where the Serbian tradesman obtained his

wares and observed the trend of prices. Vienna was the great emporium where the Serb made his purchases, and the centre of luxury where he sought his amusements. But Austria was incapable and unwilling of profiting by these opportunities. The Hungarian farmers resented the competition of cheap meat, and banded themselves with the diplomats of obsolete mentality who relied on force rather than on wisdom.

The Serbian Prime Minister, Milovanovich, amicably inclined to Austria, visited Vienna in 1909 to try and lay the foundation of an understanding, and in particular to obtain facilities for the import of Serbian meat to Austria. Aehrenthal refused to receive him. Baernreither acted as intermediary, endeavouring to win over Aehrenthal to a new outlook on Serbia, and declaring that there was still time to win Serbia's friendship. All the Serbian Prime Minister asked was some relaxation of the Austrian commercial policy, and an assurance that, in case Macedonia should be partitioned, Austria would take no hostile action against Serbia. 'I begged him,' writes Baernreither, 'to say some word of a conciliatory nature, but he only replied that his policy was concerned with the present and not with the future, which could look after itself.' Aehrenthal talked of the Serbs much as Vienna had talked of the Prussians before 1866. 'What they want is a good hiding.' This was not really his personal conviction, for, even while he was using such language, he was busy holding in check Conrad's warlike inclinations. In such words we must see, rather, a frivolous cynicism which weakened his power of resistance against the war party and obscured the better side of his nature.

After the annexation, Baron von Conrad redoubled his zeal, seeking to demonstrate that Aehrenthal's diplomatic victory had brought nothing but an inglorious and insecure peace. To judge Conrad justly, one must remember that his task was of a dual nature. On the one hand, he was the executor of Francis Ferdinand's policy. The Archduke was determined to renovate the army, and, now that Francis Joseph had given him full control in military matters, he was in a position to command. Aehrenthal's political victory had required military support. But the military enthusiasm which Conrad had stirred up henceforth dominated him. The general was a man of extremes.

To him the notion of semi-preparedness for war was ridiculous. Readiness for war, he argued, not altogether unreasonably, meant readiness to fight any conceivable enemy. He could only see two alternatives. One was a peaceful policy of evolution, with disregard for all questions of prestige. As a soldier he could not contemplate this possibility. Therefore he was all out for the other alternative, which meant knocking out each enemy as occasion arose, so as to be sure that they would not all set upon Austria simultaneously. He believed in preventive wars, and was convinced that Austria would be able, by taking advantage of the trend of political changes, to fight two or three wars in succession. Italy he regarded with unchanging hostility, and was constantly seeing opportunities for attacking and beating her. After that the next war should be against Serbia.

It is scarcely necessary to point out the errors of this soldier's outlook. Conrad's vision was lacking in a dimension. He calculated in terms of quantities which looked well on paper, but in practice were altogether different. Without psychological insight, he over-estimated Austria's capacity in every respect. Yet even if his military calculations had been justified, if victory had been certain, his outlook was fundamentally erroneous for another reason. He was unable to realize that even conquest was no final method of dealing with rising and growing peoples. Even an Austrian Napoleon should have feared that a succession of preventive wars would culminate in a gigantic Waterloo. And was Austria in 1910 comparable to France in 1795? Was Conrad a Napoleon?

In July 1911, Italy made known her intention of occupying Tripoli. In September she sent an ultimatum to Turkey, and on October 5th the town of Tripoli was captured by the Italians. The preparations for this act of war had been rapid. Under the impression of Italy's mobilization, which included a strengthening of positions on the Austrian frontier, Conrad demanded larger sums for army development, and special credits for fortifications. In numberless letters and memorials he endeavoured to persuade the Emperor and Aehrenthal that Italy harboured warlike intentions against Austria, and would be ready not later than 1912 to attack the monarchy. Neither the Emperor nor Aehrenthal were inclined to support Conrad. It would have

been hopeless to try to extract from both Parliaments military credits such as Conrad demanded. The politicians and the Press were far from inclined to support the plans of the General Staff. Conrad arraigned the Governments, Aehrenthal, and Schönaich, the Minister of War, for failing to realize the danger overhanging Austria, and for leaving the Empire without proper means of defence. He threatened to resign, and invited the Emperor to relieve him of his post. Francis Joseph was vexed that the Chief of General Staff was not content to follow the directions of the Foreign Office, but was constantly advancing his own political opinions in the form of a riddling criticism of Aehrenthal. None the less, he persuaded Conrad to remain at his post.

But when war broke out in Lybia, the conflict between Conrad and Aehrenthal deepened to irreconcilable hostility. The Chief of General Staff considered that the moment had now come to deal the great blow against Italy. 'It was suicidal,' he writes, 'to leave the opportunity thus provided by destiny unutilized.' Aehrenthal showed much patience. In his answer to Conrad's letters and chits he pointed out that Austria was bound by an alliance to Italy, which would not expire till 1914, and that there were a hundred other reasons for not letting loose the dogs of war. He complained that, if Italy was suspicious of Austria, this was Conrad's fault, and he wished to do nothing that could possibly give rise to further alarm in Italy.

Now came the breach. The Austrian Ambassador in Rome, Herr von Mérey, complained of the espionage system maintained by the Austrian General Staff in Italy. Conrad replied in heated language, and, in a long memorial, invoked the Emperor's judgement. Aehrenthal in irritation broke off all relations with Conrad. In his reply to the Emperor, Aehrenthal declared: 'It is high time that the conduct of foreign policy were left to the Minister within whose competence it falls, and who is responsible for it. The duty of the Chief of General Staff is to take such measures as may be necessitated by whatever possibilities of war appear on the horizon. It is none of his business to attempt to influence the course of events in such a way as to determine the realisation one or other of these possibilities.'



Francis Ferdinand entered into the dispute. Although he was not a partisan of Conrad's warlike projects, he saw in the opposition against the Chief of General Staff an affront to his own person. He was, moreover, Aehrenthal's most bitter opponent, reproaching him with 'misplaced pliancy, spectacular errors, and interferences in military matters.' At the manoeuvres in Dalmatia in August 1911 he 'ordered' Conrad not to give way to the 'Schönaich-Aehrenthal clique.' But he could not impede the dismissal of the Chief of General Staff.

On November 15th, Conrad was called to Schönbrunn, where the following conversation occurred :

THE EMPEROR (*in high excitement*) : I tell you I will not have these constant attacks upon Aehrenthal. I refuse to allow this pin-pricking.

CONRAD : All I ask of Your Majesty is that I may be allowed to state my views as they are. It is for Your Majesty, then, to decide.

THE EMPEROR : These constant attacks in particular upon our Italian and Balkan policy are directed against me. It is I who direct this policy ; it is my policy.

CONRAD : I can only repeat that I have simply written down my views exactly as they have occurred to me. Your Majesty is at perfect liberty to mark them as 'false.' That is in Your Majesty's power.

THE EMPEROR : My policy is a pacific policy, and every one has got to accommodate himself to it. It is along these lines that my Foreign Minister conducts my policy. Maybe this war is inevitable. But it will not be waged until Italy attacks us. So long as Italy does not attack us, there is not going to be war. Hitherto there has never been a war party in Austria.

Francis Joseph went on to recall an incident in Berlin when the German Crown Prince had let fall some bellicose syllables in the Reichstag. 'That is not going to happen here,' said Francis Joseph, 'but there are hints of something like it.' The last remark was directed against Francis Ferdinand, and Conrad's fate was sealed.

On November 30th, Conrad was once more summoned to

Schönbrunn, where the Emperor said to him : 'Much as I regret it, I am obliged, after careful consideration, to relieve you of your present position and to nominate you an Inspector-General of the Army. The reason is well known to you, and there is no need for me to talk about it.' The Emperor added that he had chosen the most direct method of action in personally informing Conrad of his dismissal, so that now they could part in friendship.

There was an interesting little episode subsequent to Conrad's dismissal. A Vienna daily, *Die Zeit*, called attention to the fact that the Italian Ambassador, the Duke of Avarna, had received news of the dismissal of Conrad on November 29th, although the dismissal had not become effective until the audience on November 30th at Schönbrunn. The German Ambassador, von Tschirschky, had heard the news from the Duke of Avarna, who added that Conrad had been 'sacrificed on the altar of the Triple Alliance.' Herr von Tschirschky was considerably annoyed at receiving such information for the first time from the mouth of the Italian Ambassador, and complained to Aehrenthal. The Foreign Minister, reporting the episode to the Emperor, wrote that Herr von Tschirschky had advanced his complaint 'in heated language,' and added 'that he observed with regret that in such circumstances it was necessary to be extremely cautious in discussions with the General Staff, since apparently private conversations with the General Staff ran the risk of being printed in the newspapers.'

The truth was as follows. The Italian Ambassador had received the news from the Foreign Office, which had considered it advisable to inform the Italians of Aehrenthal's victory over Conrad with all possible speed. The *Zeit* had received its information from the General Staff. The triumphant announcement to Rome on the one hand, the calculated indiscretion on the other, were the last sparrings in the fight between the Foreign Office and the General Staff.

## CHAPTER XXX

### THE LAST YEAR OF PEACE

A VIENNA newspaper reflecting the views of the Forward or Activist Party termed Conrad's retirement 'A triumph of mediocrity,' but the irony was misplaced. The preference given to quiet intelligence over heroic audacity was proper, but not by this alone could the inner perils of the Empire be conjured away. The partisans of intelligence were as much at a loss as the Activists. Aehrenthal had overthrown Baron von Beck. It was Aehrenthal also who first and foremost planned the appointment of a man remembered as the weakest Prime Minister Austria ever had to head the Cabinet at a moment when strength was the supreme need. This was Schmerling's grandson, Baron von Bienerth. The extension of the suffrage was Francis Joseph's last political act ; further than this he could not go. Whether it was that his imagination had ceased to play, or that the aftermath of the annexation engrossed all his attention, he could not recognize that universal suffrage was only the preface to the creation of a federal State. Francis Joseph saw in it not the beginning but the end of his effort to bring peace to the Peoples. He clung to the pious opinion that, once universal suffrage had been granted, it was up to the popular assembly, and to it alone, to show goodwill, and thereby to build up the peace. The Emperor's entourage and most of the bourgeois intelligentsia thought likewise ; only a small minority recognized that the supreme problem of the Empire would remain unsolved so long as there was no programme for the nationalities question and no bold energy in service of that programme.

Baron von Bienerth was virtually devoid of this creative understanding. He was a civil servant of middling stamp who had taken his ideas from the old centralism amid which he had grown up, and whose unpromising aim it now was to protect the administration from Parliamentarism. Beck's skill in managing the Chamber of Deputies was forgotten. For Bienerth the parties were just organized factiousness, best dealt with by

closing Parliament and depriving its members of their pay. Whatever good was accomplished in his period of office was done in the provincial assemblies behind the back of the Government—for example, the national settlement in the Bukovina and the German-Czech negotiations in Prague. In Prague it was the nobility, under the leadership of Count Franz Thun, which sought to reconcile the two Nations. The task seemed hopeless, yet Germans and Czechs came so close to each other that in the words of the Young Czech leader, Dr. Josef Kaizl, 'only a paper wall' divided them. It needed a statesman to remove this last obstacle, but Baron von Bienerth was not a statesman. In the spring of 1911 he dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. It fell to Baron von Gautsch, who for the third time took office as a stop-gap, to face the newly elected representatives of the people. In Galicia, the gendarmes put to watch over the Poles at the elections had shot twenty-six persons. After so much military exertion the State coffers were empty; prices rose throughout Austria. Serbia was bursting with food, but when the Social Democrats demanded revocation of the Treaty which hedged about the import of foreign meat with impossible conditions, soldiers were called out against the crowds of demonstrators in Vienna. The Polish big landowners let the gendarmes shoot: likewise the Hungarian farmers placed their interests under the protection of the Imperial and Royal bayonets.

In the absence of any scheme for Home Rule in the national divisions of the Empire, the bourgeois parties could find none but a negative and destructive outlet for their extreme Nationalist sentiment. The German parties formed a united whole. Acting as a single group, they took the first place in Parliament. But force of numbers did not make up for poverty of thought. On many sides the renewal of Austria was looked for from the action of the Social Democrats; but these, like the Liberals, were weakened by the national contrasts. The Czechs broke away from the united party and constituted their own independent organization. The Christian Socialists remained sterile after the loss of Lueger, the only conspicuous talent among them.

Since Gautsch's services were unobtainable, Aehrenthal recommended Count Karl Stürgkh for the succession. Baern-

reither calls Stürgkh an invention of Aehrenthal. This is not altogether just. Aehrenthal had indeed brought about the elevation of this Styrian nobleman from the post of Minister of Education to that of Prime Minister. But the 'inventor' of Stürgkh was a journalist, Emanuel Singer. The picture of political Vienna would be incomplete without this detail.

Emanuel Singer was the youngest of three brothers who in the early 'seventies had left a small Moravian village for Vienna. Here they had built up the great 'Steyrermühl' newspaper trust, popularly known as 'the three brothers' house.' Wilhelm Singer, after being for some years Paris correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse*, became editor of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, the journal of Moriz Szepe, the talented journalist who, as a friend of Crown Prince Rudolph, had played an important part in the Imperial capital. The second brother, Julius Singer, was a business man of genius, and accordingly controlled the business side of the enterprise. The third brother, Emanuel, played the part of a Jewish village sage in Vienna journalism. He talked rather than wrote. Neither in manner nor in speech did he show the smallest variation from the type well known in the villages of Hungarian Moravia ; and in this lay his originality. In the hall and lobbies of the Vienna Parliament he remained the village sage. True to type, he did not make positive recommendations, but dispensed parables from the rich store of anecdotes which he had at his command. For years he entertained Ministers and Parliamentarians, peers and commoners, with his talk. Count Stürgkh was his intimate friend of long standing. Stürgkh, the scion of an impoverished noble family, had reached the position of councillor in the Ministry of Education. He had then left the State service to devote himself entirely to politics. Emanuel Singer financed his career. The debt was repaid in full by the time Stürgkh attained to high office, but the service rendered was not forgotten. It was, on the contrary, repaid in an unusual manner. Stürgkh asked Francis Joseph to raise his friend to the nobility. The Emperor was not a friend of the Press. He had little use for reading matter, and, except for the *Fremdenblatt*, founded by the brother of Heinrich Heine, could only take newspapers in small doses. His knowledge of Vienna journalism was of the vaguest,

now as in the time of August Zang. Emanuel von Singer, now ennobled, was one of the few journalists to whom Francis Joseph spoke. It has been truly remarked that Stürgkh took Singer's advice more seriously than did any one else.

The stability of Stürgkh's Government was the wonder of Vienna. It was well explained in the following words : 'He owes his survival to two causes. On the one hand, he holds fast by the rule of sparing the Emperor. He lets him see everything only in the most favourable light. He makes little of all difficulties, so that the Emperor passes by them unawares. To save the Emperor from the necessity of making grave decisions, he defers the solution of all problems. The system may be called government by the light of hygiene. The régime is ordered by the physician Kerzl and by the Lord Chamberlain Montenuovo, and carried out by Stürgkh. It answers admirably to the Emperor's disposition.'

Stürgkh certainly showed himself a master in his observance of the hygienic method. Since the Emperor's illness in 1908, Montenuovo and Kerzl had constantly harped on the need of sparing the Emperor. The Lord Chamberlain detested the Activist Party and Francis Ferdinand, as he detested all those who interrupted the quiet rhythm of the Emperor's life. Stürgkh won Montenuovo for his ally. He imitated the methods of Taaffe, playing the part of the comfortable Minister. But his success surpassed the ambitions of Taaffe. Not only did he win the favour of the Emperor and the sympathies of the guardians of the Emperor's peace ; he was on good terms with every single influential personage, even with Francis Ferdinand and Tisza.

A firm friend of Stürgkh, never tired of praising his wide culture, energy, and endearing manners, was Ernst Plener, who makes the Prime Minister's cousin, Count Latour, 'a capricious Conservative,' responsible for the transformation of Stürgkh from a good Liberal to the servant and willing interpreter of the holders of power. The suggestion is honourable to Plener, but the good Latour was not responsible. Stürgkh's transformation was not the result of a change of political opinions but of a total loss of character. 'Stürgkh accommodates himself to all the situations and personalities he comes up against. He has

no political aims or ideas. His scheme is to serve every whim and every fancy which reaches him from Schönbrunn, Belvedere, the Ballhausplatz, or Budapest, all at once.' This method the Styrian nobleman had learnt from his counsellor, Singer. It was the method of small traders in the villages of Hungarian Moravia, where two or three races lived in close contact, while landlords and officials formed a ruling class. His first care was to see the new Army Law and the Military Service Law safely on to the Statute Book. The yearly number of recruits was raised from 103,100 to 159,500 men. Eighty million kronen were sanctioned for armaments and seventy-one million as an annual addition to army expenditure. Thanks to this, Stürgkh won to his side Schönbrunn and the Belvedere ; the Emperor and the heir ; the War Minister and the Chief of General Staff.

Aehrenthal died on February 17th, 1912, and from now dates Count Leopold Berchtold's appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This appointment, too, was in accordance with a recommendation of the dying Aehrenthal. Till 1911, Berchtold had been Ambassador in Petersburg. After the quarrel with Izvolski, he had lived on his property. Now he took over the Ministry at the Ballhaus. Although a pupil of Aehrenthal, he had little in common with his master. In his first instructions to diplomats abroad in April 1912 he gives a warning against illusions. 'The new alliances,' he said, 'have introduced an element of disturbance in our foreign policy, creating not only points of contact, but also points of friction.' When he wrote these words, neither he nor the world at large knew that on February 29th, 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria had concluded in the deepest secrecy an agreement for 'protection of common interests in the Balkans in the eventuality that the *status quo* should be modified, or that a third Power should attack one of the contracting parties."

The history of the Balkan Alliance opens in the winter of 1911. Its prime mover was Milovanovich, the Serbian Minister whom Vienna had refused to receive. The Alliance, which was soon joined by Montenegro and Greece, had been, as Sazonov acknowledges, founded with the knowledge and approval of the Russian Government, if not by its actual desire. Even France did not know the text of the treaty until Poincaré saw it in the

summer of 1912, when he visited Petersburg. Poincaré thereupon wrote to the French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, 'When I saw the text of the treaty in Sazonov's room I could not restrain myself from exclaiming, "That is a war treaty. . . . Why did you represent the treaty as pacific, and persuade us to give it our blessing by permitting the issue of a Bulgarian loan on the French market ?"'

Poincaré's anxiety was soon shown to be well grounded. On October 8th, 1912, Montenegro declared war against Turkey, and a few weeks later the whole Balkans were a battlefield. The origin of this war bore plainly the marks of secret diplomacy. It did not spring from the masses, but from the initiative of single individuals. The path was prepared by secret treaties. Yet the motive force of the aspirations of the Balkan Peoples towards independence and freedom was behind the manœuvres of the Cabinets of Petersburg, Belgrade, and Sofia. The long series of wars of liberation, which began with Napoleon, seemed to be drawing to a close. Austria was not immediately threatened ; the common foe was Turkey. But Austria stood on one side while the Balkan map was being remade.

The speedy successes of the Balkan Allies, and, above all, the dashing enterprise of Serbia, roused the greatest surprise in all Europe. Nowhere was this surprise greater than in Vienna. Francis Joseph and the men of his age around him could not but remember the year 1866, when they had under-estimated Prussia, just as now they had been under-estimating Serbia. Conrad also had misjudged Serbia's war capacity, in spite of the reports regularly received from the Military Attaché and despite the opportunities he had for close observation of a neighbouring country. Yet Conrad refused, even after the victories of the Serbs, to modify his view. His new position as Inspector-General of the Army gave him no right to address political and military memorials directly to the Emperor, yet he found the means to get over this difficulty by distributing them, in the guise of *Essays, by One who cannot look on unmoved at the Tremendous Events of the Times*, to the Military Secretary Bolfras, the heir to the throne, and the new Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, whom he had shortly before met at dinner with Baron Chlumecky.



In the first of his essays Conrad recalls that in 1909 he counselled the immediate occupation of Serbia, but had found no sympathy for his plan in his 'haughty adversary,' Aehrenthal. The only policy to follow now, he argued, was the policy of long views. Austria must join the Balkan Alliance and play the part of Leading Power, while the smaller Balkan States must be content with a position like that of the Federal States in the German Empire. It would be best, he added, that the Emperor of Austria should be recognized as Supreme Head of the Federation. Thus the old Hapsburg ambition, born of the struggles for supremacy in Germany, appears again, with the notable difference that in earlier days Austria had enjoyed the support of Saxony, Hanover, and the South German States, whereas now she stood alone in the Balkans. The notion of Austria as Supreme Power in a Balkan Federation was without substance. This did not, however, prevent Conrad from continuing, 'Once the monarchy is assured in its Balkan supremacy, then it can face war with Russia or Italy and impose its will upon the States.'

But a week later the Serbs were fully victorious, and demanded the Albanian coast in satisfaction of their traditional demand for access to the sea. Even Conrad saw that his plan was impossible. In its place he proposed something else on the same lines, namely, an understanding with Russia which would afford a basis for making war simultaneously against Italy and the Balkan Alliance. Never must Austria consent to the establishment of the Serbs in Albania. 'One fact,' he added, 'must be made perfectly clear, namely, that the monarchy is prepared to resort to arms if its demands are not complied with. . . . In conclusion, I wish to point out the significance of the events of the moment viewed in the light of a policy which aims at thrusting back Russia into Asia, and thereby liberating the Balkans for the energetic prosecution of our own aims.'

Conrad was surely expecting too much of Austria. On November 19th he declared himself against any kind of pacific solution. He now proposed immediately mobilizing against Serbia, simultaneously making all preparations for action against Russia, and, when all was ready, informing the Powers in a circular note that Austria would be ready to impose her will

by force of arms. This circular note Conrad suggested prefacing in the following manner : 'If the monarchy has hitherto bided its time, and refused to be incited into action, this has been because it was aware that warlike action against Serbia would have had consequences which must involve the whole of Europe. The monarchy understands clearly that in initiating warlike action it takes a decisive step not only on its own behalf but on that of all Europe.' Conrad added in a letter to Berchtold : 'Knowing me as you do, I do not think you will suspect me of indulgence in vainglorious boasting or tilting against windmills. I am a man of deeds, not words, but I weigh my words very carefully. I am convinced that, if matters continue as at present, nothing remains for the monarchy but to risk all upon a single card.'

In these sentences one can feel an aggressiveness born of despair, such as could be well understood if Austria-Hungary were being attacked like Turkey. But Austria was only suffering the consequences of her own policy. She had acted on the assumption that Serbia could be suppressed, and the supposition had proved false. She was also suffering from the internal conflict of her own aims. Francis Ferdinand's Forward Policy and Conrad's threats gave the impression that Austria desired to participate in the partition of European Turkey. Alarmed at this expectation, the Russian Minister, Izvolski, renewed his conversations with Poincaré, and under the same impulse Russia concluded a secret treaty with Italy. The Austrian war party, however, had no such concrete plans. Aehrenthal spoke the truth when he pointed out to Conrad that war against Serbia would be a futile march-in followed by a futile march-out, since Austria did not contemplate annexation. Even Conrad's policy of 'incorporating Serbia' did not spring from a desire for annexations, but only from the hope of arresting by this means the loss of the South Slavs within the Empire. Count Berchtold could concur in the formula, 'The Balkans for the Balkan Peoples.' He strove, not for territorial gains, but for power to make Austria's voice resound in the Balkans, and to exalt Austrian prestige.

Once again, as in 1859 and 1866, but in a new shape, the tragedy of Austria was repeated. Austria's insistence that

Serbia must not touch the coast of the Adriatic all but led to a general war in 1912. Serbia was already dependent on Austria for her land communications ; now Austria barred her access to the sea. A tempest of wrath surged up in Serbia, and passionate articles in the Belgrade papers sustained it. The Vienna Press, however, also played its part in prolonging the excitement. Since Aehrenthal's death the so-called Literary Bureau of the Vienna Foreign Office had become extremely active, by no means always to Austria's advantage, as was shown in the Friedjung case. Under Berchtold, the head of the Bureau, von Kánya, resorted to methods of the sheerest demagoguery, as when the futile affair of the Austrian Consul, Prochaska, at Prizren was inflated to an atrocity story of the worst type.

Yet for all this poisoning of the atmosphere a peaceful settlement between Austria and Serbia might yet have been achieved. Serbia would have accepted such terms as : a Customs and Commercial Treaty on lines fair to Serbian interests ; construction of the Adriatic Railway and an Adriatic port, with participation of Viennese capital in these enterprises ; in short, a union of the two countries on progressive lines. But the advocates of such a wise and pacific policy were not listened to. In November 1912, delegates from the Belgrade Chamber of Commerce came to Vienna to explore the ground. Germany and Italy also were competing for the Serbian market, but Austria was nearer at hand, and Austrian goods were already familiar. If Austria could have dropped her hostile attitude, abolished the limitations on the import of Serbian meat, concluded a favourable commercial treaty, and sanctioned the building of the Adriatic Railway, then the way would have been open for a friendly understanding. But the Belgrade delegates were not even received in Vienna ; nobody took the trouble to listen to them. Too many Austrian heads had been turned by the frivolous and fantastic advocates of the Forward Policy, with its catchword that Austria must be renewed through a victorious war, and with its superstition that the troubles of Austria were such as could only be remedied by the sword.

The Forward Policy gained strength in a manner typical of pre-war Vienna. There were industrialists, bankers, journalists, and politicians in plenty with sufficient judgement to

realize the danger of these warlike catchwords. The older generation in particular knew by experience only too well how little substance there was in the talk of the war-mongers. Unfortunately, the Forward Policy became fashionable in Vienna in 1912, so that it became a mark of good social manners to speak approvingly of it. Francis Ferdinand's apostles, the Schwarzenbergs, Czernin, Nostitz, Clam-Martinitz, and Latour, preached the new doctrine at their dinners and in the Jockey Club. The big industrialists picked up the new jargon at Sacher's and at the Hotel Bristol—men like Schoeller, Urban, and Kestranek. Finally there were ambitious figures, such as the Baron Chlumecky the younger, who plied between drawing-rooms and newspaper offices, dipping their pens in blood. Count Berchtold was not man enough to maintain his independence in such an atmosphere. In December 1912 he wrote: 'I will not lay myself open to the reproach levelled against Aehrenthal in 1908 that he prevented a settlement of accounts with Serbia.' It is the answer to Conrad's *Essays*.

We must now consider how the Emperor was influenced by this atmosphere and by the arguments of the war party. Through the influence of Francis Ferdinand, Conrad was once more placed at the head of the General Staff in December 1912. The manner of Conrad's return to the High Command throws a keen light on the relation of the Emperor to the heir, and more generally on the spirit of Austria in this last year of peace. Francis Ferdinand had already persuaded the Emperor to get rid of the War Minister, Schönaich, whom he detested, in favour of Auffenberg. In return for this, the heir had accepted the denial to Conrad of the post of Chief of General Staff. But Auffenberg annoyed the Emperor. He was one of the cleverest generals in the Austrian army, but Francis Joseph's objection to him was insuperable. This was perhaps due to trivial circumstances which took on an appearance of importance in the Emperor's mind. Auffenberg did not look a soldier. He had, moreover, the misfortune once to let his sword drop from his hand during a parade in front of the Emperor, while on another occasion his wig stuck fast in his general's helmet, so that he suddenly appeared bald before the Emperor. Be that as it may, Francis Ferdinand was aware of the Emperor's

feelings, and at the moment when it seemed necessary to him to place the army once more under Conrad's command, he consented to Auffenberg's dismissal on condition that Conrad was restored to his old post. The Emperor agreed, but insisted that Auffenberg's dismissal must be complete, and it was only the urgent advocacy of Conrad which restrained him from putting him on the retired list. When Francis Ferdinand went on to urge the Emperor to appoint Auffenberg Inspector of the Army, Francis Joseph inquired doubtingly whether he were fit for the job.

Conrad was once more appointed Chief of the General Staff by an Imperial Decree of December 12th, 1912. Two days later, in a long memorial addressed to the heir, he expressed his opinion that action must not be delayed a moment longer, writing: 'If the monarchy means to resolve a question which is vital for its existence, it seems desirable to drop all hesitations and to declare war immediately against Serbia.' On December 16th, Conrad was received in audience by the Emperor, from whom he went on to Berchtold. With extraordinary persistence he harped always on the same theme: 'We must make war!' It was Conrad's habit to go over the ground of important conversations in his letters. On December 23rd he wrote to Berchtold summing up the conversation of December 16th: 'The one way out of our difficulties is to lay Serbia low without fear of consequences. Maybe that the Entente Powers, together with Serbia, are in a position jointly to threaten the monarchy, but we, too, are in a position to place these Powers in peril of a general war of which the principal among them have every reason to be afraid.' So Conrad understood what the results of war against Serbia would be. But Aehrenthal's diplomatic victory in 1908 encouraged the belief that Petersburg, Paris, and London would shrink once more from general war. Conrad's words were echoed by the new War Minister, Krobatin, and even by Generals like Potiorek, who still lived in the tradition of Beck. Potiorek wrote on December 21st to Conrad: 'Heaven preserve us at all events from a cowardly peace. Better than that would be defeat on the battlefield at the hands of a Great Power.' This sentiment was constantly expressed again, though none of its advocates

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could say for what reason such a defeat would be better than peace.

The year 1912 had not ended before Turkey had to ask for an armistice. On the proposal of Sazonov, the Ambassadors of the Powers in London constituted themselves as a Permanent Conference. It was proposed that all the great States should begin by declaring that they desired no annexations in the Balkans, but Berchtold would not be bound in this manner. He demanded the creation of an independent Albania, which would bar Serbia from access to the Adriatic, and in this he enjoyed the support of Italy. Neither Austria nor Italy was prepared to see the other established on the Adriatic coast; better, then, that neither should make the attempt. The Catholic Church was also interested in the protection of Albania. But the whole Albanian scheme was received very sceptically by Austrian public opinion. Those who knew Albania were aware that Berchtold's aims sprang from a false supposition, and that the creation of an Albanian State was not a serious possibility. The principality, with its capital at Durazzo, would either bear the stamp of the comic opera or would become a nest of political intrigue.

Not a few voices of warning were heard, among them that of the *Neue Freie Presse*, which condemned as unreal and dishonest a plan into the prosecution of which all Austria's energy was being thrown. But on the other side there was an organized propaganda representing the fight for Albania as Austria's most notable task. A Committee for Albanian Affairs was formed, consisting of busybodies and political cranks, who beat the drum for the new State, while an unsuccessful Vienna sculptor collected a strange company of adventurers, failures, and vagabonds to join him in an expedition to the promised land.

Conrad meanwhile did his utmost to persuade the Emperor and the heir of the necessity of war. In a long letter addressed to Francis Ferdinand on December 30th, he insists that the power and dignity of the monarchy could only be exalted by war. In his own words: 'We have reached the point where there is a trial of strength between the monarchy and Serbia. It is a trial which must be seen through. All else—Albania, harbour questions, consular questions, and the rest—are

trivialities. The moment is critical, and calls for decisive action. Serbia must be defeated in war.' Conrad was forced to the painful recognition that the heir was not convinced by this argument. He wrote: 'I had repeated occasions to discuss with the Archduke Francis Ferdinand the need for resolute action against Serbia, but I could never see clearly whether he was at heart decided upon war. He discussed the details of our warlike preparations with an interest which suggested that he foresaw them being put into execution, yet at heart seemed displeased at the prospect of that turn of events. I had the impression that there were contrary influences, probably German, at work upon him. I remember that he once told me of a letter he had received from the German Emperor to the effect that Europe needed a man prepared for peaceful elimination of the conflict.'

Conrad was a fanatic who wanted war at any price. He no longer understood his master. Francis Ferdinand had, in fact, undergone a change. At the moment he rejected all thought of war. He respected Conrad's science and energy, but no longer took seriously the soldier's political opinions, while Conrad was before all else determined to persuade the Emperor and the heir that the final moment had come for action against Serbia. On January 20th, Conrad was with the Emperor, and tried for the hundredth time to win him over to the war. He declared that the root of the evil was Russia, and, once Russia was defeated, all would be well. Only Germany could not be brought to face up to the war. 'If only Germany would look further into the future!' he exclaimed. She could not help seeing, if she did, that the trial of strength between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente could no longer be delayed. But, as Germany remained timid, Austria would be obliged to undertake the smaller operation of annihilating Serbia. 'War must be declared this spring.'

Germany was genuinely out for peace. At the Ambassadors' Conference in London, Prince Lichnowsky tried to reconcile the parties. The German Minister in Cetinje, Herr von Eckardt, had the difficult task of supporting Austria without backing up every proposal of the Austrian Minister, Baron Giesl. Conrad wrote to Berchtold: 'The pronounced sym-

pathies of Herr von Eckardt, in particular for Montenegro, are obvious. His youngest son is a godchild of Queen Milena.' Germany, however, had other reasons than the Eckardt baby for shunning the general war. On January 30th, the anniversary of the death of Crown Prince Rudolph, the German Emperor paid his customary visit to the Austrian Ambassador. Count Szögyényi sent a long account of the visit to Berchtold, informing him that William was still determined, in case of war, to stand at Austria's side, but to do everything to avoid war. In the Ambassador's words: 'The Emperor said it would be very difficult to persuade the German people that such a war was necessary. A few Albanian villages were surely not worth a conflagration.' The Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke, said much the same in a letter to Conrad on February 10th, 1913: 'A war in which the very existence of the State is at stake needs the enthusiastic approval of the people. The desire to fulfil the obligations of the Alliance is strong and living in Germany, but it would be difficult to find words to rouse Germany if war were now to be provoked by Austria in a manner which the German people could not understand.' Conrad remained unconvinced, and replied to Moltke: 'See how Serbia is developing into a powerful ally of Russia, while at the same time she attracts our South Slavs. The danger will, in the long run, affect Germany no less than ourselves. Germany, too, must look for the right moment to meet the danger.'

The situation in January and February 1913 presents a new point of interest: during this time Francis Ferdinand was the strongest opponent of war. He put the German Emperor's arguments in still more trenchant words when he said that it would be unthinkable to wage war for the sake of some wretched goat pastures in Albania. Received in audience on January 21st, Conrad attempted to probe the reasons of this change, and remarked that Emperor William's hesitation was very regrettable. Francis Ferdinand cut the conversation short with the remark: 'They've got their own washing to look after.'

Francis Ferdinand's conversion to the cause of peace was not solely a matter of political tactics. He had begun to mistrust Conrad's optimism. The Chief of General Staff had requested that certain barges for heavy guns, which were lying on the



Danube, should be brought to the Save : Berchtold refused his consent. In answer to Conrad's complaints, Francis Ferdinand brusquely replied : 'How can Berchtold pursue a resolute policy when Schemua and Auffenberg declare that the army is not in fighting condition—even less so than in 1866 ?' General Schemua had succeeded Conrad as Chief of the General Staff in 1911, and had held the position for a year.

Francis Ferdinand's frame of mind was determined partly by the reserve shown by Berlin and partly by awakening doubts about the strength of the Austrian position. It must not be supposed, however, that he had abandoned his Forward Policy ; only, as he once more let it be known, his intention was first of all to restore internal order, to subdue the Hungarians, to place all the races on a level of equality, to strengthen the Central Administration, and to reform the army. When this was done, Conrad could have his war. 'Our principal enemy is Italy,' wrote the heir ; 'we must win back Venetia and Lombardy. Perhaps we shall also have to fight against Serbia to give her a lesson, but in no circumstances shall we annex a square yard of Serbian territory.'

There were three currents of opinion in the small circle which guided Austria's destinies. The Emperor gave his consent to a policy which should maintain 'prestige' without bringing about a great war. This was the policy followed by Berchtold. Conrad was out for war, a great war if Germany could be won over to it, for Conrad thought that the Central Powers could still wage such a war successfully. Francis Ferdinand was against war and against 'prestige' policy, fearing that the latter would bring Austria into conflict with Russia, while the maintenance of good relations between the monarchies seemed to him more important than a competition in the Balkans, which would divide them and imperil their existence. In two audiences in February 1913 he spoke with great clearness to this effect.

At the second of these, on February 27th, he remarked : 'In the future I intend working with Russia, and this will best succeed if Germany can be won over to agreement with us.' Conrad answered : 'But what about our prestige in Albania and our interests in the Balkans ?' The Archduke replied : 'That doesn't matter. I know you don't agree with me. Don't worry ;

when our internal position is better your turn will come. But not for the present. War against Russia must be avoided. It is France who is adding fuel to the flames, the French Freemasons and Anti-Monarchists desire war as a preface to a Revolution which will bring down the monarchs from their thrones.' Hereupon Francis Ferdinand produced a letter from the German Emperor in the same vein. This was the case against war.

So far as clear thinking was possible to one whose mind worked in terms of dynastic ambition, Francis Ferdinand's judgement was good. He could not set it out in clear language, but none the less he perceived that the movement in the Balkans was something more than a squabble about territorial possessions. He realized to some extent that a general war in the twentieth century must be dangerous to the thrones. But he could not shake off the habit of thought of his Italian forebears ; he saw the process of history as a conspiracy of the Freemasons against the monarchs. However, Francis Ferdinand knew what he wanted, while Conrad's blustering was quite unintelligent. Conrad saw history as the game of war, a problem set for the General Staff. The historical process was determined by who had the greatest number of positions. Between these two divergent views ran the zigzag line of the official policy laid down by the Emperor and followed by Berchtold. It was a policy without substance, its aim being an appearance of power known as 'prestige.' Those who conducted it were afraid of war, but played with it. They wanted to arrest the historic process and bring it to a standstill. It was a dangerous policy, dictated by men who did not realize the dangers which they were perpetually provoking. As a pendant to the dialogue of Francis Ferdinand and Conrad should be read the following between Conrad and Berchtold on January 9th, 1913 :

CONRAD : You must make up your mind. It is high time.

BERCHTOLD : But will Germany stick by us ?

CONRAD : We must take the risk of war.

BERCHTOLD : We shall get nothing but prestige out of it.

CONRAD : We shall get Serbia.

BERCHTOLD : Then we should have Germany, France, and Russia all against us.

What were the incidents on account of which Austria was holding the whole world in suspense ? The Balkan War flamed up afresh on February 3rd, 1913. The Serbs and the Montenegrins had marched into Albania ; the Serbs wanted portions of the coast ; the Montenegrins wanted Skutari. Even to-day, fifteen years after that war and ten years after the defeat of Austria, the old melancholy still hangs around that much-disputed territory. It is as unimportant intrinsically in 1928 as it was in 1913. Austria ordered the Serbs to keep off the Albanian coast, and the Montenegrins to withdraw from Skutari. The order was backed by calling up reserves. Conrad had succeeded in getting six army corps brought up to war strength. The result was that Russia, too, continued her preparations for war, and strengthened her army corps on the western frontier.

The question was whether the Ambassadors in London could maintain the peace. War with Russia had suddenly become a near possibility. Francis Joseph determined to write to the Tsar. Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, a Lieutenant-Colonel of the General Staff, formerly Military Attaché in Petersburg, conveyed the letter, in which the Austrian Emperor wrote : 'My dear friend, I take it for my deeply-felt duty at this critical moment to turn to you in order to remove those misunderstandings which apparently are arising in Russia, and to put an end to the mischievous tales which might damage the good relations happily existing between our countries.' After assuring the Tsar that he is acting in the spirit of conciliation, the Emperor adds : 'I trust that you will realize what efforts I have made, and that you will utilize to the utmost the great advantages of a European peace in which our two peoples can live harmoniously side by side. I beg you to believe in the friendly sentiments of your brother and friend, Francis Joseph.'

There were two parties in Petersburg as well as in Vienna. Whatever sympathy he might feel for Serbia, Sazonov declared he would not go to war for the sake of a Serbian harbour in the Adriatic. He has acknowledged that Hartwig, the Minister in Belgrade, put his own highly personal interpretation upon Russian policy, and thereby made his work much harder. At this moment, however, military preparations were a much more im-

portant question than what might be happening in Belgrade. If Austria and Russia could agree to disband their Reservists, this would outweigh all Hartwig's propaganda. On February 22nd, Colonel Bardolff, head of Francis Ferdinand's Military Chancellery, declared to Conrad: 'The Archduke has retired all along the line. In no circumstances will he have war against Russia; in no circumstances will he consent to it. Not a tree and not a sheep will he take from Serbia, or dream of taking from her. He demands demobilization of the Reserves.'

The Emperor's letter to the Tsar, and this clear indication of Francis Ferdinand's desires, had their effect upon the Ministers; Berchtold, too, retreated all along the line. But Conrad's resistance could not lightly be overcome. In ordinary circumstances it might not have mattered so much what Conrad thought, but, thanks to Berchtold's pliancy, it had become a regular practice for the Chief of General Staff constantly to interfere in the direction of policy. Almost daily he would send a letter, a warning, or a memorial to the Foreign Office, and would further, in the course of private conversations with Berchtold and his assistant, Count Szápáry, attempt to influence the whole Ministry. Aehrenthal had managed to shake him off, but Berchtold let him play the same part which Moritz Esterházy had played with Mensdorff.

Conrad at first thought of replying to Francis Ferdinand's desire—or demand, rather—that the Reservists should be demobilized, with his own resignation. He calmed himself, however, with the thought that, as he put it, 'Events will now speak for themselves, and it is hard to see what their message will be; it is better, then, in the meanwhile to stick to one's post.' Immediately afterwards he went off to Berchtold, hoping to find from him support against the views expressed by the heir. Berchtold replied in the voice of a changed man: 'I would never put my name to war against Russia. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand is absolutely against war.'

Conrad would not change his mind even when, having questioned the Finance Minister, Zaleski, regarding Austria's financial preparedness for war, he received the discouraging answer: 'Austria could only fight for two months, then she would be finished. The only hope would be that we might have

England's support.' How the Finance Minister was able to imagine that Austria could obtain funds from England for provoking a general war remains one of the obscure mysteries of the Austrian mentality in 1913. It is a remark perilously near to the type of political observation exchanged by the guests in small Vienna inns at meal-times in these days.

Under Conrad the organization of Military Attachés had developed into a grand service for political information. Major Gelinek in Belgrade ; Captain Hubka in Cetinje, who got on very badly with the German Minister ; Major Horváth in London, a severe critic of Lichnowsky ; Colonel Hranilevich, Captain Bilinek, and Fischer von Ledenice in Bucharest ; Colonel Pomiankowski in Constantinople, and Major Laxa in Sofia were no doubt gallant and efficient officers, but it was natural for them, in the position which they held, to send the kind of reports which the Chief of the General Staff wanted to hear. From these reports Conrad drew his conclusions, never questioning their accuracy. Backed up by Conrad, the Military Attachés came to exercise a kind of supervision over the diplomatic representatives. For instance, Major Gelinek was annoyed with the Belgrade Minister, Herr von Ugron, because the Minister was not enthusiastic about a pamphlet written by the Vienna journalist Mandl, and wrote : 'While I praised the book as being altogether to the point, and said I hoped it would now be realized that the intolerable relation of Austria to Serbia must be changed by thoroughgoing measures, Herr von Ugron condemned the book as unbalanced.' A letter from one of his correspondents was always sufficient to rouse Conrad to excitement. On February 20th, after Francis Joseph's letter to the Tsar and after the declaration of the Archduke, Conrad received a report from Major Gelinek on the atrocities perpetrated by Serbs upon Albanians. On the strength of this, Conrad announced to Berchtold : 'Only one thing can save us from the present difficult position, and that is a clear, firm, unbending attitude, without fear of recourse, when necessary, to arms.'

Conrad's daily protests against the peace policy were disturbing, but need not have been fatal had the Emperor's opinion and the Archduke's will stood firm. It was up to Francis Joseph to disband the reserve troops from the mobilized army corps ; the

letter to the Tsar must not remain a mere promise. The heir also stood firm on the point of reduction, while Berchtold demanded that the Emperor's orders should be carried out. But at this decisive moment Conrad threw all his strength into opposition. His own words were: 'I declare that not a man must be sent home before his relief has arrived.' Conrad proposed replacing the older elements in the army who had already been months under arms, without reducing the strength of the units at all, for, as he put it: 'The Serbs have given us proof enough already that they do not desire our friendship.'

Neither Conrad nor Berchtold used accurate language to describe the situation. Both of them resorted to such images as: 'They do not want our friendship'; 'There is a limit to what we can put up with'; 'We must issue a reminder of our existence.' In truth, so long as the Austrian Forward Policy was based on the opinion that Serbia's development was dangerous to the monarchy, and must therefore be arrested, Serbia was bound to defend herself against Austria and to seek aid from Russia. But Serbia made genuine efforts to convert the Vienna Foreign Office to another point of view. Apart from less formal overtures, one may recall that the Serbian Prime Minister, Pashich, in the middle of the Balkan War—that is, in December 1912—took steps to bring about an exchange of opinions, and wished to meet Berchtold. The editor of the *Neue Freie Presse*, Moriz Benedikt, had proposed to Professor Masaryk that he should communicate with some leading persons in Belgrade. Masaryk in consequence went to Belgrade, for the second time, in December 1912. Just as he was returning home, Pashich summoned him and laid before him a detailed plan, asking him to communicate it to Berchtold. 'Kindly go to Count Berchtold,' he said, 'and tell him everything I have told you.'

Pashich's plan, according to Masaryk's notes, was as follows: Serbia must remain politically and economically independent, but there is nothing to prevent her being on the friendliest terms with Austria. She has desired the partition of Albania, but would acquiesce in Austria's desire for an independent Albanian State; only she must obtain from Austria a harbour, and a territorial corridor to the harbour. Serbia would be prepared to give all possible guarantees, and to pledge herself never to

fortify this harbour nor to allow any other Power to use it. She would make all possible concessions in the economic sphere, giving special attention to Austria's requirements. She would conclude a commercial treaty in 1917, and would ensure a preference to Austria in all loan operations. If matters cannot be arranged on this basis, Serbia's attitude will be correct. She will not make war for the sake of the harbour, but will seek access to the sea at Salonika, and will attach herself economically to the Balkan Federation, purchasing nothing from Austria. Pashich concluded by declaring that he was ready to take account also of Austria's prestige, and would be ready to come to Vienna and personally expound his desires.

What was to be said against this offer of Pashich? Its honesty cannot be doubted. Pashich would not have used such language if he had thought it better to play the part of a vassal of Russia than to bring about that peace with Austria which on practical grounds he found necessary and desirable. Was Serbia's appetite truly insatiable? Only if Austria was fundamentally opposed to her development and progress.

Masaryk arrived on December 12th, 1912, at the Foreign Office with Pashich's proposals. Berchtold received these coolly, and to the decisive question whether Pashich should come to Vienna answered simply: 'No.' Much has been said of the damage done by the propaganda of the Pan-Slavists and by the Belgrade Press; it was the work, however, of irresponsible persons whom the Serbian Government, in an altogether democratic State, could not possibly have restrained as Vienna would have liked. In Pashich's offer lay the thoughts and the words of the responsible heads of the country. It was this which Austria should have settled her accounts with. Masaryk was beside himself. He took the train once more to Belgrade to inform the Serbian Prime Minister of the failure of his intervention. Pashich was greatly disappointed. Berchtold never found it necessary to explain his refusal.

Wherein lay the origin of this resistance against a peaceful settlement with Serbia? Neither the Emperor nor the Archduke ever came to hear anything of Pashich's offer. Must it be supposed that Conrad's insistences outweighed the will of the Court in Berchtold's mind? Colonel Bardolff, the trusty

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emissary of Francis Ferdinand, approached Conrad on March 15th, 1913, with the order that the Chief of General Staff was to refrain from any attempt to influence Berchtold, and must not continue to attempt to drive the Minister into taking decisive steps. Conrad replied : 'I cannot undertake not to talk to the Foreign Minister. His Imperial Highness should not allow himself to be so much influenced by the German Emperor. The Germans restrained us in 1909, and now they are once more standing in our way. I am convinced that the Germans are indifferent to our interests.' He went on once more to threaten resignation. 'In December I was appointed Chief of the General Staff in circumstances which made warlike action seem probable. His Imperial Highness can at any time obtain my removal. I can find the way down as easily as I found the way up.'

Conrad seems not to have realized that he had been nominated only Chief of the General Staff and not at the same time director of Foreign Affairs. In his audience with Francis Joseph on March 17th the headstrong general received these almost paternal words from the Emperor's lips : 'Even in politics one should stick to the rules of decency.' But Conrad was out for war, and his efforts were still to be directed towards bringing the conflict to a head.

Occasion was afforded to him by the case of the Hungarian trading steamer *Skodra*, which had been obliged by the Serbs to assist in rescuing some Serbian soldiers near Medua. The Turkish cruiser *Hamidié* had attempted to prevent a landing of Serbian troops, and some transport ships carrying Serbs had been set afire by her shelling. On March 18th, before the nature of the incident was at all clear, Conrad proceeded to take steps to ensure the severest action against Serbia. He went with Berchtold to Schönbrunn in the evening. The Emperor was awoken from his first sleep, and consented to the dispatch of a naval division to Cattaro. Conrad hastened to the Naval Department of the General Staff, and himself issued the order to the naval Commander-in-chief, Admiral Haus. The next morning at half-past five the division put out to sea.

Francis Ferdinand was at Miramare. The news put him in a state of violent excitement, and he demanded an explanation



from Conrad over the telephone. The impression of the *Skodra* affair was heightened by the unconfirmed report that the Serbs were compelling the Albanian Catholics to adopt the Orthodox Faith. Even the most cautious of the Foreign Office officials were now aroused. Conrad was asked what was to happen now, and answered : 'Above all let us have no petty measures, and no playing about with provisional occupations.' Count Hoyos, a departmental chief, said : 'We had best march straight in.' But the Emperor refused to agree, objecting : 'That would mean war, and I am against war.' What, then, was to be done ? The proposal of the Council of War, consulted by Berchtold, was to storm Lovčen, to encircle Montenegro, and to starve it out. Conrad opposed these as milk-and-water measures. For him there was only one measure to be taken—'Mobilization under Type B.' That meant war against Serbia and Montenegro.

Three days passed during which the Chief of General Staff expounded 'the necessity of action on a large scale' in memorials addressed respectively to the Emperor, to Berchtold, and to the heir. On March 24th, at 10 p.m., Conrad was summoned from his meal at a small restaurant, 'The Green Anchor,' to Berchtold's for a Cabinet Council. To his great annoyance, Conrad remarked that the Emperor's Lord Chamberlain, Prince Montenuovo, was taking part in this meeting of 'strictly professional functionaries.' Montenuovo's presence was indeed unconstitutional. It amounted really to a declaration on the Emperor's part of no confidence in his responsible Ministers and Generals. It was the Emperor's way of putting a stopper on the bellicose spirits gathered at the Ballhaus.

The meeting opened. Montenuovo inquired : 'Why is Mobilization Type B immediately necessary ?' Conrad replied : 'Sooner or later the moment will come when it is unavoidable. We shall have to drive the Serbs out of Albania and enforce the evacuation of Skutari.' Count Szápáry interpolated : 'If we carry out Mobilization B, that means necessarily action against Serbia. We cannot maintain a vast expenditure on account of this exhausted little people.' Conrad answered : 'They are not in any sense exhausted ; they are good fighters.'

Count Berchtold resolved to urge the Emperor to proclaim

a blockade and partial mobilization. Conrad demanded immediate mobilization of seven army corps. This demand was known in all its details at Petersburg two days later, for the Russian espionage service was thoroughly reliable. Sazonov thereupon remarked to Vienna that he observed Austria had already abandoned the programme of conciliation which she was recently advertising. In consequence, Russia would also revoke the disbanding of the Reserves which she had begun. 'This shot in the air,' Conrad remarked ironically, 'was sufficient to bring about on our side cancellation of all the measures already agreed upon ; only the War Minister and I stuck to our points.'

While Vienna was in continual anxiety about the maintenance of peace, the London Ambassadors' Conference continued its difficult work. Russia and England both let Serbia and Montenegro know that the Powers were resolved to determine the frontiers of Albania. They made a joint step in Cetinje to constrain the Montenegrins to give up the fight for Skutari. Once more on this occasion the Austrian Military Attaché in Cetinje, Captain Hubka, was highly dissatisfied with Germany, and wrote : 'Herr Eckardt openly showed his sympathy for Montenegro by sitting in an arm-chair away from the other diplomats, thus giving the appearance that he was taking no active part in the proceedings.' On April 5th the diplomatic pressure of the Powers on Montenegro was backed up by an international naval demonstration before Antivari. The Archduke passed a reasoned judgement on the affair, writing from Miramare on April 4th : 'The Balkan situation has become the common concern of the Powers, consequently any independent action by the monarchy would be mistaken. If the London Conference were to break down, of which there is yet no indication, Austria must act in close agreement with Germany and Italy.' These were words spoken to the wind. The very next evening, April 5th, the following conversation took place at a Council of War in the presence of Berchtold, Conrad, and Krobatin :

CONRAD : We cannot simultaneously conduct a war against Italy, one against Russia, and one in the Balkan countries.

BERCHTOLD : In case of necessity we shall have to back Italy against Greece, and even let her into Albania.

CONRAD : Yes, on condition that we get her out later.

BERCHTOLD : Could Belgrade be occupied immediately as a pledge ?

CONRAD : That is what Mobilization Type B means.

Conrad commented as follows upon this meeting : 'We finally discussed in a somewhat theoretic vein the possibility of reaching an understanding with Russia and the Balkan States in order then to have liberty of action against Italy.' In other words, he would be ready for an understanding with Russia and the Balkan States if he could thereby purchase the right to make war on Italy. The War Council did not think it worth while purchasing the maintenance of peace at this price. Conrad wrote on April 15th to Potiorek : 'I once more to-day expressed my conviction to His Majesty that a favourable end of the Balkan crisis will only be possible if the monarchy makes up its mind to leave the concert of the Powers and protect its own interests by force of arms.' To which the Emperor had replied : 'That must not be done without a great deal of forethought.'

Francis Joseph did well yet once again quietly to withstand the insistences of the Chief of the General Staff. On April 11th, Serbia resolved to stop the war against Turkey, so that Skutari automatically was liberated. Thanks to the disagreement among the victorious Powers, Austria's desires would now be fulfilled, but not for this did Conrad and the advocates of the Forward Policy allow themselves a moment of rest. On the very next day, April 12th, Conrad wrote to Berchtold : 'The monarchy must still be ready to stand up for its own interests, and Serbia and Montenegro can only be made to respect those interests by force of arms.' He added a hint that it was Germany's fault that the conflict looked like being resolved without war. 'It cannot be denied that our timid policy has largely been due to the restraining attitude of Germany, who did not conceal her need for peace. Bethmann's subsequent speech cannot alter that. But in the future we must demand a clear-cut policy on the part of Germany. We must insist upon Germany sharing in our views and recognizing our needs. If Germany

refuses, she will have to see the monarchy become a Slav State, which in the future will stand by the side of Russia and France.'

Although the evacuation of Albania was now near at hand, on April 15th he urged the Emperor that Austria should leave the Ambassadors' Conference at London, and should undertake independent action against Serbia and Montenegro. The Emperor objected: 'But I ask you, now, that we are in collaboration with all the Powers, how could we suddenly break away from them?' Conrad answered: 'Germany is supporting Serbia and Greece. We must show her that this does not do.' The Emperor for some moments was absorbed in thought, and then continued: 'This needs most careful thinking over.' Such conversations were now of daily occurrence.

Since Conrad could not persuade the Emperor to agree to Austria abandoning the Conference of the Powers, he now made an attempt upon Berchtold. Conrad was the moving force, and felt himself to be the real leader of Austrian policy. On April 24th the German Military Attaché, Count Kageneck, called upon him. Conrad assailed him: 'So here come the Germans, after keeping so quiet up to now.' Count Kageneck, with considerable spirit, tried to convince the excitable marshal. 'Your Excellency, it is very difficult to bring home to the German citizen the need of fighting against France for the sake of Albania.' Conrad replied: 'No, no. The German citizen has nothing to do with the case. It is the German Emperor who invented the phrase about the Albanian goat-pastures.' Conrad, who has published all these conversations in the intention of justifying himself before history, does not guess that in reality he has set up a monument to Emperor William II.

It was now only a matter of days till Skutari should be evacuated, and Austria's second demand thus fulfilled. The Montenegrins knew that Skutari was lost to them, but they did not wish to give up the moral satisfaction of having reduced the city. The Ambassadors' Conference proposed to tighten the blockade. Conrad and Berchtold none the less visited Schönbrunn on April 24th to request the Emperor 'to interrupt the course of events with a forceful act, and to order mobilization.'

Conrad knew that the very next day Skutari might be evacuated. Now was the last moment for warlike measures. The Emperor objected : 'It would be better to wait.' Berchtold's view was, 'We cannot let Montenegro settle down comfortably in Skutari,' and the Emperor, as usual, concluded : 'That is true, but we must do nothing without mature reflection.'

Conrad now informed the commander in Bosnia, General Potiorek, that he would probably have to make war, but it was necessary to await the moment of Serbia attacking Bulgaria. 'It is still uncertain,' he added, 'how Russia will act. In my view, therefore, we must be ready for war against Austria.' On April 27th, Conrad discussed this possibility with the German Military Attaché, Count Kagenck, who, Conrad records, declared that Emperor William was against the war, and so were many circles in Germany.

On May 4th news reached Vienna that King Nicholas had resolved unconditionally to evacuate Skutari. He only asked, in a few words, that the proposed action should be delayed forty-eight hours. Now all Austria's wishes had met with satisfaction. The last pretext for warlike interference had disappeared. Yet the Austrian Minister in Cetinje, General von Giesl, proposed immediately sending an ultimatum to Serbia whereby, he said, Montenegro would be openly compelled to bow to the will of the monarchy. It was only a few days before that Francis Joseph had said to Conrad : 'Even in politics one should stick to the rules of decency.'

Still the war party did not give up its hopes that, even at the last moment, this turning favourable to peace might be reversed into the opposite. Immediately after Nicholas's capitulation, Berchtold called a Cabinet Council at which, besides Conrad and Krobotin, there were in attendance also the Minister of Internal Defence, Baron Georgi, Stürgkh, and Bilinski. Conrad spoke in favour of Giesl's proposal that an ultimatum should be sent to Cetinje despite Nicholas's decision. Berchtold was of the contrary view. Nicholas had yielded. 'We must now await events.' Count Stürgkh was roused to a heroic vein. He declared : 'Such caution shows too tender a spirit. Sentimental policy is not in place here.' Berchtold now proposed to leave Valona to the Italians and to occupy

Albania jointly with them. But Conrad opposed this project, which would only be worth while if, in return, Italy pledged her neutrality, and Austria finally declared war against Serbia and Montenegro. Count Berchtold announced: 'We must do something. We must give Albania a Prince, a police force, and finally an army.'

Berchtold proceeded to Schönbrunn with this programme, and with the proposal to send an ultimatum to Nicholas. Once again the eighty-seven-year-old Emperor showed better sense than his Ministers, and refused Berchtold's suggestions. The history of these days would not be complete without a quotation from the diary of the former Minister of Commerce and Member of the House of Peers, Baernreither, who wrote on May 6th: 'Nicholas, it seems, has bluffed us finally. Everybody was lamenting his provocative attitude. The day before yesterday the Bourse already knew that he would yield. Through the agency of his Vienna banker, Reitzes, and his Paris banker, Rosenberg, he has discounted his own surrender at a handsome profit. Spitzmüller thinks that, with the exception of the King of Greece, all the Balkan monarchs have gambled on the Bourse.'

On the evening of May 25th, 1913, Conrad was summoned from a company of friends in the dining-room of the Vienna Grand Hotel. The Chief of the Information Bureau, Lieutenant-General Urbanski, had an important item to communicate. One of the high officers of the General Staff, formerly head of the espionage service of the Austrian army, and at that moment Chief of General Staff to the Prague Corps, Colonel Alfred Redl, had just been unmasked as a spy.

The discovery had been made by the Vienna police. The so-called Intelligence Section of the Information Bureau had for some time been aware that the Russian General Staff was informed of the most secret orders issued by the Vienna Command. This was proved by counter-measures taken by Russia, which could only be explained in the light of knowledge of the measures taken by Austria. The further the evidence was pursued, the more substantial did the unpleasant suspicion become that the spy was to be found within the General Staff or among the generals holding high command. Results obtained by counter-espionage showed that the traitor must

belong to one of the two Bohemian Corps—either the 9th, at Leitmeritz, or the 8th, the Prague Corps. Further than this the Intelligence Bureau of the General Staff could not penetrate. It therefore called the Vienna political police to its aid. That old Austrian institution, Censorship of the Letter Post, an institution which had reached its highest development in the days of the 'Black Cabinet' under the Emperor Francis, was still to some extent functioning. Detectives of the Vienna political police working in certain post offices kept watch on the correspondence of political persons, and were even charged with following traces of correspondence of a suspicious nature. In March 1913, at the poste restante section of the Vienna General Post Office, two letters bearing post-marks of the German-Russian frontier town, Eydtkunen, attracted attention as suspicious. They were addressed to 'Opernball 13.' They were opened by a secret process, so that they could be closed again without detection. Inside them were found large sums of money in Austrian notes, without any message.

On the 25th May a gentleman of heavy stature appeared at the counter to ask for these letters. The postal employee pressed the knob of an electric bell placed beneath the counter to give warning to the detectives in the waiting-room, but before they arrived the stout gentleman had disappeared. Now began an exciting hunt, which probably would have been without result but for a chance. The suspect man had left the post office in a car, of which the detectives had arrived just in time to catch the number. By chance they met the car shortly after in the Kolowratring. The chauffeur told them that he had carried the stout gentleman to a café. He was not there when the detectives arrived. But at a neighbouring taxi-stand a carriage-cleaner was found who had seen a gentleman answering to this description get into a car, and heard him give the order: 'Hotel Klomser.' In the car which the unknown man had taken from the post office the two detectives had found a pocket-knife case. The porter of the Hotel Klomser could give no information except that Colonel Redl had lately returned. At that moment a stout gentleman descended from the first floor and placed the key of room No. 1 on the porter's table. 'Have you lost the case of your pocket-knife, Colonel Redl?'

asked the porter. 'Yes,' answered the stout gentleman. Colonel Redl was now caught in the net of the police. At midnight four officers appeared in Redl's room. They tried to discover the extent of Redl's treachery and the names of his accomplices. He referred them to correspondence and papers in his official Prague residence. The Commission left a revolver on the table and went out. The four officers waited in the street outside, the Herrengasse. At two in the morning a shot was heard from room No. 1. Redl had taken his life.

On June 1st, Conrad reported all the details of the affair to the Emperor. He records: 'His Majesty was deeply concerned, but took the matter calmly and showed no indignation at the officer having been left to take his own life.' Francis Ferdinand's behaviour was quite different. Conrad, who for the most part faithfully reports every word, omits to describe the fury of the Archduke, only recording that his audience of June 4th was the most unpleasant he had experienced in his period of service as Chief of the General Staff. The Archduke in great anger threw all responsibility for the affair upon Conrad. He asked how it was possible that a man had been employed in a responsible position as head of the espionage service who was known to be given to unnatural vice, and was therefore exposed to threats of blackmail and, in consequence, to expenditure in excess of his income. He demanded dismissal of all the employees in the Information Bureau and a re-organization of the General Staff. He was equally angry at the manner in which the affair had concluded. His religious feelings revolted at the fact that suicide had positively been thrust upon the dead man. He called it 'unchristian barbarism and a disgrace' to oblige any man to commit suicide, even a man who was 'ten times a swine.' Conrad sought to justify himself, saying: 'When I was a young officer it was the practice that, when a comrade was known to have disgraced his uniform, a letter was placed upon the table informing him that his guilt was known. Beside the letter was placed a loaded revolver. The rest was left to him.' Conrad thought this was a fine practice, but in this case no doubt the believing Catholic, Francis Ferdinand, held the higher view. On this day Conrad lost the confidence of the heir,



Conrad's position was weakened, but his influence on policy was by no means at an end. When, inevitably, war broke out in the Balkans afresh, this time between the victors of the previous struggle, he urged active participation by Austria. The following conversation took place between Conrad and Berchtold on June 21st :

CONRAD : What is the situation ? What is our policy ? What shall we do if war breaks out between Serbia and Bulgaria ?

BERCHTOLD : We shall wait and see.

CONRAD : And if Bulgaria is defeated ?

BERCHTOLD : Then we shall intervene.

CONRAD : With arms ?

BERCHTOLD : Yes.

CONRAD : Shall we remain in Serbia ?

BERCHTOLD : His Majesty can't make up his mind to it, and Francis Ferdinand is against any annexation whatever.

CONRAD : What do you think Russia will do ?

BERCHTOLD : She will threaten. Then Germany will intervene to hold Russia back.

CONRAD : And if Russia cannot be held back ?

BERCHTOLD : Then we must take energetic action against Russia.

CONRAD : That means war. So, to sum up, it is likely that in the course of the summer we shall take action against Serbia, and that if Russia carries her demands to extreme lengths we shall seek means of declaring war on her.

BERCHTOLD : We shall not seek them ; we shall take advantage of them when they come.

CONRAD : That's the usual mistake. We always wait for things to come, and never aim at anything. That is what makes harmony between military necessity and foreign policy so difficult. The State must have positive aims. The Diplomatic Service must create favourable political circumstances, and then is the time to act.

BERCHTOLD : Our State is interested in the maintenance of conditions, and does not follow any positive aim.

CONRAD : That is not so. In 1909 the Empire had the

positive aim of uniting the South Slavs beneath its rule. The aim could not be achieved because the Emperor and the Archduke were lukewarm.

It will be seen that Berchtold had adopted a stronger attitude since Conrad's position had been weakened. Francis Ferdinand took occasion, at the great army manœuvres held in the middle of September 1913 between Tabor and Beneschau in Bohemia, to let Conrad feel the weight of his disapproval. Conrad had done everything to imitate the conditions of actual warfare. Ten infantry and two cavalry divisions were in action. The Northern army was commanded by General von Brudermann, who later led the Third Austrian Army in the autumn campaign of 1914. The Southern army was commanded by General Auffenberg, who in the war led the Fourth Army. On Sunday, 14th September, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand arrived at the manœuvre headquarters at Chotivin. After receiving the reports of the generals, he went to Mass in the local church, followed by the generals. 'About an hour later,' Conrad reports, 'I was summoned by the Archduke. As I entered, I found him highly excited. He greeted me brusquely with the question why I had not been in church. Amazed at this question, I replied that my duties had prevented me. The Archduke replied : "I know your religious views, but when I go to church you've got to go as well".'

On the second day Francis Ferdinand called off Conrad's manœuvres, and ordered a practice advance against an imaginary foe, with a big cavalry attack in conjunction. Conrad returned to Vienna, and on September 18th asked the Archduke to receive his resignation. Francis Ferdinand answered very politely, asking Conrad 'to abstain from changes in the highest interests.' The request, however, was made solely with a view to the possible external effects of Conrad's resignation. The personal side of the matter played no part. The Archduke wrote in his letter : 'After the invitation and the honours that you have received from Emperor William it is impossible that you should leave your position. The rag of a newspaper which sets forth the views of the Jews and the Freemasons has, moreover, published such infamous articles that for this very reason

you must remain.' These strange motives determined Francis Ferdinand's decision. Conrad remained, but the Archduke pondered over his possible successor. His favourite candidates were Generals Terszyánszky, Puhallo, and Rhemen.

The Peace of Bucharest on August 10th concluded the war between the Balkan Allies and Bulgaria ; on September 29th, Bulgaria made peace with Turkey. The Balkan settlement was left to the Balkan Peoples. Austria alone among the Powers was implicated, for she had adopted the creation of an independent Albania as her programme. The purpose of this was to put a check on Serbia and to hinder her advance towards the Adriatic. But Albania was easy to invent and difficult to create as a reality. The London Conference had endorsed Austria's plan, but a revolt among the Albanians interfered with the establishment of the new State, and Serbia was reluctant to evacuate the area of the revolt.

Austria's aims can be gathered from the speech of Berchtold in the Cabinet on October 3rd, 1913 : 'Austria demands fulfilment of the decisions of London. Serbia has an undisputed right to behave as she chooses on the territory allotted to her, but if she encroaches beyond the frontiers laid down by the London Conference, and does not respect Albania's guaranteed neutrality, then Austria must send an ultimatum to Serbia and compel her to evacuate Albanian territory.'

The Ministers approved these suggestions of Berchtold, save only Count Stürgkh, who went further in demanding that an immediate indication should be given of Austria's absolute determination.

Stendhal, in his book on Napoleon, remarks that in the future no one will fight for possession of a province of which the acquisition is a matter of little advantage to the community. Eighty years after the expression of this opinion, Austria risked the advantage of the community for the sake of a province which was not only unimportant, but absolutely insignificant as an element in the present and future prosperity of the Peoples. To begin with, this province was a sheer invention. Berchtold wanted to make it a reality. Conrad wanted to use it as an excuse for war. After the Cabinet Meeting he went to the Emperor and said to him : 'The rising in Albania affords

suitable grounds for action against Serbia—that is to say, war to the last extremity.’ Conrad says that it was his impression that the Emperor would not fall for the suggestion.

There was a deep difference between Conrad and Berchtold. In his way, the Chief of General Staff was more logical than the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He cared little or nothing for Albania, considered Albania a mere buffer against Serbia, and proposed directly to annihilate Serbia. Berchtold desired a policy of force without using forcible means. This contrast made it impossible for the ruling personages to reach any sound decision.

There was a typical discussion at the Cabinet Meeting on October 13th. Count Stephen Tisza had now become Hungarian Prime Minister in succession to Lukács. His plan was to defeat Serbia, but not to partition her. He was for a policy of ‘castigation and humiliation.’ Count Stürgkh was of opinion that some territory should be taken away from Serbia, and that a reliable family should be set on the throne to replace the existing dynasty. He omitted to suggest how such a ‘reliable’ family could be found. ‘Reliability’ of this kind might be found among great landed proprietors with an interest in the Constitution of their State, but not among democratic peasants like the Serbs. Herr von Bilinski, who may have had little character but certainly had sharp brains, suggested that it was pointless to go on talking about war, seeing that those with whom the decision lay would certainly not permit war to come about. In his view the wisest plan was to do nothing. Baron Burián thought that Serbia ought to be made for once to feel a master’s hand. Berchtold said, ‘There is a limit to what we can put up with,’ and that war could not be avoided for ever, but that the Russian question remained fundamental. In the last resort it was the Emperor once again who, in the audience held after the Cabinet Council, put a brake upon the heroic enthusiasm of Tisza, Stürgkh, and Conrad. Berchtold chose a middle path. On October 18th he caused a demand to be presented to the Serbian Government that it should within one week give its consent to the evacuation of Albania. Serbia was ready, her only desire being, it was assured, to secure certain minor frontier modifications. On October 20th she gave an official undertaking to do as Austria desired.

Berchtold's policy was to work for an independent Albania, if possible with a German Prince at its head, by every means in his power. But when the Albanian State emerged from dreams into reality, when the Prince of Wied had declared his readiness to accept election to the post of 'Mbret of Albania,' a difficulty arose. The German Prince was an excellent but not an intelligent man, whose ideas about Albania were as vague as those of Shakespeare about Bohemia, which he supplied with a sea-coast. The Prince of Wied wanted to make his residence on a yacht. Vienna could not agree to this. The Austrians wanted the Mbret to make a solemn entry into Skutari and then into the other towns. Berchtold and Conrad discussed the matter as follows :

BERCHTOLD : Let us hope there will be no hitch. But what shall we do if there is ?

CONRAD : Nothing at all.

BERCHTOLD : But what if the Prince is assassinated ?

CONRAD : Even then we can do nothing. Somebody else must take the throne in his place. Any one will suit us as long as he is not under foreign influence.

BERCHTOLD : What about a member of the Napoleonic dynasty married to an Austrian Archduchess ?

CONRAD : That would be an excellent plan.

The Prince of Wied had not yet even seen his throne, but in Vienna they were discussing his successor in case of assassination.

The results of Austria's Balkan policy were pathetic. Austria had declared that she wanted nothing in the Balkans. But for two years she held her hand on her sword, as though she really wanted something. She had given up the Sanjak of Novibazar, and had subsequently obtained, as the result of her most concentrated efforts, the creation of a State without substance. Austria had made an irreconcilable enemy of Serbia without in any way helping Bulgaria. She had even alienated the non-Slav Balkan countries, Rumania and Greece, which felt themselves indebted to Germany for the successful conclusion of the Peace of Bucharest. Germany, unable to follow the incompre-

hensible policy of Berchtold, had gone her own way. Italy, in view of Conrad's war projects, was more suspicious than ever before. Count Ottokar Czernin, the Austrian Minister in Bucharest, wrote to Berchtold on March 11th, 1914: 'The Austro-Rumanian Alliance is a valueless scrap of paper. In case of war, Rumania will not be on the side of Austria.' By May 1914, Albania, intended to serve the purpose of a buffer against Serbia, was finished with. The Prince of Wied had departed.

On June 4th, 1914, Francis Ferdinand was with the Emperor. He had personally ordered manœuvres in Bosnia and Dalmatia for this month, and had entrusted, not Conrad, but General Potiorek with the command. He himself, however, was hesitating whether he should risk a shock to his feeble health by undertaking the discomforts of the journey and the sojourn in Bosnia. The Emperor left it to the Archduke to make his own decision. Prince Montenuovo heard him say: 'Do as you choose.' He agreed that the Duchess should accompany her husband. From Vienna the Archduke proceeded to Konopischt, his castle near Beneschau, in Bohemia. The Emperor William was expected as a visitor on June 12th. The German Emperor, on his way to Corfu in March of the same year, had spent some hours at Miramare with Francis Ferdinand. This time he stayed with him two days.

They had much to discuss. Austrian and German policy in the Balkans were not running in harmony. On certain highly important questions Francis Ferdinand altogether agreed with the Emperor. After all, he had borrowed from none other than the Emperor William the happy phrase about the 'miserable Albanian goat-pastures.' Conrad was constantly complaining that behind the Archduke's steady objection to war lurked the influence of William. Berchtold and Czernin took a similar view.

On September 8th, 1913, Conrad, attending the German manœuvres, had remarked in his outspoken manner to Emperor William: 'So we didn't march against Serbia. My proposal was shelved. This year, too, we had a fine opportunity for going for Serbia.' William was upset by this outspoken complaint, and replied: 'I didn't hold back your soldiers.' The

contrast between Vienna and Berlin did not, however, centre round this point, for, after all, Francis Joseph had refused his consent to Conrad's policy. The centre of the contrast was the different estimation in which Vienna and Berlin held Serbia and Bulgaria. This contrast was strikingly revealed by an exchange of telegrams between the Emperor William and King Carol of Rumania after the Peace of Bucharest.

Austria's diplomatic failure was her own fault. Germany showed a better political instinct, and her tactics were cleverer, while Austria made one mistake after another. In despite of Conrad, Germany made every effort to keep Italy in the Alliance. Now arose the new disturbing question of Rumania. Was this doubtful Ally also to be lost? Emperor William did not realize Austria's difficulties. He did not see that good relations with Rumania depended upon Hungary, and did not guess that even Francis Joseph was powerless in the face of Hungarian obstinacy. And what of Francis Ferdinand? What power had he to influence the policy of the monarchy? He had to bide his time; his Forward Policy was a policy for the future; for that very reason he was against a Forward Policy in the immediate present. He was altogether against sudden action for the sake of improving the atmosphere. His plan was first to establish order and create the conditions necessary for a successful active policy. He meant first also to settle accounts with Hungary. That war with Russia, which he did not desire but which he thought possible, needed preparation, and he himself records: 'I have discussed the matter with the German Emperor; the Germans must build up their fortresses in the east.' Francis Ferdinand agreed with William that Rumania and Greece must be held close to the Triple Alliance. His programme was concerned with the day after to-morrow. For the present Francis Joseph was still in the way.

On June 25th, Francis Ferdinand arrived at Ilidže, a watering-place in the neighbourhood of Sarajevo. On June 27th the Emperor proceeded to Ischl. The next day, Sunday, Francis Joseph spent a sunny morning in the park of his summer residence. Shortly after one o'clock came a telegram from the Governor of Bosnia, Potiorek, from Sarajevo. In the course of

his drive round the town the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, together with his wife, had been the object of an outrage not far from the Town Hall in the Appel Quay. The bomb had hit the Archduke's car, glanced off it on to the pavement, and exploded under the wheels of the following carriage. Potiorek's aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel von Merizii, and Count Boos-Waldeck, who were in the carriage, had been injured, the first seriously and the second slightly. The Archduke and his wife, neither of whom had been hurt, shortly afterwards continued the drive to the Town Hall. The Archduke's programme had, in consequence, been cut somewhat short.

On arrival at the Town Hall, Francis Ferdinand remarked to the Mayor of Sarajevo (a remark not reported by Potiorek), 'So in Sarajevo you receive people with bombs.' The Archduke then asked Potiorek if he thought there would be any more bombing. Potiorek was convinced that there was no danger. Francis Ferdinand wished first of all to visit the wounded Lieutenant-Colonel Merizii and then the Museum. He decided to go by the quay, avoiding the middle of the town. But the chauffeur of the Mayor's car which led the way forgot the new order, and took the usual turning into the Franz Joseph Strasse. The Archduke's car, on the left-hand running-board of which Count Harrach stood in a protective attitude, had to wait while the Mayor's car turned round. Then two revolver-shots were heard from the right and the Duchess fell senseless into her husband's arms. The Archduke tried to raise her. The first impression was that the Archduke himself had escaped uninjured, but, as they drove past the Konak, blood flowed from his mouth. At eleven o'clock the doctors arrived. The Archduke had lost consciousness, and ten minutes later he was dead. A priest, hurriedly summoned, attempted to administer extreme unction. Immediately afterwards arrived Archbishop Stadler with a large procession to lead the devotions for the dying. The authors of the outrage—two young Bosnians, both Austrian subjects, Nedeljko Chabrinovich and Gavrilo Princhip—were both taken into custody. The next morning, Monday, June 29th, 1914, at 6 a.m., Francis Joseph returned to Vienna.



## CHAPTER XXXI

### FATEFUL DAYS

**T**HAT Sunday still lives in the memory of the generation of 1914. All Europe trembled, in apprehension or terror, it seemed, confronted by a tragedy from which there was no escape. Reflecting upon the dreadful events of that day, one hardly dares to assert that humanity is the master of its own destiny and makes its own history ; never before had the presence of a power beyond human control been more clearly felt—the presence of the Ghost of War. The Ghost threw its gigantic shadow over the peaceful world of the pigmies. Vienna was empty. The Viennese had trooped off to the neighbouring woods ; they lay and enjoyed the sun on the banks of the Danube or on the grassy forest plains. Berlin, vast and noisy, was making holiday on the surrounding lakes ; railway-stations, landing-stages, race-courses, and open-air cafés were crowded to the full. Paris was rejoicing in the early summer sun. At that moment a quiver of anxiety ran through all the capitals of Europe. Was it to be good-bye to this world of peace ? The quick nerves of the great cities felt the coming earthquake, which reason said could not come. A Prince had been murdered on the extreme edge of European civilization. The deed was repulsive in all its details. Was it possible that the shots of Sarajevo should endanger Europe ? Was Europe still in the Middle Ages ? Were business, capitalism, and socialism no stronger forces than the rivalry of the Powers ? Those who were in the know trembled. Their imaginations showed them tables at which the General Staffs were seated, their hands close to a bell which they only had to ring to call up whole nations to arms. They saw the tremendous apparatus of the Military Commands which were a law to themselves. They saw the whole complex of treaties and armies which had developed in the course of centuries. One of these bells had to be rung and whole armies would be set in motion. The first military train that sped along the lines would determine the fate of Europe.

Europe slept uneasily on the evening of June 28th, 1914. The

Dreadnought *Viribus Unitis* brought the bodies of Francis Ferdinand and his wife to Trieste. At ten o'clock on Thursday evening, July 2nd, they reached the Southern Railway Station in Vienna. They could not be buried in the crypt beneath the Capucin church, where one hundred and thirty-seven members of the Hapsburg family had been laid to rest. Like lightning playing around the bodies of the murdered couple was the peril which threatened millions of men with destruction, but entrance to the little church, beneath whose walls poor women sold fruit by the pennyworth, was restricted by rules which took no account of this world. Before the wooden church door stood Prince Montenuovo as guardian of the Court ceremonial. The domestic rules of the Hapsburg Royal family, rules which had taken shape on Spanish soil, forbade entrance into the Imperial vault to those of lower birth. Logical to the last degree, the Spanish ceremonial came once more and for the last time into play on the grand scale, assigning to the dead couple a funeral of the third class. To complete the dramatic effect, there was a demonstration of the Austrian nobility against the Court and its ceremonial that night. It was a scene from Shakespeare staged by a firm of undertakers. The nobility accompanied the hearse from the Burgring to the Western Railway Station. On the way to Artstetten, as the bodies were being conveyed across the Danube, a heavy tempest broke, and the rising waves threatened to overturn the funeral barge. Francis Ferdinand and his wife were interred to the accompaniment of thunder and lightning.

And what was to happen now? On arrival at Schönbrunn on Monday, the Emperor said to Berchtold that the result of the investigation into the circumstances of the murder must be awaited. He repeated this opinion on Wednesday, July 1st. Berchtold was undecided, and full of doubt when Conrad pressed for a speedy decision.

BERCHTOLD *inquired* : You don't think there will be a revolutionary outbreak?

CONRAD : Where do you mean?

BERCHTOLD : In Bohemia.

CONRAD : You must not indulge such ideas.

On July 5th, Conrad approached the Emperor and told him that war against Serbia was unavoidable. The two discussed it as follows :

FRANCIS JOSEPH : You're quite right, but how can we make war with everybody waiting to jump on us, particularly Russia ?

CONRAD : We have Germany to back us up.

FRANCIS JOSEPH (*with an inquiring look*) : Are you sure of Germany ? [The German Emperor, he recalled, had avoided a clear answer to the question at Kanopischt.] . . . Yesterday evening a note went to Germany asking for a clear answer.

CONRAD : If Germany is on our side, shall we declare war against Serbia ?

FRANCIS JOSEPH : In that case yes, but if Germany does not give a clear answer, what then ? The German Emperor is in the Baltic, and we must in any case wait for his answer.

With these words Francis Joseph retired, and on Tuesday, July 7th, returned to Ischl. After leaving the Emperor, Conrad proceeded to the office of the aide-de-camp, where he met Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe. He said to him : 'If Germany's support is so uncertain, we must ask ourselves if the Alliance can continue. We get no political advantage out of it, and economically Germany has the advantage of it in any case.' On the next day Conrad and Berchtold talked over the views of Francis Joseph.

BERCHTOLD : The German Emperor has said 'Yes,' only he has still to talk the matter over with Bethmann. How will His Majesty take this news ?

CONRAD : If Germany agrees, then His Majesty will approve of war against Serbia.

COUNT FORGÄCH (*who was present*) : The war would be a simple march in, I suppose ?

BERCHTOLD : Tisza is against the war. He is afraid the Rumanians might march into Siebenbürgen. And what will happen in Galicia if we mobilize against Serbia ?

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CONRAD : For the moment we would not mobilize in Galicia ; but if the Russians threaten, then we must mobilize the three corps in Galicia.

On July 7th the fate of Francis Joseph, of the House of Hapsburg, of Austria, of Europe even, was sealed. The Cabinet Council decided, against the single adverse vote of Tisza, 'to address to Serbia such radical demands that refusal on her part can be anticipated, and a solution of the situation will then only be possible by the method of military action.' The five men who took this decision were : the Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold ; the Austrian Prime Minister, Count Stürgkh ; the joint Finance Minister, von Bilinski ; the War Minister, von Krobatin ; and the Chief of General Staff, Baron von Conrad. Berchtold said that there were various ways of putting an end to the alarming conditions in Bosnia, but first it must be considered whether the moment had not come 'to render Serbia harmless in the future by a demonstration of force.' German support was now assured. Russia's policy was aimed at getting the Balkan States and Rumania into her hands for use, ultimately, against the Dual Monarchy. 'A settlement of accounts with Serbia at the right moment' could arrest this process. Later on it would no more be possible. Tisza declared that he would never agree to an attack upon Serbia without previous diplomatic action. The demands addressed to Serbia should be severe, but not impossible to fulfil. It was not Germany's business to judge whether Austria-Hungary should take action against Serbia or not. In his opinion, war at the present moment was not absolutely necessary. Count Stürgkh declared himself doubtful whether Serbia's disruptive manœuvres could be countered otherwise than by warlike methods. 'The psychological situation' was good. German support was assured. It was a matter of detail how the conflict should be opened. The main point was that 'warlike action must be finally decided upon.' Stürgkh brought forward once more his plan of deposing the Karageorgievich dynasty and placing a reliable family on the throne of a diminished Serbia. Bilinski also had no faith save in force ; he said it was the only thing the Serb understood, and that a diplomatic success would make no

impression whatever in Bosnia. The Minister of War, speaking as a soldier, said it would be good to declare war at once rather than later.

Tisza arose once more to urge that if Bulgaria were brought into the Triple Alliance, that would make for a successful Balkan policy. He declared that a European war would be 'a fearful calamity.' After a long discussion about the war, Berchtold summarized the result of the Council : all present except Tisza agreed that unacceptable demands must be addressed to Serbia, so that war would be inevitable. Conrad recalled that he had urged an attack in the years following the annexation, and that the situation would now be less favourable. He added some explanations of the preparations of the General Staff. The report of this decisive Cabinet Meeting of July 7th, 1914, bears the annotation, 'Vienna, August 16th, 1914. I have taken note of the contents of this report. Francis Joseph.' Does this mean that Francis Joseph first took cognizance of this most important document in the history of the World War—this birth certificate of the War, as it might be called—forty-one days after the Cabinet Meeting in question ?

From the day of the Cabinet Meeting, Francis Joseph was at Ischl, where he awaited his Foreign Minister. Tisza asked Berchtold to give the Emperor a memorial in which once more he solemnly warned him against war. At the head of this memorable document stands the sentence : 'Most gracious Majesty. News from Berlin, which is in itself good news, combined with wholly justified indignation at the events in Serbia, have brought all the participants in yesterday's joint Cabinet Council to the view that we should provoke a war with Serbia and settle once and for all with this arch-enemy of the monarchy.'

Tisza informed the Emperor that he could not agree with this plan. With clear understanding of the situation he wrote : 'So far as it is humanly possible to judge, such an attack upon Serbia will provoke the intervention of Russia and, consequently, a World War. Rumania will be on the side of our enemies. Can so hazardous a war as this be lightly entered upon ? . . . Add to these political considerations the fact that the financial and economic situation would immensely add to the difficulties, and

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would render the sacrifices and sufferings of war almost unbearable for the community. After the most conscientious meditation I cannot share in the responsibility for the proposed military aggression against Serbia.' Subsequently he added that he by no means favoured mild acquiescence in the provocation of the Serbs, and would accept all consequences of a war resulting from Serbia rejecting fair demands, but in this case it must be clear to all the world that Austria-Hungary had been obliged to take this course in defence of her just interests. Finally he added : 'I must declare, for the moment only in a personal capacity, that, despite my devotion to Your Majesty's service, or rather because of it, I could not share in the responsibility for a solution which necessarily signifies waging an aggressive war.'

That Berchtold also was uneasy, though for a different motive, is shown in the following conversation on July 8th at 6 p.m. :

BERCHTOLD : What would happen if Serbia went as far as mobilizing, but then retired all along the line ?

CONRAD : Then we should march in.

BERCHTOLD : Yes, but if Serbia did nothing at all ?

CONRAD : We should continue to occupy Serbia until she had paid the costs of the war. When will the ultimatum be sent ?

BERCHTOLD : In a fortnight, on the 22nd July. It would be a good thing if you and the Minister of War were to go away on holiday, so as to preserve the appearance that there is nothing particular up.

The same day the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, General Wladimir Giesl, visited Conrad. On the day of the assassination he had been at Vichy, whence he had dashed to Vienna on receiving the news of the fatal event. In his Memoirs he records that Berchtold, in his conversation of July 6th, had clearly spoken against war. Conrad, in favour of whose reliability it must be said that he never touched up his Memoirs to make them fit in with the subsequent catastrophe, remarks with reference to Giesl's visit : 'On July 8th our Minister in Belgrade,

Baron Giesl, visited me. He told me that there was quite a new tone in the Foreign Office. He had talked to Berchtold and Macchio. He said that Serbia would not accept our demands, and that there would be war, for which the moment was highly propitious. I replied, "Hardly so propitious as all that, but what we must not do is to make demands and then go back on them." Giesl remarked that the German Emperor stood surety for Rumania. I said: "If we have to count on Russian intervention we had best leave them no time to prepare." After Giesl had left me I remarked to a few intimate friends that, as one might expect, none of those in charge had any clear views.'

The same day Giesl left Vienna, and arrived on July 10th in Belgrade. Hartwig, the Russian Minister, immediately asked him to discuss matters. The conversation is recorded in Giesl's Memoirs. 'I ask you,' said Hartwig, 'as an honest friend, to tell me, so far as you can, what is Austria-Hungary going to do about Serbia, and what has been decided in Vienna?' Giesl answered that the Austro-Hungarian Government would demand that full light be thrown upon the circumstances of the crime. If it were proved that Serbia had no share in the murder, then 'nobody would think of seeking to make Serbia or her Government responsible.' If it were proved that the Archduke had been the victim of a definite organization, then Serbia would have to punish the guilty and to assist in disbanding the organization. Giesl concluded: 'I can assure you that Serbia's sovereignty will not be violated, and that if Serbia shows some measure of goodwill the crisis can be overcome in a manner satisfactory to both parties.' Was he speaking the truth? Hartwig answered: 'Many thanks. I am much relieved. But once more, as a friend, there is something I want to ask you.' At this moment words failed him. He fell backwards and tumbled to the ground. He was placed on a sofa, unconscious, and a doctor, who was immediately called, could only certify his death. 'There followed,' Giesl writes, 'painful and trying scenes. The daughter of the Minister, accompanied by the Secretary of the Russian Legation, showed by her suspicious gestures that she had come to my house under the suggestion of a fantastic suspicion. She smelt the bottle of eau-de-Cologne, while her companion occupied himself with

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cigarette ends, and asked me if the Minister had had anything to eat or drink.'

On July 9th, Berchtold visited the Kaiser at Ischl, bringing Tisza's letter with him. After his return to Vienna he related that the Emperor was 'resolute and unperturbed,' and seemed to approve of action against Serbia, though he was concerned lest there should be disturbances in Hungary. Baron Burián had gone to Budapest to use his influence with Tisza.

On July 10th, Herr von Wiesner, a Foreign Office official, proceeded to Sarajevo to determine the causes of the outrage, but above all to establish whether the Serbian Government was in any way responsible. On July 13th, he sent Berchtold a long telegram containing the following words on the main question at issue: 'Connivance of the Serbian Government in the Assassination Plot, or in its preparation, or in supplying the weapons, is neither proved nor even suggested by any evidence. There are, on the contrary, sound reasons for supposing the opposite.' He further telegraphed: 'It is proved beyond doubt that the bombs came from the Serbian Military Museum at Kraguyevach, but there is no evidence that they were recently taken thence, since they may easily have come from the stores of the Comitajis in the late war.'

More copious and precise details about the organization of the crime have later become known, but at the time when Wiesner summarized the results of the inquiry there was no other foundation in law for the accusation against Serbia. Wiesner's conclusions, which later knowledge has rectified but not essentially reversed, did not avail to alter the intentions of the Cabinet Council. On July 19th the final text of the Note to Serbia was fixed. The decision was taken by the same men who had voted the resolution of July 7th, but with one great exception. The resolution to deliver to Serbia on July 23rd, at 5 p.m., in Belgrade, a Note containing demands which it was thought Serbia could not accept received a unanimous vote. Ministers and generals all agreed to it; not only Berchtold, Stürgkh, Bilinski, Krobatin, and Conrad, but also Tisza.

What had happened to make Tisza give up his resistance to the proposed war? He had warned the Emperor in language which seemed to spring from an unshakable moral conviction.



After the most conscientious meditation, he had said he felt bound to refuse responsibility for military aggression against Serbia. Only if Austria-Hungary could manage matters so that the sword was drawn 'in defence of just interests' could he appease his conscience ; but even in that case he would have to warn the Emperor of the sacrifices and sufferings which war would entail. Tisza himself never explained how he had been converted from convinced opposition to the policy of Conrad and Berchtold, to accepting it and supporting it in the War Council. The letters he has left show a Tisza already converted. Perhaps later he would have spoken, but his mouth was sealed for ever when he fell to an assassin's shot in 1919. The reasons for Tisza's conversion must be sought in what knowledge we have of the facts. He gave his consent to the war policy in the meeting of July 19th only after he had extracted an undertaking, against which Berchtold protested, that 'the action against Serbia was unconnected with any plan of conquest, and that no Serbian territory would be annexed.' This does not alone suffice to explain the sacrifice of a deeply held conviction, which one must suppose sprang straight from the moral sense of the Calvinist Tisza. In this world of courtiers and half-believers, Tisza was, in his way, a man of character, perhaps the only one. But he was also a practical politician and a Hungarian patriot. The situation after July 7th proved to him that Austria's resolution to make war on Serbia could not be changed ; if his letter had not changed the Emperor's mind it would be useless to try other means. He had to decide whether it would be more sensible and useful to abide by his own conviction, or to give his support to a policy he could not prevent, and to protect the interests of Hungary. A less active man, with an eye to the judgement of posterity, would have chosen the first way. He would have kept his intellectual conscience clear, and would have ensured himself the esteem of later generations by repeating the words of Marcus Aurelius, 'Misfortune, take thy course.' But Tisza could not stand on one side. He must have said to himself that this was a mistake which they were embarking upon, a foolish, precarious, and perilous line of action, but that, even so, he would do what it lay in his power to do.

Tisza was fortified in this decision by the action of Germany.

This point in the history of the Triple Alliance was the climax of the German tragedy. Since 1908, Germany had subordinated her relations with Austria to the dictates of practical reason. When Aehrenthal undertook the annexation, she did not desert Austria, but thereby scored a diplomatic victory over Russia. Thereafter, however, she did not concur in Austria's Balkan policy. Kiderlen, with his sharp mind and strong views, would never have allowed the fortunes or misfortunes of the German Empire to be dependent on the policy of Vienna. He had no use for this kind of prestige policy; moreover, he did not agree with Austria's aims—the throttling of Serbia and the favouring of Bulgaria. Germany's reserve and disagreement with Austria on Balkan questions were regarded in Vienna as signs of weakness, indecision, and unreliability. Such reproaches were levelled at Germany after 1912. Conrad addressed them to the German Emperor twice: first at the manœuvres, and then, in 1913, before the Völkerschlacht Memorial.

In the decisive days of 1914, William II stood alone. Bethmann was no diplomat. Jagow, head of the Foreign Office since Kiderlen's death, was on his honeymoon, and did not return to Berlin till July 6th. The German Ambassador in Vienna, Tschirschky, received no instructions after the assassination, and took it to be his duty to follow the usual course. He wrote to Berlin: 'I take every occasion to deliver quiet but emphatic and serious warnings against hasty measures.' He did not know that in Berlin the practical policy of calm reason had been given up in favour of an unpractical policy of sentiment. The Emperor wrote impulsively in comment upon Tschirschky's dispatch: 'How foolish of him! Who gave him such instructions? It's nothing to do with him if Austria does what she thinks best. Then, if things go amiss, we shall be told that Germany had stood in the way. Tschirschky had better drop this nonsense.'

There is no longer really any secret about what happened in Berlin between June 30th and July 7th, 1914. The change is clearly expressed in Emperor William's marginal note: 'It must not be said again that Germany stood in the way.' William's decision was taken on grounds of sentiment, but it was

a clear and definite decision, and was given to Vienna in this form. This was what Vienna had expected—that is to say, Francis Joseph, Berchtold, and Conrad. Whoever in Vienna was still undecided now made up his mind on the strength of Berlin's decision. Francis Joseph was loud in his thanks. He had found courage to take the great risk. He said to Conrad that there could be no change now, 'if only out of consideration for the German Emperor.' William, fearing a reproach that he had once more been weak, had decided to say yes ; Francis Joseph, unsure and irresolute, took spirit from this answer.

## CHAPTER XXXII

### THE WAR

ON Thursday, July 23rd, at 6 p.m., the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade, Baron Giesl, handed Austria's Note to Serbia. The terms were very severe. Serbia's complicity in the assassination at Sarajevo was taken as proved. Austria demanded a declaration by the Serbian Government deploring the criminal act, and threatening with severe punishment any one who conducted propaganda against Austria. This declaration, the Note demanded, must be published on the front page of the Belgrade Government organ and conveyed to the Serbian army in a Royal Order of the Day.

The Note further required the Serbian Government to dissolve the great national union 'Narodna Obrana,' to take measures against all teachers and officers who had agitated against Austria, and to eliminate from school manuals all traces of anti-Austrian sentiment. Finally, Austria insisted that the inquiry into the crime and the suppression of pan-Serb propaganda must be supervised by the Austrian police. The Serbian Government could have forty-eight hours in which to think the matter over. There could be no middle way; either Serbia must accept unconditionally, or relations would be broken off.

Berchtold held the Note back three days. On July 19th it had been definitely approved by the Cabinet, and within twenty-four hours sanctioned by Francis Joseph. Not till July 23rd did the German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, receive a copy. On the same day, Poincaré and the French Foreign Minister, Viviani, took ship from Kronstadt, outside Petersburg. And on the same day, simultaneously with the presentation of the Note in Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in the European capitals were instructed to bring the Note to the attention of the Powers. Was it Berchtold's fear of raising objections in Berlin that made him withhold the text of the Note from Tschirschky, or was he concerned to spare Germany the appearance of being responsible for the Note?

Was he waiting for Poincaré's departure from Petersburg? Be that as it may, there was now no time for discussion: a decision had to be made within a few hours.

On Saturday, July 25th, at five minutes to six, the Serbian Prime Minister, Pashich, entered the Austrian Legation at Belgrade, bringing with him Serbia's answer. He informed the Austrian Minister, Baron von Giesl: 'We have accepted some of your demands; for the rest we rely on your loyalty and chivalry.' Giesl glanced at the reply. It was not an unconditional acceptance: two points remained in dispute. At five minutes past six the conversation was concluded, and at half-past six Giesl left Belgrade. The station was cordoned by troops, and the departure was accomplished in all haste. As the train containing Giesl and the employees of the Austrian Legation moved out of the station, Serbian officers shouted after it: '*Au revoir à Budapest.*' At the frontier station at Semlin, Giesl was called to the telephone. It was Tisza speaking. 'Can nothing be done?' he asked.

At 9.23 the General Staff received Francis Joseph's order to mobilize against Serbia and Montenegro. Eight corps—half the Imperial army—were called up. Serbia mobilized her whole army. Austria was going to war. Since 1866 the word 'war' had not been heard in its practical significance. The generation which would have to fight knew war only from books. The word called up associations of old names and pictures of romantic battles. Even Königgrätz, the greatest event in Austrian history, had been decided in six hours. Would war still be the same as then? Would battalions storm with unfurled flags? Would cavalry attack to the sound of martial music through the smoke of gunpowder? In Vienna, Hapsburg military romanticism revived. To the tones of 'Prince Eugène' crowds gathered round the statue of the hero who had once stormed the city and fortress of Belgrade. Enthusiastic scenes took place round the Radetzky Memorial. Budapest hoisted the Hungarian colours. But Prague remained quiet. A single procession, accompanied by patriotic music, was too obviously watched over and guided by the Prague political police for any one to mistake it for a spontaneous demonstration. Austria, called to arms, knew virtually nothing of what was happening.

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Count Stürgkh kept the Parliament closed. The newspapers were not allowed to announce the mobilization of half the army. From the evening of July 25th they were under strict war censorship. The official reports told nothing of the change of public opinion in London and Paris. After the Sarajevo murders there had been a certain sympathy in these capitals for Austria in her quandary. But now that had changed. London opinion was set by Sir Edward Grey with his remark that he had never yet seen a Note like Austria's. France and Russia asked England to make her position clear, saying that if England showed she had made up her mind, then Germany would retreat. But Grey feared that such a declaration would be in the nature of a threat. He sought to mediate, proposing to the German Ambassador joint action by the four Powers. To the Italian Ambassador he said that he thought Austria could have adequate satisfaction. If Russia pointed the way, Serbia would have to bow to necessity. Bethmann, attentive to the news from London, advised Berchtold to accept British mediation. Emperor William remarked, on seeing the Serbian answer: 'I would certainly not have mobilized on the strength of this. Giesl could perfectly well have remained in Belgrade.' The opinion was excellent but valueless now that William, by his show of resolution, had determined Francis Joseph and Berchtold to make war.

On July 27th, Francis Joseph declared war on Serbia. Now there was no more drawing back. Germany, having expressly allowed Austria all liberty of action, was herself caught in the net of Vienna policy. On July 29th the *Wiener Zeitung* published Francis Joseph's proclamation 'to my Peoples.' This proclamation was the last essay in the grand style to be penned in the Vienna Foreign Office. 'I have weighed and considered everything. With a clear conscience I follow the way which duty points out to me.' The arguments and the style belong to the *ancien régime*, but Gentz knew how to do it better. On the same day Berchtold asked Conrad: 'What do you think? Can we hold out financially? Stürgkh thinks that if Russia comes in we couldn't hold out.' Conrad replied that it was too late for such thoughts.

Was it really too late? Russia was mobilizing, but secretly.

Bethmann, recognizing the danger from England, had refused Berchtold's request that the German Chargé d'Affaires should hand the Austrian declaration of war to Serbia. Berchtold had to send it as a public telegram by way of Bucharest, since the communications between Vienna and Belgrade were already cut. Bethmann's last attempt to recommend 'with all urgency and emphasis' that Berchtold should accept British mediation, a recommendation which he placed in the mouth of the German Ambassador in Vienna, remained without success. Berchtold, Krobatin, and Conrad conveyed this almost threatening advice to the Emperor on July 30th at Schönbrunn, whence he had returned at midday from Ischl. Francis Joseph became thoughtful, and asked what, in this case, could be demanded of Serbia. The conversation continued as follows :

BERCHTOLD : Acceptance of the ultimatum word for word, and payment of all costs resulting from the mobilization.

CONRAD : We should also have to demand territorial concessions to strengthen our military position. We should require Schabatz, with adjoining territory, for fortifications, the costs to be carried by Serbia.

FRANCIS JOSEPH : They would never agree to that.

BERCHTOLD : Tisza will not consent.

CONRAD : We must tell Germany straight out that we cannot defer hostilities. If Russia mobilizes, we must mobilize also.

BERCHTOLD : That costs millions.

CONRAD : The monarchy is at stake.

It was the last possibility of reconsidering the situation. Francis Joseph decided that the war against Serbia must continue. Conrad comments as follows upon this meeting : 'Thus the Emperor Francis Joseph, at what was perhaps the most difficult moment of his life, undertook in a spirit of deep seriousness and quiet resolution a step of which he clearly foresaw the consequences, but equally clearly saw the inevitability. Meanwhile it seemed that the Emperor William was contemplating a retreat, since the sentiments of Berlin had changed with Italy's desertion.' 'Retreat' is a military word misused in

this connection. Germany now realized for the first time that Austria's war against Serbia would inevitably bring about the Great War, the World War, with England on the side of Russia. And she saw that Italy and Rumania were on the point of turning their backs on Germany and Austria.

At the same time as he urgently advised Vienna to accept British mediation, Bethmann had directed a new warning to Russia, this time in clear language : If Russia did not stop mobilizing, Germany would mobilize. On the strength of this threat, Nicholas II was persuaded on July 29th to order general mobilization in the whole Russian Empire. During the night, when the telegraphists were beginning to tap out the mobilization decree, the Emperor William's telegram to the Tsar arrived. The German Emperor appealed to his friend's love of peace. Nicholas II ordered the telegraphists to halt in their work of alarming the whole Empire. But the next morning Sazonov arranged that the mobilization against Austria should remain unrevoked. On July 30th, at 8 p.m., Francis Joseph received a telegram from the Emperor William informing him that he 'had not thought it possible to refuse a personal request from the Russian Emperor that he should undertake an attempt at mediation.' But a few hours later, on Friday, July 31st, at 8 a.m., Moltke wired to Vienna, 'Russia is still mobilizing. Mobilize immediately against Russia. Germany will mobilize.' Berchtold could not understand the contradiction between the two telegrams. He exclaimed : 'That's queer. Who rules in Berlin, Moltke or Bethmann ?'

This really was the question in Berlin. At the Council in Potsdam on July 29th the German Emperor had decided for Bethmann against the German General Staff. Bethmann desired to avoid anything which could make Germany appear the aggressor. But the chain of decisions and counter-decisions could not be undone so long as the first link held fast. This link was Austria's war against Serbia. In the night of July 29th-30th the Tsar did all that lay in his power to save the peace. At this moment, when all hope was vain, he still thought of bringing the dispute before the Hague Tribunal. In his honourable struggle against the General Staff, against Sazonov, and against the Grand Duke Nikolaevich, he was



defeated. The mobilization against Austria was put through. This was the second link in the chain which brought about the Great War. It was of no avail that Bethmann sought to avoid the rôle of aggressor. The German General Staff saw more clearly. Bethmann's effort to take only defensive and protective measures would interfere with the German plan of attack, the only plan Germany had. The German General Staff had planned the war on two fronts in the belief that the western enemy could be crushed before Russia's full force was in the field. It was a plan calculated by days and hours. But Russia had actually been mobilizing for some days. Even if it were true that Russia's mobilization was only directed against Austria, which was hard to suppose, even then Germany must mobilize, according to the terms of the Alliance. The fears of the German General Staff were quite reasonable. The Staff thought more clearly than Bethmann.

War still seemed inevitable; nothing had happened to change this expectation. Austria proceeded with the campaign against Serbia. The capture of Belgrade without war against Serbia was, as Conrad remarked, impossible. Therefore, Russia also continued to mobilize. Willham's mediation availed nothing. Germany was pledged to mobilize. To act as Bethmann desired in such a way as to avoid all appearance of being the attacking party would have meant that the German General Staff should wait until Austria declared she had been attacked by Russia. But this condition was fulfilled at the moment when Austria replied to Russian mobilization with a counter-mobilization on her own part. So long as Austria did not mobilize against Russia, Germany could not mobilize. This was the terrible anxiety of the German General Staff, which saw war coming inevitably upon it, and was obliged to sit still with folded hands while the Russian military trains began to rattle along the lines. That is why Moltke telegraphed to Vienna: 'Mobilize against Russia.'

Berchtold could not understand the contradiction between Bethmann's and Moltke's telegrams. From Moltke's urgent words he gathered only that Germany was determined to fulfil the terms of the Alliance. There had been some reason to doubt it. On July 31st, after Francis Joseph had handed him

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William's telegram, he had summoned Conrad and said to him : 'I asked you to come because I had the impression that Germany was weakening.' Meanwhile, however, Moltke's telegram had come, so that he added : 'I now have received, however, the most reassuring announcement from the highest military quarters.' Berchtold went to the Emperor to request an order for general mobilization. But Conrad still could not understand Moltke. He had told Berlin that Austria would not begin war against Russia, but wait till she was attacked. Moltke, offended, replied on July 31st : 'Is Austria going to leave Germany in the lurch ?' No, Austria would not do that. Berchtold had meanwhile obtained the order for mobilization against Russia from the Emperor. On the very day when Moltke addressed his anxious question to Vienna, on Friday, July 31st, at 12.23 p.m., the Imperial Ministry of War received the Emperor's order for general mobilization, and immediately issued it. Conrad's hesitation and confusion sprang from the fundamental mistake in his calculations, which proved fatal to Austria : the supposition that war could be made against Serbia without war against Russia.

At the same moment when this mistake in the calculations was shown up in Vienna erroneous ideas were also corrected in Berlin. When the Emperor William learned that the Tsar had succumbed, and when he read Grey's plain warning, his temper rose. He saw in both the evidence of an intentional deceit practised against Germany ; he felt himself encircled and betrayed. Henceforward he would know nothing of mediation and nothing of Bethmann's anxious care for appearances. Now the General Staff was given liberty to make decisions. William II telegraphed to Emperor Francis Joseph on the afternoon of July 31st : 'I have to-day ordered preliminary mobilization of my whole army and navy, upon which total mobilization will immediately follow. . . . In the great struggle before us it is of high importance that Austria should direct her main forces against Russia, and not weaken herself by diverting part of them to an attack on Serbia.'

The German Emperor now sent an ultimatum to Petersburg demanding cancellation of the Russian mobilization order. On the afternoon of August 1st, Francis Joseph replied to the Ger-

man Emperor with the words : 'My dear friend, I thank you for your deeply reassuring information. In this grave hour I am united with you, and pray God that He will grant victory to our Allied Armies in their fight for a good cause.' An hour later Moltke's telegram arrived in Vienna : 'His Majesty has ordered mobilization against Russia.' The diplomatic preliminaries to the Great War, so far as they are known to history, were not yet concluded. Germany, tied to her plan of attack, had to make a formal declaration of war on Russia so as to justify the march through Belgium. Now came the great struggle of public opinion in England and France, the fight for appearances. In truth, the Great War had become inevitable from the moment of the first mobilization.

Conrad, in his *Memoirs*, strongly opposes the view that the Emperor Francis Joseph had been 'a shadowy figure, an old man without a will of his own,' in these decisive days, or that he had 'been dragged unawares into the decision to make war.' Conrad says it was not so, and Conrad is right. Francis Joseph had not at first desired or planned to settle accounts with Serbia by way of war. This is proved by historical evidence. Yet after many hours of doubt and anxiety he had finally agreed to the war project, and from the time of the Cabinet decision of July 7th until the end he had held fast to his decision. At the time when the war plan first took shape, Francis Joseph appears as the coolest judge of the risk in the circle of his advisers. But he still showed in these last years one of his early traits. He treated the great Empire as his domestic property, the State as his family domain, and he based his decisions on considerations of private morality. Only one who viewed the affairs of State in a purely personal light could coin such an expression as the following, with which Francis Joseph took leave of Austria : 'If the monarchy must fall to the ground, let it at least fall honourably.' Such might be the words of a nobleman seeing his own life at stake. They are altogether out of keeping with the thoughts of the times ; nay, they are even far from the statesmanlike wisdom with which Francis Joseph's great predecessors, Ferdinand II, Charles VI, Maria Theresa, and his own grandfather, sustained by the guidance of Metternich, had survived difficult times.

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It was not a mere pose, this hint of Francis Joseph's that the end was at hand. As before, he continued to order his daily work with the precision of a clock. The war only added to the number of documents which had to be read and decided upon. At eighty-four years of age the Emperor let this work wholly absorb him. When Conrad left for the war the Emperor said to him: 'God grant that all may go well, but even if it goes badly I shall carry on.' Such were his words as a soldier. Alone or among his old attendants his attitude was less determined. Even Germany's victories could not give him confidence. The task which had fallen to the lot of the Austrian army was too hard. The basis of the Serbian project was to have been quick action and an irreversible decision at arms. Mobilization was to follow on the ultimatum. Russia had at this time not made up her mind, so Conrad ordered partial mobilization against Serbia and Montenegro. Now difficulties arose out of this. The minor mobilization had to be diverted into the attack against Russia. The larger plan of campaign required, at any rate to begin with, no more than a line of defence towards Serbia. But Conrad had approved of an offensive campaign. It was thought that an Austrian victory in Serbia would influence Rumania's and Italy's attitude.

The Commander-in-Chief of the forces attacking Serbia, General Potiorek, had two armies at his disposal: the Fifth and the Sixth. The Second Army, also located in the south-east, was to proceed to Galicia. Potiorek's attack went badly, and he demanded the Second Army. Conrad could not agree, but the Emperor and Berchtold supported Potiorek. Conrad managed to secure his point about the Second Army, but the Emperor appointed Potiorek Commander-in-Chief in the Balkans, and left him completely independent of Conrad. 'This decision,' Conrad remarked on August 21st, 'was a fearful blow to me.' It proved also to be a mistake. Potiorek was once more defeated by the Serbs.

About this time Tisza wrote to the Emperor: 'I should be afraid of exaggerating the significance of these very unfortunate occurrences, were it not that errors have occurred which, if repeated, would have disastrous consequences.' Tisza related these errors one by one. 'In the vital forces of the army and the

people we have the promise of victory. But unskilful leadership has already wasted fine elements of these forces, and all may be lost unless the supreme War Lord speaks a word of authority and restores order.' Warnings like this came from others as well as Tisza, and still further depressed the despondent spirits at Schonbrunn. A reflection of this depression appears in the letters addressed from time to time by the head of Francis Joseph's Military Chancellery, Baron von Bolfras, to Conrad. Francis Joseph's thoughts went back to 1859 and 1866. On September 11th, 1914, the campaign in Galicia also ended with failure for the Austrian Forces. The whole army had to be brought behind the Save and there re-organized. Two days before this the order for retreat had been issued on the Marne.

The enormous difficulties of a war on three fronts were not realized at Schönbrunn, and the efforts of the army were not properly appreciated. Conrad was compelled to remove from their posts the commanders of armies, divisions, and corps which had not obtained their objectives. All these details mounted up in the Emperor's study to form a picture of gloomy foreboding, as can be seen in the following letter from Bolfras to Conrad: 'Allow me to draw your attention for a moment to the many difficulties which beset us here. . . . Our People have shown themselves loyal and ready for sacrifice beyond all expectations. Cannot the Supreme Command refrain from needlessly deceiving them, as is happening to such an absurd degree? . . . Public opinion is amazed and delighted at the German victories, but distressed at the meagre information about our own alleged successes. The unfortunate events in the Fifth Army have given great moral, if not practical, importance to this front, as one can realize if one knows, as I do, that the whole Twenty-first Division of the Landwehr has been placed under *Standrecht*. . . . Berchtold now thinks that every chance of winning the Balkan States for our cause is lost. . . . From all the impressions which we receive we form the conviction that we are being over-hasty in all our movements and tactics. Instead of slowly but surely fighting our way forward, we make heroic and often rash forward rushes, and suffer enormous and scarcely replaceable losses. Are these the results

of years of careful preparation?' Conrad's self-confidence must have suffered severely from such reproaches, which were, however, to some extent justified. Conrad was too much occupied with general plans of campaign to pay attention to the details of practical warfare. But which of the fighting armies of 1914 was not in the same difficulties? The Austrian General Staff however had, since 1909, been agitating for war. Its plight was the worst now, when the art of war, as the staff knew it, broke down in face of the tasks of the war. It had to justify itself and to explain the reasons for the removal of so many commanders from their posts. 'The removal of all these commanders from their posts is the worst part of the story,' wrote Conrad to Bolfras. 'Events are taking a shape which I should hardly have thought possible. . . . Take this instance: when the unfortunate Third Army, after the check at Przemyślany, tried to re-organize itself at Lemberg, the Twenty-third Division was placed at Kulikow to protect the north wing. During the night a few shots created panic, and the whole Division retreated in a scramble to Lemberg, where it had to be re-assembled on the Janow drill ground. The divisional commander and both the brigade commanders left their units, went to an hotel, and can hardly yet be fished out of their beds. In such circumstances it is impossible to make even a half-certain calculation. Only those who have had to do it understand what it means to work with an instrument which breaks in your hand.'

That is the language of the Chief of General Staff writing to the Emperor's Military Chancellery. The commander at the front complains of the army at his disposal, his 'instrument.' Against whom did he level the reproach? Was it not part of Conrad's duty to know in all its details the army which he desired to lead to war? Conrad is quick with such reproaches. He often speaks like a spoiled leading lady who tries to put the fault on others after a bad performance. He will not give just recognition to the victories of the Germans, which he attributes to the feeble resistance of the French, while he himself has to deal with Russians. The way in which he describes the failure of certain commanders in this letter to Bolfras—that is, to the Emperor—as indicating a defect in the

whole instrument, is an injustice against his own army, which, in spite of bad leadership, showed a wonderful resistance on the greater part of the Front.

It looks as though with such complaints Conrad desired to anticipate the disappointment which must all too soon be felt at Schönbrunn, and by Berchtold and Tisza. Tisza tried to rouse these sinking spirits, writing to Berchtold : 'Nobody must show the smallest sign of hesitation or fear ; above all no such sign must be marked by our German friends.' But in his heart he was lamenting his moment of weakness.

In November 1914 matters had reached such a point that Berchtold was considering replacing Conrad by another general ; and perhaps not only Berchtold. Tisza was asked for his view, and answered that it was a serious dilemma. 'Even if the Supreme Command were vested in some one who gave less cause for annoyance than Conrad, yet the position is such that there would still be much malevolent criticism against the commander-in-chief. If you remove divisional and corps commanders from their posts by dozens, you cannot be surprised if every one who is discontented with the present results of the war demands your own removal. . . . Actually Conrad has made one fatal mistake—that of launching an offensive against Serbia in August. Apart from that I know of no other gross blunder. . . . Certainly the fact that he is a *mauvais coucheur* does not help matters.'

Conrad was aware of the growing discontent, and wrote to Bolfras : 'Should responsibility for the regrettable turn of events be laid upon me, then naturally I accept any decision with complete resignation.' Conrad's defence, in which he made the German Command responsible for the failure in Galicia, showed that Tisza's judgement was right. It was not calculated to promote unity of the Allies. 'Thanks to the total blindness of the German Command to the supreme aim of the war,' Conrad wrote, 'it has come about that our 526 battalions are faced with 752 Russian battalions. Germany must make up her mind if she is going to intervene immediately at our side or let us be bled to death.' Bolfras answered, 'You can well imagine the feelings with which I convey to our Supreme Master Emperor William's triumphant telegrams ! . . . When

shall we make up our minds to talk plain German with our present Allies ?' On September 15th, 1914, however, Francis Joseph was in a position to write to the German Emperor : 'My Supreme Command informs me that you have decided to send nine of your divisions to Galicia. I am delighted at the news.'

All wars waged by coalitions occasion reproaches, jealousies, and hatreds between the Allies. The Commanders in the field are more subject to human failings than one could guess from looking at their portraits in military museums. The war of 1914 was no more an exception to this rule than the war of 1813 ; but within Austria a conflict broke out between the military command and the directors of foreign policy. Berchtold could not resign himself to the idea that the Balkan campaign should remain a side-show in the Great War. He needed a success at arms in Serbia to make an impression upon Austria's hostile neighbours, and his egotistic outlook now severed him from the man with whom so far he had proceeded pace by pace up to the decisive moment—Conrad. When he addressed to Conrad on September 22nd, 1914, the question : 'At what date must we be prepared for a Russian march upon Vienna and Budapest ?' Berchtold was speaking, not only as Minister of the Imperial House, stricken with anxiety, but also as one disappointed in a commander of whom great things had been expected. Berchtold observed to the Chief of General Staff that some two weeks would be required for 'the necessary removals and transportations, if they were to be accomplished in time ; the first necessity would be the removal of the Imperial residence.' Was such a move seriously contemplated at Schönbrunn ? If so, it would have had to be a move into Germany, for Innsbruck, the traditional refuge of the Court, was as much menaced from the south as Vienna and Budapest from the east. But matters did not reach this point. At the most critical moment of the war, after the autumn campaign in Galicia of 1914, the Russian advance in the Carpathians was held up by the Second and Third Reserves.

No history has been written of this most tragic but most heroic fight of the old Austria at bay. The daily staff reports spoke of brigades and regiments without revealing that these were units of the old Austrian Territorial Reserves. Many of



these regiments were made up of men whose national sentiment went out to territories on the other side of the front ; yet in this winter campaign a generation of elderly men gave their lives for the Empire. The reports from the front lifted the veil from the face of the war even for those in the Court. 'Mars has become gluttonous,' wrote Bolfras to Conrad, 'war used to be a chivalrous duel, now it is a murderous butchery.' Francis Joseph's old general was obsessed with pictures of the romantic war of 1866.

The results of the decision of July 7th, 1914, could not be undone. The ideas which had brought about the war still flourished. Despite the anxious situation in the north, the offensive war against Serbia was continued. Considerations of prestige, and the desire to make a present of the fortress of Belgrade to the Emperor on the anniversary of his accession to the throne, induced the commander of the Balkan army, General Potiorek, to make a hasty attack. Belgrade was captured, but had to be given up again after three days. The retreat across the Danube was in all appearance a flight. Tisza wrote to the Emperor : 'The evacuation of Belgrade obliges me respectfully to point out the full gravity of the situation. If we were obliged to evacuate Schabatz and Belgrade, it seems doubtful whether we shall be able to resist a further Serbian attack. . . . But a new victorious advance of the enemy into the territory of the monarchy would be a catastrophe, if only for its effect upon waiting and watching Rumania.' To Berchtold he wrote : 'The evacuation is another of those events which makes it very hard for us responsible leaders to do our duty. . . . What is to happen to those responsible for it ? I do not accept the theory that after every unsuccessful campaign the commander should be moved from his post. A change of command, especially when it means bringing an altogether new man to a post where he knows neither his own troops, nor the enemy, nor the country, has much to be said against it.'

So Potiorek remained, but the days of the 'responsible leader' to whom Tisza wrote these lines, Count Berchtold, were numbered. It was Tisza himself, now Francis Joseph's most influential adviser, who brought down the Foreign Minister. Occasion arose during the struggle over Italy's neutrality. Ger-

many, when informed of Italian opinions and intentions by the trustworthy dispatches of Prince Bülow, urged Austria to negotiate with Italy, and to dissuade the hesitating ex-Ally from swinging over to the enemy, by making over to Italy the Italian part of South Tyrol. In face of the danger of having to stand up against yet another foe, Berchtold lost his nerve. Tisza advised the Emperor for the moment to refuse any negotiation. He wrote to Berchtold: 'Herr von Tschirschky's statement of January 4th, 1915, removes the veil from the intrigues of Prince Bülow. At the worst possible moment the Italians are incited to advance their claims to the Trentino. I urgently beg you to speak seriously to the Germans, and remind them that the solemn declaration of our Supreme Lord, that he would not voluntarily give up any portion of our own territory, was taken note of by Emperor William himself.'

On January 11th the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, the Duke of Avarna, invited Berchtold to open a discussion. 'The previous day,' Tisza reports, 'I lunched with Tschirschky at Berchtold's, as I wanted to have a go at the German Ambassador, and to persuade him that Bülow's tactics were mistaken and dangerous. After lunch the three of us had a long conversation, in which Tschirschky began on a harsh and overbearing note, which he only modified after a few emphatic remarks from me. The King<sup>1</sup> was waiting for me, so that I had only just time to call Berchtold into the other room and to tell him that, despite all my sympathy for him, I should be obliged to say to His Majesty that, at the present moment, I considered the post of Foreign Minister should be occupied by a man of greater decision, who followed out his own policy with more consequence and energy. Berchtold replied smiling, as was his custom, like a good child: "I shall be very thankful if you really do say it, for I am always saying it, but he won't believe me. He will believe you." I informed His Majesty that Berchtold, despite all his praiseworthy and attractive qualities, was not the man for the present task. I insisted that I was fulfilling a very unpleasant duty, but that I could not delay it any longer without neglect of duty. His Majesty was not surprised, but answered: "I have often thought the same thing, but I do not know if the only man

<sup>1</sup> For Hungarians Francis Joseph was 'King,' not Emperor.

who can succeed him can be spared from Budapest." I answered that in my view I must remain in Budapest, but that there was someone altogether suited for the post. "Who?" inquired His Majesty. He did not seem altogether convinced when I named "Burián". A day later Francis Joseph again questioned Tisza. 'Do you still hold the view that you cannot leave Budapest?' Tisza replied that he did, whereupon the Emperor agreed to appoint Baron Burián as Minister of Foreign Affairs. On January 13th, 1915, Count Berchtold took leave of the Ministry in the Ballhausplatz, and Baron Burián, the friend of Tisza, took over his work as the executive organ of Tisza's policy.

The fact that Berchtold was removed from office through Tisza's agency fits logically into the last chapter of the history of Francis Joseph. Before the last decision to make war in June 1914, Tisza was the doubter who issued warnings; Berchtold was the man of bold encouragements. Now it was Berchtold who shrank from plunging still farther ahead, while the resolute Tisza pushed him out of the way. At first, however, this change in the post of Foreign Minister did not have the effect which Tisza desired. Germany did not easily yield to Tisza's arguments. She sent Prince Wedel to Vienna with instructions to assist the Bavarian diplomat, Count Podewil, in overcoming Tisza's obstinacy. Germany saw that it would require a sacrifice to keep Italy out of the war. She feared an irruption of the Italian forces into Tyrol, with danger to Bavaria and Munich. On January 18th, Prince Wedel visited Emperor Francis Joseph. The Emperor had asked for the opinion of the War Minister whether Austria was in a position to beat off an attack on Tyrol; General Krobatin had given the answer that the men were not lacking, but that arms were insufficient. None the less, Francis Joseph refused to take into consideration proposals of mediation, and was supported by Burián and Stürgkh. But in March, when the Austrian Embassy also reported from Rome that Italy was undoubtedly determined to make war, Burián notified the Italian Ambassador in Vienna that he would like to negotiate with respect to compensation for Italy. Burián offered South Tyrol, with a reasonably generous frontier, but Italy demanded the frontiers of 1810, with Gorizia

and Gradisca, and creation of an autonomous State of Trieste. She also demanded several Dalmatian Islands. Burián endeavoured to please the Italians, only stipulating that Trieste should not be wholly cut off from Austria. But his offer came too late. On April 25th, 1915, Italy concluded a treaty with England and France. On May 4th she declared her alliance with Austria-Hungary null and void.

Francis Joseph had not thought it possible that his Empire should have to sustain this third war upon its frontiers, although in autumn 1914 information had come from Rome which indicated clearly the likelihood of Italy's desertion. The Prince Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Piffl, had gathered in the Vatican that the King of Italy felt he would be obliged to leave the Triple Alliance, since otherwise revolution would break out in Italy. The King was said to have declared that he knew he was the first Prince of the House of Savoy to break his word, but that he could not act otherwise.

Italy's declaration of war was answered by an Imperial declaration dated May 23rd, 1915, in the language of pathos: 'The Kingdom of Italy has been guilty of a breach of faith towards its two Allies without parallel in history. After more than thirty years' alliance, Italy has left us in the hour of danger.'

Simultaneously with this diplomatic defeat, and the consequent isolation of the two Central Powers, a great change occurred on the Eastern front: a breach was effected in the encircling Russian army at Gorlice. This was the fruit of collaboration between the German eastern army and the Austrian army, the first great blow beneath which the military might of the Russian Empire tottered towards its fall. Successes in the field now secured two allies for the Central Powers: Turkey and Bulgaria. The German General Staff took over the direction of the south-eastern campaign; German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops annihilated Serbia. Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania were in the hands of the Central Powers from the capture of Lovćen onwards.

On November 28th, Emperor William visited Vienna. The year 1915 had opened gloomily, but it ended with a spectacle of military success on a scale such as Europe had not seen even in

Napoleon's time. The great change of the situation on the fronts roused a warlike spirit in Austria. The Supreme Army Command, which had hitherto minded its own business, took over the trusteeship of the Empire. The Staff had at first approved of Count Stürgkh because he kept Parliament closed and did not dream of giving the Peoples a chance to air their opinions. But this approval ceased when the attitude of the Czechs began to occasion anxiety. Ignorance of the essential problems of the Empire led to faulty decisions. A more severe régime, accompanied by arrests and police observation, failed to touch the points where danger really threatened. The vast majority of the Czechs still had no thought of a future outside Austria. Count Stürgkh was better informed than the Political Department of the Supreme Command. He was on intimate terms with Dr. Kramář, and knew that the Czech leader had plans which did not accord with those of Vienna and the Germans, but aimed only at reforms within Austria. There was one man only among the Czechs who had another programme—a lonely man, unknown to his own people, reputed an idealist out of touch with reality. One man regarded it as a moral duty to work for the destruction of the Hapsburg Empire. This solitary revolutionary was T. G. Masaryk, professor of the Czech University in Prague. In December 1914 he had quietly left Austria.

The career of this solitary man is one of the most remarkable dramas within the framework of the great drama of the World War. In 1915 the Central Powers had conquered half Europe. German troops were ranged in Asia, in the Near East, and on the Balkans, but no degree of mere force can create an idea. The diplomats, the political parties, the responsible brains, and the independent thinkers were all equally powerless to bridge the gulf between military success and political creation. It was the turn of a solitary man with nothing behind him but faith in an idea. The powerful enemies of the Hapsburg Empire did not dream, even if they won the completest victory, of dismembering the Empire that had lasted six hundred years. The British and the French thought of Francis Joseph's monarchy as an indispensable necessity. London and Paris treated projects for the revision of the map of Europe with great

reserve. It required the wonderful persistence of a single determined man to lead these Conservative thinkers away from what they termed reality to approval of what they had considered a Utopian project.

While this quiet and almost unsuspected foe was working against the Hapsburgs, new hopes were entertained in Vienna under the impression of the victories. A plan of immediate reforms was mooted in the House of Peers. The Central Executive was to be strengthened and to re-impose order in Bohemia. Goluchowski and Baernreither, both enemies of Stürgkh, recommended Count Silva Tarouca as the proper man to put through a programme of Austrian renovation. The Emperor acknowledged receipt of the memorial of the reforming Peers, but shelved it. The attack on Stürgkh failed ; he survived as a wall to shelter the Emperor from the troubles of Austria.

But on October 21st, 1916, in the dining-room of the 'Meisl und Schadn' in Vienna, three shots were fired which laid Count Stürgkh low. They were fired by Dr. Friedrich Adler, son of the leader of the Austrian Social Democrats, Viktor Adler. The echo of these shots was heard above the noise of battle. The Archduke Frederick, the Supreme Army Commander, and his party, demanded and expected an intensification of military authority within the Empire. Francis Joseph decided otherwise. The shots fired by Dr. Adler made the first fissure in the wall which hid the truth from the Emperor. Vienna and large areas of the Empire were hungry. Thanks to the blockade and to the inability of the Government to distribute the available stocks throughout the Empire, Austria became a land of two classes—the hungry and the well fed. The hungry numbered millions. Nothing was reported to the Emperor of their protestations, which could be heard even in the neighbourhood of the castle of Schönbrunn. But the recommendations of the Military Party that a general should head the Government remained unheard, for the Emperor now saw Austria in a new light. From the circle of his surviving counsellors he summoned the man who stood farthest to the left, a man who was popular with the hungry and disliked by the well fed : Ernest von Koerber. Since February 1915, Koerber had had charge

of the joint Ministry of Finance and of the Administration of Bosnia. Now, for the second time, he was to take on the highest office in the State. Sixteen years earlier the Emperor had entrusted him with the Government of an Austria which could have been renewed. In those sixteen years his energy and his power of making the most of that energy had not failed him ; yet he had changed, for he had lost faith. In the last years his doubts about Austria's future had changed to deep pessimism. When he arrived at Schönbrunn on October 26th, 1916, the Emperor was ill ; his old complaint, bronchitis, was afflicting him, and he was eighty-six years old. Owing to the Emperor's feverish condition, Koerber had to cut short his remarks.

## CHAPTER XXXIII

### DEATH

ON the evening of November 11th, 1916, an official announcement was made that the Emperor's health had been affected by symptoms of catarrh, but that his daily work would undergo no modifications in consequence. Francis Joseph carried on exactly as usual. On Monday, November 13th, he received the Archduke Charles, the heir to the throne, who thanked him for his appointment as general. On November 15th he received the Ministers as usual, and heard their reports ; and he received also General von Hazai and his granddaughter, Princess Elizabeth Windischgrätz. The next day Conrad spent an hour and a half with him. On Saturday, November 18th, he was coughing more, and ate hardly at all, but drank a glass of tokay and two small glasses of champagne. He worked the whole day, talked to his granddaughter, Countess Waldburg-Zeill, and for an hour heard the report of the Foreign Minister, Baron Burián. On Sunday, Koerber spent a long time with him. The next day the Emperor had a high fever ; none the less, he got up and read his documents, but was too tired to do any real work. At the request of the house physician, Dr. Kerzl, Professor Ortner, of the University of Vienna, was called to Schönbrunn. Ortner diagnosed inflammation in the Emperor's lung. Francis Joseph none the less stayed up and received the Supreme Commander in the Field, the Archduke Frederick. Countess Waldburg had not liked the look of things when she saw him on Saturday, and reported this to her mother, the Archduchess Marie Valerie. The Emperor's younger daughter arrived on Monday at Schönbrunn. The Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, who had planned to go away, remained close at hand at Reichenau. On Tuesday, November 21st, the Emperor arose as usual at half-past four, was handed five folders containing documents of State, and early in the morning received the Lord Chamberlain, Prince Montenuovo, the Chief Secretary, Schiessl, and Baron von Bolfras, Chief of the Emperor's Military Chancellery, who brought him



the reports from the General Staff, announcing the capture of Crajova, capital of western Wallachia, by the allied troops under Generals Falkenhayn and Arz. From the Foreign Office he received the information that von Jagow, the German Secretary of State, had retired, and would be succeeded by the Under-Secretary, Zimmermann.

At ten o'clock the Archduchess Marie Valerie was announced. The Emperor's daughter had not informed the doctors of the surprise she had for her father, namely, the news that the Pope had telegraphed his blessing to the Emperor, and had instructed the papal Nunciature at Vienna to impart the blessing. The Emperor asked for the Court Chaplain, Bishop Seydl, to be summoned, made his confession, received communion, and accepted the papal benediction. Shortly afterwards, Charles Francis Joseph and the Archduchess Zita appeared. At mid-day the Court Steward, Baron von Prileszky, had a soup made from four chickens placed before the Emperor, but the fever had risen and he had no appetite. The doctors tried to persuade the Emperor to go to bed. On the way from his writing-table to the adjoining bedroom he had to be supported. The Emperor got into bed, and said to his personal valet, Ketterl : 'Please call me at half-past three to-morrow. I am behind-hand with my work.' Shortly afterwards he fell asleep. The sleep, broken once or twice by coughing, lasted from half-past five till a quarter past eight in the evening. Professor Ortner, who remained with Baron von Prileszky and Ketterl in the valet's room, remarked that the sleep was so sound that the Emperor would perhaps survive the illness. But a violent attack of coughing awoke the Emperor. Ketterl tried to raise him in bed and make him drink some tea. But the coughing broke out afresh, and developed into a rattle. The invalid sank back on his pillows. At twenty past nine the Emperor Francis Joseph gave up the struggle for life.

Only Professor Ortner, Chief Steward Prileszky, and Ketterl were with him when he died. The Archduke Charles, the new Emperor, the Archduchess Marie Valerie, and the nearest relations were called. By Francis Joseph's request, Frau Schrott had not been asked to Schönbrunn during the illness, as he wished, he said, 'to spare her the sight of a sick man.' She

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was now informed, and the Emperor Charles led her to Francis Joseph's death bed.

The little gathering which knelt before the iron bed of the departed Emperor—the young Emperor Charles, the daughter, the lover, and the old servants of Francis Joseph—did not realize the full significance of the death to which they were so near. Francis Joseph had endeavoured to realize the words placed by Grillparzer, the poet of the dynasty, in the mouth of his ancestor :

My mortal self I have stripped off,  
And now am naught but Emperor, who cannot die.

Inheritor of the Hapsburg tradition that had endured six hundred years, son of the dynasty which for four hundred years had been a Great Power, the Emperor Francis Joseph upheld for sixty-eight years the ambition of his family. His reign opened at a moment when Europe was developing along lines which seemed to condemn the ambition of the dynasty to extinction. All the great events in his long life were decisions which went against Hapsburg.<sup>1</sup> In 1848 the Peoples declared their coming of age. In 1859 Italy shook off Hapsburg domination. In 1866 the German Nation took leave of Hapsburg. In 1871 the Imperial Power of Hapsburg suffered diminution in the hierarchy of Europe. In 1912 Hapsburg was thrust out of the Balkans.

Francis Joseph ruled in opposition to the tendencies of the times. Against the external forces which threatened his Empire he pitted the tradition of his House. Two generations knew him as the monarch and nothing more, the personal centre of the Empire, the 'Emperor who never died.' The war hastened the course of history and precipitately brought to a conclusion the inevitable process of the development of the Nations.

Hegel declares that the great moments and personages of history appear twice on the stage, and Karl Marx commented that the first time they appear as tragedy and the second time as farce. In the two years which began with Francis Joseph's

<sup>1</sup> The dynasty, in German, goes by this single name, without any addition of the word 'House' or 'Family.'—*Translator*.



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